Workers all over the world have been moved to admiration by the heroic resistance of the Austrian workers, fighting in defence of their trade union and political organisations. These men were organised in a party to which we are opposed, a party whose policy we know to be wrong, but that should not, and does not, prevent us from welcoming the spirit in which they defended themselves. Their conduct is a proof that the working class can produce men and movements as tenacious, and possessed of as much endurance and integrity, as anything the ruling class can show, despite the manifold advantages of their position.
~ Edgar Hardcastle,
Austrian Workers’ Tragic Heroism
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On the morning of September 12th the breaking point was reached. Heimwehr forces in Styria under the command of Dr Walter Pfrimer mobilised to take control of the state before marching into Lower Austria, Vienna was surrounded before Heimwehr forces marched in. Their aims were to arrest the Social Democratic Chancellor, Otto Bauer, and Mayor of the city, Karl Seitz as well as to seize the Chancellery, War Ministry and the broadcasting station of the national Radio Communication Company. It was hoped by the end of that day the country would be secured and the resignation of Bauer’s government could be announced before a new Heimwehr regime could declare the end of the Austro-German economic union.
The basis of the Heimwehr coup was predicated on previous exercises carried out in the name of preparing for a Socialist uprising in Austria. These had involved seizing control of the states of Carinthia, Lower Austria and Styria whilst placing a cordon around Vienna before marching into the city. The remnant of Austria to the north and west was deemed to contain less of a ‘red’ presence and could be expected to fall in line. These plans were adapted based on the experiences of the former Third Reich veterans of the German Civil War who emphasised the need to secure a position of dominance throughout the country to best exploit the element of surprise and their superior firepower and win a decisive victory before any Socialist uprising could properly coordinate or even manifest itself in the first place. In this way it was hoped the Heimwehr would not make the same mistakes the Third Reich had.
This advice had come from men who had recently expanded the organisation to over 400,000 members with 150,000 of those under arms, theoretically larger than the Bundesheer and the left-wing militias put together. Only around 20,000 of these men could really be considered ‘mobile’ by the time of the coup but the Heimwehr enjoyed close connections with the Bundesheer in many states, particularly the Tyrol where frequent weapons transfers would occur between the two sides. It was expected the Bundesheer could be relied upon in the event of a coup, at the very least not to do anything. Financial and political support had been gained from the Hungarian and Italian regimes although neither had actively been made aware of the impending coup, nor had the Bundesheer or indeed some sections of the Heimwehr itself.
Despite the development of the coup plans its initiation came down to the local leadership in the state of Styria. Dr Pfrimer was a man keen on personal glory and privately had designs on the position of Chancellor or President, or both, following the success of the coup. He was nonetheless keen on ensuring the coup was as widespread as possible and thus encouraged many of the forces not directly available to be transported to Vienna to take control of their states and await news from the capital. The reaction to this was mixed and although around 100,000 of the Heimwehr’s armed men came out they were often keen to interact with the local police, with whom they could often rely upon good relations but who tried to keep public order at the same time, confining them to static displays of strength and waiting for news to come from Vienna.
In Vienna itself the entrance of the Heimwehr forces into the capital quickly broke out into a riot. The Social Democratic and Communist militias, taken by surprise, initially struggled to coordinate themselves and in those first hours it was the workers of Vienna who played the main role in holding back the Heimwehr forces. Just as in 1927 bricks and tools went up against guns with predictable bloodshed. The broadcasting station announced the developing takeover but as fighting began to rage around it the news became increasingly unclear, eventually devolving into the recital of right-wing slogans. The Heimwehr forces entering the Chancellery shot Bauer dead, allegedly whilst the Social Democratic Chancellor was attempting to evade arrest. Those attempting to seize Vienna City Hall bizarrely lost Mayor Seitz, who was claimed, somewhat bizarrely, to have made his way out of the besieged building brandishing his walking stick as a club. The reason these tales arose are perhaps to be found in Seitz’s rallying of the Social Democratic militia who were able to build their strength over the course of the following days until Vienna became an urban battlefield with thousands of armed men battling for the city’s streets. Seitz would finally declare victory on September 15th as the Heimwehr were forced to retreat out of the city and back to the cordon they had placed around it. By this time events on the Austro-Italian border had taken precedence.
Two days previously the Italian army had attempted to enter into Austria on the basis of assisting the coup. Although it is unlikely this was prearranged it is likely the Heimwehr would have welcomed such a move, had the Italians not met a resolute Bundesheer defence on the mountainous border. The better equipped Italians faced against beleaguered Austrian defenders who were short of ammunition and weapons but nonetheless had the advantage of some of the most easily defensible terrain in the world. It was a battle which quickly descended into a bloody quagmire for both sides.
General Siegmund Knaus, the Bundesheer Chief of Staff, had watched events in Vienna play out from the undisturbed War Ministry, having warned the approaching Heimwehr forces that he would not react to either side until attacked. Following a short discussion with Pfrimer, the two men agreed the War Ministry would not be disturbed nor would its special phone lines out of the capital be disconnected. What was on the face of it a smart conciliatory gesture from the Heimwehr was to end up a disastrous one, for when Knaus heard of Italian troops approaching the border he ordered those Bundesheer troops stationed there to defend themselves against any border violation. Knaus was no Socialist and it is likely his sympathies would have lay closer to the Heimwehr position even if he wasn’t keen to get his own hands dirty. The notion of the coup being foreign backed however, gave him reason to pick a side. This was also the case for the Tyrolese Heimwehr who found themselves acting as traffic police for the German People’s Guard.
The Austrian Civil War is a difficult conflict to characterise. On the one hand there are challenges as to what extent the conflict could be seen as a civil war at all in comparison to the far bloodier affair that had occurred less than a year beforehand in Germany. Then there is the issue that it was multi-faceted. Whilst there were certainly contrasting sides it is difficult to define them. The Bundesheer and their impromptu allies in the Austrian left-wing militias and the German People’s Guard made a bizarre coalition who lacked unified aims beyond defending the status quo of the Austro-German economic union. On the other hand the Italian-backed Styrian Heimwehr was a clear danger but the Heimwehr not acting in unison and in some cases assisting the ‘enemy’ further muddies the waters. The fact that much of the actual fighting took place between the conventional forces of Austria, Germany and Italy around the Brenner Pass whilst in the streets of Vienna the Republicaner Schutzbund and the Communist League were left to deal with the Heimwehr leaves it difficult to ascribe the importance to one combatant or the other.
The historical focus, particularly on the international level, has undoubtedly favoured greater scrutiny in regards to the events that played out in Brenner than those in Vienna. It was this early prelude to the Second World War which alerted the League of Nations of the need to once again intervene to find a peaceful solution. It is for this reason that the incident is often spun into the wider narrative of those events leading towards the global conflict. This is despite the fact that, if not for the workers of Vienna it is likely that any Italian moves would not have been necessary and, perhaps in turn, the binding of Austria and Germany would not have become such an urgent political necessity.
~ Shaun Williams,
Weimar's Rise and Fall
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The painting is
Rose Garden by Paul Klee