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Part 2-11
…On April 11th the Germans started a bombardment on a line between Armentieres and Festubert. After just under a day the bombardment stopped and the Germans launched a massive assault on the British 1st Army codenamed Georgette. The 1st Army consisted of a number of worn out formations holding a relatively quiet sector of the front and was not prepared for a major assault.

Three British divisions were shattered in the initial assault by eight German ones. First Army commander Horne counterattacked with his reserves, including the Portuguese expeditionary Corps on the 13th, but the counterattack was shattered. By the Fourteenth the Germans had advanced twelve miles before reserves transferred from the Second Army stopped them.

This transfer was just in time for a second prong of the German attack to be launched against Second Army on the fourteenth. The Germans advanced 3 miles on a five-mile front north of Armentieres and recaptured the Messines ridge by the 15th.

At this point the situation was desperate. Marshal Haig recognized his troubles, he needed to hold the railway center at Hazebrouk, otherwise his forces could not be supplied and would be overwhelmed or forced to withdraw to the channel ports. He could not however make a withdrawal to the South of Hazebrouk to free up troops, as the critical coal mines of Bethune were located in that sector, while their loss would not lead to immediate defeat, it would cripple the French war effort in the longer term. Haig therefore gave his famous “backs to the wall” order on the 15th forbidding retreat without higher orders. At the same time he ordered second army to shorten its lines near Ypres to free up reserves, as well as demanding the Belgians shorten their own lines to the north.

On the 16th Ludendorff launched simultaneous attacks at the south and center of his salient, targeting Hazebrouk and Bailleul respectively. The latter was successful, but the former faced stiff resistance from British and Commonwealth troops. After three days the defenders had been forced to give ground, but were unbroken, if barely. Rather than keep attacking the British strong points head on Ludendorff ended the attack to fight elsewhere where the enemy were weaker.

On the 21st Ludendorff launched a three-pronged attack, aimed at Bethune, and encircling Ypres from the north at and south. The attack on Bethune was called off after a day after facing stiff resistance. The other attacks went better and after three days Ypres was abandoned by the British rather than risk their forces being encircled.

On the 26th Ludendorff again attempted to take Hazebrouk, attacking towards Godewaersvelde to threaten it from the north. However by this point Ferdinand Foch had become the Supreme Entente Commander and sent French divisions to Flanders. The Fresh divisions stopped the Germans short of their goal after two days.

The last German assault as part of Georgette occurred on the 30th. Attempting to renew the momentum they attacked the town of Poperinghe and managed to capture it. Stiff resistance behind the town persuaded them that they could go no further after the end of the day.

Instead Ludendorff decided that his next move would be as he planned a large offensive against the French to tie up French reserves before moving on to a decisive attack on the British…

…Georgette ultimately failed its goal of taking Hazebrouk and its stretch goal of shattering the British Army to allow an attack on the channel ports. The reason for this can be blamed on Ludendorff’s indecision. Had he continued the attacks on Hazebrouk he would have very likely taken the critical supply center there and totally unhinged the British positions, forcing them to withdraw to the Channel Ports and leaving a massive gap in the Entente lines to exploit. The forces defending the town had been exhausted by both assaults and committing more German reserves would have probably broken them. A similar push could have taken Bethune and crippled the French war effort there.

In general Georgette saw the beginning of a pattern of flaws in Ludendorff’s strategy, he would expend considerable manpower to achieve a breakthrough in the front, make great gains, then get cold feet when the attack stalled. Rather than expend more manpower to take a strategic objective from exhausted Entente troops he would switch to a different easier target to repeat the success of his earlier breakthrough elsewhere…

…Georgette inflicted casualties of 175,000 on the Entente, 40,000 French, 15,000 Belgians, 15,000 Portuguese and 105,000 British with the loss of 150 guns, whereas the Germans took 105,000 casualties. German casualties had a significantly lower proportion being unrecoverable, captured and deceased, than Entente casualties, but like in Michael were concentrated in the elite Stormtrooper units whose training and experience was difficult to replace…

…The Germans had penetrated 15 miles into Entente lines and forced considerable withdrawals on the extreme end of the front. Over half of the Belgian territory remaining in Entente hands was lost from the battle or in line shortening withdrawals. Despite this the attack was strategically indecisive, the Germans did not follow up on the seizure of key territory and failed to achieve any immediately decisive objectives…


-Excerpt from The Loss of Innocence: America in the Great War, Harper & Brothers, New York 2014

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