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The Third Battle of Murfreesboro - Aftermath
With Maj. Gen. Forrest's stunning but costly victory at Murfreesboro, any hope of a quick Union counter-attack from the north had been quashed. The majority of Union forces in and around Nashville rushed to fortify the city, convinced that it was under threat of an immediate Confederate attack. Burnside, however, assumed (correctly) that Forrest's command had taken casualties too large to allow for another large-scale offensive, and would continue to press on towards Murfreesboro in an attempt to retake the city and open the path the Chattanooga back up.
A major effect of the seizure of Murfreesboro was that Georgia was now safe from potential Union advances, and with the need of Longstreet and Forrest to perpetuate costly, lengthy offensives in order to retake as much of Tennessee as possible before Union reinforcements arrived, most garrisons across the state were further stripped of forces, leaving them nearly helpless. Meanwhile, Longstreet had continued his campaign west, attempting to defeat the Union forces under Grant and Sherman in detail. He had re-taken a number of towns scattered across southern Tennessee, such as Fayetteville, Pulaski, and Salem, and though he had only left dangerously small garrisons behind to defend them, his forces were waning, even as he drummed up townsfolk and integrated local militias. As the Army of Tennessee occupied Waynesboro, it was in possession of 34,000 men. By Longstreet's estimates, Sherman possessed something like 24-27,000 men. Sherman's forces, while smaller, occupied a good position opposite the Tennessee river near the town of Savannah.
Longstreet, generally cautious, was wary of attacking such a position. However, Grant's forces were approaching. Were the two to unite, it would leave the Army of Tennessee heavily outnumbered without a solid means of defense. After meeting with his officers, D.H. Hill, Joseph Wheeler, and Patrick Cleburne, it was decided that an attack was necessary, but a straightforward assault would be insufficient to dislodge Sherman from his position. The plan eventually arrived at would involve a series of complex maneuvers in which Cleburne would cross the Tennessee River on a ford northwest of Waynesboro, marching southwest as Longstreet's center opened up an artillery barrage on Sherman's forces. Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry would cross further south, seizing Hamburg. Longstreet's center, under D.H. Hill, would launch an assault from the east in conjunction with Cleburne from the north, before a massive charge from Wheeler in the south would dislodge and rout Sherman, chasing them down and crushing them before an effective rearguard could be put up.
In the east, a series of skirmishes had begun between Meade and Lee had begun, with Meade attempting to cover the movement of Maj. Gen. William H. French to Tennessee in order to reinforce Burnside, and Lee attempting to delay and buy the Army of Tennessee time to do as much damage to the Union effort in the west as possible. The numerous major Confederate victories in the west had severely depleted Union morale, and after stealing a march on Meade, a contingent of Lee's forces under the command of Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill scored a quick victory on the surprised, demoralized forces guarding Bristoe Station. Despite winning a number of skirmishes, and forcing Meade to continuously retreat until settling into a position in Fairfax, Lee was unable to draw out a decisive battle. With Meade's forces heavily entrenched within Fairfax, an assault was infeasible, and due to the proximity to Washington, Lincoln forced Meade to rescind his order for French to reinforce Burnside in Tennessee. Meade eagerly did so, as he had never wanted to send French's men out in the first place, though his failure to stop Lee's advance during what would eventually become known as the Bristoe campaign would stain his career permanently, as there were many who claimed he had purposefully avoided pushing back or starting a major engagement in order to avoid having to lose French's command, though today this is seen as unlikely.
A major effect of the seizure of Murfreesboro was that Georgia was now safe from potential Union advances, and with the need of Longstreet and Forrest to perpetuate costly, lengthy offensives in order to retake as much of Tennessee as possible before Union reinforcements arrived, most garrisons across the state were further stripped of forces, leaving them nearly helpless. Meanwhile, Longstreet had continued his campaign west, attempting to defeat the Union forces under Grant and Sherman in detail. He had re-taken a number of towns scattered across southern Tennessee, such as Fayetteville, Pulaski, and Salem, and though he had only left dangerously small garrisons behind to defend them, his forces were waning, even as he drummed up townsfolk and integrated local militias. As the Army of Tennessee occupied Waynesboro, it was in possession of 34,000 men. By Longstreet's estimates, Sherman possessed something like 24-27,000 men. Sherman's forces, while smaller, occupied a good position opposite the Tennessee river near the town of Savannah.
Longstreet, generally cautious, was wary of attacking such a position. However, Grant's forces were approaching. Were the two to unite, it would leave the Army of Tennessee heavily outnumbered without a solid means of defense. After meeting with his officers, D.H. Hill, Joseph Wheeler, and Patrick Cleburne, it was decided that an attack was necessary, but a straightforward assault would be insufficient to dislodge Sherman from his position. The plan eventually arrived at would involve a series of complex maneuvers in which Cleburne would cross the Tennessee River on a ford northwest of Waynesboro, marching southwest as Longstreet's center opened up an artillery barrage on Sherman's forces. Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry would cross further south, seizing Hamburg. Longstreet's center, under D.H. Hill, would launch an assault from the east in conjunction with Cleburne from the north, before a massive charge from Wheeler in the south would dislodge and rout Sherman, chasing them down and crushing them before an effective rearguard could be put up.
In the east, a series of skirmishes had begun between Meade and Lee had begun, with Meade attempting to cover the movement of Maj. Gen. William H. French to Tennessee in order to reinforce Burnside, and Lee attempting to delay and buy the Army of Tennessee time to do as much damage to the Union effort in the west as possible. The numerous major Confederate victories in the west had severely depleted Union morale, and after stealing a march on Meade, a contingent of Lee's forces under the command of Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill scored a quick victory on the surprised, demoralized forces guarding Bristoe Station. Despite winning a number of skirmishes, and forcing Meade to continuously retreat until settling into a position in Fairfax, Lee was unable to draw out a decisive battle. With Meade's forces heavily entrenched within Fairfax, an assault was infeasible, and due to the proximity to Washington, Lincoln forced Meade to rescind his order for French to reinforce Burnside in Tennessee. Meade eagerly did so, as he had never wanted to send French's men out in the first place, though his failure to stop Lee's advance during what would eventually become known as the Bristoe campaign would stain his career permanently, as there were many who claimed he had purposefully avoided pushing back or starting a major engagement in order to avoid having to lose French's command, though today this is seen as unlikely.
- Pulmonic_Consonant
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