alternatehistory.com

…1917 was a chaotic year for the American War effort. The United States was unprepared for the magnitude of the commitment it embarked on. The vast industrial potential of the United States was poorly managed by a government that had not planned for this effort, nor had experience in doing so for over half a century.

Vast numbers of contracts were let out to massively expand war production, often to companies that had no relevant experience or were already at full capacity. Building the capacity to fill those contracts would take time and money. However the latter was in short supply as the government primarily followed the contracting practices of the day where payment would be mostly provided on delivery. This meant that companies had to borrow money to start or expand production, at a time when the markets for lending were almost tapped out by the war and many other companies were doing so. This imposed unnecessary delays on the expansion of the war effort.

This was made worse by mismanagement of the national transportation system. The massive expansion of construction placed massive amounts of extra demand on the American railroad system. Coordination was almost nonexistent and thousands of loaded railcars of raw materials and finished goods sat idle, jamming up railway yards all along the eastern seaboard for months. This too contributed to the American war production being far below what it could have been…

…American troops began arriving in force in the fall of 1917. Even before then clashes had begun between the Entente and American leadership over their deployment. The British and French were united in their urging that the American troops going to France should be dispersed and fight under their command. It was desired that the American forces be broken up and the Americans used as individual replacements in their formations to bring them up to strength. This was flatly refused both by General Pershing and President Wilson.

The French, recognizing the difficulties of integrating Anglophone Americans into their Francophone units, were quickly willing to compromise by suggesting that American units be integrated into theirs, companies into battalions, battalions into regiments or regiments into divisions. The British were more stubborn in their desires. Both sides argued that the Americans were unprepared for a modern war and needed to be directed by experienced leadership. Both applied pressures to force the Americans to accept their suggestions.

The American leadership, political and military, as well as the American public, viewed this as an attempt to use American doughboys as cannon fodder. The public was outraged and the papers demanded that Wilson hold firm in his insistence on an independent American Expeditionary Force. Anglo-French entreaties to send more riflemen and fewer support troops over, at a time when they were both reducing the number of riflemen in their forces in favor of increased numbers of artillery and rear area troops, merely confirmed this view. Wilson stayed adamant in one of his unequivocally good decisions, American forces would fight under American command.

The French realized relatively quickly that Wilson and Pershing would not be swayed at the time and decided to bide their time. The British were more stubborn and insisted that since many of those troops were coming over on British ships, that some, if not all should be under their command and control. Wilson then threatened British access to American credit and suggested that if they did not find room for American troops, Wilson would make room by stopping some of their orders in the US. The British were forced to back down and grudgingly accepted that the Americans would be an independent force. As a compromise some American formations would be attached to British and French forces on a temporary training basis…

The creation of a separate American Expeditionary Force command complicated the command structure on the Western Front. Already there had been considerable difficulties between the separate French and British command structures. With the addition of a third, American, command structure this was made worse. It was soon determined that the ad hoc nature of previous international military coordination was insufficient and on November 7th 1917 a Supreme War Council was formed. Proposals were made to have a combined reserve, a joint general staff and a supreme commander, but due to the actions of Lloyd George, Marshal Haig and General Petain delayed that until after the start of the German Spring Offensive…

…Ludendorff planned on his Spring Offensive to open with an assault on the British near St. Quentin. He would hit the British with 76 divisions, against 29 British divisions, at the seam between the 5th and 3rd British armies. His goal was to punch a hole in the British lines so that they could be outflanked and forced to withdraw to the Channel Ports or be destroyed. If the first offensive did not work, then follow up offensives would follow to achieve that goal. The opening attack was codenamed Michael, after the Archangel, and would begin on March 23rd…


-Excerpt from The Loss of Innocence: America in the Great War, Harper & Brothers, New York 2014



…The Austrians were pressured to launch their own offensive against the Italians concurrently with the German attack in Flanders. Conrad did not wish to do so, too much of the Austrian Army’s bridging equipment was being used to supply their forces in their current positions. He did not believe that the Austrian Army would be ready to attack until June, when sufficient bridging equipment would be available. However German pressure proved too great for Kaiser Karl to bear and Conrad was ordered to launch his attack on the 23rd of March, to coincide with the German one.

The shortage of equipment forced Conrad to plan his assault on the narrower Mincio River against the British and French, rather than across the wider Po against the still recovering Italians. Furthermore he would be restricted in the number of places he could attack by the lack of bridging equipment…

…The Middle Eastern Theater proven the only military bright spot for the Entente during 1917. Baghdad had fallen to the British in early March. In late March Gaza had fallen to the British as well. From then a stalemate lasted until August. Then the insistence of Enver Pasha on withdrawing troops facing the British to reinforce the Caucuses after the Kerensky offensive provided an opportunity. In late September the British launched an assault at Kuj and shattered the weakened Ottoman defensive lines.

British cavalry turned the retreat into a rout and inflicted 20,000 casualties on the Ottomans. In mid to late October the Ottomans attempted to stop the British in the Judean Hills. The Ottomans managed to hold out until November 1st, but suffered 10,000 more casualties and ultimately lost. Jerusalem fell on November 10th. This was the most significant British victory so far and proved a balm to morale that had suffered heavily.

Ottoman attempts to retake Jerusalem were fought off in December to minor losses on both sides. In January Allenby furthered advanced north, capturing Jericho and the Jordan valley from the Ottomans. After capturing the Tell Asur hill in February Allenby launched at attack on Amman, which established bridgeheads but ultimately failed to take the town. Instead of launching a second attack Allenby instead attacked to the north and unhinged the Ottoman position around Mt. Gilboa, capturing the Jezreel Valley in mid-March. This caused the Ottoman commander in the theater to be sacked and replaced with the German Erich von Falkenhayn, who had arrived with German reinforcements.

Von Falkenhayn pulled back his troops from Amman to Der’a and dug in on a Haifa-Nazareth-Samakh-Der’a line. Against the strengthened defensive line Allenby was forced to pause for reinforcements, ones that would not arrive until fall…

-Excerpt from European Wars for Americans, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2004