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Part #5: Braving the Ballot Box
Part #5: Braving the Ballot Box
“Tell Stephens that Brutus, Judas, and I will set a spot at our table for him.”
“I never wanted any part of this…”
“Let me get this all written down…
On this side, we’ll put the Democrats, and on this side, the Republicans. They can be put into two factions each. The Copperheads are up here, and the War Democrats are down here. The Radicals are up here, and the Moderate Republicans are down here.”
“Now my placement is intentional. Anyone know why?”
“‘Sa way t’ ‘arties formed later, innit?”
“Can I get that answers from someone willing to enunciate with coherence? Oliver.”
“He said, ‘It’s the way the parties formed later, isn’t it?’”[1]
“‘Ucking prick…”
“Thank you, Oliver. That is correct. But we’ll get back to that in a second. Each faction had it’s own ideal candidate for the election. The Copperheads had good old Pendleton, who you should know well enough. Strengths? A nationally known name, experience in the executive branch, evaded all blame for any of McClellan’s scandals. Weaknesses? Well… He’s Pendleton. Weak-willed but stubborn, proud but cowardly.[2]
The War Democrats would put up Andrew Johnson, who was at this time widely known as the stubborn Tennessee Senator who had bravely gone to battle against the South. Strengths? A keen debater, respected for his service and ideals. Weaknesses? A southerner, too aggressive in his rhetoric against his opponents.[3] People wanted someone who could unite, not divide.
On the other side of the aisle we have Thaddeus Stephens for the Radical Republicans. Strengths? Dedicated to his values, skilled statesman. Weaknesses? He was too close to the O’Hara Conspiracy, having little national goodwill for him or his allies.
And then we have the Moderate Republicans, who put forward Schuyler Colfax. Strengths? One of the founders of the Republican Party, a staunch abolitionist, but a friendly face to everyone. And to boot a story had circulated during the demonization of John C. Frémont about Colfax giving Frémont and other generals sound tactical advice that had been ignored. That made Schuyler here sound like a guy who know how to lead and who had been at odds with the O’Hara Conspirators for years. Weaknesses? Well the biggest is that despite being so friendly that people called him ‘Smiler’, he didn’t have a presence, couldn’t command a room, and debates between him and Stephens usually went nowhere, even though Colfax had become less radical and more in-line with the more popular tenets of his party. And after a debate between him and Johnson, Colfax was described by a newspaper as ‘emasculated.’”
“Oof…”
“Oof is right. Now after a while, Thaddeus Stephens backed off. He and Colfax had an understanding, because for a lot of years Colfax was seen as a Radical. Johnson, of course, refused to bow out of the race against Pendleton. You might think at first that this would split the Democrat vote. But you’d be wrong. The Democrats were affiliated with the South, but McClellan had been one. The Republicans were the party of Lincoln and Unionism, but not only had they lost the war, but a prominent member had just been executed for being involved in a conspiracy that murdered the president.[4]
There was no faith in party. People looked for candidates they could agree with, looked for people who could entice their votes. Colfax couldn’t draw in enough people back after the O’Hara Conspiracy, and Johnson’s aggression spooked recently defecting Republicans. And so the winner was…”
“It must be understood just how divided the nation was. Looking at the electoral map, it is easy to just dismiss Pendleton’s victory as any kind of landslide. By the map, Johnson only won 3 states of the 25 states, and yet he garnered over a quarter of the popular vote.[5] It was a close race in a number of regions, and not just between both Democratic candidates, but between all three men. As scandalous and disastrous as appointing Wade and Frémont to the executive branch had been, only for Frémont to be proven a conspirator and effective murderer, Colfax represented the face of the Republicans. A founder of the party, likeable and honest, and having disavowed his peers.
This is very important when reviewing the Pendleton presidency. While he has often been derided by historians, he was a smart and intelligent politician, who was very much aware of the fact that his nation had not granted him any kind of mandate to act. Pendleton was a Democrat of the Old Jacksonian school, of reaching out to masses and being a tool for their will.[6] To be without true popular support was a blow to how he believed he should govern, and explains many of the failures of his administration. I contend that while there was failure, Pendleton’s actions were not those of a coward, a cretin, or an idiot, but a man bound to his ideals and struggling against a situation that could never be won, just lost the least…
…This brings us to the first major act of Pendleton’s presidency. The position of Secretary of State was given to Clement Vallandigham, a man court martialed and exiled to the Confederacy for opposing the war.[7] Vallandigham began to reach out to the Confederacy, creating an embassy in Philadelphia and one being built in kind in Eden.[8] Unfortunately, this was not the lauded act of a peacemaker Pendleton intended. Vallandigham was a divisive figure, and so Pendleton managed to drive a greater wedge between himself and the War Democrats, as they had hoped Pendleton would make overtures rather hand the reins of diplomacy to the most traitorous Copperhead known.
Certainly Pendleton should have considered offering the position to a War Democrat, a neutral figure, or even a Republican as a show of solidarity. From Pendleton’s own letters, we know he did consider these things. However, he believed that after first the election of McClellan and then himself, as well as a general “malaise of futility concerning the War With the South,” the President believed that the last thing the general will desired was tension with their new southern neighbor. Where he miscalculated was presuming that malaise over the war was equivalent with desiring reconciliation.[9]
There was a deeper wound, a wider divide between North and South than Pendleton realized. Perhaps he could be called naïve, but he was aware that he “may have misplaced optimism over the reconciliation of Americans.” This is why to call him an imbecile is false. Pendleton was self-aware, but believed his morals could be made real with diligence and commitment…
…With these bills it is clear that Pendleton had many high points of his presidency that simply took too long to bear fruit for him to receive due credit. The cornerstone of the modern role of the veteran is the Grand Army of the Union, and it was Pendleton who took the growing organization and grew it into a state-backed entity.[10] And it was Pendleton who approved and fostered the Union Postal Express Service (UPX) that so critically aided to maintain the razor thin connection between the Union and the Western Coast.[11]
Even one of his greatest so-called blunders was of great importance. The Adams-Lyons Treaty, negotiated by former Vice Presidential candidate Charles Francis Adams, Sr. and the Earl Lyons. That Adams, a Republican, first encouraged the treaty’s idea once it was offered by Lyons is often irrelevant to detractors of Pendleton. But his defenders are too quick to dismiss how carefully he considered the Treaty before dedicating his full support. The Treaty infamously alleviated American War debts by selling the Washington Territory norther of the 47th Parallel to Britain, for both an immediate bulk price and continuous payments for a minimum of 10 years, with a caveat that American settlers would keep their lands and be allowed to enter or leave the territory, though the recognition of Britain’s claim to the area would stand in perpetuity or renegotiation.[12]
The treaty was rammed past Congress, and clever delays and negotiations with Senators prevented the treaty from being rejected. The general public was appalled, however, as it was a “Spit in the Face to President Polk,” or so wrote one prominent Republican paper.[13] The territory was gone, and opponents of Pendleton began to spin the payments not as a boon to America, but as dependency on the British. Yet did not the lessening of debt become critical to the uplifting of the economy? Was not the dollar saved and the Panic ended by the ensuing closeness with British investors? And were not both of these things fundamental to the future investments and economic freedom of the Union?
Pendleton must be recognized as the man who bit the bullet and took the loss of prestige for a treaty that saved the economy. He also knew that losing more land would incense the public. But with the Sioux Alliance expanding and Mormon raiding growing more violent, there were barely any settlements growing in Washington, and even the state government of Oregon rarely had the ability to maintain communication with Washington’s territorial government. The British had been exerting greater influence and sending settlers since the war, reaching a zenith in the McClellan administration that rendered American ownership a shallow idea as it was.
Pendleton wrote that “so much land has been lost already… what’s a touch more for the good of national prosperity?” He believed that given time, public resentment would fade as the loss of Washington was tied part and parcel to the loss of the South, becoming one singular incident. He was not entirely wrong, but again he underestimated how long the grudge would endure, or perhaps how well his enemies would capitalize on it…
…If there are incidents that earn Pendleton full ire, it is these two. The Mormon War was truly needless. But Pendleton had felt pressure at the time, and needed a swift military victory to give him the appearance of strength. With another seven dead at the Colorado-Utah border, he gave Custer full permission to sweep in, and sent Burnside as a supporting force.
In choosing two ruthless commanders, Pendleton was practically asking for a massacre. It is difficult to fathom why he made the decision, or why he refused the delegation sent by the ‘Council of Deseret’. Perhaps the stresses were too great, or perhaps he felt that his reputation as a Confederate sympathizer could be abated if he showed zero tolerance to other separatists. Or perhaps he merely placed too much faith in the diplomatic abilities of the two generals, who admittedly were formally tasked with ‘ensuring a peaceable end to the insurrection in Utah if possible…’
…Leaving Custer retreating back towards the Rockies. And this was not the worst news to return from the ever lawless West. The Sioux were plainly aware of the lacking ability of the military. For all the bravado Pendleton offered in refusing any parlay with the indians on the basis that ‘the people of the Union shall not bend to savages,’ he did not have the military to counter them. Perhaps without the Mormon War, it could have been feasible, but enlistment for the military was abysmal, and morale remained low. Sherman, as Secretary of War, advised mild conscription from areas near the conflict, in order to drum up at least a force capable of hindering Sioux raids.[14]
But yet again Pendleton let his ideals stand firm. He had come to oppose conscription as a fundamentally tyrannical act, something which did garner him popularity once published in newspapers. And yet, it only left the Sioux and their allies to raid and even conquer territory. Any political boon gained in the taming of Colorado and the Arapaho Treaty dried up, leaving Pendleton once again at square one…”
“James, you have the power of choice. Your category?”
“‘National Parties’ for 4,000.”[15]
“Jenna, reveal the challenge… Ahem; Before 1867, this 19th Century political party held the same name as a major political party in the Union… James?”
“What is the Democratic Party.”
“That is correct. For your prize question: What name did the Democratic Party adopt?”
“The Southern Democratic Party.”
“One moment, the judges are conferring on that answer… I’m sorry, James, that’s been deemed incorrect. It was the Southern Democrat Party, not Democratic. Still, that’s 4,000 points added to your Triumph! And you maintain the power of choice. Your category?”[16]
“‘Mantle of Eatership’ for 1,000.”
“Jenna? ...This was Stonewall’s infamous treat, which he ate, rine and all, to help with indigestion.”
“...”
“James?”
“What are… oranges?”
“Incorrect. Rebecca?”
“Uhm… What are lemons?”[17]
“Correct! Prize question: What was Stonewall’s actual favorite snack?”
“Ah, Peaches!”
“Correct! Jenna, please reveal the Prize… And that’s another 1,000 points in addition to the 1,000 for the Challenge question, which brings your Triumph to 47,000. You now have the power of choice. Your category?”
“I would like to defer power to Emmett.”
“You would like to use your one time deferment, is that correct?”
“Yes.”
“Understood. Emmett, you now have the power of choice. But remember that means that whatever you gain from the question, she will gain half of it if you cannot answer the question, in addition to the full amount if she answers the question rather than James or Argos. So choose wisely. Your category?”[18]
“‘National Parties’ for 100,000.”
“No hesitation, going right for the big win! Jenna? …This annual event first began as a political stunt by Robert Toombs in 1867 before ending in 1944. Oh, Rebecca!”
“What is the National Temperance Rally?”
“Incorrect. Emmett!”
“What is the Dixie Days Gala.”
“Correct! That is 100,000 in your pocket, for a total of 130,000, and Rebecca is down to -3,000. For your prize question: What political party did Robert Toombs help found at the very first Dixie Days Gala?”
“The Constitutionalist Party.”
“Correct! Oh, there’s the Lucky Bell! Your second prize question: What party convention did Toombs originally attend to run as a Vice Presidential candidate for in 1867?”
“Southern Democrat Party, John.”
“Correct. My, it seems 1867 was on our challenge teams’ minds. It’s now time for a word from our partners, but you’ll get to see more Knowhow after the break.”
“1867 was the single most important election in Dixie history. It set the country down a particular path, and had the potential to set it down a very, very different path if Jackson had lost…[20]
…When Jefferson Davis threw his weight behind Jackson, he likely didn’t expect the man to so fundamentally alter the identity of the Southern Democrats. The SDP, formerly the Democratic Party, was the only official political party at the start of 1867, and everyone expected Stephens to dominate the convention.
Instead, Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson started to oppose him, and Jefferson Davis was all too happy to name Stonewall as his champion against Stephens. And Stephens had been so sure of victory that he had burnt enough bridges that by the time of the party convention there were a number of party officials who were happy to screw him over. The SDP named Stonewall the candidate after a number of debates against Stephens, where Stonewall received thunderous applause.[21]
Stephens was mad. But he wasn’t alone. Some people saw Stonewall as a way for Davis to rule past his term, others were appalled at a ‘lesser’ candidate being set to win the presidency purely out of spite for Stephens. Robert Toombs, Stephens’ running mate, gathered these people at a massive party he called the Dixie Days Gala, and convinced Stephens that they needed to run anyway. Arguing that Stonewall’s presidency would see violations of the Confederate Constitution, the Constitutionalist Party had no choice but to hold up Stephens and Toombs as their leaders. For the past months, the two had been garnering national attention during their conflict with Stonewall and Graham, so it would have been a waste of time to try and field anyone else…
…Let’s imagine a timeline with Stephens’ victory. That means no Slave Code Reform Act, which means no restrictions on the treatment of slaves. In fact, Stephens would probably have sponsored and expanded chattel slavery and dehumanization methods.[22] This could mean earlier slave revolts, but that would make them smaller and less well prepared. And then with generations of dehumanization, it’s unlikely the slave class would have literacy or emboldened leadership.
A Stephens presidency also means no Stonewall Doctrine. President Stonewall famously said ‘The South shall stand on its own feet,’ when he signed the Second Industrial Investment Act, but its doubtful someone as agrarian focused as Stephens would have bothered to invest in growing Southern industry and cities. Even Stonewall wasn’t extremely supportive of shifting the Confederacy away from a ‘pious agrarian society’, but he had a strong belief that it would be necessary.[23]
If Stephens instead opted to consolidate the power of the Planters by keeping industry small, then not only would the Confederacy stagnate in the coming years, but the nation would have become dependent on French, British, or even Yankee industry. Even if Reconciliation would never happen, the Confederacy could have ended up a puppet of the Union anyways…
…And that is why President Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson was so important for Dixie agriculture too. Stephens opposed the subsidies Davis had created to combat famine, and likely would have ended them over time and let the Planters go back to growing cotton only. The Stonewall administration diversification policy was what kept trade going during the Indian Cotton Boom…
…So in short, Stephens would have meant a more decentralized, weaker Confederacy. We can even see this in the states that voted for him in 1867. Texas was a state with a shaky loyalty to the Confederacy, and voted against Stonewall purely because they wanted the Confederacy to weaken, for Davis’ expansions of power to get undone so they could be more independent again. Missouri and South Carolina were sold on the doctrine of the Constitutionalist, since Missouri had gone through a split of their state in the name of the Confederate dream, and South Carolina was the birthplace of the Confederacy. Georgia loved Stephens and Toombs as native sons, but Alabama and Arkansas voted for them because they were sold on allegations by Stephens that Stonewall was an abolitionist.
These states, from conservative bastions to hardliner idealists to states that wanted near independence, were who wanted Stephens. Stonewall’s promises of a better, fairer Confederacy, and a nation run by ‘Christian compassion and Stoic resolve’ appealed to places in need like Tennessee and Florida and Oklahoma. Not every state voted because of that. Virginia loved Stonewall, and North Carolina was loyal to Graham, even though both states were not in as much need of the economic and social policies Stonewall was speaking for. Mississippi voted Southern Democrat because of Davis’ support for Jackson, but they were one of the states still recovering from famine too, as was Louisiana. What this tells us is that Stonewall primarily drew in states that had desire or were willing to allow a stronger Confederacy with stronger federal standards for states in exchange for more support in their times of need…[24]
…This is what makes the 1867 Presidency so critical to the future of the Confederacy.”
“Tell Stephens that Brutus, Judas, and I will set a spot at our table for him.”
- Jefferson Davis, last words to his friends
“I never wanted any part of this…”
- Jefferson Davis, last words to Franklin Pierce
“Let me get this all written down…
On this side, we’ll put the Democrats, and on this side, the Republicans. They can be put into two factions each. The Copperheads are up here, and the War Democrats are down here. The Radicals are up here, and the Moderate Republicans are down here.”
D | R |
Copperheads - George Pendleton | Radical Republicans - Thaddeus Stephens |
War Democrats - Andrew Johnson | Moderates - Schuyler Colfax |
“Now my placement is intentional. Anyone know why?”
“‘Sa way t’ ‘arties formed later, innit?”
“Can I get that answers from someone willing to enunciate with coherence? Oliver.”
“He said, ‘It’s the way the parties formed later, isn’t it?’”[1]
“‘Ucking prick…”
“Thank you, Oliver. That is correct. But we’ll get back to that in a second. Each faction had it’s own ideal candidate for the election. The Copperheads had good old Pendleton, who you should know well enough. Strengths? A nationally known name, experience in the executive branch, evaded all blame for any of McClellan’s scandals. Weaknesses? Well… He’s Pendleton. Weak-willed but stubborn, proud but cowardly.[2]
The War Democrats would put up Andrew Johnson, who was at this time widely known as the stubborn Tennessee Senator who had bravely gone to battle against the South. Strengths? A keen debater, respected for his service and ideals. Weaknesses? A southerner, too aggressive in his rhetoric against his opponents.[3] People wanted someone who could unite, not divide.
On the other side of the aisle we have Thaddeus Stephens for the Radical Republicans. Strengths? Dedicated to his values, skilled statesman. Weaknesses? He was too close to the O’Hara Conspiracy, having little national goodwill for him or his allies.
And then we have the Moderate Republicans, who put forward Schuyler Colfax. Strengths? One of the founders of the Republican Party, a staunch abolitionist, but a friendly face to everyone. And to boot a story had circulated during the demonization of John C. Frémont about Colfax giving Frémont and other generals sound tactical advice that had been ignored. That made Schuyler here sound like a guy who know how to lead and who had been at odds with the O’Hara Conspirators for years. Weaknesses? Well the biggest is that despite being so friendly that people called him ‘Smiler’, he didn’t have a presence, couldn’t command a room, and debates between him and Stephens usually went nowhere, even though Colfax had become less radical and more in-line with the more popular tenets of his party. And after a debate between him and Johnson, Colfax was described by a newspaper as ‘emasculated.’”
“Oof…”
“Oof is right. Now after a while, Thaddeus Stephens backed off. He and Colfax had an understanding, because for a lot of years Colfax was seen as a Radical. Johnson, of course, refused to bow out of the race against Pendleton. You might think at first that this would split the Democrat vote. But you’d be wrong. The Democrats were affiliated with the South, but McClellan had been one. The Republicans were the party of Lincoln and Unionism, but not only had they lost the war, but a prominent member had just been executed for being involved in a conspiracy that murdered the president.[4]
There was no faith in party. People looked for candidates they could agree with, looked for people who could entice their votes. Colfax couldn’t draw in enough people back after the O’Hara Conspiracy, and Johnson’s aggression spooked recently defecting Republicans. And so the winner was…”
- Dr. Thomas Brooks, Union Political History course, Rothschild University
[1] This will be explained later. But if it wasn’t clear, the implication is that future parties will see Copperheads and Radicals working together and War Dems and Moderates working together. How? Why? Well you’ll just have to wait.
[2] The speaker is clearly biased against Pendleton and teaching his students a standard narrative.
[3] Johnson was infamous for his aggressive debate style and trying to debate nearly anyone. Often he was more focused on ‘winning’ against a perceived opponent rather than doing the smartest thing politically.
[4] There is no evidence by this point that Frémont was framed. Also, the Republicans aren’t a dead party because they completely disavowed the O’Hara Conspiracy by acting so quickly and harshly.
[2] The speaker is clearly biased against Pendleton and teaching his students a standard narrative.
[3] Johnson was infamous for his aggressive debate style and trying to debate nearly anyone. Often he was more focused on ‘winning’ against a perceived opponent rather than doing the smartest thing politically.
[4] There is no evidence by this point that Frémont was framed. Also, the Republicans aren’t a dead party because they completely disavowed the O’Hara Conspiracy by acting so quickly and harshly.
“It must be understood just how divided the nation was. Looking at the electoral map, it is easy to just dismiss Pendleton’s victory as any kind of landslide. By the map, Johnson only won 3 states of the 25 states, and yet he garnered over a quarter of the popular vote.[5] It was a close race in a number of regions, and not just between both Democratic candidates, but between all three men. As scandalous and disastrous as appointing Wade and Frémont to the executive branch had been, only for Frémont to be proven a conspirator and effective murderer, Colfax represented the face of the Republicans. A founder of the party, likeable and honest, and having disavowed his peers.
This is very important when reviewing the Pendleton presidency. While he has often been derided by historians, he was a smart and intelligent politician, who was very much aware of the fact that his nation had not granted him any kind of mandate to act. Pendleton was a Democrat of the Old Jacksonian school, of reaching out to masses and being a tool for their will.[6] To be without true popular support was a blow to how he believed he should govern, and explains many of the failures of his administration. I contend that while there was failure, Pendleton’s actions were not those of a coward, a cretin, or an idiot, but a man bound to his ideals and struggling against a situation that could never be won, just lost the least…
…This brings us to the first major act of Pendleton’s presidency. The position of Secretary of State was given to Clement Vallandigham, a man court martialed and exiled to the Confederacy for opposing the war.[7] Vallandigham began to reach out to the Confederacy, creating an embassy in Philadelphia and one being built in kind in Eden.[8] Unfortunately, this was not the lauded act of a peacemaker Pendleton intended. Vallandigham was a divisive figure, and so Pendleton managed to drive a greater wedge between himself and the War Democrats, as they had hoped Pendleton would make overtures rather hand the reins of diplomacy to the most traitorous Copperhead known.
Certainly Pendleton should have considered offering the position to a War Democrat, a neutral figure, or even a Republican as a show of solidarity. From Pendleton’s own letters, we know he did consider these things. However, he believed that after first the election of McClellan and then himself, as well as a general “malaise of futility concerning the War With the South,” the President believed that the last thing the general will desired was tension with their new southern neighbor. Where he miscalculated was presuming that malaise over the war was equivalent with desiring reconciliation.[9]
There was a deeper wound, a wider divide between North and South than Pendleton realized. Perhaps he could be called naïve, but he was aware that he “may have misplaced optimism over the reconciliation of Americans.” This is why to call him an imbecile is false. Pendleton was self-aware, but believed his morals could be made real with diligence and commitment…
…With these bills it is clear that Pendleton had many high points of his presidency that simply took too long to bear fruit for him to receive due credit. The cornerstone of the modern role of the veteran is the Grand Army of the Union, and it was Pendleton who took the growing organization and grew it into a state-backed entity.[10] And it was Pendleton who approved and fostered the Union Postal Express Service (UPX) that so critically aided to maintain the razor thin connection between the Union and the Western Coast.[11]
Even one of his greatest so-called blunders was of great importance. The Adams-Lyons Treaty, negotiated by former Vice Presidential candidate Charles Francis Adams, Sr. and the Earl Lyons. That Adams, a Republican, first encouraged the treaty’s idea once it was offered by Lyons is often irrelevant to detractors of Pendleton. But his defenders are too quick to dismiss how carefully he considered the Treaty before dedicating his full support. The Treaty infamously alleviated American War debts by selling the Washington Territory norther of the 47th Parallel to Britain, for both an immediate bulk price and continuous payments for a minimum of 10 years, with a caveat that American settlers would keep their lands and be allowed to enter or leave the territory, though the recognition of Britain’s claim to the area would stand in perpetuity or renegotiation.[12]
The treaty was rammed past Congress, and clever delays and negotiations with Senators prevented the treaty from being rejected. The general public was appalled, however, as it was a “Spit in the Face to President Polk,” or so wrote one prominent Republican paper.[13] The territory was gone, and opponents of Pendleton began to spin the payments not as a boon to America, but as dependency on the British. Yet did not the lessening of debt become critical to the uplifting of the economy? Was not the dollar saved and the Panic ended by the ensuing closeness with British investors? And were not both of these things fundamental to the future investments and economic freedom of the Union?
Pendleton must be recognized as the man who bit the bullet and took the loss of prestige for a treaty that saved the economy. He also knew that losing more land would incense the public. But with the Sioux Alliance expanding and Mormon raiding growing more violent, there were barely any settlements growing in Washington, and even the state government of Oregon rarely had the ability to maintain communication with Washington’s territorial government. The British had been exerting greater influence and sending settlers since the war, reaching a zenith in the McClellan administration that rendered American ownership a shallow idea as it was.
Pendleton wrote that “so much land has been lost already… what’s a touch more for the good of national prosperity?” He believed that given time, public resentment would fade as the loss of Washington was tied part and parcel to the loss of the South, becoming one singular incident. He was not entirely wrong, but again he underestimated how long the grudge would endure, or perhaps how well his enemies would capitalize on it…
…If there are incidents that earn Pendleton full ire, it is these two. The Mormon War was truly needless. But Pendleton had felt pressure at the time, and needed a swift military victory to give him the appearance of strength. With another seven dead at the Colorado-Utah border, he gave Custer full permission to sweep in, and sent Burnside as a supporting force.
In choosing two ruthless commanders, Pendleton was practically asking for a massacre. It is difficult to fathom why he made the decision, or why he refused the delegation sent by the ‘Council of Deseret’. Perhaps the stresses were too great, or perhaps he felt that his reputation as a Confederate sympathizer could be abated if he showed zero tolerance to other separatists. Or perhaps he merely placed too much faith in the diplomatic abilities of the two generals, who admittedly were formally tasked with ‘ensuring a peaceable end to the insurrection in Utah if possible…’
…Leaving Custer retreating back towards the Rockies. And this was not the worst news to return from the ever lawless West. The Sioux were plainly aware of the lacking ability of the military. For all the bravado Pendleton offered in refusing any parlay with the indians on the basis that ‘the people of the Union shall not bend to savages,’ he did not have the military to counter them. Perhaps without the Mormon War, it could have been feasible, but enlistment for the military was abysmal, and morale remained low. Sherman, as Secretary of War, advised mild conscription from areas near the conflict, in order to drum up at least a force capable of hindering Sioux raids.[14]
But yet again Pendleton let his ideals stand firm. He had come to oppose conscription as a fundamentally tyrannical act, something which did garner him popularity once published in newspapers. And yet, it only left the Sioux and their allies to raid and even conquer territory. Any political boon gained in the taming of Colorado and the Arapaho Treaty dried up, leaving Pendleton once again at square one…”
- In Defense of President Pendleton, by Archie M. Wheeler
[5] The states he won were Maryland, Missouri, and Nevada, states that felt themselves to be ‘border’ states and the most jingoistic.
[6] This is taken from historians’ review of Pendleton as a politician. He was a true believer in Jacksonian populism and anti-elitism.
[7] This actually happened. Lincoln wanted to have Vallandigham arrested but didn’t want him made into a martyr. So instead the man was made to move past enemy lines and then was court-martialed, leaving him stranded in the Confederacy, where he was taken as a prisoner of war voluntarily.
[8] Eden, C.E. has been completed, but the US is still figuring out what to do as Washington, D.C. is still being rebuilt and is now on a fairly hostile border. For now, Philadelphia is the de facto capital.
[9] Union citizens don’t want peace, they don’t want war. Mostly they’re just done with the South. F*ck ‘em is the general mindset.
[10] This is the GAR but more like the American Legion and eventually becoming a state sponsored/funded veterans organization. Couldn’t have negative ramifications, right?
[11] The USPS meets the Pony Express, meets the Mojave Express. Guns, adventure, excitement, crossing the lawless West! Definitely a gold mine for films in the future.
[12] British encroachment was mentioned earlier, and the American economy is in shambles from the Panic that triggered after the war. War reparations are expensive too.
[13] President Polk ran on a slogan of “Fifty-four forty or fight!” meaning to push for as much of the Cascadian region as possible.
[14] If it wasn’t obvious, Sherman was appointed, but his ‘mad dog’ reputation means that Pendleton micromanages and goes over his head on everything. The appointment was meant to counteract appointing Vallandigham as Secretary of State. But since most people expected Sherman to serve in a position like that, it didn’t earn Pendleton any brownie points.
[6] This is taken from historians’ review of Pendleton as a politician. He was a true believer in Jacksonian populism and anti-elitism.
[7] This actually happened. Lincoln wanted to have Vallandigham arrested but didn’t want him made into a martyr. So instead the man was made to move past enemy lines and then was court-martialed, leaving him stranded in the Confederacy, where he was taken as a prisoner of war voluntarily.
[8] Eden, C.E. has been completed, but the US is still figuring out what to do as Washington, D.C. is still being rebuilt and is now on a fairly hostile border. For now, Philadelphia is the de facto capital.
[9] Union citizens don’t want peace, they don’t want war. Mostly they’re just done with the South. F*ck ‘em is the general mindset.
[10] This is the GAR but more like the American Legion and eventually becoming a state sponsored/funded veterans organization. Couldn’t have negative ramifications, right?
[11] The USPS meets the Pony Express, meets the Mojave Express. Guns, adventure, excitement, crossing the lawless West! Definitely a gold mine for films in the future.
[12] British encroachment was mentioned earlier, and the American economy is in shambles from the Panic that triggered after the war. War reparations are expensive too.
[13] President Polk ran on a slogan of “Fifty-four forty or fight!” meaning to push for as much of the Cascadian region as possible.
[14] If it wasn’t obvious, Sherman was appointed, but his ‘mad dog’ reputation means that Pendleton micromanages and goes over his head on everything. The appointment was meant to counteract appointing Vallandigham as Secretary of State. But since most people expected Sherman to serve in a position like that, it didn’t earn Pendleton any brownie points.
“James, you have the power of choice. Your category?”
“‘National Parties’ for 4,000.”[15]
“Jenna, reveal the challenge… Ahem; Before 1867, this 19th Century political party held the same name as a major political party in the Union… James?”
“What is the Democratic Party.”
“That is correct. For your prize question: What name did the Democratic Party adopt?”
“The Southern Democratic Party.”
“One moment, the judges are conferring on that answer… I’m sorry, James, that’s been deemed incorrect. It was the Southern Democrat Party, not Democratic. Still, that’s 4,000 points added to your Triumph! And you maintain the power of choice. Your category?”[16]
“‘Mantle of Eatership’ for 1,000.”
“Jenna? ...This was Stonewall’s infamous treat, which he ate, rine and all, to help with indigestion.”
“...”
“James?”
“What are… oranges?”
“Incorrect. Rebecca?”
“Uhm… What are lemons?”[17]
“Correct! Prize question: What was Stonewall’s actual favorite snack?”
“Ah, Peaches!”
“Correct! Jenna, please reveal the Prize… And that’s another 1,000 points in addition to the 1,000 for the Challenge question, which brings your Triumph to 47,000. You now have the power of choice. Your category?”
“I would like to defer power to Emmett.”
“You would like to use your one time deferment, is that correct?”
“Yes.”
“Understood. Emmett, you now have the power of choice. But remember that means that whatever you gain from the question, she will gain half of it if you cannot answer the question, in addition to the full amount if she answers the question rather than James or Argos. So choose wisely. Your category?”[18]
“‘National Parties’ for 100,000.”
“No hesitation, going right for the big win! Jenna? …This annual event first began as a political stunt by Robert Toombs in 1867 before ending in 1944. Oh, Rebecca!”
“What is the National Temperance Rally?”
“Incorrect. Emmett!”
“What is the Dixie Days Gala.”
“Correct! That is 100,000 in your pocket, for a total of 130,000, and Rebecca is down to -3,000. For your prize question: What political party did Robert Toombs help found at the very first Dixie Days Gala?”
“The Constitutionalist Party.”
“Correct! Oh, there’s the Lucky Bell! Your second prize question: What party convention did Toombs originally attend to run as a Vice Presidential candidate for in 1867?”
“Southern Democrat Party, John.”
“Correct. My, it seems 1867 was on our challenge teams’ minds. It’s now time for a word from our partners, but you’ll get to see more Knowhow after the break.”
- Knowhow, Collection 14, Installment 6, SA game show[19]
[15] At the time this is broadcasted, gameshows don’t measure victory by dollars...
[16] The way this game works is that, like Jeopardy, you pick a category and answer a question based on who buzzes in. But if you’re correct, there’s follow-up questions for bonus points. They don’t use the ‘what is the question’ format for those, and a panel of judges is available to make decisions on the answers.
[17] Just a reminder than Stonewall ate lemons like apples like an utter madman.
[18] Deferring choice can be done once an episode by each contestant. It lets someone else pick the question category. In exchange, you get 1.5x the points if you answer the question correctly, and are guaranteed half of the points if someone other than the category-picker answers the question.
[19] I’ve stated before that collection is a season/series. Installments are episodes.
[16] The way this game works is that, like Jeopardy, you pick a category and answer a question based on who buzzes in. But if you’re correct, there’s follow-up questions for bonus points. They don’t use the ‘what is the question’ format for those, and a panel of judges is available to make decisions on the answers.
[17] Just a reminder than Stonewall ate lemons like apples like an utter madman.
[18] Deferring choice can be done once an episode by each contestant. It lets someone else pick the question category. In exchange, you get 1.5x the points if you answer the question correctly, and are guaranteed half of the points if someone other than the category-picker answers the question.
[19] I’ve stated before that collection is a season/series. Installments are episodes.
“1867 was the single most important election in Dixie history. It set the country down a particular path, and had the potential to set it down a very, very different path if Jackson had lost…[20]
…When Jefferson Davis threw his weight behind Jackson, he likely didn’t expect the man to so fundamentally alter the identity of the Southern Democrats. The SDP, formerly the Democratic Party, was the only official political party at the start of 1867, and everyone expected Stephens to dominate the convention.
Instead, Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson started to oppose him, and Jefferson Davis was all too happy to name Stonewall as his champion against Stephens. And Stephens had been so sure of victory that he had burnt enough bridges that by the time of the party convention there were a number of party officials who were happy to screw him over. The SDP named Stonewall the candidate after a number of debates against Stephens, where Stonewall received thunderous applause.[21]
Stephens was mad. But he wasn’t alone. Some people saw Stonewall as a way for Davis to rule past his term, others were appalled at a ‘lesser’ candidate being set to win the presidency purely out of spite for Stephens. Robert Toombs, Stephens’ running mate, gathered these people at a massive party he called the Dixie Days Gala, and convinced Stephens that they needed to run anyway. Arguing that Stonewall’s presidency would see violations of the Confederate Constitution, the Constitutionalist Party had no choice but to hold up Stephens and Toombs as their leaders. For the past months, the two had been garnering national attention during their conflict with Stonewall and Graham, so it would have been a waste of time to try and field anyone else…
…Let’s imagine a timeline with Stephens’ victory. That means no Slave Code Reform Act, which means no restrictions on the treatment of slaves. In fact, Stephens would probably have sponsored and expanded chattel slavery and dehumanization methods.[22] This could mean earlier slave revolts, but that would make them smaller and less well prepared. And then with generations of dehumanization, it’s unlikely the slave class would have literacy or emboldened leadership.
A Stephens presidency also means no Stonewall Doctrine. President Stonewall famously said ‘The South shall stand on its own feet,’ when he signed the Second Industrial Investment Act, but its doubtful someone as agrarian focused as Stephens would have bothered to invest in growing Southern industry and cities. Even Stonewall wasn’t extremely supportive of shifting the Confederacy away from a ‘pious agrarian society’, but he had a strong belief that it would be necessary.[23]
If Stephens instead opted to consolidate the power of the Planters by keeping industry small, then not only would the Confederacy stagnate in the coming years, but the nation would have become dependent on French, British, or even Yankee industry. Even if Reconciliation would never happen, the Confederacy could have ended up a puppet of the Union anyways…
…And that is why President Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson was so important for Dixie agriculture too. Stephens opposed the subsidies Davis had created to combat famine, and likely would have ended them over time and let the Planters go back to growing cotton only. The Stonewall administration diversification policy was what kept trade going during the Indian Cotton Boom…
…So in short, Stephens would have meant a more decentralized, weaker Confederacy. We can even see this in the states that voted for him in 1867. Texas was a state with a shaky loyalty to the Confederacy, and voted against Stonewall purely because they wanted the Confederacy to weaken, for Davis’ expansions of power to get undone so they could be more independent again. Missouri and South Carolina were sold on the doctrine of the Constitutionalist, since Missouri had gone through a split of their state in the name of the Confederate dream, and South Carolina was the birthplace of the Confederacy. Georgia loved Stephens and Toombs as native sons, but Alabama and Arkansas voted for them because they were sold on allegations by Stephens that Stonewall was an abolitionist.
These states, from conservative bastions to hardliner idealists to states that wanted near independence, were who wanted Stephens. Stonewall’s promises of a better, fairer Confederacy, and a nation run by ‘Christian compassion and Stoic resolve’ appealed to places in need like Tennessee and Florida and Oklahoma. Not every state voted because of that. Virginia loved Stonewall, and North Carolina was loyal to Graham, even though both states were not in as much need of the economic and social policies Stonewall was speaking for. Mississippi voted Southern Democrat because of Davis’ support for Jackson, but they were one of the states still recovering from famine too, as was Louisiana. What this tells us is that Stonewall primarily drew in states that had desire or were willing to allow a stronger Confederacy with stronger federal standards for states in exchange for more support in their times of need…[24]
…This is what makes the 1867 Presidency so critical to the future of the Confederacy.”
- Tessa Vanderlin, Essay for Confederate History 102, Marks: 3.1/5.0
Comments: Tessa, please see me in my office hours if you want to makeup points. Signed, Prof. Regina Looker
Comments: Tessa, please see me in my office hours if you want to makeup points. Signed, Prof. Regina Looker
[20] This is a student writing, so expect odd logic and connections within this section because it’s a student who slapped their final paper together last minute.
[21]...And numerous political deals to ensure Stephens would not be chosen. Jackson only ran alongside William Graham because Graham was a more trusted member of the party. Recall that the VP in the Confederacy has more power, so balancing the ticket is far more important.
[22] Stonewall was not a fan of slavery. He was a racist believer in a White Man’s Burden to Civilize, but he wanted slaves literate and treated kindly. We’ll get into the weeds of his reforms next time.
[23] Stonewall Doctrine = Trying to achieve autarky by subsidizing industry.
[24] This is the first true election. At the moment Confederate politics are heavily based on personalities like Davis and voting for the guy from your area above all. That will change overtime as local party politics evolve. As a final note, Oklahoma, as a Dependent Autonomy, gets to have electors in the college, as many as they would have if they were a state, but to be clear they have only one non-voting representative in either house of government. And yes, this was an amendment to their Constitution that the Confederacy passed under Davis.
[21]...And numerous political deals to ensure Stephens would not be chosen. Jackson only ran alongside William Graham because Graham was a more trusted member of the party. Recall that the VP in the Confederacy has more power, so balancing the ticket is far more important.
[22] Stonewall was not a fan of slavery. He was a racist believer in a White Man’s Burden to Civilize, but he wanted slaves literate and treated kindly. We’ll get into the weeds of his reforms next time.
[23] Stonewall Doctrine = Trying to achieve autarky by subsidizing industry.
[24] This is the first true election. At the moment Confederate politics are heavily based on personalities like Davis and voting for the guy from your area above all. That will change overtime as local party politics evolve. As a final note, Oklahoma, as a Dependent Autonomy, gets to have electors in the college, as many as they would have if they were a state, but to be clear they have only one non-voting representative in either house of government. And yes, this was an amendment to their Constitution that the Confederacy passed under Davis.
- Xanthoc
- Word Count: 3.4k