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27 - Meade's Course of Action
The meeting between George Meade and his corps commanders just before midnight on 4 July took place around a campfire near Gettysburg Cemetery. The record since taking over his command was openly discussed and, characteristically, Meade did not spare self-criticism, although he was willing to dish it out in his inimitable style. The most silent and reserved participant in the meeting was, uncharacteristically, Daniel Sickles, who had merely rushed northeast with a cavalry escort. He had admitted the highest losses of any command at the beginning, although he tried to put this into perspective by claiming that when his troops marched out that evening he had left many slightly wounded who could not have kept up with the marching column.
The remaining corps commanders agreed that the campaign had not yet taken a clear course. Near Harrisburg, elements of Ewell's Corps and Jenkins' Cavalry Brigade had been stopped by Couch's militias, ending the rebels' northward movement on 30 June. The battle at Gettysburg on July 1 had also ensured that Lee's army not only failed to advance further east before the Army of the Potomac had consolidated, but had effectively forced the Confederates back several miles. The fact that Stuart was now also no longer behind the Union Army was also a success, particularly in terms of civilian morale. Lee's range of movement had been limited to the southwest corner of Pennsylvania by the engagements at Harrisburg and Gettysburg, but this did not hide the fact that this was still the most northerly rebel incursion to date and that he was in excellent terrain.
It was agreed that the attempt to cut off the supply lines had been a good approach, whatever the reasons for its later failure. The attack on the Cashtown line was not a mistake per se and Meade, unlike Hooker, had proved that he could keep his nerve while under pressure. Sedgwick and Reynolds received well-deserved praise for their dedicated attacks, which had almost broken Lee's army. All along the front, however, men and officers had done their duty and in the end no individual could be held responsible for the ultimate failure. Hood's Elite Division had been finished for all purposes and with the Texas Brigade its heart had literally been torn out. Pickett's Division had been decimated and everywhere the rebels had been taught to take heavy losses.
Nothing but a battery from Slocum's corps had been lost for equipment and ammunition supplies were secured via the Westminster route. After all of Lee's divisions except the cavalry had fought, the Union commanders expected the rebels to have enough ammunition for another major battle, but not much more.
Finally, the discussion focused on the question of future troop movements. Meade argued that Gettysburg was a road junction, but otherwise of no military significance whatsoever. Hancock, in particular, expressed concern that the army, in its reduced state, was not adequately able to secure its position behind the city without diluting the lines too much. Furthermore, the close presence of the Confederate Army made it difficult for those present to bring reinforcements safely to the town. While the New York and Pennsylvania militia had by now assembled a total of 10,000 men in Harrisburg and Carlisle, another 10,000 volunteers had been deployed and provisionally equipped in Lancaster on the north side of the Susquehanna. The Harpers Ferry Garrison was also finally on its way north. If these and the forces from Lancaster could be brought in, it would at least almost make up in numbers for the losses suffered over the past few days.
But where should the rallying point be? In this respect, Meade prevailed. The Pipe Creek line was probably the most formidable position between Cashtown and Washington. During the night, marching orders were issued to all army units as well as to French and Lancaster. On July 5th, every Union soldier within reach would march towards Union Mills while Couch would continue to secure the Susquehanna crossings. Now Lee had the burden of deciding which course to take.
Map of the Pipe Creek Line
Meade's Course of Action
The meeting between George Meade and his corps commanders just before midnight on 4 July took place around a campfire near Gettysburg Cemetery. The record since taking over his command was openly discussed and, characteristically, Meade did not spare self-criticism, although he was willing to dish it out in his inimitable style. The most silent and reserved participant in the meeting was, uncharacteristically, Daniel Sickles, who had merely rushed northeast with a cavalry escort. He had admitted the highest losses of any command at the beginning, although he tried to put this into perspective by claiming that when his troops marched out that evening he had left many slightly wounded who could not have kept up with the marching column.
The remaining corps commanders agreed that the campaign had not yet taken a clear course. Near Harrisburg, elements of Ewell's Corps and Jenkins' Cavalry Brigade had been stopped by Couch's militias, ending the rebels' northward movement on 30 June. The battle at Gettysburg on July 1 had also ensured that Lee's army not only failed to advance further east before the Army of the Potomac had consolidated, but had effectively forced the Confederates back several miles. The fact that Stuart was now also no longer behind the Union Army was also a success, particularly in terms of civilian morale. Lee's range of movement had been limited to the southwest corner of Pennsylvania by the engagements at Harrisburg and Gettysburg, but this did not hide the fact that this was still the most northerly rebel incursion to date and that he was in excellent terrain.
It was agreed that the attempt to cut off the supply lines had been a good approach, whatever the reasons for its later failure. The attack on the Cashtown line was not a mistake per se and Meade, unlike Hooker, had proved that he could keep his nerve while under pressure. Sedgwick and Reynolds received well-deserved praise for their dedicated attacks, which had almost broken Lee's army. All along the front, however, men and officers had done their duty and in the end no individual could be held responsible for the ultimate failure. Hood's Elite Division had been finished for all purposes and with the Texas Brigade its heart had literally been torn out. Pickett's Division had been decimated and everywhere the rebels had been taught to take heavy losses.
Nothing but a battery from Slocum's corps had been lost for equipment and ammunition supplies were secured via the Westminster route. After all of Lee's divisions except the cavalry had fought, the Union commanders expected the rebels to have enough ammunition for another major battle, but not much more.
Finally, the discussion focused on the question of future troop movements. Meade argued that Gettysburg was a road junction, but otherwise of no military significance whatsoever. Hancock, in particular, expressed concern that the army, in its reduced state, was not adequately able to secure its position behind the city without diluting the lines too much. Furthermore, the close presence of the Confederate Army made it difficult for those present to bring reinforcements safely to the town. While the New York and Pennsylvania militia had by now assembled a total of 10,000 men in Harrisburg and Carlisle, another 10,000 volunteers had been deployed and provisionally equipped in Lancaster on the north side of the Susquehanna. The Harpers Ferry Garrison was also finally on its way north. If these and the forces from Lancaster could be brought in, it would at least almost make up in numbers for the losses suffered over the past few days.
But where should the rallying point be? In this respect, Meade prevailed. The Pipe Creek line was probably the most formidable position between Cashtown and Washington. During the night, marching orders were issued to all army units as well as to French and Lancaster. On July 5th, every Union soldier within reach would march towards Union Mills while Couch would continue to secure the Susquehanna crossings. Now Lee had the burden of deciding which course to take.
Map of the Pipe Creek Line
- Lothar
- Word Count: 690