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Chapter Seven - Medley: Aquarius/Let the Sunshine In (The Flesh Failures)

The Democratic Party had managed to win the presidency yet again, as well as both chambers of Congress, but it remained in a state of barely contained existential crisis. McCarthy may have won the Democratic nomination, but he had only been able to do so because of the indecision of the party bosses, the near-bankruptcy of the party itself, and the extreme unpopularity of the incumbent administration. In the aftermath, the Democratic leadership that had not already been replaced would have to reckon with the fact that the man they had done everything they could to keep from the nomination was now their boss. Not only that, but it was a man infamous for holding a grudge.

Inspired by McCarthy’s successful presidential challenge, the Democrats became crippled by infighting between November of 1968 and January of 1969, before the 91st Congress had even begun.

In the Senate, this took the form of a challenge against Majority Whip Russell Long of Louisiana.

The son of the infamous populist Senator Huey Long, Russell Long had become a political force in his own right over the years. Elected to the Senate at the minimum legal age of thirty, Long had slowly worked his way up the seniority system, to become an expert on tax law and the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee. Following Senate Majority Whip Hubert Humphrey’s ascension to the vice presidency in 1965, Long had taken his place, becoming the Senate’s second highest ranking Democrat after Mike Mansfield of Montana, a liberal Democrat who would come to oppose the Vietnam War. In his dual role as Chair of the Finance Committee and Majority Whip, Long had ushered much of President Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty legislation through the Senate. However, despite his support for liberal spending programs, Long was champion of big business (particularly the oil industry, which generously donated to him) and had a social conservative streak that bordered on the reactionary: he had consistently voted against civil rights legislation, believed the Supreme Court was too soft on crime, praised Mayor Daley and the Chicago police for their crackdown against protestors at the Democratic National Convention, and had supported the Vietnam War to the hilt. Despite positions like these, there had never been a liberal mutiny against Long, as Johnson had kept him on an incredibly tight leash. Johnson had effectively acted as his own whip as president, and frequently circumvented Long by using Caucus Secretary Robert Byrd of West Virginia as his liaison. However, with Johnson out of office, the dynamics of Long’s position quickly changed. His tendency to openly talk about backroom deals and his use of oil lobby money to effectively bribe other politicians had earned the ire of liberals and conservatives alike, and his penchant to turn up to the Senate floor drunk also hurt him. By 1969, most of Long’s fellow Southerners had quietly agreed that if he were ever challenged for his title as Majority Whip that they would only provide token support. That challenge came in the form of Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine.

Muskie was a somber, quiet, intellectual, Catholic liberal, who reminded many people of President McCarthy. Indeed, Muskie was one of McCarthy’s two close friends in the Senate along with Philip Hart of Michigan. Notably, neither of them had supported McCarthy’s nomination challenge: Hart had still been mostly in favour of the Vietnam War despite his daughter campaigning for McCarthy, and Muskie had been busy positioning himself as a pro-Humphrey, anti-war candidate for vice president. After McCarthy’s nomination, they both quickly rallied to his side, and while the President has mostly forgiven them for their past transgressions, he never missed an opportunity to hold it over their heads either [1]. Receiving encouragement from Hart and other Senate liberals, Muskie decided to challenge Long, but not before confirming he had the support of Ted Kennedy, who reportedly had had a fleeting interest in the position [2].

It seemed that Muskie, at face value, would be able to draw a relatively wide field of support. Mansfield could not openly support him but privately made it clear he was his preference. He also received the support of the Kennedys (technically two votes in the Senate if one included the still-absent Bobby), as well as Chair of the Senate Commerce Committee Warren Magnuson. Likewise, senior Southern Democrats such as Richard Russell of Georgia and John Stennis of Mississippi informed Muskie that they would not be “putting any roadblocks” in the way. Their ideal outcome was that Muskie would narrowly win, and they could then challenge him later with their favourite candidate, Robert Byrd, next time around. As it turned out, the biggest roadblock was the President himself. McCarthy had served on the Finance Committee under Long, and when Muskie asked for his support, the President casually remarked, “I don’t know, I haven’t got anything against Russell Long. I don’t see any reason to strike out against him over something this unimportant.” McCarthy considered the position of whip to be a largely ceremonial role – especially after the Johnson years – and believed there would be no great change in his ability to pass his legislative agenda regardless of who held the position. Under extreme pressure from the liberal wing of his cabinet to support Muskie, McCarthy met them half way and publicly declared his neutrality [3]. For his part, Long was caught completely off-guard by the challenge. Calling in old favours and making new promises, he desperately tried to hold on to his position.

In a narrow vote, Muskie triumphed over Long, ironically, because of people’s assumptions. The liberals assumed that McCarthy secretly preferred Muskie and he was only keeping quiet to mollify the South. The South believed the same thing, and despite sabotaging Long themselves, felt that McCarthy was being truly gentlemanly about the whole thing. With Muskie as Majority Whip, the liberal nature of the 91st Congress was guaranteed.

Meanwhile, if things had been simple in the Senate, they were an absolute mess in the House.

Speaker of the House John William McCormack had served in that position since 1962, and had been a representative since 1928. An able legislator and eloquent debater, he had overseen not only Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty’s, but Kennedy’s New Frontier as well. Despite this, McCormack had never been popular; he was blunt, withdrawn, incredibly formal, and devoutly Catholic, which evidently made for good presidential timber but not for a good Speaker. While he was respected, he had never been able to make connections like his mentor and predecessor as Speaker, Sam Rayburn of Texas. Additionally, the liberal wing of the party considered him overly close with the South. Elderly Southern Democrats dominated the important committee chairmanships, and McCormack brusquely dismissed suggestions by young liberals to change the seniority system to something more democratic. By the late 1960s, there had been growing calls for his replacement. In January of 1967, the Washington Post criticized his leadership style and closeness with the South, prompting the Southern Democrats to rally to his cause. Most vocal of all were his direct subordinates: Majority Leader Carl Albert of Oklahoma, Majority Whip Hale Boggs of Louisiana, and Chair of the House Armed Services Committee L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina. Asking to be recognized for “a long minute,” River remarked, “Mr. Speaker, when they undertake to vilify the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, they undermine the war effort of America, they undermine the fighting man on the battlefront and the most anti-Communist man in America, and they offend the dignity and the sensibilities of each one of us...” Besides being a matter of procedure, Rivers’ support for McCormack was also tied into their mutual support for the Vietnam War. While the backlash against the Washington Post abated criticisms of McCormack for a time, they had re-emerged by the end of the year. Richard Bolling of Missouri– a protégé of Rayburn’s along with McCormack – called for his resignation in October of 1967. Attacking him from the left, Bolling claimed that McCormack was standing in the way of essential House reform, accusing him of being “the greatest defender of the status quo because it made him Speaker.” Writing off Bolling as jealous for not having been chosen as Speaker himself, McCormack’s Southern allies once again went on the attack. While the criticisms had dulled for most of 1968, they had come back stronger than ever following McCarthy’s election. Looking to parse out the extent of his support, McCormack began sending out letters to representatives starting in late November of 1968. He also secured the support of Albert to make sure his second-in-command would not challenge him for the Speakership. However, McCormack had not covered all of his bases, as Boggs considered a challenge, and Bolling continued to agitate [4]. Even Brock Adams, who had only been in the House since 1965, seemed to imply he was going to challenge McCormack. But, ultimately, it was not Bolling, Boggs, nor Adams who challenged McCormack, but the relatively obscure Morris K. Udall of Arizona.

More commonly known as Mo, Udall was Arizona's only Democrat on the federal level. Brother of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, Mo had made his mark in his eight years in the House as a quick witted liberal reformer was was opposed to the Vietnam War. Believing it was time for a change of leadership and congressional procedural reform, Udall decided to challenge McCormack. Managing his 'campaign' was Frank Thompson, a representative from New Jersey who was also an ally of Bolling. Looking to craft an alliance, Thompson approached the incredibly influential Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills of Arkansas. Thompson voiced the possibility of a Mills-Udall 'ticket' to challenge McCormack, with Mills as the new Speaker and Udall as his deputy. Mills was reluctant however, as he had no ambitions beyond his chairship, and had to be convinced that Udall was not a stalking horse for Bolling, whom he and much of the rest of the House disliked due to his brash and grating personality. Mills opined that he would do it if asked by the President-elect, but McCarthy remained aloof of the whole affair, much as he had been doing with the simultaneous Senate intrigues. Instead, Mills suggested that they should approach Albert. Udall did indeed call Albert, who rattled off a list of McCormack's various shortcomings, but he showed no visible interested in a challenge, and implied that Udall should try and take the position of Majority Whip from Boggs instead [5]. Despite these proposed alternatives, Udall pushed forward, and prepared a declaration of his candidacy on December 26th of 1968, to be circulated to the rest of the House's Democrats. In his letter, Udall declared that he had great respect for McCormack, but that it was time for a fresh start, and that many members of the party wanted reform. Distancing himself from the liberal wing of the party, Udall promised to run a subdued campaign, and claimed to be a candidate of change rather than a candidate of any ideology or faction. In this way, he hoped that he could position himself as the 'anti-McCormack' candidate rather than a 'pro-Udall' one. He was also looking to emulate a McCarthy-esque acceptability to Southerners. Udall also encouraged a secret ballot, and, most notably, announced that if he defeated McCormack he would open a second round of voting in which any candidate could enter. By doing so, Udall hoped to encourage ambitious members of the mid-tier leadership to support him on the first ballot. Regardless of the outcome of later ballots, he believed that he would be in a strong enough posture to demand some kind of leadership position either way.

Having declined to comment up to that point, McCarthy quickly warmed to the idea of a second ballot. He was barely acquainted with Udall, but felt that his call for a second ballot was emblematic of his own calls for a second ballot at the 1960 Democratic National Convention, so that each delegate (or, in this case, representative), could vote their conscience. Without even mentioning either candidate's name, McCarthy declared his support for the second ballot idea, implicitly endorsing Udall in the process.

The lead-up to the vote remained unclear, as many representatives avoided making commitments, despite intensive schmoozing from both McCormack and Udall. Following McCarthy's semi-endorsement, Udall began to more openly associate himself with the New Politics label, and met with Vice President Connally to assure him that if he were to win that Texas' longstanding influence in the House would be maintained.

When the caucus was held in January of 1969, Udall managed to beat out McCormack [6]. Although the vote was secret, attitudes leading up to it indicated that Udall received his support from pro-McCarthy New Politicians, Southerners closely associated with the national and congressional leadership (namely in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana), and some more reform-minded moderates. McCormack appeared to receive his support from the majority of the committee chairs and their followers, as well as representatives from heavily unionized districts opposed to Udall's support for right-to-work legislation [7].

Expecting firmer presidential support in the second round of voting, Udall was sorely mistaken. McCarthy returned to his comfortable neutrality, risking a brutal, drawn out voting process in the House. Despite this, there were no clear challengers against Udall. While Albert was privately interested in the Speakership, he knew he likely not be able to get it. Albert had been the Chair of the Democratic National Convention in 1968, and McCarthy held Albert accountable for the convention's bias against him and his supporters. If Albert had entered the race, McCarthy would have begun openly supporting Udall out of spite. Mills continued to be uninterested despite being able to easily win the vote, while Boggs was in the process of being vetted for Director of the FBI, and no longer had an immediate interest in the Speakership. Sensing a golden opportunity, Bolling entered the race, portraying himself as a more seasoned and realistic liberal candidate. Caucus Chairman Dan Rosenkowski also entered. As the highest ranking Democrat willing to run he felt entitled to the position, and as the most moderate of the candidates felt he would be the most likely to succeed. Last but not least was James G. O'Hara, the regional whip for Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. O'Hara was a founding member of the Democratic Study Group along with McCarthy, but he had eventually taken a more moderate path. O'Hara had supported Humphrey and the Vietnam War up to the convention, but otherwise, he was considered a champion of various liberal causes, including congressional procedural reform. O'Hara positioned himself as a dark horse compromise candidate, and was the rallying point for the minority of liberal-moderate House Democrats who could not tolerate Udall's past anti-unions votes, did not like Bolling, and were unsure about Rostenkowski [8]. In the second round of voting, Udall kept his lead, but he did not reach the majority he needed to win. The ever-ambitious Bolling called in all the favours he could and placed second, while O'Hara placed third. Rostenkowski placed a dismal fourth, in spite of his title as Caucus Chairman [9]. In the third round, Udall's lead narrowed as O'Hara surpassed Bolling. In the fourth and final round, with Bolling and Rostenkowski having both dropped out, O'Hara easily defeated Udall. Udall would gripe that he could have won the whole thing on the second ballot if McCarthy had intervened, but he was still pelased with his incredibly strong showing, and secured the position of House Majority Whip soon after Boggs left the office for the FBI. As for Albert, he remained Majority Leader.

Soon after this unprecedented reshuffling of House leadership, McCarthy invited O'Hara, Albert, and Udall to the Oval Office to congratulate them on the success of the democratic process. If any of them had peaked inside his desk, they would have found a letter from eleven years earlier:

“Dear Eugene: Congratulations on your entry into the Senate in this coming Congress. I have always been proud of you.”



The chaos and factionalism of the Democrats choosing their new leadership would have been a golden opportunity for congressional Republicans, if they had not been in an even worse state.

Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois had lost re-election in an upset to his Democratic challenger, William G. Clark. Clark had been an open McCarthy supporter and had drafted the peace plank at the Democratic National Convention, and rode McCarthy's big coattails in the state to victory. Dirksen's most obvious replacement, Senate Minority Whip Thomas Kuchel of California, had also been defeated, but by a right wing primary challenger named Max Rafferty. Rafferty went on to lose in the general election to Alan Cranston, another McCarthy supporter. This marked the first instance of the two Senate leadership positions being vacated at the same time in American history. Because of this, the two candidates who had been planning to battle it out for the position of Minority Whip instead found themselves thrust forward into a battle for Minority Leader. The choice of Dirksen and the conservatives for the position was Roman Hruska, the Senator from Nebraska. A fiscal conservative who was tough on crime, the cantankerous Hruska was nonetheless consistently progressive on civil rights legislation. Challenging him was Hugh Scott, the Senator from Pennsylvania, the choice of the party's moderates and liberals (colloquially known as the progressives). A supporter of Nelson Rockefeller at the Republican National Convention, Scott was equally progressive to Hruska on civil rights, but was a fiscal moderate, and was considered the more able legislator of the two. While the battle for influence was fiercely fought, Hruska won out by a single vote to attain leadership, with his victory being attributed to a backlash against the moderate Nixon's defeat and the conservatives making more gains than the progressives in the Senate elections [10]. The vote for Minority Whip was, on the other hand, a matter of compromise. In 1959, conservatives and progressives within the party had agreed to choose a conservative from the Midwest as leader and a western progressive as deputy, leading to Dirksen and Kuchel, respectively. With a conservative from the Midwest as leader once again, there was an inclination within the party to make a similar compromise. The most obvious choice for Minority Whip was Mark Hatfield of Oregon, the last of the prominent western progressives, but he was disqualified due to the fact that he had openly supported McCarthy over Nixon in the presidential election [11]. Turning to the East Coast, there was some consideration for Jacob Javits of New York or Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, but they were both on the left fringe of the party, and were considered too much of a compromise by the conservatives. Eventually Scott was chosen as the simplest choice, and began the session as Minority Whip under Hruska [12].

Things were much calmer for the House Republicans. The conservative-leaning moderate Gerald Ford of Michigan remained House Minority Leader, with his dreams of a Republican majority and the title of Speaker being dashed by the static results for the House elections in 1968. He was joined by the entirely conservative House Minority Whip Leslie Arends of Illinois. Republican progressives in the House looked on in envy at the shake-ups on the Democratic side compared to what they considered to be their own moribund leadership. Meanwhile, the moderate Melvin Laird of Wisconsin retained the third highest position as Conference Chairman [13]. Laird was known for his frequent battles for influence with Ford, which caused persistent infighting amongst the House Republicans. There was also the matter of the Republican Committee on Planning and Research, affectionately known to its supporters as P & R. It had been established by Ford after he had forcibly taken over the Republican leadership from his predecessor, Charles Halleck, and it was designed to circumvent the rest of the House's Republican leadership by ignoring committee chairs and making its own policy proposals and task forces. Chaired by the moderate Charles Goodell of New York, a confrontation on the status of the P & R was inevitable; conservatives were waiting for Goodell to make a planned run for Senate so that they could abolish the post, while the progressives were looking to put in a progressive successor to Goodell as Chair in the form of a young representative from Illinois named Donald Rumsfeld [14].


While all of Congress' changes in leadership resolved within January of 1969, there was still the matter of the Supreme Court to take into consideration. In 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren declared that he would retire. Warren, a progressive Republican, had previously served as Governor of California and the 1948 Republican vice presidential nominee. Appointed as Chief Justice by President Eisenhower in 1953, Warren oversaw some of the most famously liberal and civil libertarian rulings in American history. Landmark decisions had been made on civil rights, criminal justice, civil liberties, separation of church and state, and the loosening of censorship. Warren believed that Nixon was the most likely to be elected president in 1968, but also believed he was an untrustworthy opportunist. Attempting to preempt a Nixon Administration shaping the Supreme Court, Warren declared his retirement months before the election, asking President Johnson to begin proceedings to replace him. This drew heavy criticism from conservatives, who – expecting a moderate or conservative Republican to win in November – accused Warren of trying to circumvent democracy for his own ideological purposes.

Refusing to waste a golden opportunity, Johnson had gone forward with choosing a new Chief Justice. His pick was Associate Justice Abe Fortas. Fortas, a Jewish liberal from the South, had been Undersecretary of the Interior under the Franklin Roosevelt Administration, and had been a close ally of Johnson for decades. He had represented Johnson in the incredibly hotly contested 1948 Senate Democratic primary in Texas, where Johnson won by eighty-seven votes amidst widespread accusations of voter fraud. Using his connections in Washington, namely with Associate Justice Hugo Black, Fortas ensured that Johnson's name would appear on the ballot for the general election, and stopped an investigation into the voter fraud accusations before they had begun. Since then, Fortas had run his own private practice while also giving legal advice to Johnson. Once president, Johnson created a vacancy on the Supreme Court by asking Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg to become US Ambassador to the UN so that he could appoint Fortas to the position. Believing that some of his Great Society and War on Poverty legislation might be ruled unconstitutional, Johnson wanted Fortas on the court both as a consistent liberal vote, and as an early warning system for any unfavourable rulings. Once on the Supreme Court, Fortas closely collaborated with Johnson, to the extent that it made some of the other Justices uncomfortable. Otherwise, Fortas' positions were consistent with the liberalism of the Warren Court. Additionally, if Fortas were to be made Chief Justice, his position as Associate Justice would be vacated. Johnson planned to fill the second position with Judge Homer Thornberry, another personal friend who had once represented the same district in the House of Representatives as Johnson had. Believing it would be a relatively easy feat to have the Senate confirm Fortas and Thornberry, Johnson faced a rude awakening; social conservatives in both parties believed that Fortas was much too liberal to be Chief Justice, while Republicans accused both appointments of being products of nepotism, and Everett Dirksen had been mistaken when he told Johnson he would be able to bring the Republicans around. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, Johnson's old mentor, summed up the mood of the Southern Democrats when he remarked "We will support Abe Fortas, but we will enthusiastically support Homer Thornberry." However, opposition persisted from the Republicans, with Strom Thurmond of South Carolina leading the charge on social conservatism, and Robert Griffin of Michigan leading on the nepotism issue. Facing an extensive filibuster, Fortas decided to withdraw his name from consideration in October of 1968, automatically withdrawing Thornberry's name as well.

With McCarthy as president, the selection of a new Chief Justice entered a new stage. At the Democratic National Convention, McCarthy had privately promised Connally that he would resubmit the names of Fortas and Thornberry, but Fortas' self-withdrawal effectively absolved him of that promise. Instead, McCarthy put forward the name of Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Fortas' mentor. Appointed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1939, Douglas was a staunch civil libertarian, and one of the most consistently liberal members of the Warren Court. He also appealed to McCarthy because he was the only Supreme Court Justice to openly oppose the Vietnam War. However, the extent of Douglas' civil libertarianism was just as unacceptable to conservatives as Fortas had been: he had granted a stay of execution for Julius and Ethel Rosenburg – who had been sentenced to death for giving American nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union – on the grounds that they had not received a jury trial; in the case Roth v. United States, Douglas had given a dissenting opinion from the left, arguing that pornography was protected under the First Amendment; he had also drawn controversy for publishing articles in various counterculture and pornographic magazines. Despite McCarthy's initial enthusiasm, it quickly became clear that Douglas was unacceptably liberal for the Senate to confirm, especially considering McCarthy made no effort to try and convince anyone. The Douglas attempt was quickly aborted, and McCarthy instead put forward the name of Associate Justice William J. Brennan Jr. Only slightly less liberal than Douglas and privately opposed to the Vietnam War, Brennan was reassuringly clean of controversy and unorthodox takes. Considering he was the best they were going to get, the Southern Democrats agreed to confirm Brennan, under the condition that Thornberry would be his replacement. Now free of clear accusations of nepotism, the Democrats made their Supreme Court appointments.

With Brennan's ascension to Chief Justice, the Supreme Court had four liberals and moderates each, with only one conservative [15]. But, this balance was quickly thrown out of equilibrium, as yet another intrigue gripped Fortas. A Life magazine investigation in May of 1969 revealed that Fortas was on a twenty thousand dollar a year retainer from the Wall Street financier Louis Wolfson. Paid to give unspecified 'advice,' many interpreted the arrangement as a bribe, as Wolfson frequently found himself in trouble with the law for a series of white collar crimes. With impeachment proceedings opening and facing intense pressure from other members of the Supreme Court, Fortas resigned. He would later claim that he had "resigned to save Douglas," who was under investigation for a similar scandal. As Fortas' replacement, McCarthy put forward the unconventional choice of David Riesman, a famous sociologist. Riesman was most famous as the author of The Lonely Crowd, a sociological analysis of American cultural development in relation to the middle class. As for his qualifications, Riesman was a graduate of Harvard Law School, a former member of the Harvard Law Review, had clerked for Supreme Court Associate Justice Louis Brandeis, and had taught at both the University of Buffalo Law School and the University of Chicago. Legally and philosophically, Riesman was an advocate of individualism and civic and civil rights, being a critic of both American consumer culture and socialist collectivism. Caught completely off guard by the proposal, hearings on Riesman's selection continued well into late 1969, but he was eventually confirmed by the Senate, with the expectation that he would be a liberal member of the Brennan Court. An impeachment investigation into Douglas headed by House Minority Leader Ford continued well into 1970.


Beyond the matters of leadership struggles and judicial appointments, McCarthy also began to deal with his legislative agenda. Titled New Politics, the cornerstone of McCarthy's domestic policy were the Four New Civil Rights: a minimum income, healthcare coverage for every American, expanded education and workforce training, and the right to a decent house. To address the first of these, McCarthy began to explore an idea that united both laissez-faire capitalists and Post-Keynesian economist: a guaranteed minimum income. The drafting of the proposed legislation, titled the Adequate Income Act (AIA), was overseen by Secretary of Housing, Education, and Welfare Daniel Patrick Moynihan, with assistance from Secretary of Treasury John Kenneth Galbraith. Believing the most direct solution to poverty was "cold cash," Moynihan's version was the original draft of the AIA. The Moynihan Plan used a nuclear family of a mother, father, and two children as the metric, though coverage would not just be limited to families of four. A family would receive a stipend, to be sent either monthly or annually, which would amount to 1,600 dollars a year until the family reached the poverty line of 3,290 dollars. Including food stamps and other related welfare programs, the effective annual stipend would be 2,464 dollars a year. With the AIA expected to come into effect in the 1971-1972 fiscal year, the Moynihan Plan would add nearly four and a half billion dollars to the welfare budget, which already stood at around two hundred billion dollars if spending trends continued at the same rate. An additional investment would be attached to the AIA which would cover the third New Civil Right, and would include hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidized daycare, adult education, and on-the-job training [16]. Galbraith's additions to the Moynihan Plan was a 'grandmother clause' which would maintain the rate for those already on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) at 4,119 dollars a year, and a negative income tax that would exempt those on AIA from taxation.

While conceptually agreeing with a guaranteed minimum income, the Moynihan Plan was fiercely opposed by the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), founded by George Wiley, a chemist and black civil rights activist. Founded in August of 1967, the NWRO was created to represent people on welfare, with the single most visible group of the organization being black single mothers. The NWRO was opposed to invasive questions and investigations by welfare case workers, the stigmatization of welfare recipients (particularly the stigmatization of black single mothers as 'welfare queens'), and the often inconsistently enforced rules of the welfare system, among other issues. However, the NWRO had also drawn controversy due to its growing tendency for direct action and takeovers of welfare offices, and while it had never used violence, it occasionally threatened to bring in militant groups like the Black Panther Party. They also boldly refused any private charity, and demanded money up front from the government rather than needed items; they believed that they were entitled to government welfare as a human right, and that they should be able to purchase high quality goods and products such as fashionable clothing, based on the psychological theory that poverty induced self-hatred. This limited their support from moderates who might otherwise have been sympathetic, as it played into the stereotype of poverty as a personal failing. As one analyst put it, "No one appreciates a panhandler with an 'exact change only' sign." Regardless, by 1969, the NWRO supported the concept of a guaranteed minimum income and they had drafted their own plan, but there were disagreements over the particulars between the membership – which was mostly black, female, unemployed, or working poor – and the organization's bureaucracy – which was professionally educated, middle class, and more frequently white and/or male. Much more ambitious than the Moynihan Plan, the NWRO Plan would provide 5,500 dollars a year for a family of four, which would increase with earnings until the family was making 10,000 dollars a year (for example, if a family was earning 9,887 dollars a year, they would receive 8,792 dollars in guaranteed income, which would push them nearly five times above the poverty line). The figure of 5,500 dollars was chosen as the minimum figure because the NWRO claimed that the poverty line of 3,290 dollars was enough to literally not die, but that, according go the Department of Labor, 5,500 dollars was the minimum for "maintenance of health and social well being, the nurture of children, and participation in community activities." The NWRO Plan specified that it did not cover costs for a car, cigarettes, out-of-town travel, laundromats, long-distance phone calls, and life insurance, with the whole system being monitored by "spot checks." As a work incentive, there would be a sixty-six percent income tax until recipients went off if guaranteed minimum income. Whitney Young, one of the 'Big Six' of civil rights activists and the Executive Director of the National Urban League, proposed an even higher stipend of 6,500 dollars a year, and there were calls within the NWRO to remove work incentives entirely as being "an act of political repression."

Having extensive ties to the organization from his presidential campaign, McCarthy preferred the NWRO Plan, and asked for it to be introduced into the Senate, over the loud protests of Moynihan [17]. Introducing the AIA into the Senate was Fred Harris of Oklahoma, chosen for the role due to his place on the Senate Finance Committee. A supporter of Humphrey during the primaries and at the convention, Harris had swung hard into the New Politics camp following McCarthy's election, and had adopted guaranteed minimum income as his pet project. Harris began introducing the NWRO Plan version of the AIA to his fellow members of the Finance Committee, with the full knowledge that it would be absolutely unacceptable to the rest of the committee. Harris was quickly proven right by Russell Long. Despite losing the title of Majority Whip, he was still the Chair of the Finance Committee, and an opponent of the NWRO. With McCarthy believing his job as president was done once the legislation was introduced to Congress, he began moving on to other projects, giving Harris an opportunity to shine. He introduced his own compromise plan of 3,600 dollars a year (above the Moynihan's 1,600 dollars and the 3,290 dollar poverty line, but below the 5,500 dollar suggestion of the NWRO and the Department of Labor), with Moynihan's work incentives and New Civil Rights overlap legislation still in place along with Galbraith's grandmother clause and negative income tax. While the price tag on the Harris Plan was still significantly higher than Long's preference for the Moynihan Plan, Harris reminded the more hesitant members of the committee that many welfare programs would be removed as redundancies and to help pay for the AIA, such as AFDC. Harris also played off Long's sympathies toward the President due to their long-standing working relationship (McCarthy had also served on the Finance Committee) and his neutrality during the whip fight.

In the end, the Harris Plan version of the AIA was accepted by the Senate Finance Committee by a vote of nine to eight. In favour were Senators Russell Long of Louisiana, Albert Gore of Tennessee, Vance Hartke of Indiana, Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, Fred Harris of Oklahoma, Harry Byrd Jr. of Virginia, William Proxmire of Wisconsin, and John J. Gilligan of Ohio, all Democrats. In opposed were Senators John Williams of Delaware, Wallace Bennett of Utah, Carl Curtis of Nebraska, Herman Talmadge of Georgia, Jack Miller of Iowa, Len Jordan of Idaho, Paul Fannin of Arizona, and Gordon Allott of Colorado, all of whom but Talmadge were Republicans [18].

The NWRO were very unhappy with the Harris Plan to say the least. Wiley announced that they would not care if the AIA passed either way, and would come out completely against it if Congress watered down the rest of the New Civil Rights legislation. Further demands by the NWRO to testify before the Finance Committee were denied by Long [19].

With the understanding that the AIA was a major part of President McCarthy's domestic agenda, Senate Democrats rallied to ensure its passage. Quickly invoking cloture, it received unanimous support from liberal Democrats, and also held a reasonable amount of appeal to Southern Democrats, in part because of their continued reciprocity with McCarthy, but mostly because they could return to their voters and say they had dramatically reduced the size of the welfare state. Even with some defections from especially fiscally conservative Democrats, the AIA was able to make up the difference with the support of the most liberal of the progressive Republicans, and it passed in the Senate by a comfortable margin. Although it still had to make its way through the House, the world's first guaranteed minimum income proposal had come much closer to reality.

Although the AIA took the most interest, other laws were in the works as well. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was passed, which McCarthy had helped craft during his time in the Senate on the Finance Committee. While it provided several minor changes and recalibrated the tax code, its main purpose was to add an alternative minimum tax, which was designed to tax wealthy individuals, trusts, or corporations who had otherwise avoided paying any taxes through loopholes and deductibles.

The fourth of McCarthy's New Civil Rights also began to make its way through committee in the form of the Federal Aid Housing Act of 1969. Modeled after the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, which created the Interstate Highway system, the Housing Act aimed to build at least three and a half million affordable suburban homes – if not several million more – over a five to ten year period. Like with the Highway Act, construction would be contracted out to private companies, and up to six billion dollars were to be allocated to it per year. Costs would initially be covered by ending the Vietnam War budget, but once that ran out it would be re-allocated to the Treasury General Fund. Eventually, it was expected that a Federal Housing trust fund would be created with a new source of income to pay for it. An incredibly ambitious plan, the Housing Act was designed with the goal of ending the country's ghettos entirely, and would effectively end the de facto segregation that was still common across the nation. It also had an incredibly optimistic budget: judging by the expenses of the Highway Act, the Housing Act would cost nearly five times more than what they were hoping to pay.

McCarthy's presidency also marked the beginning of a new wave of environmental legislation. On January 28th of 1969, a massive oil spill occurred in the Santa Barbara channel, off the coast of the city of Santa Barbara and northwest of Los Angeles. The Santa Barbara channel been coveted by the oil industry for decades, for its huge underwater petroleum reserves which were close enough to the shore to be easily accessible for nascent offshore drilling technology. The amount of federal leases for oil drilling in the channel ballooned throughout 1968, to the chagrin of the local communities, who had advertised the area as a tourist spot with pristine waters. Foreshadowing the larger spill, two thousand gallons of crude oil spilled into the channel on June 7th of 1968, despite assurances from the oil industry and Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall that a spill was impossible. Finally, the major spill came from Union Oil's Platform A due to a pressure build-up of oil, gas, and mud while a drill bit was being changed. Attempts to plug up the well with steel and concrete were only partially successful, and oil would continue to leak out for months. Up to 672,000 gallons of oil were spilled, becoming an ecological disaster and killing thousands of animals. Trying to minimize the public relations fiasco, the President of Union Oil, Fred Hartley, said he would not call it a disaster as no humans had died he was "amazed at the publicity for the loss of a few birds." Outcry was furthered by the indecision of the federal government, which rapidly halted, resumed, and halted oil production in the channel after the spill. McCarthy was criticized for not appearing in person, leaving it to Secretary of the Interior Ernest Gruening. When asked why he seemed uninterested in the disaster, the President replied that his presence would not change the situation at all, so there was no point going. Spillage continued into 1970, with the environmental recovery taking much longer than that. In the aftermath, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was introduced into the Senate by Henry Jackson of Washington. The NEPA would establish the President's Council on Environmental Quality, and would require federal agencies to provide regular environmental audits. While not particularly extensive, the NEPA was expected to easily pass, and drafts for other environmental legislation was to follow soon after. The Santa Barbara oil spill also prompted renewed interest in the removal of the oil depletion allowance, which had exempted nearly a third of the profits of the oil industry from federal taxation. McCarthy had frequently voted to protect it in his time in the Senate.

But, for all of the prospective legislative accomplishments of the first year of the McCarthy Administration, America's greatest triumph would have nothing to do with the President; it would have to do with the Moon.


In 1961, President Kennedy had famously announced his ambition that there would be a manned mission to land on the Moon by the end of the decade. By 1969, Kennedy's ambition became a reality under the auspices of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

In December of 1968, the Apollo 8 mission became the first manned mission to orbit the Moon. Apollo 8 gathered information for a future landing site before returning to Earth. It was followed up by Apollo 9 in March of 1969. While Apollo 9 only orbited the Earth, it was the first to test out the lunar excursion module that would be used for the actual Moon landing, and performed a series of remote control maneuvers. It was then followed by Apollo 10, which effectively served as the test flight for the real Moon landing. Apollo 10 approached the Moon, and lowered the lunar module above the chosen landing site in the Sea of Tranquility, a lunar basalt plain. Somewhat forebodingly, the lunar module entered into what was described as a "combination of minor and easily correctable failures," meaning it went spinning out of control for eight seconds before stabilizing. The three astronauts chosen for the most important mission of all, Apollo 11, were Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins. Armstrong was a test pilot who had been on the Gemini 8 mission, which featured the first successful docking between spacecraft. Aldrin was a West Point graduate and mechanical engineer who had helped design the NASA in-space docking procedures. Collins, also a West Point graduate, had served as the pilot of Gemini 10. The roles were assigned with Armstrong as the mission commander, Aldrin as the pilot of the lander module, and Collins as the pilot of the command module which would remain in orbit. As the lander pilot, Aldrin was originally going to be the first man on the Moon, but NASA changed procedures in March of 1969 so that Armstrong – in his role as mission commander – would be the first.

Launching on the morning of July 16th, the three men entered lunar orbit seventy-six hours later. While making the descent, the lander module experienced a recurrent false error code which turned out just to be an information overload, but, in the confusion, the lander, with Armstrong and Aldrin inside, were heading for a dangerously sloped plot of earth. Switching to manual control, Armstrong avoided the slope and found a flat-bottomed crater to land in. With the engines blasting the lunar dust away with magnificent force, the astronauts had not realized at first that they had already landed. Ignoring NASA's advice to get some sleep, Armstrong and Aldrin spent several hours completing shutdown protocols before suiting up and activating a television transmitter.

Noting the the appearance and texture of the lunar surface, Armstrong prepared to step foot on the lunar surface, and said the famous words that were broadcast to a fifth of the world's population: "That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind."

Planting an American flag and some other items and research material, Armstrong and Aldrin explored the lunar surface, collecting space rocks among other things. By rerouting the transmission through NASA's mission control in Houston, Texas, McCarthy was able to phone the astronauts from the White House. Waxing poetic about the Moon and the indomitable nature of the human spirit, the very practically-minded space men seemed rather bemused by the President's call.

Twenty-two hours after landing, Armstrong and Aldrin safely left the Moon's surface, and exited orbit soon after. Re-entering the Earth's atmosphere on July 24th, the three astronauts landed in the Pacific Ocean near Johnston Atoll. Once recovered by the US Navy, they were put under quarantine for any possible Moon diseases, and were later transferred to the Johnson Space Center for observation. Watching the international fanfare on TV from quarantine, Aldrin remarked, "Look. We missed the whole thing."

After eighteen days in quarantine, the astronauts began a thirty-eight day international tour, having leapt into history.

McCarthy's first year as president was a year of prominent successes and underlying controversies. An unprecedented amount of turnover had happened in Congress' leadership under his watch: In the Senate, McCarthy's friend Edmund Muskie had been able to seize the position of Senate Majority Whip Russell Long without compromising the President's close working relationship with the South; in the House pro-McCarthy insurgent Mo Udall managed to topple the Speaker of the House, John William McCormack. While Udall failed to attain the Speakership, his bold challenge secured him the position of House Majority Whip, and replaced the already liberal McCormack with an even more liberal alternative in the form of James G. O'Hara. McCarthy's followers were again able to remove a traditionally Southern backed senior politician without alienating the South.

On the Supreme Court, McCarthy made three appointments in one year, elevating the liberal Associate Justice William J. Brennan Jr. to the position of Chief Justice, while also appointing the moderate Homer Thornberry, and replacing the liberal Abe Fortas, who resigned amidst scandal, with the liberal sociologist David Riesman.

Legislatively, McCarthy began to implement his New Politics program in the form of the Four New Civil Rights. Great strides were made in passing a guaranteed minimum income and beginning construction on millions of low cost houses that would accommodate historically impoverished groups. Despite the President's general lack of interest in the subject, environmental policy also began to take centre stage.
With the adoption of the Gavin Plan, McCarthy made great strides in bringing the Vietnam War to an end. A ceasefire had been negotiated by the end of the year, with full American withdrawal scheduled for the end of 1970.

However, it is worth noting that in all of these issues, McCarthy had enjoyed an extraordinary amount of luck. If Long had been more popular among his Southern colleagues, or if a Southern Democrat had tried to run for Speaker, the fragile alliance between liberals and Southerners could well have smashed to pieces. Likewise, due to Fortas withdrawing his name from consideration for Chief Justice in 1968, McCarthy did not appoint him to the position in 1969, thereby avoiding being caught up in his scandalous resignation. Additionally, McCarthy's adherence to congressional supremacy could have easily ruined his landmark legislative proposals, but a mix of good timing and the efforts of congressional liberals like Fred Harris pulled him through. Likewise, the Gavin Plan had only succeeded due the inadaptability of the North Vietnamese military; if the North Vietnamese had changed tactics sooner, the Gavin Plan could well have been a disaster.

An escalating culture war was also unfolding to McCarthy's disadvantage. Increasingly radical leftist groups like Students for a Democratic Society and the Weathermen were turning to domestic terrorism, even with one of the furthest left presidents in American history in office. Conservative authority figures and police crackdowns were overwhelmingly popular with America's white majority, and while McCarthy was still popular with this main group, his seeming unwillingness to distance himself from the radical left had begun to raise eyebrows. McCarthy's key demographic of the white suburban middle class were also still waiting on their promised lower taxes and lower inflation.

Despite all this, McCarthy's first year in office was, for the most part, a huge success, but in many ways his presidency would be similar to the Moon landing: a miraculous ascent followed by an inevitable crash back down to Earth.



[1] IOTL, while Muskie was personally more inclined to the peace plank, he was a vocal supporter of the pro-administration plank. Muskie apparently believed it was unwise to make such a public break from the incumbent Democratic president, while a more cynical interpretation being that he was trying to grab the vice presidential nomination, which he did. McCarthy never forgave Muskie, and ran an incredibly aggressive, mud-slinging campaign against him in the 1972 Democratic primaries. Despite this, in their only head-to-head match-up, in the Illinois primary, Muskie beat McCarthy by a nearly two-to-one margin. ITTL, with Humphrey having supported the peace plank, Muskie sensed which way the political wind was blowing and supported the peace plank as well. Because of this, the McCarthy-Muskie friendship remained intact.

[2] IOTL, Muskie got a taste for presidential politics as Humphrey's running mate. Planning his 1972 presidential run, he considered running for Majority Whip, but did not want to be tied to Washington D.C. by taking the position, leaving the challenge open to Ted Kennedy's successful leadership challenge against Long. ITTL, with the extra responsibility of taking care of his grievously injured brother Bobby, and with Muskie preempting his decision, he has decided to support the Senator from Maine instead.

[3] IOTL, McCarthy refused to back Muskie in the event that he had run for Majority Whip, and voted for Long when Kennedy made his challenge, describing him as “about as liberal on most issues as anybody in the Senate.” ITTL, with their friendship not spoiled, McCarthy has declared neutrality instead of openly supporting Long. The quotation above was what McCarthy said to Kennedy.

[4] Like IOTL, Boggs ultimately decided not to run for the Speakership in 1969. However, unlike IOTL, he does not rally the Louisiana delegation to McCormack, as he is hesitating to wait for McCarthy's reaction and eyeing the possibility of being appointed Director of the FBI.

[5] It was frequently speculated by Albert's colleagues in the late 1960s that the reason he hesitated to challenge McCormack was because he had recently suffered a heart attack and was unsure about his own health.

[6] IOTL, McCormack easily won, with a vote of one hundred and seventy-eight to fifty-eight. ITTL, McCarthy served as the wild card that stopped most representatives from pledging early support to McCormack before Udall even declared his candidacy.

[7] While Udall was personally a supporter of labour unions and opposed to right-to-work legislation, he voted for it because it was overwhelmingly popular amongst his constituents.

[8] IOTL, O'Hara was an unsuccessful candidate for the position of Majority Leader in 1971, losing to Boggs.

[9] During the events of Chicago, President Johnson had felt that Albert had not been adequately keeping the protestors under control, and had ordered Rostenkowski to take over the podium at one point. Albert took it as a personal affront, and went out of his way to put roadblocks in Rostenkowski's career for the rest of his time as Majority Leader. ITTL, that has manifested by actively discouring people to vote for him for the Speakership.

[10] IOTL, Scott narrowly defeated Hruska for the position of Minority Whip.

[11] IOTL, Hatfield remarked to the press that if Nixon had kept the same position on the Vietnam War while running against an anti-war Democrat, then he would have voted for the anti-war Democrat. He also admitted that he wore a McCarthy campaign pin during the Oregon primary and met with his campaign at least once. Following Humphrey’s nomination, Hatfield supported Nixon.

[12] Ironically, Scott’s voting record while Minority Leader in the mid-1970s was to the right of the Minority Whip, Robert Griffin of Michigan, despite the fact that Scott was associated with the progressives and Griffin with the conservatives.

[13] Laird was chosen as Nixon’s Secretary of Defense and left his position as Conference Chair. The progressives quickly mobilized and had the moderate John Anderson of Illinois voted in as his replacement over the conservative choice, Jackson E. Betts of Ohio.

[14] Following Bobby Kennedy’s assassination, Nelson Rockefeller chose Goodell as his replacement by his authority of Governor of New York. With Goodell’s absence from the House, the party’s conservatives failed to abolish P & R entirely, but stripped it of most of its powers. In the ensuing vote to decide the new Chair, Rumsfeld was defeated seventy-six to seventy-four by the choice of the conservatives, Robert Taft Jr. of Ohio.

[15] William Douglas, William Brennan Jr., Abe Fortas and Thurgood Marshall for the liberals; Hugo Black, Potter Stewart, Byron White, and Homer Thornberry for the moderates; John Harlan II as the sole conservative.

[16] This is the same as Nixon’s OTL Family Assistance Plan (FAP) which was also created by Moynihan in his role as White House Urban Affairs Advisor.

[17] IOTL, Nixon had FAP introduced to the House first.

[18] IOTL, the FAP failed in the Senate Finance Committee in 1970 by a vote of ten to six. Voting in favour were Russell Long, J. William Fulbright, Abraham Ribicoff, Wallace Bennett, Jack Miller, and Len Jordan. Voting against were Clinton Anderson, Albert Gore, Herman Talmadge, Eugene McCarthy, Fred Harris, Harry Byrd Jr., John Williams, Carl Curtis, Paul Fannin, and Clifford Hansen. Senator Vance Hartke did not vote. Notably, many liberal Democrats who voted for the AIA ITTL voted against the FAP IOTL, including McCarthy himself! This was because McCarthy considered the FAP much too weak, and many liberal Democrats were trying to curry favour with the NWRO for planned 1972 presidential bids by doggedly sticking to their plan. In the Senate, McCarthy put forward the AIA in reaction to the FAP, remarking that work incentives were “not conductive to freedom and self-respect of those who must use the system to survive” and if his proposal was unrealistic, then “the same may be said about the amounts provided under the proposals of President Nixon.” McCarthy’s torpedoing of the FAP and his vote for Long for Majority Whip are generally considered to be the start of the erratic ‘kooky obscurity’ phase of his life. There have also been changes to the vote compared to OTL. The higher stipend caused the potentially favourable Republicans to vote against it, while Harry Byrd Jr., the swing vote ITTL, decided to support McCarthy due to his alliance with the South and his friendship with his late father, Harry Byrd Sr. Replacing McCarthy and Fulbright on the Finance Committee ITTL are William Proxmire and John J. Gilligan, while Gordon Allot replaced Everett Dirksen.

[19] IOTL, McCarthy circumvented Long’s rejection of the NWRO’s request to be present at a hearing by holding his own impromptu hearings in his office. Reporters and half a dozen senators attended – all liberal Democrats – as an entourage of mothers on welfare provided testimony. It did not go well. One mother compared Nixon to a slave driver, and another remarked that Ted Kennedy could kiss her ass, among other insults. Fortunately, the court reporter was partially deaf and did not catch most of the testimony, so the remarked did not become widely publicized. While McCarthy admitted “it was kind of a comedy,” but used the gist of the testimonies as the basis for his opposition to the FAP, claiming that it was discriminatory against single mothers as they would have to work a low-paying job to be eligible, which would not leave them with enough time to care for their children. McCarthy’s opposition to FAP convinced many of the other liberals to oppose it, resulting in its defeat, and ultimately killing the first serious guaranteed income proposal in modern history.