A series of assumptions: a Britwank on a budget?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Probably not feasible because it would be too difficult to co-ordinate. However, here goes...

Could RAF aircraft operating in the vicinity of the Falklands (and the task force) be refuelled by the Buccaneer tankers operating from Prince of Wales? AFAIK the equipment was compatible.

Another problem would be that a Buccaneer tanker carried considerably less fuel than a Victor. So I think that it would only be attempted in emergencies. E.g. an aircraft used more fuel than expected or failed to rendezvous with a Victor tanker.

 

[Riain]

On the morning of 15 May the carrier Queen Elizabeth II announced in arrival in emphatic fashion. After flying off a pair of Phantoms and a Buccaneer(1) which had done 7 hour ferry flights from Ascension to be taken the rest of the way she launched an alpha strike of 14 Buccaneers and a pair of Phantoms for escort. These arrived over Pebble Island armed with AS30 missiles, Paveway Laser guided bombs, BLU755s and 1,000lb with various fusing and proceeded to demolish everything in sight. Unlike Port Stanley and Goose Green there were no AA cannon, only .50cal Browning M2 Heavy Machine-guns so the Buccaneers were able to take their time and thoroughly destroy all 6 Pucara, 4 Turbo Mentor and the Shorts Skyvan, the mobile radar, fuel dump and ordnance dump.(2)

The arrival of the second carrier transformed the air campaign, allowing it to go on the offensive in a way unlike it had been for the past fortnight. PoW’s 809sqn Buccaneers was aware of the danger areas around the islands, were the various radars, SAMs and most dangerous AA batteries were and with 801 sqn now on the scene set to work methodically attacking them. The helicopters were also sought out and by the end of the day a CH47 and Puma had been destroyed near Mount Kent.(3) Port Stanley airfield was attacked, this time with guided weapons from outside the Roland SAM’s engagement range. These guided weapons were able to target individual aircraft dispersed around the airfield, often within crude protective revetments. Several Pucaras, Turbo Mentors another Skyvan(4) and a Macchi were destroyed on the ground. Fortunately the FAA the Mirage III that had landed on 1 May had been repaired and flown out two nights previously.

Further afield the events were escalating for the British. The HMS Hermes had arrived in South Georgia with 40 Commando RM, uniting all of the reinforced 3 Commando Brigade apart from 2 Para which was training in the north of Scotland.(5) While they awaited Intrepid’s arrival the troops undertook helicopter drills, landing craft drills and other training in South Georgia’s forbidding terrain and climate.(6) 15 May was also when the Belfast made it’s first mission into the Falklands area of operations. The slow Belfast struggled to conduct inflight refueling with the VC10, however a procedure was developed where these aircraft could go into a shallow descent with the VC10 making maximum use of the high lift devices which gave it such superlative hot and high performance. These descents would start at 20,000’ and go down to 5,000’ as the Belfast took on the huge amounts of fuel the VC10 could offload at long range.(7)

1. IOTL the first reinforcement of aircraft was 8 Sea Harriers and 6 GR3s in Atlantic Conveyor on about 19 May
2. IOTL this raid was undertaken by the SAS backed by naval guns
3. IOTL these were destroyed on 21 May
4. IOTL this Skyvan had been damaged beyond repair by NGS on 3 May
5. IOTL 2 Para was chopped to 3 Cdo Bde on 15 Apr and traveled south on MV Norland, STUFT on 17 Apr
6. IOTL the landing force stayed in tropical Ascension until 7 May and made the assault directly from there
7. IOTL this was the procedure used by Victor and C130, the Victor carried about half the fuel of the VC10

 

[Riain]

Probably not feasible because it would be too difficult to co-ordinate. However, here goes...

Could RAF aircraft operating in the vicinity of the Falklands (and the task force) be refuelled by the Buccaneer tankers operating from Prince of Wales? AFAIK the equipment was compatible.

Another problem would be that a Buccaneer tanker carried considerably less fuel than a Victor. So I think that it would only be attempted in emergencies. E.g. an aircraft used more fuel than expected or failed to rendezvous with a Victor tanker.

The issue would be that the big British aircraft used the Mk17 HDU and small aircraft the Mk20, the difference being the Mk17 was twice the size flow rate of the Mk20. Since the Hercs and Nimrods used ex V Bomber probes I suspect they'd be too big to refuel from the Mk20 that the Buccaneers would have.

 

[Riain]

It only took the Argentinians a single day of punishment to realise their days of fighting back with shell games and AA traps were over. The weight of bombing that two big Buccaneer squadrons bought to bear was too much to handle, now their mission was to conserve their assets for when the landings actually occurred. Their became exports in camouflage and field fortification, as failure to do so meant death by naval guns or bombs and rockets as the Buccaneers methodically bombed whatever they could located. While on the mainland the FAA and ARA forces prepared for the inevitable invasion.

A few days later further afield in Chile a strange convergence of events took place that even today aren’t properly explained. A TSR2 Vengeance was seen flying around several air bases in Chile, in a mixture of Chilean and RAF markings, a story being put about that the Chileans were interested in buying some used models to replace their Canberras(1). Further confusion reigned when an RN Sea King was found crashed and destroyed by it’s crew in southern Chile near the Argentine border close to Rio Grande air base and some 400 miles from British ships operating around the Falklands. Some speculated that the Acme missions, the Vengeance and the crashed Sea king were all related, part of some shady operation, yet nothing was revealed and no operation became obvious.

1. IOTL it was RAF Canberra PR9s in Chilean markings

 

[Rajveer Naha]

I really like this timeline, apart from the premise I greatly appreciate the number of lesser facts that I learnt for instance the refuelling of the Belfasts, the early obsession with VTOL aircraft. Just sad that P.1121 went nowhere. Dit it die the same way as OTL?

 

[Riain]

I really like this timeline, apart from the premise I greatly appreciate the number of lesser facts that I learnt for instance the refuelling of the Belfasts, the early obsession with VTOL aircraft. Just sad that P.1121 went nowhere. Dit it die the same way as OTL?

Thanks, I've learned so much writing it. Just yesterday I learned that in the 10 days before Black Buck 1 hit the runway the Argentines undertook 205 transport flights into Port Stanley, that's 20 flights a day into that tiny 4,100 foot runway with airliners like 737s! While this airlift was going on the FAA Boeing 707 located the British Fleet and the operation to retake South Georgia occurred; nothing happens in a vacuum.

The P.1121 died in a similar way as OTL, the difference being ITTL the roles it was to undertake were to be done by the Lightning fighter-bomber for 10-15 years rather than being done by the Lightning and Hunter for 5-10 years before being replaced by missiles.

 

[Riain]

On May 19 Intrepid arrived at South Georgia and began loading 40 Cdo RM, with 42 Cdo to undertake the helicopter assault from Hermes,(1) 45 Cdo landing from Fearless and 3 Para landing from Canberra.(2) Meanwhile 2 Para boarded chartered BA VC10 Super 200s from RAF Kinloss in Scotland for their long flight south to Ascension Island(3) where Belfasts and VC10 tankers awaited them. After two days loading and reorganisation the Amphibious Task Group headed by Hermes, Fearless and Intrepid each carrying a RM Commando, backed by 6 LSL, the SS Canberra carrying 3 Para, RFA Fort Austin, MV Europic Ferry and MV Elk. These were escorted by the Sea Slug DLG Glamorgan which carried the TG Commander and liberator of South Georgia Admiral Sandy Woodward, Antrim, Type 21 Frigates Ardent, Antelope and Argonaught and the older Frigates Plymouth and Yarmouth.(4)

As the Amphibious Task Group closed in on the Falklands 4 Belfasts and 7 VC10 tankers and a Nimrod for navigation assistance took to the air from Ascension Island. Each Belfast was loaded with a 100 strong ‘battle group’ from 2 Para, a mixture of infantry, heavy weapons and HQ elements so that if any of the aircraft failed to make it to the Islands the remainder would be a balanced force. The VC10s were all able to extend and retract their big Mk17 HDUs and by now each of the Belfasts had crew who had flown supply drop missions previously, so the 3 reserve VC10s returned to take their part in the next act of this highly choreographed play. As this air armada approached the Bingo point for refueling the ‘go’ order came through, the Belfasts took on the 50,000lb(5) and more of fuel they needed to get to the islands and headed south while the VC10s and Nimrod turned for Ascension.

It was by mere chance that the same night an FAA Hercules, hugging the ground over West Falkland and Lafonia discharged perhaps the most important cargo of the entire war. Following the operations on May 1st, Argentine forces thought a ground-launched Exocet missile would deter the Royal Navy from attacking Port Stanley. Commander Julio Perez and two civilians designed and built an improvised firing device that used a telephone switchboard to allow an Exocet missile to be fired from a wheeled launcher. The canisters containing the missiles were removed from a couple of corvettes and mounted on trailers, with the firing apparatus and 12 Exocet missiles were flown in on the night of 22/23 May.(6)

1. IOTL it was assumed early that Hermes would be used for helicopter assault but this was denied
2. IOTL it was planned to land 2 RM Cdo and 3 Para directly from Canberra, but this was countermanded due to the risk of so many troops on a single large target. 2 Battalion/Commando then transferred by helicopter and jackstay to Fearless and Intrepid in the open ocean a few hundred miles from the Falklands on 19 or 20 May
3. IOTL 2 Para was added to 3 Cdo Bde on 15 Apr and travelled south in MV Norland STUFT 17 Apr
4. IOTL the escort was HMS Antrim, HMS Coventry, HMS Broadsword, HMS Brilliant, HMS Ardent, HMS Antelope, HMS Argonaut, HMS Plymouth and HMS Yarmouth
5. IOTL Hercules took on 35-40,000lbs of fuel in a single tanking and 46,000lb in a two tanking mission.
6. IOTL the first attempt to fly the trailers and 8 missiles in on 24 May was unsuccessful due to British activity, they were flown in later and first used on 28 May, another 4 missiles were flown in on 5 Jun

 

[Spencersj345.346]

Why do I get the feeling that said Exocets are mearly going to be pavewayed into the ground

 

[Riain]

Why do I get the feeling that said Exocets are mearly going to be pavewayed into the ground

Like the radars and Rolands the Exocet launcher was held in town during the day. Hunting mobile land targets at night is a tough job in the 80s and certainly TTL RN isn't set up for it even if the RAF is.

Something that worried the land forces IOTL was the 155mm howizters 2 were flown in on 15 May and 4 were captured by the British at the end of the war, indeed the last Hercules mission on the night before surrender was carrying 155mm ammunition. A range of 20km is a long way in the Falklands. ITTL some 16 of these guns were bought in, although some have been destroyed by bombing. Also ITTL the MRLS was unloaded from the ship that IOTL left harbour after Black Buck 1. There will be a lot for the Buccaneers to worry about.

 

[McPherson]

Does the ARA figure out the Siemens fire control system on the San Luis which the Germans bungled?

On the other hand, the Argentinians were well aware of the limits of Sea Harrier performance. They knew that the two irreplaceable British carriers were as far to the east as they could get – and the limits of Sea Harrier endurance made it fairly clear where that was. The sole effective Argentinian submarine had no difficulty finding the ships. In NATO exercises, diesel submarines found carriers only when they were constrained to stay in roughly one place, an artificial restriction used to ensure that diesel submarine commanders would have the opportunity to make attacks. In the Falklands, the two British carriers were in exactly that situation, and the Argentinian Type 209 submarine San Luis attacked HMS Hermes.

More...

The attack should have succeeded. British sonar range was limited, and it turned out that the protected area around the carrier was far too small. Hermes was saved by a fluke: part of the torpedo fire control system on board the Argentinian submarine had been misinstalled. On the other hand, it can be argued that, had the Argentinian commander fired from a shorter (more dangerous) range, he would have succeeded despite the fire control problem.

and lastly...

Perhaps the most interesting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) lesson was an old one: Any time it seems that a submarine is present, there will be many false alarms. Once the British knew that an Argentinian submarine was at sea, they clearly became nervous. Before the war, there were many attempts to estimate wartime weapon expenditure rates. As torpedoes became more expensive, estimates trended lower and lower, to justify shorter production runs and smaller capacities per ship.

WWII Lessons forgotten...

The outstanding ASW lesson of the war was that such estimates were fantasies. Faced with diesel-electric submarines, the British relied entirely on active sonar, because a diesel-electric submarine on batteries has little or no distinctive acoustic signature. One consequence was that they could not distinguish whales from submarines. Not only will a whale run at roughly submarine speed, but it will turn to evade a loud noise in much the way a submarine might try to evade.

The Argentinian submarine did not have things entirely its own way; it was cornered and bottomed. The British (and others in NATO, including the United States) had no weapon that could detect and attack a submarine sitting on the bottom. The alliance depended almost entirely on homing torpedoes, which distinguish their targets by the Doppler due to their motion over the sea bottom. It is not at all clear that this problem has been solved; the best that NATO seemed to do in the years after the Falklands was to develop a very cheap, lightweight weapon. The idea was that if the weapon were dropped on a bottomed submarine, the submarine’s commander would probably try to run, creating the conditions needed by a homing torpedo.

Just as NATO navies scoffed at Russian rocket-boosted depth charges, not understanding what the Russians were doing... hunh? Lesson learned? NEVER throw away a lesson learned. Depth charges can kill a bottomed immobile sub. Also, one never has enough hunting platforms or prosecutors.

As for San Carlos Water? Lacking a true CAP capability, even with this wank... barrage balloons, AAA GUNS and cheap balloon decoys are a thing...

 

[Mike D]

Like the radars and Rolands the Exocet launcher was held in town during the day. Hunting mobile land targets at night is a tough job in the 80s and certainly TTL RN isn't set up for it even if the RAF is.

Sounds like the ideal job for SF teams to set up an OP overlooking the town and either guiding aircraft in at night or malleting the missiles themselves.

 

[Riain]

Does the ARA figure out the Siemens fire control system on the San Luis which the Germans bungled?


More...

and lastly...


WWII Lessons forgotten...


Just as NATO navies scoffed at Russian rocket-boosted depth charges, not understanding what the Russians were doing... hunh? Lesson learned? NEVER throw away a lesson learned. Depth charges can kill a bottomed immobile sub. Also, one never has enough hunting platforms or prosecutors.

As for San Carlos Water? Lacking a true CAP capability, even with this wank... barrage balloons, AAA GUNS and cheap balloon decoys are a thing...

The San Luis has gone home just like OTL, after failing twice when attacking Frigates.

As for CAP, there are 28 Phantoms and 8 Buccaneer tankers to maintain 3 CAP stations for about 10-12 hours a day. With a tanking the Phantom should be able to maintain a 3 hour mission. I don't know where I'll put them, they certainly have more options than the Harriers with less than half that flight time, but putting them too far out means no radar control.

That said the butterflies of facing a stronger force have kicked in for the Argentines as well, they will perform better than OTL as well.

 

[Rickshaw]

As for San Carlos Water? Lacking a true CAP capability, even with this wank... barrage balloons, AAA GUNS and cheap balloon decoys are a thing...

And pray tell, where are the British going to find such things in 1982? There was IIRC one company manufacturing self-inflating barrage balloon for use against low level attacking aircraft. They sold several to Iraq. They didn't do much for them. The British Army had abandoned AA Guns when they retired their last 40mm Bofors L/70 guns in 1975.

 

[McPherson]

And pray tell, where are the British going to find such things in 1982? There was IIRC one company manufacturing self-inflating barrage balloon for use against low level attacking aircraft. They sold several to Iraq. They didn't do much for them. The British Army had abandoned AA Guns when they retired their last 40mm Bofors L/70 guns in 1975.

Barrage balloons left over from WWII were stored in a British RAF warehouse. Forgotten.

AAA guns? Borrow or beg from NATO. (Italy...)

Decoy balloons? Make them or the USN has them.

Depth charges? Buy them from Italy or ask the Americans for bombs.

All of which one can lesson learn here...

 

[Riain]

Sounds like the ideal job for SF teams to set up an OP overlooking the town and either guiding aircraft in at night or malleting the missiles themselves.

Maybe, but they didn't get that close until late in the war. The most likely scenario is that they become more and more constrained and basically become irrelevant and get captured intact

 

[Riain]

I'd point out that even wanks have their limits, as great as the Phantom is compared to the Sea Harrier it isn't a magic wand and there were some easy-ish thing the FAA could have done that would overwhelm even the mighty Phantom. Especially when a single plane can fly once a day for 3 hours, the day is 10 hours long and there are 28 Phantoms which fly in pairs.

14 pairs @ 3 hours a pair (tanked) is 42 pair-hours, covering 10 hours in daylight is 2 pairs of Phantoms in the air all day during daylight. From the carriers to San Carlos airspace and back takes 1 hour giving 2 hours on station, so to provide 10 hours of coverage over San Carlos requires 15 pair-hours at an absolute minimum. In contrast a CAP over the carriers only takes like 15 minutes of the 3 hour flight time up and down which is like 11 pair-hours.

This leaves about 15 pair-hours of tanked Phantom flight time for all contingencies, or to put it another way 5 launches over 2 carriers in an entire day to replace CAPS that have burned through their fuel in combat or to chase some special target or whatever.

What this means is that when the Daggers organise with the A4s on their base to arrive over San Carlos at the same time, especially if they organise that some A4s are more lightly loaded so don't need tanking (for example, I have something way cooler in mind) then the 2 Phantoms guaranteed to be overhead are faced with 12-16 aircraft within 10 minutes while each carrying 4 onboard kills (1 sparrow out of 4 and 3 SRAAM out of 4). Even if everything goes awesome 4-8 aircraft will not be shot down, they can't be.

I can't count, so please check my maths, but I think I'm pretty close.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Does the ARA figure out the Siemens fire control system on the San Luis which the Germans bungled?


More...

and lastly...


WWII Lessons forgotten...


Just as NATO navies scoffed at Russian rocket-boosted depth charges, not understanding what the Russians were doing... hunh? Lesson learned? NEVER throw away a lesson learned. Depth charges can kill a bottomed immobile sub. Also, one never has enough hunting platforms or prosecutors.

As for San Carlos Water? Lacking a true CAP capability, even with this wank... barrage balloons, AAA GUNS and cheap balloon decoys are a thing...

She never attacked Hermes - its pure fiction - like when the air force sunk the Invincible

She might have attacked some pickets but it is now thought that she engaged them from twice the maximum range of her torpedoes which failed anyway.

The boat was in very poor condition with numerous faults and the Argentines proved to be very poor submarine operators.

With regards to barrage balloons of which there were 80 maintained in a warehouse in the UK (forgotten about in the hurry) there was also smoke generators which could have filled san Carlos waters with a heavy fog during the landings (like those used by the Germans to hide Tirpitz and when the British crossed the Rhine) which would have, combined with the Barrage balloons, made low level attacks far more dangerous than they already where - which was already pretty dangerous.

 

[McPherson]

She never attacked Hermes - its pure fiction - like when the air force sunk the Invincible

Friedman has been known to make factual errors. This is from Quora...

Vincent Branley
, former Military Historian
Answered October 30 · Author has 169 answers and 1.3M answer views

Anniversary of the Baptism of Fire of the Submarine (S-32) ARA San Luis

*Video:


Configuration-Subtitles-Automatically Translate-English
May 1, 1982, dawn, Patrol Area, codenamed "Maria" in the South Atlantic. On board the "San Luis" the sonarists notice hydrophonic rumors of warships and the commander orders to cover combat positions. At 10:15 am the submarine attacks by firing an SST-4 torpedo on a target classified as a destroyer. Three or four minutes later the submarine prematurely loses contact with the torpedo, due to a cable cut, and no explosion is heard. Having revealed its position, the “San Luis” began to endure almost a day's harassment by two ships and three helicopters.

Commander ARA San Luis Captain Azcueta
“We were shooting false targets (bubblers, tubular shaped) that produce noise and allow the submarine to escape towards another course. At one point we were shooting so many in a row that the pressure between launching and launching was not even compensated ”, says Captain Jorge Fernando Dacharry, then a frigate lieutenant and Chief of Electricity of the“ San Luis ”.
During the attack, a British helicopter launched an antisubmarine torpedo, which could be avoided thanks to evasive maneuvers. "When they said 'torpedo in the water' we felt despair ... adrenaline ... it passed us near, above, we heard it as if it were the engine of a motorcycle, but under water", he evokes.
He remembers those hours, as if thirty years had not passed, the uncertainty suffered by not seeing what is happening around him, outside the ship. It can be a friend, an enemy, a noise of nature ... "When we were subjected to the 24-hour attack, depth bombs were permanently falling and we did not know when it was our turn ... That produces a very important psychic wear."
After constant harassment the submarine maneuvered towards the Falkland coast where it found a stony bottom and was deposited. “We withstand the constant attack of depth bombs for more than 12 hours. They threw us in every course we set, so the commander ordered to go to the bottom and I was in defeat, because I was also the Chief of Navigation. I asked how deep it was and they told me 70 meters, we were at 6 knots. I put the bow to 'land' and instead of 70 meters we were at 50 ... The groove is still in the Malvinas! ”, He laughs, while the other veterans present are infected.
“The worst thing in a submarine is that you can't see the outside when you're immersed. The war passes above, on the sides, below. An aviator shoots a missile and in a matter of seconds it is away from there. A Marine is on the ground and sees the development of events, how the enemy is approaching, where his own forces are. We, underwater, must be, above all, stealth and patient ”, details Captain Dacharry, with a firm voice based on experience.

ARA San Luis shortly after arriving at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, after its war patrol.
Behind, the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo can be seen.

More>

Dacharry highlights the essentials. “What allowed us to return alive was not only the technical preparation to board a 40-day patrol in which we were able to remain in the area of operations, but the human group and the physical and mental preparation that the Submarine School provided us. and the Navy. ""What helped us was the knowledge of the environment, of our coastline, in terms of water temperature, soil composition, salinity, water, coasts, bottom ... That allowed us to have added value", he evaluates as to the strategies used throughout the conflict.On May 1, for enduring 24 hours of harassment, the "San Luis" had his baptism of fire. In total it was a 40-day campaign (from April 12 to May 29) fulfilling a dissuasive mission in which it carried out three attacks on the enemy, despite having operated with only three of its four diesel engines and having had the computer weapon system out of service.

From the Daily Mail.

A British warship fired on and killed three whales during the Falklands War after mistaking them for enemy submarines.

The startling revelation is contained within new eyewitness accounts of the tense days aboard anti-submarine frigate HMS Brilliant during the 1982 conflict in the southern seas.

Radar on the Royal Navy ship was unable to distinguish between attacking 'Wolf Packs' of subs and a pod of whales.

In one instance, two of the mammals were killed by torpedoes and the third was attacked by one of the ship’s helicopters.

The British did not do well going the other way.

From accounts.... (Argentine Fight for the Falklands, Martin Middlebrook pp 132)

Argentine Fight for the Falklands - Google Books

It appears that the ARA San Luis fired an SST4 torpedo at an offset interval of ~5,000 meters on a sound bearing at a ship later identified as the HMS Arrow. The other torpedo never enabled and was a tube-baby. Fault was traced to the fire control system. No cause for the fail to function wire-guided swimmer has ever been definitively established. The Germans recalled their defective fish, they sold to customers, and claimed to have fixed the "problem".

Point is, despite the Argentine claim that the fish went stupid after the wire was cut; the wire was supposed to be cut once a signal from the target was acquired and the torpedo could give independent signal chase, once the target's signal was detected. HMS Arrow was allegedly towing a decoy and the torpedo was alleged to have chased that decoy and thus been seduced off the ship.

British version of events.

On May 1, the San Luis’s passive sonar detected the HMS Brilliant and Yarmouth, both specialized antisubmarine frigates. Azcueta launched an SST-4 torpedo at a range of nine kilometers—but shortly after launch, the guidance wires on the torpedo cut out. Azcueta quickly dove his sub into hiding on the seabed. The Brilliant detected the attack, and the two frigates and their helicopters went into a frenzied pursuit of potential sonar contacts. Launching thirty depth charges and numerous torpedoes, the British vessels successfully blew up several whales for their efforts.

One cannot split the baby on this one. The determinant is the sound conditions at the north end of the Falklands strait that close in to the coastal inlet mouth. It HAD to be closer than nine kilometers to HMS Arrow when the submarine launched. The frigate was toddling along until she heard the launch transient. The bottom is hard and the convergent zones (short interval due to shallow bottom bounce) echo returns on the shelf is sharp. the wire cut early, so that fish picked up something.

She might have attacked some pickets but it is now thought that she engaged them from twice the maximum range of her torpedoes which failed anyway.

Here.

Ship Class Used On	Surface ships and Submarines
Date Of Design	1975
Date In Service	1980
Weight	3,116 lbs. (1,414 kg)
Overall Length	239 in. (6.080 m)
Explosive Charge	573 lbs. (260 kg)
Range / Speed	12,000 yards (11,000 m) / 35 knots 22,000 yards (20,000 m) / 28 knots 40,000 yards (37,000 m) / 23 knots
Power	Silver-zinc battery

Wire-guided anti-ship torpedo. Has passive homing capability. When launched by surface ships, these torpedoes are fired back over the stern with the tail facing forward.

Cryhavoc wrote further:

The boat was in very poor condition with numerous faults and the Argentines proved to be very poor submarine operators.

One diesel engine was out; she was barnacled, several key senior officers were in Germany getting refresher training and the Germans who built her, screwed up the fire control system, so let us cut that crew some little slack? They came home alive. That actually means they were well-trained. And who knows? If the torpedoes selected had been...Mark 37s?

Ship Class Used On	ASW vessels
Date Of Design	about 1956
Date In Service	Mod 0: 1957 Mod 1: 1960 Mod 2: 1967 Mod 3: 1967
Weight	Mods 0 and 3: 1,430 lbs. (649 kg) Mods 1 and 2: 1,690 lbs. ( kg)
Overall Length	Mods 0 and 3: 11 ft 3 in (3.429 m) Mods 1 and 2: 13 ft 5 in (4.089 m)
Explosive Charge	All Mods: 330 lbs. (150 kg) HBX
Range / Speed	Mark 37: 10,000 yards (9,140 m) / 26 knots 23,500 yards (21,490 m) / 17 knots Mark NT37: 15,000 yards (16,400 m) / 36 knots
Power	Mark 37: Electric-Battery NT37: Otto fuel engine
Guidance	Mods 0 and 3: Active and passive acoustic Mods 1 and 2: Wire guided

The NEZ would have been about 3,000 meters or less and the onboard drive through logic should have ignored seduction. Would have been a very dangerous effort since the setup requires periscope work and basic trig a la WWII and then free swim the fish out the tube to acquisition ~1000 meter signal range to the target in the anti-ship role, but even so, the torpedo works. Hard to hear the fish inbound. Probably would cost the ARA San Luis her life, though. That close, British active sonars should ping her, even in those crappy acoustic conditions

With regards to barrage balloons of which there were 80 maintained in a warehouse in the UK (forgotten about in the hurry) there was also smoke generators which could have filled san Carlos waters with a heavy fog during the landings (like those used by the Germans to hide Tirpitz and when the British crossed the Rhine) which would have, combined with the Barrage balloons, made low level attacks far more dangerous than they already where - which was already pretty dangerous.

Lessons learned, but not applied.

Thing is.. Items like WINDOW (chaffe launchers) and decoy balloons (heat and radar decoys), was also ignored. It is the simple passive things which could defeat EXOCET, not the fancy SAM missiles and radars. Atlantic Conveyor need not have died.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'd point out that even wanks have their limits, as great as the Phantom is compared to the Sea Harrier it isn't a magic wand and there were some easy-ish thing the FAA could have done that would overwhelm even the mighty Phantom. Especially when a single plane can fly once a day for 3 hours, the day is 10 hours long and there are 28 Phantoms which fly in pairs.

14 pairs @ 3 hours a pair (tanked) is 42 pair-hours, covering 10 hours in daylight is 2 pairs of Phantoms in the air all day during daylight. From the carriers to San Carlos airspace and back takes 1 hour giving 2 hours on station, so to provide 10 hours of coverage over San Carlos requires 15 pair-hours at an absolute minimum. In contrast a CAP over the carriers only takes like 15 minutes of the 3 hour flight time up and down which is like 11 pair-hours.

This leaves about 15 pair-hours of tanked Phantom flight time for all contingencies, or to put it another way 5 launches over 2 carriers in an entire day to replace CAPS that have burned through their fuel in combat or to chase some special target or whatever.

What this means is that when the Daggers organise with the A4s on their base to arrive over San Carlos at the same time, especially if they organise that some A4s are more lightly loaded so don't need tanking (for example, I have something way cooler in mind) then the 2 Phantoms guaranteed to be overhead are faced with 12-16 aircraft within 10 minutes while each carrying 4 onboard kills (1 sparrow out of 4 and 3 SRAAM out of 4). Even if everything goes awesome 4-8 aircraft will not be shot down, they can't be.

I can't count, so please check my maths, but I think I'm pretty close.

IIRC Eagle's 12 Phantoms armed with four Skyflash each butchered the Argentines in @flasheart's thread.

HMS EAGLE in the Falklands

Story only thread: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/hms-eagle-in-the-falklands-story-only.506141/ 31st March 1982 Whitehall Pausing only to make a quick phone call to get a quick update on the disposition and readiness of his fleet and having found the defence secretary not in...

www.alternatehistory.com

However, in this thread the RAF has Blue Jay and the small number of FAA Phantoms doesn't justify the development of Skyflash.

The RAF has the Blue Jay, which is more or less the TTL analogue of Skyflash development, it's not worth developing a new missile for a fleet that started out at 55 aircraft.

Could the FAA's Phantoms have been modified to fire Blue Jay?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Friedman has been known to make factual errors. This is from Quora...

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From the Daily Mail.


The British did not do well going the other way.

From accounts.... (Argentine Fight for the Falklands, Martin Middlebrook pp 132)

Argentine Fight for the Falklands - Google Books

It appears that the ARA San Luis fired an SST4 torpedo at an offset interval of ~5,000 meters on a sound bearing at a ship later identified as the HMS Arrow. The other torpedo never enabled and was a tube-baby. Fault was traced to the fire control system. No cause for the fail to function wire-guided swimmer has ever been definitively established. The Germans recalled their defective fish, they sold to customers, and claimed to have fixed the "problem".

Point is, despite the Argentine claim that the fish went stupid after the wire was cut; the wire was supposed to be cut once a signal from the target was acquired and the torpedo could give independent signal chase, once the target's signal was detected. HMS Arrow was allegedly towing a decoy and the torpedo was alleged to have chased that decoy and thus been seduced off the ship.

British version of events.


One cannot split the baby on this one. The determinant is the sound conditions at the north end of the Falklands strait that close in to the coastal inlet mouth. It HAD to be closer than nine kilometers to HMS Arrow when the submarine launched. The frigate was toddling along until she heard the launch transient. The bottom is hard and the convergent zones (short interval due to shallow bottom bounce) echo returns on the shelf is sharp. the wire cut early, so that fish picked up something.

Here.






One diesel engine was out; she was barnacled, several key senior officers were in Germany getting refresher training and the Germans who built her, screwed up the fire control system, so let us cut that crew some little slack? They came home alive. That actually means they were well-trained. And who knows? If the torpedoes selected had been...Mark 37s?



The NEZ would have been about 3,000 meters or less and the onboard drive through logic should have ignored seduction. Would have been a very dangerous effort since the setup requires periscope work and basic trig a la WWII and then free swim the fish out the tube to acquisition ~1000 meter signal range to the target in the anti-ship role, but even so, the torpedo works. Hard to hear the fish inbound. Probably would cost the ARA San Luis her life, though. That close, British active sonars should ping her, even in those crappy acoustic conditions


Lessons learned, but not applied.

Thing is.. Items like WINDOW (chaffe launchers) and decoy balloons (heat and radar decoys), was also ignored. It is the simple passive things which could defeat EXOCET, not the fancy SAM missiles and radars. Atlantic Conveyor need not have died.

Oh god no - the on going joke every time the Marines heard of another Submarine threat was that the RN was off to kill another whale

The problems with hunting stuff around the very shallow seas around the Falkland's was that it is littered with hundreds of wrecks and an abundance of biologicals - I would mention that so is the North Sea to a certain degree and it certainly focused minds in the RN and NATO in general

But the Argentine Submarine Arm was a far bigger threat in the minds of the RN than it actually proved in reality.

While the officers and crew might were undoubtedly of the right stuff and all that (they were submariners!) they were unable to keep their boat working and for some systems did not have the know how to maintain and use it effectively.

How much of that is down to deficiencies in the sub and weapon systems I could not say.

But the effect is the same.

I have heard that the Atlantic Conveyor was the Chaff - that she was positioned 'up threat' of the Carriers as a decoy and in that respect worked perfectly

Loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, the Helicopters (3 Chinook and some Wessex troops carriers) as well as the supplies on baord which IIRC included lots of metal runway materials was a loss to teh task force but damage to a carrier would have been more keenly felt and possibly decisive.

But I agree some form of chaff and ECM should have been made available for the auxiliary STUFT ships - but back then that required money and back in the 70s......well there was not any. Certainly not for that sort of thing.

Again within years of the Falkland's NATO warships and Auxiliary's would be festooned with CIWS, ECM and Chaff launchers

Lessons 'relearned' again...by the survivors.