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Winter 1863-1864
The winter of 1863 to 1864 was, in stark contrast to the prior fall, largely uneventful, with both Union and Confederate forces far too depleted and overstretched to attempt any major offensive. With Confederate forces finally pinned down due to the harsh weather, Union forces were finally able to replenish much of their numbers with fresh reinforcements. These new recruits, while unprepared and inexperienced, allowed for the armies under Grant and Meade to plug many vital gaps and strengthen already strong defensive positions into nearly impenetrable ones.

Confederate armies were not so lucky. Many areas had already been stripped bare in order to push the armies of Tennessee and Northern Virginia to their levels of strength they'd had earlier in the fall, and while the reinforcements that were arriving were generally far more experienced and proficient with aspects of the army such as firearms, camping, and horseback riding, there were vastly fewer of them. Particularly hurt by this discrepancy in reinforcements was the army under Forrest, still stationed in Murfreesboro. Over the winter, his forces received only 3,300 reinforcements in total, putting the size of his army at 11,900 men at the end of the winter, after the large number of deaths to disease. Meanwhile, Burnsides army had received 8,500 reinforcements in preparation for a spring offensive, and combined with his already larger army, as well as the garrison of Nashville, this put his total forces at 26,500 men. Other fronts saw similar disparities in troop counts, and while the average quality of soldiers in the Union army had decreased somewhat, the sheer numbers were enough to concern even the most optimistic Confederate generals and politicians, despite the incredibly successful campaign season prior.

The only major movement to occur during the winter began slightly prior to its' onset, and involved the majority of Longstreet's remaining forces moving south to lay siege to Sherman's army, which had retreated to Florence, Alabama following the Second Battle of Shiloh. The remainder of his men remained north, occupying the heights along various parts of the Tennessee river and preventing supplies or reinforcements from arriving to aid Sherman. Over the winter, the men began to run out of food, and with Grant nowhere in sight, morale was low.

In the east, the Army of the Potomac had been reinforced heavily to contain 105,000 troops in comparison to the Army of Northern Virginia's 62,000. Meade sat impatiently over the winter, wishing to strike at Lee while he possessed an enormous numerical advantage, and despite Lincoln's orders not to launch an offensive until later in the spring, Meade ordered French's corps to perform reconnaissance in force, in the hope that such a maneuver would draw Lee out into a major battle, something which had escaped Lee throughout the Bristoe Campiaign. However, this movement, performed with little cover during the daytime, was almost immediately spotted by a large contingent of the Army of Northern Virginia in Centreville, and quickly repulsed after a brief skirmish. Casualties on both sides were low, but upon Lincoln receiving word of French's movement, Meade was ordered directly, in no uncertain terms, not to attempt any kind of offensive maneuver against any Confederate army until the spring.

Meanwhile in the west, Grant was stationed miles away from the nearest army, friendly or otherwise. Sherman's forces were under a desperate siege, and by now the majority of the Tennessee river lay in Confederate hands. Shiloh, the location of what was possibly Grant's most important victory ever, had seen his trusted subordinate beaten by a Confederate army and driven into retreat, making combining the two armies impossible for the time being. Dozens of important towns had been recaptured by Confederate forces, resetting nearly all of the progress of the last year over the course of a few months. In Arkansas, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, who had previously been pushed back with ease, had begun seizing a number of small forts and towns in Northern Arkansas, particularly in the Delta, as many Union troops were pulled out of the area to reinforce Grant. His forces were edging dangerously near the Mississippi, and while they were small, it was yet another thorn in Grant's side. With the sources of frustration seemingly endless, no solution apparent until the spring, and no movements that required his management, Grant would begin to spend long stretches of time alone in his tent, drinking. Over the course of the winter, his habits would grow continuously worse.

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