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Chapter III: Clearing Arkansas (Part 2)
The railroad, and its strategic value in moving men and supplies, was another of the innovations of the war between the states. This was even true in Arkansas, with its less than 50 miles of track. The port of DeValls Bluff was the eastern terminus of the unfinished Little Rock and Memphis Railroad, the only in the state. Supply boats would steam up the White River, depositing provisions at DeValls Bluff that would then be transported by train to Little Rock and freighted to the outlying posts. The track between the Bluff and Huntersville, as the depot opposite Little Rock was called, was a lifeline to the posts at Little Rock and farther west. Protecting this lifeline was full-time work for the Union soldiers in central Arkansas. The supply situation seriously hampered field operations for the Union army in Arkansas.
After the capture of Little Rock in 1863, the Federal soldiers were kept busy working on the fortifications while the timber and brush in front of the works was kept cleared. The constant arrival of transport boats kept them busy unloading stores and loading rail cars for shipment to the state capital. The troops performed boring picket duty or manned the forts surrounding the post. The drudgery of post duty was broken by patrols into the countryside or along the supply line. These routine patrols were occasionally interrupted by contact with enemy troops who had not retreated when Price's army evacuated Little Rock. These stay-behind Rebels would cut telegraph wire, tear up railroad tracks and ambush lone picket outposts, generally making life miserable for the Union troops and the few loyalist citizens alike.
One of the Rebel bands grew to be a real nuissance in early 1864, as Confederate Brigadier General Dandridge McRae was recruiting troops in the area between the White and Mississippi rivers. Aided by around fifty commissioned officers who were left without commands because of the flood of Confederate desertions that followed the fall of Little Rock in September 1863, McRae sought to bring the former soldiers back into the Rebel ranks for attacks against such Yankee targets as the Memphis to Little Rock Railroad.
Colonel Christopher C. Andrews, led men of the 3rd Minnesota from Little Rock and troopers of the 8th Missouri Cavalry to Woodruff County on March 30, 1864, to disrupt McRae’s operations. The Yankee troops aboard the steamer Dove arrived at Gregory’s Landing on the White River at dusk and advanced toward a reported Confederate camp site which they found deserted.
On the morning of April 1, the Federal troops arrived at Augusta in Woodruff County and learned that McRae’s main camp was said to be at Antony’s plantation, seven miles north of Augusta. Andrews left a small detachment to guard the Dove and headed north with slightly more than 150 men. His column soon encountered some resistance from Confederate cavalry, but Union troops nearly captured McRae himself as he watered his horse at a stream near Antony’s. However, the general and his companions managed to outrun his pursuers.
After marching about twelve miles north of Augusta, Andrews decided to turn back toward the town. While pausing at the Fitzhugh Plantation for lunch, the Federal troops were attacked by Confederate cavalrymen under Colonel Thomas W. Freeman and Captain John Bland, with a mixed force of about 400 troopers. Repelling this attack, the Yankee troops hurried south on the road to Augusta but were soon hit again south of the plantation at a forested area known as Fitzhugh’s Woods.
The attacking Confederates included the commands of Freeman and Bland and fielded a combined force of about 550 Rebel cavalrymen. The Southern riders struck Andrews’s men from the front, left, and rear, but the Federal soldiers stood their ground and fended off their attackers in a lengthy firefight that left both forces low on ammunition.
Perceiving a Rebel attempt to cut his retreat route south across a cypress bayou, Andrews ordered his men to fall back to a cluster of log huts and fences near the bayou. The Confederates moved into Fitzhugh’s Woods but did not seriously challenge the new Union line. The Federal troops returned to Augusta without opposition.
Andrews’s command suffered around 30 killed, missing or wounded. McRae listed his losses of all causes as 80.
This little skirmish showed, that the Union troops along the river banks, that were not part of Steele's main strike force, were by no means amateurs or second-tier men, but veterans of the conflict with the guerillas.
The strategic role of DeValls Bluff in supplying Little Rock made it another worthwhile target for Sterling Price before the latter and his entire army would strike against Steele and his corps.
To carry out a decisive attack against the Union troops' supply lines, Price ordered Colonel Sidney D. Jackman of Shelby's division and his brigade to the northeast. Jackman and his 1,700 men left Camden on May 16, 1864 and reached the southern vicinity of DeValls Bluff in the evening of May 19.
The terrain and fortifications around DeValls Bluff could be divided into two sectors, east and west, conveniently bisected by a railroad cut. The eastern sector rose sharply from the cut to a hill. Atop this hill was a house that served as the headquarters for the 8th Missouri (US), one of the regiments stationed there. A spur of the hill extended north, paralleling the railroad and the cut. To the east, the hill descended into a gentle saddle. A solid road bisected the saddle below and continued north. Past the saddle, the ground again rose gently to the summit of another hill. The draw north of the saddle and between the two hills was sharp and long. The change in elevation between the two hilltops was minor, but the slopes of the hill itself were quite steep. The grade to the north was uphill, to be sure, but manageable. However, the slopes to the east and south were steep and, at points, quite precipitous. The land fell quickly in these areas into the valley of White River.
The fortifications in this sector of the garrison were focused on the easternmost hilltop. There, the Federals had constructed a strong earthen fort, about 65 feet long and 50 feet wide. It had walls twelve feet thick and was surrounded by a ditch six feet deep. As a practical matter, this made the wall of the fort twelve feet tall, and it could only be climbed with scaling ladders. It was accurately, if unimaginatively, dubbed the Eastern Redoubt. Along the northern slope, starting near the redoubt, the men built a line of earthworks stretching all the way to the main road. Another U-shaped half-fort was built along the northern slope of the spur next to the cut. There were no works at the saddle, but soldiers firing from the trenches near the main road and the spur could support one another, covering the gap. Rifle pits that could fit one to three soldiers were built farther out in all directions. Abatis were constructed and placed around and in front of each fortification and trench. These were made by felling trees and brush and laying them out so that the branches pointed toward the enemy. Any force that attacked the entrenchments would have to stop, or would at least be slowed down, due to the entanglements. This pause would often give the defenders time to fire a few more shots at the stalled enemy, a few more shots that could make all the difference in breaking and halting an assault.
In the western sector, the cut rose to a hill directly west of the railroad and opposite the hill on which stood the 8th Missouri's headquarters building. On this hill, the Union men built another strong earthen fort. It had six sides and was roughly hexagonal in shape. It was about 75 feet long and 60 feet wide and was constructed with interlocking railroad ties. As with the Eastern Redoubt, the walls were twelve feet thick and twelve feet tall from the bottom of the six-foot ditch surrounding the structure. This fort was named the Star Fort. Artillery fire, and to a lesser extent small arms, from the two main redoubts interlocked and covered the depot and village to the south, as well as approaches from the north.
A spur branched off from the hilltop and extended north. It paralleled the railroad; in fact, it paralleled the spur on the eastern side. A small trench covered the northern approach along this spur, and men stationed along these spurs could shoot over the railroad cut and cover one another with rifle fire. There was a small house about thirty yards north of the Star Fort. West of the Star Fort, the hill sloped down into a long ridge. A smaller ran north from the village, cut into the steep hillside and then turned west and followed this ridge. About four hundred yards west of the fort, the ridge rose slightly, and a house occupied the rise. A steep ravine ran to the north of this rise, between the northern spur and the house. The ridge and road continued west and rose to another gentle height two hundred yards farther. Past this elevation, the ridge immediately narrowed to a point only about ten yards wide, the width of the road, with steep ravines running to the north and south. To cover this narrow point, the men built another line of works on the slight rise. They extended north of the road, crossed it and then angled back almost due east to cover the southern approaches to the position. It was a naturally strong redoubt. There was a bastion, complete with opening for artillery, where the redoubt crossed the road, and a traverse built at right angles to the earthworks provided protection in case they were outflanked from the north. The slopes to the west and south were steep, and the only easy avenue of approach was along the road, which narrowed just in front of the redoubt. More abatis and entanglements were placed out front to further delay an approaching enemy.
About 400 yards farther west of this redoubt, the road turned sharply south. Two small redoubts covered the approaches to this area. The men occupied the redoubts and dug a line of rifle pits in this area to give an early warning of any attack from that direction. In many places between this location and the Star Fort, the road dug into slopes and formed natural cuts and shelters for concealing infantry. In addition, the entire hillside, from the valley of White River to the east to the rifle pits at the curve on the small road to the west, was clear-cut of all trees. This provided an open field of fire for all the entrenched positions in all directions.
However, by May, the hillsides had become covered in low underbrush. Combined with natural folds in the terrain, not to mention the hundreds of tree stumps, this left plenty of cover and concealment to a foe willing to go to ground.
The railroad cut was an imposing physical barrier between the two sectors. The Federals constructed a bridge to facilitate traffic across the gorge and eliminate the need to walk down one slope and back up the other. About 75 feet north of the Star Fort, two pine trees were felled and laid across the cut, about 95 feet above the tracks. Planks were then nailed to the trunks and handrails added. The tents of the garrison dotted the hillsides. They took up most of the flat spaces along the rides, such as the area north and northwest of the Star Fort, along the crest of the ridge near the 8th Missouri's headquarters building and in front of the Eastern Redoubt.
The Confederates formed early on May 20 under the warm morning sun into two lines of battle. In the forefront, two regiments lined up for the task ahead. Hunter's Missouri Cavalry were on the right, followed on the left by Jackman's old unit. The majority of the brigade was centered on the ridge, with skirmishers deployed ahead to lead the advance and screen the main force. Officers told the men to throw off everything but their cartridge and cap boxes, and the command “load at will” echoed down the line. To add to the tension, Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nichols of Jackman's Missouri Cavalry walked among the men and passed along the order to take no prisoners. The upcoming assault promised to be grim indeed. Behind them and aligned slightly to the left, John A. Schnable's and D. A. Williams' Battalions of Missouri Cavalry formed up to support, if necessary. Colonel Jackman looked at his watch. It was almost 10:00 a.m., and there was still no large volume of musketry from the south indicating that Colonel W. O. Coleman and the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry had started their attack. Knowing that time was critical, he sent orders to his regimental commanders to advance. By the time the Rebels moved forward, it was 10:20 a.m.
The opposing skirmish lines made contact first. It wasn’t much of a fight. The skirmishers from the 3rd Minnesota fired a few rounds and then immediately retreated in the face of the gray tide. The Confederates were right behind them. The Minnesotans were “driven back on a tangent,” according to one survivor, and fell back on their main line, where they continued to fire into the advancing butternuts.
The Missourians’ main line came up to the rifle pits and halted. Once there, they re-formed and dressed their ranks. After a short rest, the advance resumed. With their skirmishers out of the way, the 3rd Minnesota opened fire. A hailstorm of bullets was rapidly and accurately poured into the ranks of the Confederates as they recklessly advanced. They had been made to believe that they were to have an easy and speedy victory…And yet, notwithstanding their fearful losses at every step, they still advanced, faster and faster, until their whole force, west of the railroad cut, burst into an impetuous charge. The spectacle was sublime.
The Missourians were hindered by the terrain as much as the shower of lead raining down on them. The ridge was so narrow that the outlying regiments had to struggle through three hundred yards of downed brush and trees. After fighting its way through this jungle, the left wing of the brigade descended into the ravine then up the opposing slope. The right likewise swung around and up to confront the 3rd Minnesota head on. Both wings halted at the abatis. This fatal pause gave the Federals even more time to rake the line with deadly fire. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols of Jackman's regiment described the adrenaline-fueled scene: “Our first trouble was in scrambling through and over the abatis, which was, I think, thickly laced with telegraph wire, where we lost many men.” The Confederate line was in shambles. “When we reached the abatis,” wrote Colonel DeWitt C. Hunter, “our advance was momentarily checked. By the time our line had made its way through the network of fallen timber all organization was gone. Companies and regiments were thoroughly mixed up.” Exhausted, the Missourians halted about twenty yards from the earthworks and threw themselves to the ground. From there, they traded volleys with the Federals above them.
To the south, the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry finally gained a position above the pass. As the firing intensified at the redoubt, the regiment stepped off. It, too, had to contend with several hundred yards of underbrush and felled trees. As Jackman's main force approached the Federals from the west, Coleman was poised to fall on their left and rear from the south.
The fighting continued unabated in front of the redoubt. The two sides traded shots at each other from close range—the Federals behind their earthworks and the Missourians only twenty yards away behind whatever cover they could find. Several hundred yards behind them, the men of Schnable's and Williams' Battalions halted at the first line of rifle pits. There, Colonel Jackman addressed them. With a short inspirational speech, he told the men what was expected of them and where they were to charge the enemy’s works. With a yell, they surged forward. Over and through the trees and obstacles they struggled. The Union men saw them coming and directed their fire into the approaching onslaught. Men fell with every step. Down into the ravine and back up they rushed, until within forty feet of the redoubt. They, along with the rest of the brigade, reached their prone compatriots, and the two lines merged. Schnable ordered his men to the ground, where they rested and reloaded. After about five minutes, he ordered them to charge. Independently, officers along the line did likewise. The four units, hopelessly intermingled, leapt to their feet and scrambled over the parapet in front of them. What followed was one of the longest and most vicious hand-to-hand struggles west of the Mississippi River. “As our boys swarmed over the parapet,” wrote D. A. Williams, “the bayonet was freely used by both sides, officers firing their pistols, and many throwing sticks and stones.” Another officer agreed: “Here sabers clashed, bayonets crossed, and clubs and rocks hurled back and forth in the desperate struggle.” Sergeant Earnest Davis, carrying the colors of the Jackman's regiment, cried, “Come ahead, boys!” and bound forward. He was almost immediately wounded and fell. The flag had barely touched the ground when Lieutenant Elliott Cole, leading Company C, scooped it up. With Cole yelling, “Come on, my brave boys!” the flag caught the breeze as he ran toward the Yankees. They shot him dead before he went fifteen feet. Sergeant Daniel Hawker then took up the colors, sprinted the last few steps to the breastwork and planted the flag on the parapet. There a Federal shot him in the face. The Minnesotans were giving as good as they got. Fighting swirled around the regimental flags of both sides. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nichols, leading Jackman's old unit, was shot down on the parapet while waving the regiment’s flag he just picked up.
Colonel Christopher Andrews was doing his best to inspire the Minnesotans under his charge. He was just to the right of the road when he was shot in the arm. He continued exhorting his men to stand by the colors to the last, only to have another round shatter his leg. Falling, he managed to pull himself upright when a bullet finally pierced his heart. Other officers fell inspiring their men. The stubborn defense of the redoubt was sublime horror. One Missourian described it as the “only bayonet fight we were in during the war—God grant that we may never witness another scene like that.” Indeed, the defenders refused to give up. The only way to dislodge one of them was to knock him down and pull him out of his place.The pressure was greatest where the road bisected the works.
The Arkansians broke the deadlock. Coming from the south, they filtered up the ravines and draws to the left. They began firing into the flank of the redoubt. At the Star Fort, Colonel Washington F. Geiger from the 8th Missouri Cavalry saw them coming, but there wasn’t much he could do about it. The overall Federal commander ran to the two companies on the north spur and encouraged them to hold on, but it was no use. The Arkansians swept over them, and they and Geiger had to beat a hasty retreat to the main fort. It was too much for the defenders. After almost thirty minutes of ferocious face-to-face combat, those who could turned and fled. Many indeed surrendered, but just as many turned and fought as they retired. For all those racing for safety, the Star Fort became the beacon of their salvation, and all ran for its protection.
The mass of Confederates pursued. It was not an organized pursuit—more of a follow-up to the successful capture of the redoubt. Units were intermingled, and there was little organization at this point. Officers and NCOs attempted to restore order, shouting orders and getting their men into some sort of formation as quickly as possible. Two or three regiments began re-forming in the shelter of the road where it cut into the hillside.
The first Confederates coming up against the main foritfications were from the 46th Arkansas. The enemy fire was heavy, but they finally struggled through the obstacles and abatis. Moving up the ravine southwest of the Star Fort, they made their way to a small shelf on the edge of the slope that offered some protection from the incoming fire. Over the lip of the shelf was a flat area on which lay some of the tents of the garrison; the Star Fort loomed beyond. The companies were hopelessly intermingled. The officers did the best they could to re-form, and then someone called out, “Forward!” Somebody else bellowed, “The 46th goes forward!” and the line surged ahead. With a wild yell, about thirty of them dashed through the tents toward the fort. A hailstorm of lead greeted them. When within a few yards of the fort, Colonel Coleman, commanding the 46th, took the regimental colors and waved them aloft to encourage his men. He was soon shot down. The Confederates had been stopped short of the Star Fort, but it was a temporary reprieve. The struggle for the fort was rapidly becoming the focus of the entire battle.
The next charge for the fort occurred when Hunter's and Williams' men rushed forward in a desperate attempt to overrun the stronghold. Some occupied the village on the east side of the tracks. Others rushed the fort. According to a lieutenant of the 61st Illinois, the Confederates launched four separate assaults against the Star Fort in the hour between 11 a.m. and noon. The defenders, men from the 61st Illinois and 8th Missouri Cavalry, were formed several ranks deep. Three men often worked together. One man stood at the parapet and fired the rifles, while the other two loaded. That way, the shooter could merely hand his spent rifle back and receive a charged one immediately. Coleman continued his attack from the south. Unfortunately, the fire from the 8th Missouri Cavalry stymied any attempt of a coordinated and determined assault. At 12:30 p.m., the acting commander of the 46th Arkansas sent a message to Jackman:
„Our men are fighting bravely. Will get up a grand charge as soon as the men rest a little. We will take this work, if possible. Men are greatly fatigued. We are in enemy's works, but have not the fort yet. The yells of your men do us great good.“
Unfortunately, the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry's new attack was no more successful than the previous ones. The men attempted to use a ravine as a covered avenue of approacg, but the determined fire from the loyalist Missourians' repeaters brought their charge to a halt. Those who weren't killed or able to get away had to find shelter at the bottom of the draw. There was no way out.
The fighting at the Star Fort had turned into a stalemate. One Federal described it as „the Confederates still clinging to ever hillside and every knoll and every ravine, and every house and outbuilding, and every other place that afforded the least protection from our fire, maintained the battle with wonderful pertinacity... they kept the air, over the forts and rifle pits, literally full of bullets all the time.“ Concealed behind stumps, logs and depressions in the ground, the Confederates fired at any man who dared raise himself over the parapet. Still, when a Rebel showed himself, they returned the favor as best they could.
At about 1 p.m., Colonel Jackman went to the front himself. He was completely baffled by the carnage and intensity of the melee. When he saw the pityful remains of his old regiment, he openly began to weep. Hundreds of wounded Confederates littered the groudn between the rdoubt and the Star Fort, and the Star Spangled Banner still waved proudly and unbroken over the main bastion. Jackman had seen enough to realize, that any further attacks would do no more good than to raise the butcher's bill. He called for a general retreat.
The Confederates, however, did not withdraw entirely without achieving anything. While the Unionists continued to entrench themselves in their fort, Jackman put the harbor and all available river barges to the torch. With the help of former German engineer turned Confederate battalion commander John A. Schnable, the Rebels destroyed several miles of railroad before moving southwest. This serious impairment of Steele's supply lines was bought with 500 dead and wounded out of 1,700 Confederates engaged. The Union troops lost 400 out of 1,200 men of all causes, more of a hundred of them were taken prisoner.
Chapter III: Clearing Arkansas (Part 2)
The Battle of DeValls Bluff
The Battle of DeValls Bluff
The railroad, and its strategic value in moving men and supplies, was another of the innovations of the war between the states. This was even true in Arkansas, with its less than 50 miles of track. The port of DeValls Bluff was the eastern terminus of the unfinished Little Rock and Memphis Railroad, the only in the state. Supply boats would steam up the White River, depositing provisions at DeValls Bluff that would then be transported by train to Little Rock and freighted to the outlying posts. The track between the Bluff and Huntersville, as the depot opposite Little Rock was called, was a lifeline to the posts at Little Rock and farther west. Protecting this lifeline was full-time work for the Union soldiers in central Arkansas. The supply situation seriously hampered field operations for the Union army in Arkansas.
After the capture of Little Rock in 1863, the Federal soldiers were kept busy working on the fortifications while the timber and brush in front of the works was kept cleared. The constant arrival of transport boats kept them busy unloading stores and loading rail cars for shipment to the state capital. The troops performed boring picket duty or manned the forts surrounding the post. The drudgery of post duty was broken by patrols into the countryside or along the supply line. These routine patrols were occasionally interrupted by contact with enemy troops who had not retreated when Price's army evacuated Little Rock. These stay-behind Rebels would cut telegraph wire, tear up railroad tracks and ambush lone picket outposts, generally making life miserable for the Union troops and the few loyalist citizens alike.
One of the Rebel bands grew to be a real nuissance in early 1864, as Confederate Brigadier General Dandridge McRae was recruiting troops in the area between the White and Mississippi rivers. Aided by around fifty commissioned officers who were left without commands because of the flood of Confederate desertions that followed the fall of Little Rock in September 1863, McRae sought to bring the former soldiers back into the Rebel ranks for attacks against such Yankee targets as the Memphis to Little Rock Railroad.
Colonel Christopher C. Andrews, led men of the 3rd Minnesota from Little Rock and troopers of the 8th Missouri Cavalry to Woodruff County on March 30, 1864, to disrupt McRae’s operations. The Yankee troops aboard the steamer Dove arrived at Gregory’s Landing on the White River at dusk and advanced toward a reported Confederate camp site which they found deserted.
On the morning of April 1, the Federal troops arrived at Augusta in Woodruff County and learned that McRae’s main camp was said to be at Antony’s plantation, seven miles north of Augusta. Andrews left a small detachment to guard the Dove and headed north with slightly more than 150 men. His column soon encountered some resistance from Confederate cavalry, but Union troops nearly captured McRae himself as he watered his horse at a stream near Antony’s. However, the general and his companions managed to outrun his pursuers.
After marching about twelve miles north of Augusta, Andrews decided to turn back toward the town. While pausing at the Fitzhugh Plantation for lunch, the Federal troops were attacked by Confederate cavalrymen under Colonel Thomas W. Freeman and Captain John Bland, with a mixed force of about 400 troopers. Repelling this attack, the Yankee troops hurried south on the road to Augusta but were soon hit again south of the plantation at a forested area known as Fitzhugh’s Woods.
The attacking Confederates included the commands of Freeman and Bland and fielded a combined force of about 550 Rebel cavalrymen. The Southern riders struck Andrews’s men from the front, left, and rear, but the Federal soldiers stood their ground and fended off their attackers in a lengthy firefight that left both forces low on ammunition.
Perceiving a Rebel attempt to cut his retreat route south across a cypress bayou, Andrews ordered his men to fall back to a cluster of log huts and fences near the bayou. The Confederates moved into Fitzhugh’s Woods but did not seriously challenge the new Union line. The Federal troops returned to Augusta without opposition.
Andrews’s command suffered around 30 killed, missing or wounded. McRae listed his losses of all causes as 80.
This little skirmish showed, that the Union troops along the river banks, that were not part of Steele's main strike force, were by no means amateurs or second-tier men, but veterans of the conflict with the guerillas.
The strategic role of DeValls Bluff in supplying Little Rock made it another worthwhile target for Sterling Price before the latter and his entire army would strike against Steele and his corps.
To carry out a decisive attack against the Union troops' supply lines, Price ordered Colonel Sidney D. Jackman of Shelby's division and his brigade to the northeast. Jackman and his 1,700 men left Camden on May 16, 1864 and reached the southern vicinity of DeValls Bluff in the evening of May 19.
The terrain and fortifications around DeValls Bluff could be divided into two sectors, east and west, conveniently bisected by a railroad cut. The eastern sector rose sharply from the cut to a hill. Atop this hill was a house that served as the headquarters for the 8th Missouri (US), one of the regiments stationed there. A spur of the hill extended north, paralleling the railroad and the cut. To the east, the hill descended into a gentle saddle. A solid road bisected the saddle below and continued north. Past the saddle, the ground again rose gently to the summit of another hill. The draw north of the saddle and between the two hills was sharp and long. The change in elevation between the two hilltops was minor, but the slopes of the hill itself were quite steep. The grade to the north was uphill, to be sure, but manageable. However, the slopes to the east and south were steep and, at points, quite precipitous. The land fell quickly in these areas into the valley of White River.
The fortifications in this sector of the garrison were focused on the easternmost hilltop. There, the Federals had constructed a strong earthen fort, about 65 feet long and 50 feet wide. It had walls twelve feet thick and was surrounded by a ditch six feet deep. As a practical matter, this made the wall of the fort twelve feet tall, and it could only be climbed with scaling ladders. It was accurately, if unimaginatively, dubbed the Eastern Redoubt. Along the northern slope, starting near the redoubt, the men built a line of earthworks stretching all the way to the main road. Another U-shaped half-fort was built along the northern slope of the spur next to the cut. There were no works at the saddle, but soldiers firing from the trenches near the main road and the spur could support one another, covering the gap. Rifle pits that could fit one to three soldiers were built farther out in all directions. Abatis were constructed and placed around and in front of each fortification and trench. These were made by felling trees and brush and laying them out so that the branches pointed toward the enemy. Any force that attacked the entrenchments would have to stop, or would at least be slowed down, due to the entanglements. This pause would often give the defenders time to fire a few more shots at the stalled enemy, a few more shots that could make all the difference in breaking and halting an assault.
In the western sector, the cut rose to a hill directly west of the railroad and opposite the hill on which stood the 8th Missouri's headquarters building. On this hill, the Union men built another strong earthen fort. It had six sides and was roughly hexagonal in shape. It was about 75 feet long and 60 feet wide and was constructed with interlocking railroad ties. As with the Eastern Redoubt, the walls were twelve feet thick and twelve feet tall from the bottom of the six-foot ditch surrounding the structure. This fort was named the Star Fort. Artillery fire, and to a lesser extent small arms, from the two main redoubts interlocked and covered the depot and village to the south, as well as approaches from the north.
A spur branched off from the hilltop and extended north. It paralleled the railroad; in fact, it paralleled the spur on the eastern side. A small trench covered the northern approach along this spur, and men stationed along these spurs could shoot over the railroad cut and cover one another with rifle fire. There was a small house about thirty yards north of the Star Fort. West of the Star Fort, the hill sloped down into a long ridge. A smaller ran north from the village, cut into the steep hillside and then turned west and followed this ridge. About four hundred yards west of the fort, the ridge rose slightly, and a house occupied the rise. A steep ravine ran to the north of this rise, between the northern spur and the house. The ridge and road continued west and rose to another gentle height two hundred yards farther. Past this elevation, the ridge immediately narrowed to a point only about ten yards wide, the width of the road, with steep ravines running to the north and south. To cover this narrow point, the men built another line of works on the slight rise. They extended north of the road, crossed it and then angled back almost due east to cover the southern approaches to the position. It was a naturally strong redoubt. There was a bastion, complete with opening for artillery, where the redoubt crossed the road, and a traverse built at right angles to the earthworks provided protection in case they were outflanked from the north. The slopes to the west and south were steep, and the only easy avenue of approach was along the road, which narrowed just in front of the redoubt. More abatis and entanglements were placed out front to further delay an approaching enemy.
About 400 yards farther west of this redoubt, the road turned sharply south. Two small redoubts covered the approaches to this area. The men occupied the redoubts and dug a line of rifle pits in this area to give an early warning of any attack from that direction. In many places between this location and the Star Fort, the road dug into slopes and formed natural cuts and shelters for concealing infantry. In addition, the entire hillside, from the valley of White River to the east to the rifle pits at the curve on the small road to the west, was clear-cut of all trees. This provided an open field of fire for all the entrenched positions in all directions.
However, by May, the hillsides had become covered in low underbrush. Combined with natural folds in the terrain, not to mention the hundreds of tree stumps, this left plenty of cover and concealment to a foe willing to go to ground.
The railroad cut was an imposing physical barrier between the two sectors. The Federals constructed a bridge to facilitate traffic across the gorge and eliminate the need to walk down one slope and back up the other. About 75 feet north of the Star Fort, two pine trees were felled and laid across the cut, about 95 feet above the tracks. Planks were then nailed to the trunks and handrails added. The tents of the garrison dotted the hillsides. They took up most of the flat spaces along the rides, such as the area north and northwest of the Star Fort, along the crest of the ridge near the 8th Missouri's headquarters building and in front of the Eastern Redoubt.
The Confederates formed early on May 20 under the warm morning sun into two lines of battle. In the forefront, two regiments lined up for the task ahead. Hunter's Missouri Cavalry were on the right, followed on the left by Jackman's old unit. The majority of the brigade was centered on the ridge, with skirmishers deployed ahead to lead the advance and screen the main force. Officers told the men to throw off everything but their cartridge and cap boxes, and the command “load at will” echoed down the line. To add to the tension, Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nichols of Jackman's Missouri Cavalry walked among the men and passed along the order to take no prisoners. The upcoming assault promised to be grim indeed. Behind them and aligned slightly to the left, John A. Schnable's and D. A. Williams' Battalions of Missouri Cavalry formed up to support, if necessary. Colonel Jackman looked at his watch. It was almost 10:00 a.m., and there was still no large volume of musketry from the south indicating that Colonel W. O. Coleman and the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry had started their attack. Knowing that time was critical, he sent orders to his regimental commanders to advance. By the time the Rebels moved forward, it was 10:20 a.m.
The opposing skirmish lines made contact first. It wasn’t much of a fight. The skirmishers from the 3rd Minnesota fired a few rounds and then immediately retreated in the face of the gray tide. The Confederates were right behind them. The Minnesotans were “driven back on a tangent,” according to one survivor, and fell back on their main line, where they continued to fire into the advancing butternuts.
The Missourians’ main line came up to the rifle pits and halted. Once there, they re-formed and dressed their ranks. After a short rest, the advance resumed. With their skirmishers out of the way, the 3rd Minnesota opened fire. A hailstorm of bullets was rapidly and accurately poured into the ranks of the Confederates as they recklessly advanced. They had been made to believe that they were to have an easy and speedy victory…And yet, notwithstanding their fearful losses at every step, they still advanced, faster and faster, until their whole force, west of the railroad cut, burst into an impetuous charge. The spectacle was sublime.
The Missourians were hindered by the terrain as much as the shower of lead raining down on them. The ridge was so narrow that the outlying regiments had to struggle through three hundred yards of downed brush and trees. After fighting its way through this jungle, the left wing of the brigade descended into the ravine then up the opposing slope. The right likewise swung around and up to confront the 3rd Minnesota head on. Both wings halted at the abatis. This fatal pause gave the Federals even more time to rake the line with deadly fire. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols of Jackman's regiment described the adrenaline-fueled scene: “Our first trouble was in scrambling through and over the abatis, which was, I think, thickly laced with telegraph wire, where we lost many men.” The Confederate line was in shambles. “When we reached the abatis,” wrote Colonel DeWitt C. Hunter, “our advance was momentarily checked. By the time our line had made its way through the network of fallen timber all organization was gone. Companies and regiments were thoroughly mixed up.” Exhausted, the Missourians halted about twenty yards from the earthworks and threw themselves to the ground. From there, they traded volleys with the Federals above them.
To the south, the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry finally gained a position above the pass. As the firing intensified at the redoubt, the regiment stepped off. It, too, had to contend with several hundred yards of underbrush and felled trees. As Jackman's main force approached the Federals from the west, Coleman was poised to fall on their left and rear from the south.
The fighting continued unabated in front of the redoubt. The two sides traded shots at each other from close range—the Federals behind their earthworks and the Missourians only twenty yards away behind whatever cover they could find. Several hundred yards behind them, the men of Schnable's and Williams' Battalions halted at the first line of rifle pits. There, Colonel Jackman addressed them. With a short inspirational speech, he told the men what was expected of them and where they were to charge the enemy’s works. With a yell, they surged forward. Over and through the trees and obstacles they struggled. The Union men saw them coming and directed their fire into the approaching onslaught. Men fell with every step. Down into the ravine and back up they rushed, until within forty feet of the redoubt. They, along with the rest of the brigade, reached their prone compatriots, and the two lines merged. Schnable ordered his men to the ground, where they rested and reloaded. After about five minutes, he ordered them to charge. Independently, officers along the line did likewise. The four units, hopelessly intermingled, leapt to their feet and scrambled over the parapet in front of them. What followed was one of the longest and most vicious hand-to-hand struggles west of the Mississippi River. “As our boys swarmed over the parapet,” wrote D. A. Williams, “the bayonet was freely used by both sides, officers firing their pistols, and many throwing sticks and stones.” Another officer agreed: “Here sabers clashed, bayonets crossed, and clubs and rocks hurled back and forth in the desperate struggle.” Sergeant Earnest Davis, carrying the colors of the Jackman's regiment, cried, “Come ahead, boys!” and bound forward. He was almost immediately wounded and fell. The flag had barely touched the ground when Lieutenant Elliott Cole, leading Company C, scooped it up. With Cole yelling, “Come on, my brave boys!” the flag caught the breeze as he ran toward the Yankees. They shot him dead before he went fifteen feet. Sergeant Daniel Hawker then took up the colors, sprinted the last few steps to the breastwork and planted the flag on the parapet. There a Federal shot him in the face. The Minnesotans were giving as good as they got. Fighting swirled around the regimental flags of both sides. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nichols, leading Jackman's old unit, was shot down on the parapet while waving the regiment’s flag he just picked up.
Colonel Christopher Andrews was doing his best to inspire the Minnesotans under his charge. He was just to the right of the road when he was shot in the arm. He continued exhorting his men to stand by the colors to the last, only to have another round shatter his leg. Falling, he managed to pull himself upright when a bullet finally pierced his heart. Other officers fell inspiring their men. The stubborn defense of the redoubt was sublime horror. One Missourian described it as the “only bayonet fight we were in during the war—God grant that we may never witness another scene like that.” Indeed, the defenders refused to give up. The only way to dislodge one of them was to knock him down and pull him out of his place.The pressure was greatest where the road bisected the works.
The Arkansians broke the deadlock. Coming from the south, they filtered up the ravines and draws to the left. They began firing into the flank of the redoubt. At the Star Fort, Colonel Washington F. Geiger from the 8th Missouri Cavalry saw them coming, but there wasn’t much he could do about it. The overall Federal commander ran to the two companies on the north spur and encouraged them to hold on, but it was no use. The Arkansians swept over them, and they and Geiger had to beat a hasty retreat to the main fort. It was too much for the defenders. After almost thirty minutes of ferocious face-to-face combat, those who could turned and fled. Many indeed surrendered, but just as many turned and fought as they retired. For all those racing for safety, the Star Fort became the beacon of their salvation, and all ran for its protection.
The mass of Confederates pursued. It was not an organized pursuit—more of a follow-up to the successful capture of the redoubt. Units were intermingled, and there was little organization at this point. Officers and NCOs attempted to restore order, shouting orders and getting their men into some sort of formation as quickly as possible. Two or three regiments began re-forming in the shelter of the road where it cut into the hillside.
The first Confederates coming up against the main foritfications were from the 46th Arkansas. The enemy fire was heavy, but they finally struggled through the obstacles and abatis. Moving up the ravine southwest of the Star Fort, they made their way to a small shelf on the edge of the slope that offered some protection from the incoming fire. Over the lip of the shelf was a flat area on which lay some of the tents of the garrison; the Star Fort loomed beyond. The companies were hopelessly intermingled. The officers did the best they could to re-form, and then someone called out, “Forward!” Somebody else bellowed, “The 46th goes forward!” and the line surged ahead. With a wild yell, about thirty of them dashed through the tents toward the fort. A hailstorm of lead greeted them. When within a few yards of the fort, Colonel Coleman, commanding the 46th, took the regimental colors and waved them aloft to encourage his men. He was soon shot down. The Confederates had been stopped short of the Star Fort, but it was a temporary reprieve. The struggle for the fort was rapidly becoming the focus of the entire battle.
The next charge for the fort occurred when Hunter's and Williams' men rushed forward in a desperate attempt to overrun the stronghold. Some occupied the village on the east side of the tracks. Others rushed the fort. According to a lieutenant of the 61st Illinois, the Confederates launched four separate assaults against the Star Fort in the hour between 11 a.m. and noon. The defenders, men from the 61st Illinois and 8th Missouri Cavalry, were formed several ranks deep. Three men often worked together. One man stood at the parapet and fired the rifles, while the other two loaded. That way, the shooter could merely hand his spent rifle back and receive a charged one immediately. Coleman continued his attack from the south. Unfortunately, the fire from the 8th Missouri Cavalry stymied any attempt of a coordinated and determined assault. At 12:30 p.m., the acting commander of the 46th Arkansas sent a message to Jackman:
„Our men are fighting bravely. Will get up a grand charge as soon as the men rest a little. We will take this work, if possible. Men are greatly fatigued. We are in enemy's works, but have not the fort yet. The yells of your men do us great good.“
Unfortunately, the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry's new attack was no more successful than the previous ones. The men attempted to use a ravine as a covered avenue of approacg, but the determined fire from the loyalist Missourians' repeaters brought their charge to a halt. Those who weren't killed or able to get away had to find shelter at the bottom of the draw. There was no way out.
The fighting at the Star Fort had turned into a stalemate. One Federal described it as „the Confederates still clinging to ever hillside and every knoll and every ravine, and every house and outbuilding, and every other place that afforded the least protection from our fire, maintained the battle with wonderful pertinacity... they kept the air, over the forts and rifle pits, literally full of bullets all the time.“ Concealed behind stumps, logs and depressions in the ground, the Confederates fired at any man who dared raise himself over the parapet. Still, when a Rebel showed himself, they returned the favor as best they could.
At about 1 p.m., Colonel Jackman went to the front himself. He was completely baffled by the carnage and intensity of the melee. When he saw the pityful remains of his old regiment, he openly began to weep. Hundreds of wounded Confederates littered the groudn between the rdoubt and the Star Fort, and the Star Spangled Banner still waved proudly and unbroken over the main bastion. Jackman had seen enough to realize, that any further attacks would do no more good than to raise the butcher's bill. He called for a general retreat.
The Confederates, however, did not withdraw entirely without achieving anything. While the Unionists continued to entrench themselves in their fort, Jackman put the harbor and all available river barges to the torch. With the help of former German engineer turned Confederate battalion commander John A. Schnable, the Rebels destroyed several miles of railroad before moving southwest. This serious impairment of Steele's supply lines was bought with 500 dead and wounded out of 1,700 Confederates engaged. The Union troops lost 400 out of 1,200 men of all causes, more of a hundred of them were taken prisoner.
- Lothar
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