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…With Russia falling into civil war the German decision to ship Lenin there in the early part of the year was vindicated. With the Eastern front now a passive holding action, Hindenburg and Ludendorff turned to their next target, Italy. If the Italians could be driven from the war a major part of the pressure on Austria-Hungary would be gone and the Dual-Monarchy could partially demobilize and provide greater economic contributions to the German war effort. Even if the Italians were not outright driven from the war a major defeat could leave them incapable of significant offensive action. Such a defeat would also allow the occupation and exploitation of a significant quantity of Italian territory for the Central Powers war effort, and possibly divert Anglo-French troops to stiffen the wavering Italians. It would thus be a useful precursor to a knockout blow on the Western Front in Spring of 1918.

The Italians had attacked the Austrians in the tenth battle of the Isonzo in late Spring, and launched the eleventh in midsummer, slightly pushing back the Austrians and inflicting a great deal of casualties on both sides. The pressure of the still ongoing Eleventh battle convinced Conrad to agree to allow the Germans to take the lead.

German specialists in chemical and mountain warfare were sent to reconnoiter the area, choosing a quiet area around the town of Caporetto, Karfreit in some sources, as the location for the planned assault. A thrust by nine Austrian and nine German divisions would split the Italian Second Army, then hook behind and encircle the Italian Third Army. Other formations would launch attacks of opportunity if the Italians diverted troops to try to contain the breakthrough.

The attack was timed for October 1st, to give the Austrians four weeks to recover from the Eleventh Battle of the Isonszo. Italian aircraft were able to notice the buildup of German and Austrian troops for an offensive, as a result General Cadorna ordered defenses constructed to halt the coming attack.

Bad weather delayed the attack two days, but on the night of October 3rd there was no wind and a heavy mist over the front. With perfect conditions the Germans launched a heavy and abnormally effective gas attack. This was followed up by a short sharp bombardment and the detonation of a pair of mines. This provided the cover for stormtroopers to infiltrate strong points and quickly take them out. By 8:00 in the morning the Germans had broken through and were advancing almost unopposed through the valley road. By the end of the day they had penetrated almost 20 miles into the Italian lines.

Attempted counterattacks on the Fourth proved unable to stem the Germans and Austrians and the Second Army started the process of disintegration. Its commander Luigi Capello asked to withdraw on the 5th, however Cadorna still thought the situation could be salvaged. By the 6th, with the Austrians advancing in other parts of the front as well, he realized that it could not be and ordered a withdrawal behind the Tagliamento river. By that point it was too late, Second Army was in the process of disintegration and Third Army was not far behind.

Italian morale had, after the Russians, been the lowest of any of the great powers. Luigi Cadorna was infamous as a martinet who was detested by his troops for being overly harsh. To maintain discipline the Italian Army had as many military executions as the rest of the European great powers put together and it was rumored that Cadorna had reintroduced decimation for defeated units. He was liked no better by the officers, having sacked over 800 officers above the rank of Captain during his time in command. As such the Italian soldier, and indeed many officers, often felt no pressing need to die for his country, and would surrender in situations where his counterparts in other nations would keep fighting. This proved the Italian Achilles heel during the Caporetto campaign.

The Italians started crossing the Tagliamento on the 7th and took three days to cross. A large portion proved unable to do so and were trapped and captured by the Germans. By the time the Germans and Austrians crossed the river on the 10th Second Army had essentially disintegrated and Third was heavily damaged. The Austro-Germans could not follow up their success immediately as the rapid advance had overwhelmed their logistics, given time for the Italians to withdraw behind the Piave River.

The British and French sent further troops to reinforce the Italians, however they urged the Italians to withdraw further, to the Adige if not the Mincio and Po Rivers. This would mean sacrificing Venice and Padua, as well as Verona in the latter case.

On October 23rd the Austrians and Germans began their assault on the Piave line, specifically targeting the Third Italian Army. Already shaken by the enormous casualties it had taken in the earlier battles the Army broke. Fourth Army was forced to withdraw to protect it’s flank and Venice was cut off, with the garrison and many citizens to be evacuated by the Italian Navy. By the end of the Month the Italians were in full rout.

The Anglo-French force on the Mincio advanced to the Adige and on November 5th checked the Austro-German advance and saved First and Fourth Armies from destruction. The Austrians had managed to cross the Adige in the South on November 10th and the Entente forces were able to withdraw behind the Mincio and Po rivers for the Winter.

The Italians had suffered 30,000 dead, 50,000 wounded and an incredible 400,000 captured, along with 350,000 stragglers and 75,000 deserters. An estimated half of the Italian army simply ceased to exist in a recognizable form, though the stragglers would be reconstituted over the winter. The Germans and Austrians suffered about 90,000 casualties between them, and the Anglo-French 10,000. Over 4,000 artillery pieces, 5,000 machine guns and 2500 mortars were captured by the Central Powers, along with a vast quantity of supplies. It was in many ways a disaster worse than the loss of Russia and despite the entry of the United States into the war, many were privately convinced it meant that the war was lost...

-Excerpt from European Wars for Americans, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2004