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The Battle of Chattanooga - Opening Movements
September 29, 1863
On September 29, Stanton ordered Grant to go to Chattanooga himself, as commander of the newly created Military Division of the Mississippi, bringing all of the territory from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River (and much of the state of Arkansas) under a single commander for the first time. Grant was given the option of replacing the demoralized Rosecrans with Granger. Although Grant did not have good personal relations with Granger, he heartily disliked Rosecrans. He selected Granger to command the Army of the Cumberland. Hearing an inaccurate report that Rosecrans was preparing to abandon Chattanooga, Grant telegraphed to Granger , "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible." He replied immediately, "I will hold the town till we starve." Grant traveled over the treacherous mountain supply line roads in an attempt to reach Chattanooga before a battle erupted.
Longstreet had been using Wheeler's cavalry to intercept and raid supply trains on their way to Chattanooga, both as a way to lower the morale and strength of the Army of the Cumberland, and to make up for the poor Confederate mountain supply routes. However, on September 29, Longstreet issued orders for Wheeler to take positions near Walden's Ridge, a ways north of Chattanooga, on the other side of the Tennessee River. Later that day, when supplies arrived to the city unmolested, Granger began to suspect that an attack was imminent. He sent urgent messages to both Hooker and Grant, though it would still be a few days until either of them could arrive.
Longstreet continued to arrange his corps. He was growing increasingly nervous as the day went on. Not only would this be his first major test of independent command, it would also be an offensive battle against a fortified opponent, a situation which went against Longstreet's generally defensive approach to warfare. Aides reportedly witnessed him pacing outside his tent, asking seemingly random questions about minor details within the order of battle, such as how many men were in each regiment under Manigault, or how many batteries were assigned to Smith's brigade. Much to the annoyance of his subordinates, he would also continuously micromanage the positions of various divisions and brigades in preparation for an attack.
Finally, he summoned the commanders of each corps- Maj. Gen. John B. Hood, now commanding Longstreet's old corps, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, now commanding Polk's old corps, Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill, Maj. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Sr., and William H.T. Walker, along with Maj. Felix H. Robertson, commander of the reserve artillery. He explained to them the plans for the next day- at dawn, a massive artillery barrage from the main army's elevated positions around the city. Meanwhile, Wheeler's pieces of low-caliber artillery, particularly horse-drawn mortars, would open fire from the north side of town. After an hour-long barrage, infantry would descend from their positions, assaulting the city while Wheeler moved to cut off retreat from the bridge crossing the Tennessee river, and descend into the town. His officers heartily agreed, riding back to their men to finish preparations for the attack.
Meanwhile, Longstreet had been exchanging messages with Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest. During the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga, Bragg had sent Forrest out to conduct raids across central Tennessee. Longstreet, however, saw the importance of Forrest's cavalry as a method to prevent Union reinforcements from participating in the battle, and so ordered Forrest to hinder Hooker's corps and prevent them from arriving at Chattanooga, "[So] that our assault of the city may go smoothly, and remain unmolested". Forrest reportedly cheered upon receiving the news that an assault of the city was underway, and set off with his men, who were bivouacked east of Tullahoma, set out to harass Hooker's forces, which had recently departed from Murfreesboro on their way to Chattanooga to relieve the Army of the Cumberland.
Granger, despite being trapped inside the city, had not remained idle. His demoralized forces had spent the days since their defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga digging in and heavily fortifying the city. Despite their low morale and lack of supplies, they were determined to hold the city in time for reinforcements to arrive. As Longstreet's movements made it increasingly obvious that an attack was imminent, and with Grant's men at least a month away, it became clear that Joseph Hooker's 20,000 men were the only hope for the Army of the Cumberland to hold off a Confederate attack. Granger urgently attempted to wire Hooker to explain the direness of his situation. However, the lines had been cut by Forrest's men, who were then preparing to assault and capture one of Hooker's divisions. Due to a blunder in communication, a division under Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr, had been left isolated and "in the air", with no natural defenses, in bivouac north of Manchester.
What followed was the Battle of Duck River, also known as the Battle of Manchester by Confederate forces. During a night raid, two divisions under Forrest's command burst from the woods near Manchester to attack von Steinwehr's weary, unprepared men. Catching them by surprise, they quickly routed Union forces, scattering attempts at resistance with speed and overwhelming numbers. Within half an hour of the initial assault, most of the division had either surrendered, or was dead or wounded. A small contingent of the division escaped and fled north. In total, 3,296 men had been captured, and 422 men were dead or wounded.
On September 29, Stanton ordered Grant to go to Chattanooga himself, as commander of the newly created Military Division of the Mississippi, bringing all of the territory from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River (and much of the state of Arkansas) under a single commander for the first time. Grant was given the option of replacing the demoralized Rosecrans with Granger. Although Grant did not have good personal relations with Granger, he heartily disliked Rosecrans. He selected Granger to command the Army of the Cumberland. Hearing an inaccurate report that Rosecrans was preparing to abandon Chattanooga, Grant telegraphed to Granger , "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible." He replied immediately, "I will hold the town till we starve." Grant traveled over the treacherous mountain supply line roads in an attempt to reach Chattanooga before a battle erupted.
Longstreet had been using Wheeler's cavalry to intercept and raid supply trains on their way to Chattanooga, both as a way to lower the morale and strength of the Army of the Cumberland, and to make up for the poor Confederate mountain supply routes. However, on September 29, Longstreet issued orders for Wheeler to take positions near Walden's Ridge, a ways north of Chattanooga, on the other side of the Tennessee River. Later that day, when supplies arrived to the city unmolested, Granger began to suspect that an attack was imminent. He sent urgent messages to both Hooker and Grant, though it would still be a few days until either of them could arrive.
Longstreet continued to arrange his corps. He was growing increasingly nervous as the day went on. Not only would this be his first major test of independent command, it would also be an offensive battle against a fortified opponent, a situation which went against Longstreet's generally defensive approach to warfare. Aides reportedly witnessed him pacing outside his tent, asking seemingly random questions about minor details within the order of battle, such as how many men were in each regiment under Manigault, or how many batteries were assigned to Smith's brigade. Much to the annoyance of his subordinates, he would also continuously micromanage the positions of various divisions and brigades in preparation for an attack.
Finally, he summoned the commanders of each corps- Maj. Gen. John B. Hood, now commanding Longstreet's old corps, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, now commanding Polk's old corps, Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill, Maj. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Sr., and William H.T. Walker, along with Maj. Felix H. Robertson, commander of the reserve artillery. He explained to them the plans for the next day- at dawn, a massive artillery barrage from the main army's elevated positions around the city. Meanwhile, Wheeler's pieces of low-caliber artillery, particularly horse-drawn mortars, would open fire from the north side of town. After an hour-long barrage, infantry would descend from their positions, assaulting the city while Wheeler moved to cut off retreat from the bridge crossing the Tennessee river, and descend into the town. His officers heartily agreed, riding back to their men to finish preparations for the attack.
Meanwhile, Longstreet had been exchanging messages with Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest. During the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga, Bragg had sent Forrest out to conduct raids across central Tennessee. Longstreet, however, saw the importance of Forrest's cavalry as a method to prevent Union reinforcements from participating in the battle, and so ordered Forrest to hinder Hooker's corps and prevent them from arriving at Chattanooga, "[So] that our assault of the city may go smoothly, and remain unmolested". Forrest reportedly cheered upon receiving the news that an assault of the city was underway, and set off with his men, who were bivouacked east of Tullahoma, set out to harass Hooker's forces, which had recently departed from Murfreesboro on their way to Chattanooga to relieve the Army of the Cumberland.
Granger, despite being trapped inside the city, had not remained idle. His demoralized forces had spent the days since their defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga digging in and heavily fortifying the city. Despite their low morale and lack of supplies, they were determined to hold the city in time for reinforcements to arrive. As Longstreet's movements made it increasingly obvious that an attack was imminent, and with Grant's men at least a month away, it became clear that Joseph Hooker's 20,000 men were the only hope for the Army of the Cumberland to hold off a Confederate attack. Granger urgently attempted to wire Hooker to explain the direness of his situation. However, the lines had been cut by Forrest's men, who were then preparing to assault and capture one of Hooker's divisions. Due to a blunder in communication, a division under Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr, had been left isolated and "in the air", with no natural defenses, in bivouac north of Manchester.
What followed was the Battle of Duck River, also known as the Battle of Manchester by Confederate forces. During a night raid, two divisions under Forrest's command burst from the woods near Manchester to attack von Steinwehr's weary, unprepared men. Catching them by surprise, they quickly routed Union forces, scattering attempts at resistance with speed and overwhelming numbers. Within half an hour of the initial assault, most of the division had either surrendered, or was dead or wounded. A small contingent of the division escaped and fled north. In total, 3,296 men had been captured, and 422 men were dead or wounded.
- Pulmonic_Consonant
- Word Count: 930