alternatehistory.com
32 - Decisions
The evening meeting of the commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia lasted late into the night. The committed attack on Meade's lines, which had failed, showed that another fight along Pipe Creek was not promising. The main objectives of the invasion of Pennsylvania had been achieved. The Union Army had suffered defeat on its own soil and Virginia's fields and farms had been relieved. The destruction of Meade's army or the capture of Washington had not been considered realistic by any of the leading officers.
Even during the current day's attack news had reached the camp that Pemberton and the garrison at Vicksburg had capitulated. This, it seemed at first sight, outweighed even the success before Cashtown. It was now open to debate whether, in view of this fact and the deadlock at Pipe Creek, a retreat to Virginia would really be the best signal. This was especially true in view of the fact that the army was still fit for action and in a comparatively good condition. Jubal Early in particular argued passionately for holding the line north of the Potomac River. A victorious army would not turn its back on the enemy, A. P. Hill also argued. Longstreet did not directly reject these arguments, but pointed out that his corps had been the hardest hit by the fighting so far and had suffered the highest losses.
Lee agreed with Early and Hill after a brief period of reflection. The Army of Northern Virginia had suffered just under 16,000 casualties to date, while the total losses of Union troops since the beginning of the march north exceeded 27,000 men. West Maryland seemed a logical choice for a base. The area was already known to commanders from the Maryland Campaign a year earlier, and the Catoctins and South Mountain seemed ideal bastions. The army would move west the next morning, while Stuart's cavalry would feint a flank attack against Manchester. The town of Frederick was chosen as the first target. Lee would also telegraph to Richmond and request support to hold his ground.
When Meade learned during the course of July 8 that Lee had withdrawn, it was a relief. The heavy losses of his army over the past few days had greatly reduced his combat capabilities. French's garrison troops had been able to fill some of the biggest gaps, but the troops were still far below target strength. As quickly as the Pennsylvania militias had been brought in from Lancaster, they withdrew again. They had crossed the state border grumbling anyway and were now ordered back by the governor, as heavy draft riots had broken out in New York and it was feared that they would spread to the big cities of Pennsylvania. Meade informed the High Command that he had finally beaten Lee back after a changeable battle, but that his army was not able to follow the enemy forcefully. The men would need rest and other people to strengthen their ranks, veterans at best. Meade told his subordinates that he considered the army unable to move for at least the next four weeks.
Chapter 32 - Decisions
The evening meeting of the commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia lasted late into the night. The committed attack on Meade's lines, which had failed, showed that another fight along Pipe Creek was not promising. The main objectives of the invasion of Pennsylvania had been achieved. The Union Army had suffered defeat on its own soil and Virginia's fields and farms had been relieved. The destruction of Meade's army or the capture of Washington had not been considered realistic by any of the leading officers.
Even during the current day's attack news had reached the camp that Pemberton and the garrison at Vicksburg had capitulated. This, it seemed at first sight, outweighed even the success before Cashtown. It was now open to debate whether, in view of this fact and the deadlock at Pipe Creek, a retreat to Virginia would really be the best signal. This was especially true in view of the fact that the army was still fit for action and in a comparatively good condition. Jubal Early in particular argued passionately for holding the line north of the Potomac River. A victorious army would not turn its back on the enemy, A. P. Hill also argued. Longstreet did not directly reject these arguments, but pointed out that his corps had been the hardest hit by the fighting so far and had suffered the highest losses.
Lee agreed with Early and Hill after a brief period of reflection. The Army of Northern Virginia had suffered just under 16,000 casualties to date, while the total losses of Union troops since the beginning of the march north exceeded 27,000 men. West Maryland seemed a logical choice for a base. The area was already known to commanders from the Maryland Campaign a year earlier, and the Catoctins and South Mountain seemed ideal bastions. The army would move west the next morning, while Stuart's cavalry would feint a flank attack against Manchester. The town of Frederick was chosen as the first target. Lee would also telegraph to Richmond and request support to hold his ground.
When Meade learned during the course of July 8 that Lee had withdrawn, it was a relief. The heavy losses of his army over the past few days had greatly reduced his combat capabilities. French's garrison troops had been able to fill some of the biggest gaps, but the troops were still far below target strength. As quickly as the Pennsylvania militias had been brought in from Lancaster, they withdrew again. They had crossed the state border grumbling anyway and were now ordered back by the governor, as heavy draft riots had broken out in New York and it was feared that they would spread to the big cities of Pennsylvania. Meade informed the High Command that he had finally beaten Lee back after a changeable battle, but that his army was not able to follow the enemy forcefully. The men would need rest and other people to strengthen their ranks, veterans at best. Meade told his subordinates that he considered the army unable to move for at least the next four weeks.
- Lothar
- Word Count: 520