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The Second Battle of Shiloh - Action and Aftermath
October 12, 1863
The opening maneuvers of what would eventually be known as the Second Battle of Shiloh (Second Battle of Pittsburg Landing), were, much like the Third Battle of Chattanooga a few weeks prior, marred by poor communication and lack of general coordination. Longstreet's plan, featuring a number of corps moving independently of one another in an attempt to flank and overwhelm Sherman's forces, was immensely complicated, and while he had improved considerably in independent command following the nearly disastrous opening stages of the Third Battle of Chattanooga, a number of delayed messages would prevent Cleburne from beginning his march southwest until 10:00 AM.
Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry had already moved into a position in the woods south of Sherman, and had been harassing Union picket lines since 8:30 AM. However, the local Union commander, Col. Joseph R. Cockerill, was convinced that the cavalry he was encountering were simply a small diversionary unit, intended to draw Union forces away from an attack from the Confederate center, and only mentioned them in passing while reporting his status to the division commander, Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Ewing, who similarly disregarded the Confederate cavalry, but nonetheless shifted two regiments south on the chance that it was something larger.
At 12:00 PM, Longstreet's center, under the command of D.H. Hill, began an enormous artillery barrage on Sherman's forces, causing much of the XV Corps to pull towards the center in preparation for a massive assault. This happened to coincide with a thrust by Wheeler's cavalry from the south, which, upon finding almost no resistance, continued sweeping forward, brushing aside the small force left behind by Ewing to protect the southern flank and sending them into a rout. They progressed nearly to the Union center before being stopped by a fierce counterattack by two brigades under Brig. Gen. John M. Corse and Col. John M. Loomis.
With Wheeler's surprising and luckily timed attack stalling before it could deal serious damage to the Union lines, Sherman readjusted his forces to face towards the center and south. He moved a division under Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith around his right, with the hope of flanking Wheeler's isolated corps and killing a potential Confederate advance against his center before it could begin. As they arrived, Wheeler's cavalry began to get pushed east, allowing Sherman to reform much of his line into a more cohesive shape.
As Wheeler began to make preparations to retreat towards the southeast, the forward elements of Cleburne's Corps collided with Sherman's northern flank, causing brief disarray before being repulsed by vastly larger numbers. Sherman, forced to shift some of the forces from his center yet again, sent a division under Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus to deal with Cleburne's advance from the north.
While Cleburne's Corps began to materialize in the north, D.H. Hill dispatched three brigades under the command of Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall to ford the Tennessee River a ways north of Diamond Island and assault the weakened Union center. In conjunction with this, the remaining Confederate center made final preparations to cross the Tennessee on previously prepared pontoons.
Meanwhile, Sherman was desperately shifting units around. While he had been prepared for an assault from numerous sides, the poor timing of Confederate appearances had made his position a dangerous one. Cleburne, having repulsed an attempted counterattack from Osterhaus, had begun advancing southwards, threatening to cut off Smith's forces and, along with the Confederate forces on the other side of the Tennessee, surround the Union center. Sherman attempted to attack Wheeler's forces from two sides, the Union center and Union far right, while Osterhaus held off Cleburne. While this movement saw initial success, quickly resetting the progress made by Wheeler during the disarray of Cleburne's initial attack, the forces under Stovall which had been fording the river would soon attack the Union center from behind, sending many of the forces guarding the rear into a rout. The remaining Confederate center would then launch a massive assault, crossing the Tennessee and easily defeating what little Union resistance remained nearby.
Sherman, now aware of the attack from the Confederate center, quickly realized how dire the situation was, ordering Osterhaus back in an attempt to form a strong defensive line and slowly fall back to higher ground. However, this would fall apart as Cleburne took advantage of the withdraw to put Osterhaus's disorganized forces into a rout, circling around in an attempt to surround and trap Sherman himself. As Wheeler and D.H. Hill continued to pursue the south and center, Sherman's forces were nearly surrounded. Sherman, however, would launch an attack and break through part of Wheeler's line, retreating hastily through the gap towards the only open direction- southwards. A desperate, fierce rearguard action managed to prevent Wheeler's cavalry from forcing Sherman's forces into a rout, though they would continue pursuing and harassing the retreating Union army until well after nightfall.
Aftermath
The Second Battle of Shiloh was, much like the Third Battle of Murfreesboro, a massive success that came at an enormous cost. Roughly 10,000 of Longstreet's 34,000 men, nearly a third, lay dead, wounded, or missing. Shiloh, and with it, much of the Tennessee river, had been seized, along with an enormous cache of supplies and munitions. Grant and Sherman were prevented from combining their forces, an act which would have left the Army of Tennessee in an impossible position. Sherman had been forced to retreat southwards, eventually settling his exhausted army in Florence, Alabama, which had served as one of the final major Union bastions on the Tennessee river. This, in conjunction with Forrest's victory in Murfreesboro, had effectively reset the Union position in Tennessee to roughly what it had been in mid-1862, essentially erasing an entire year and a half of Union progress.
However, this had come at an enormous cost. The Army of Tennessee, which had peaked during the battle of Chickamauga in terms of total numbers, with roughly 65,000 men, had been reduced to 24,000 men, a little over a third of that. Even counting Forrest and Hood's isolated forces, that placed the Army of Tennessee at around half the size of what it had been. On top of that, the men of the Army of Tennessee were exhausted to the point of breakdown. They had been fighting and marching nearly nonstop for nearly an entire month straight. They had outrun their supply lines a number of times, and many sported uniforms and shoes that had been nearly torn to shreds with wear. Sherman still commanded roughly 15,000 men in Florence, while Grant approached from the west with 32,000 men. That, along with Burnside and the various garrisons across the state, meant that there were roughly 73,000 Union soldiers in Tennessee to 39,000 Confederate soldiers. While the Army of Tennessee was in a much better strategic position than it was prior to Chickamauga, in many ways, it was beginning to bleed itself dry. Longstreet himself would record in his journal on the day following the victory that he felt, "[M]uch like Pyrrhus after his victory at Heraclea... one more such victory, and we are undone."
The reaction in the North, however, was far more bleak. While both sides had lost a little under half of their forces since peak strength in the fighting since Chickamauga, this amounted to far, far more casualties for the Union. Nearly 60,000 Union soldiers had been left dead, wounded, or missing in the last month in Tennessee, which was quickly becoming the bloodiest front of the war. In the east, the Army of the Potomac had been deftly outmaneuvered by the Army of Northern Virginia, and the two sat worryingly close to Washington. Though there hadn't been a major battle between the two, the skirmishes had been decisively in favor of the Confederate forces. Meanwhile, in the far west, Union forces had been stripped to provide reinforcements for Grant's army, allowing Maj. Gen. Sterling Price to regain ground in northern Arkansas, particularly near the Delta. It seemed to much of the Union that the war which they had just begun winning was already beginning to turn once more in the Confederate's favor.
Lincoln would soon begin planning for a major multi-front offensive to begin in the spring. At the time, however, he ordered a general standing-down of Union forces to begin winter preparations, as he could not afford another major loss to Confederate forces. Union armies in Tennessee and Virginia entrenched and braced for a potential winter assault, though the Confederate forces were far too exhausted and weakened to even attempt such a thing. Burnside would march his army north to Nashville after a failed assault on Forrest's entrenched positions in Murfreesboro, the final noteworthy battle of the year.
The opening maneuvers of what would eventually be known as the Second Battle of Shiloh (Second Battle of Pittsburg Landing), were, much like the Third Battle of Chattanooga a few weeks prior, marred by poor communication and lack of general coordination. Longstreet's plan, featuring a number of corps moving independently of one another in an attempt to flank and overwhelm Sherman's forces, was immensely complicated, and while he had improved considerably in independent command following the nearly disastrous opening stages of the Third Battle of Chattanooga, a number of delayed messages would prevent Cleburne from beginning his march southwest until 10:00 AM.
Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry had already moved into a position in the woods south of Sherman, and had been harassing Union picket lines since 8:30 AM. However, the local Union commander, Col. Joseph R. Cockerill, was convinced that the cavalry he was encountering were simply a small diversionary unit, intended to draw Union forces away from an attack from the Confederate center, and only mentioned them in passing while reporting his status to the division commander, Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Ewing, who similarly disregarded the Confederate cavalry, but nonetheless shifted two regiments south on the chance that it was something larger.
At 12:00 PM, Longstreet's center, under the command of D.H. Hill, began an enormous artillery barrage on Sherman's forces, causing much of the XV Corps to pull towards the center in preparation for a massive assault. This happened to coincide with a thrust by Wheeler's cavalry from the south, which, upon finding almost no resistance, continued sweeping forward, brushing aside the small force left behind by Ewing to protect the southern flank and sending them into a rout. They progressed nearly to the Union center before being stopped by a fierce counterattack by two brigades under Brig. Gen. John M. Corse and Col. John M. Loomis.
With Wheeler's surprising and luckily timed attack stalling before it could deal serious damage to the Union lines, Sherman readjusted his forces to face towards the center and south. He moved a division under Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith around his right, with the hope of flanking Wheeler's isolated corps and killing a potential Confederate advance against his center before it could begin. As they arrived, Wheeler's cavalry began to get pushed east, allowing Sherman to reform much of his line into a more cohesive shape.
As Wheeler began to make preparations to retreat towards the southeast, the forward elements of Cleburne's Corps collided with Sherman's northern flank, causing brief disarray before being repulsed by vastly larger numbers. Sherman, forced to shift some of the forces from his center yet again, sent a division under Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus to deal with Cleburne's advance from the north.
While Cleburne's Corps began to materialize in the north, D.H. Hill dispatched three brigades under the command of Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall to ford the Tennessee River a ways north of Diamond Island and assault the weakened Union center. In conjunction with this, the remaining Confederate center made final preparations to cross the Tennessee on previously prepared pontoons.
Meanwhile, Sherman was desperately shifting units around. While he had been prepared for an assault from numerous sides, the poor timing of Confederate appearances had made his position a dangerous one. Cleburne, having repulsed an attempted counterattack from Osterhaus, had begun advancing southwards, threatening to cut off Smith's forces and, along with the Confederate forces on the other side of the Tennessee, surround the Union center. Sherman attempted to attack Wheeler's forces from two sides, the Union center and Union far right, while Osterhaus held off Cleburne. While this movement saw initial success, quickly resetting the progress made by Wheeler during the disarray of Cleburne's initial attack, the forces under Stovall which had been fording the river would soon attack the Union center from behind, sending many of the forces guarding the rear into a rout. The remaining Confederate center would then launch a massive assault, crossing the Tennessee and easily defeating what little Union resistance remained nearby.
Sherman, now aware of the attack from the Confederate center, quickly realized how dire the situation was, ordering Osterhaus back in an attempt to form a strong defensive line and slowly fall back to higher ground. However, this would fall apart as Cleburne took advantage of the withdraw to put Osterhaus's disorganized forces into a rout, circling around in an attempt to surround and trap Sherman himself. As Wheeler and D.H. Hill continued to pursue the south and center, Sherman's forces were nearly surrounded. Sherman, however, would launch an attack and break through part of Wheeler's line, retreating hastily through the gap towards the only open direction- southwards. A desperate, fierce rearguard action managed to prevent Wheeler's cavalry from forcing Sherman's forces into a rout, though they would continue pursuing and harassing the retreating Union army until well after nightfall.
Aftermath
The Second Battle of Shiloh was, much like the Third Battle of Murfreesboro, a massive success that came at an enormous cost. Roughly 10,000 of Longstreet's 34,000 men, nearly a third, lay dead, wounded, or missing. Shiloh, and with it, much of the Tennessee river, had been seized, along with an enormous cache of supplies and munitions. Grant and Sherman were prevented from combining their forces, an act which would have left the Army of Tennessee in an impossible position. Sherman had been forced to retreat southwards, eventually settling his exhausted army in Florence, Alabama, which had served as one of the final major Union bastions on the Tennessee river. This, in conjunction with Forrest's victory in Murfreesboro, had effectively reset the Union position in Tennessee to roughly what it had been in mid-1862, essentially erasing an entire year and a half of Union progress.
However, this had come at an enormous cost. The Army of Tennessee, which had peaked during the battle of Chickamauga in terms of total numbers, with roughly 65,000 men, had been reduced to 24,000 men, a little over a third of that. Even counting Forrest and Hood's isolated forces, that placed the Army of Tennessee at around half the size of what it had been. On top of that, the men of the Army of Tennessee were exhausted to the point of breakdown. They had been fighting and marching nearly nonstop for nearly an entire month straight. They had outrun their supply lines a number of times, and many sported uniforms and shoes that had been nearly torn to shreds with wear. Sherman still commanded roughly 15,000 men in Florence, while Grant approached from the west with 32,000 men. That, along with Burnside and the various garrisons across the state, meant that there were roughly 73,000 Union soldiers in Tennessee to 39,000 Confederate soldiers. While the Army of Tennessee was in a much better strategic position than it was prior to Chickamauga, in many ways, it was beginning to bleed itself dry. Longstreet himself would record in his journal on the day following the victory that he felt, "[M]uch like Pyrrhus after his victory at Heraclea... one more such victory, and we are undone."
The reaction in the North, however, was far more bleak. While both sides had lost a little under half of their forces since peak strength in the fighting since Chickamauga, this amounted to far, far more casualties for the Union. Nearly 60,000 Union soldiers had been left dead, wounded, or missing in the last month in Tennessee, which was quickly becoming the bloodiest front of the war. In the east, the Army of the Potomac had been deftly outmaneuvered by the Army of Northern Virginia, and the two sat worryingly close to Washington. Though there hadn't been a major battle between the two, the skirmishes had been decisively in favor of the Confederate forces. Meanwhile, in the far west, Union forces had been stripped to provide reinforcements for Grant's army, allowing Maj. Gen. Sterling Price to regain ground in northern Arkansas, particularly near the Delta. It seemed to much of the Union that the war which they had just begun winning was already beginning to turn once more in the Confederate's favor.
Lincoln would soon begin planning for a major multi-front offensive to begin in the spring. At the time, however, he ordered a general standing-down of Union forces to begin winter preparations, as he could not afford another major loss to Confederate forces. Union armies in Tennessee and Virginia entrenched and braced for a potential winter assault, though the Confederate forces were far too exhausted and weakened to even attempt such a thing. Burnside would march his army north to Nashville after a failed assault on Forrest's entrenched positions in Murfreesboro, the final noteworthy battle of the year.
- Pulmonic_Consonant
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