alternatehistory.com
Knock Knock, Let the Enemy In
Decades before Canada even had an inkling of developing their naval forces, Germany had been moving to cement themselves into a major naval power. This was always predicated on building a large battle fleet in the Mahanian style however, the target of this fleet seemed to constantly change. The United States became one of the German fleets main priorities following the various civil wars in Samoa, the resulting tension putting Germany in a position where war plans were needed in case of an unseen conflict. The Germans quickly came to the conclusion that a fleet on fleet blue water engagement between the nations would not be particularly possibly given the distance required and the lacking nature of the German battle fleet. Therefore, the German Admiralty adopted the stance of cruiser warfare against any enemies on the continent. This type of warfare was designed to damage or destroy the enemy nations economy to the point where it would enter into negotiations. The main tactics within this type of warfare would be the sinking/capturing of merchants, bombardment of ports, sending landing parties ashore and generally causing havoc around enemy shores. While this tactic was adopted though, the German Admiralty and the Kaiser both seemed to grasp the fact that cruiser warfare was a sound tactic but not one in which an entire war strategy can be based upon.
German naval developments were spurred onward by international conflicts such as the Spanish-American war and the various American annexations of Pacific islands. In order for a nation to survive on the world stage, it required a strong naval force. The Germans saw American expansionism in the Pacific as a direct rivalry to their own ambitions there. Germany would go so far as to draft multiple plans regarding attacks on the American mainland, seemingly never stopping to question the logistics or foolishness of such actions. These plans moved away from cruiser warfare and advocated for direct action on the mainland. Such actions included full military occupations of Norfolk, Hampton Roads and Newport News in Virginia with a strike through Chesapeake Bay up into Baltimore and Washington. These plans were eventually replaced by alternatives which called for the seizing of the Azores alongside various bays in Maine and South Carolina which the Germans would use as staging areas for the destruction of the USN. Various versions of the war plans called for 150,000 men to capture Cape Cod. While these various plans were kept on the record and tweaked for years, they were hopelessly optimistic and would have likely been complete suicide for the German fleet. It is interesting to see that in this period of tension, Britain also experienced similar issues with the United States but instead of heavily planning invasions or military action, the British took the action of rapprochement. It seems the Germans held a rather low amount of respect for the various American armed forces branches given their showings against the Spanish and other parties, judging their own forces as likely to succeed against them due to sheer training and willpower alone. The mindset of Germany is well expressed by a former naval attaché in Washington who stated, “A declaration of war by Germany against the United States is only possible if we have an alliance with England and if our flank facing France is covered by Austria, Italy and possibly Russia as well.”
It seems that sometime around 1903, German warships began extensive scouting of Canadian and American coastlines for potential military actions. From the period of 1903 to 1904, SMS Gazelle, SMS Falke and SMS Panther all surveyed both coasts of North America. Falke and Panther specifically are of great interest specifically given their hidden objective of locating what was referred to as 'unterstutzungplatze' or 'U-places'. These areas would be hidden ports, anchorages or other vital areas in which raiding cruisers could gather, rest and hide from enemy eyes. Lengthy trips throughout 1905-1906 reported on various settlements, soundings, defenses, and local landmarks along the entire west coast of North America, all the way into Alaska. All of this information was aggregated into the 'Cruiser Handbook' and passed out to any commanding officers in charge of Cruiser Warfare. Extensive charting was conducted on both coasts alongside photographic info and invasion plans for Puget Sound and the straits of Juan da Fuca.
SMS Bremen in 1909 as she visits New York city. Her distinctive yellow upperworks, white hull and ram bow were rather striking to onlookers.
Even though the West Coast of North America was viewed as the 'soft underbelly' compared to the East Coast, German planning largely revolved around the more valuable Eastern Coast. SMS Bremen was dispatched in 1907 to gather information on the harbors of Halifax and Quebec City after the Royal Navy’s departure from Halifax. Handwritten orders specified identifying any changes in the bases defenses or operations alongside rumored fortifications being built in the St Lawrence. This “tour” by Bremen proved to be one of the most valuable in years. Alongside various goodwill stays throughout the period, shore parties heavily photographed building areas for new batteries, ruins of the old fortifications and got as accurate information on the current batteries as possible. It was revealed that the defenses of Quebec were essentially completely neglected while Halifax proved to be rather fairly defended. The location and caliber of batteries were noted however, the mixture of deteriorating older defenses and new construction greatly confused the Germans as they fairly did not seem to understand Canadian internal defense politics.
SMS Freya visited Halifax in August of 1908 however, her entrance was less than stellar. On her way into Halifax, a heavy bank of fog was encountered and a local schooner was cut in half. 9 locals were killed and while the Halifax Herald did run the story on their front page, the text itself was rather muted and fair towards the Germans. For their part, the crew of Freya attended a large church parade and sermon in honor of the victims of the accident. This visit resulted in the revelation that certain passages and narrows around Halifax were not navigable by larger ships and through interviews with Canadian artillerymen, the true caliber of their guns was discovered, smaller than expected. Bremen would visit the East coast again in 1911 and 1912, visiting Quebec, Montreal, Sydney, Charlottetown, and Halifax. Cruiser warfare was heavily practiced in the gulf of St Lawrence, entailing torpedo drills, gunfire exercises on locally purchased targets and small arms practice. Bremen’s surprise visit to Saint John, New Brunswick in May of 1912 proved to be a particularly eventful endeavor. Clad in the white and yellow of the German East Asia Squadron, Bremen contrasted heavily with the dull grey of Royal Navy vessels normally found around the coast of Canada. The Charlottetown Guardian said that the particular color scheme gave her the “appearance of a big pleasure yacht” but the inclusion of the prominent ram bow and heavy guns showed she was built for fighting rather than amusement of the public.
The mayor of the city had been delighted and invited the commanding officers on a tour of the harbor/city in his automobile. Throughout the drive, the mayor went into great detail in regard to the dredging of the nearby bay and the improvement of the surrounding dockyard. Alongside a gift of the Saint John’s Standard, a special issue of the newspaper containing a full diagram and description of the discussed port improvements. His final act as a host involved him promising to send the original harbor plans through the German embassy. Throughout this visit and the many others, the Germans gathered a complete picture of Saint Johns and its non-existent defenses. Various newspapers through the town condemned and praised the Germans visit although discourse came to such a head that the mayor personally apologized to his guests, who graciously accepted.
Ships bands and ceremonial guards were common place on port visits, the crew of SMS Gneisenau can be seen here in their tropical white uniforms.
The cruisers SMS Viktoria Louise and SMS Hertha visited Halifax through 1912 and 1913, the commanding officers of both ships stating in their reports;
“The huge cruiser Niobe has not left drydock for the past nine months. The breeches of all guns were removed and she is without maintenance personnel. Sailors from HMS Cornwall called the Niobe rotten and that a voyage aboard her would be a risky endeavor. The training of cadets has ground completely to a halt and as the Director of the Naval College told me, cadets had to find work ashore to ‘earn dollars’ as soon as they go on leave. Officers complain openly of difficulties with the cadet’s social education, being bitter regarding how the younger men were listless and had lost all joy in their work. Cadets come from very divergent social circles and there was abundant difficulties in recruiting sons of French-Canadian parents. The officers themselves seemed generally not particularly enthusiastic about their duties and the English officers regarded their Canadian comrades as colonial and therefore inferior. It seemed nobody wanted to undertake tough demanding work of the service or in business anymore. Businessmen and industrialists in Canada seem to view the naval question as merely an election slogan. All of the English sea officers aboard Niobe are in some respect inferior, either physically or professionally compared to Royal Navy personnel. The dockyards themselves are present in a melancholy aspect. Freshwater cannot be brought aboard ships as there is no barge and the coaling area is heavily cramped.”
Besides direct spying and information gathering on military matters, officers of the ships attempted to gather information on Canadian politics and naval policy. It seems that the backwards and extremely convoluted state of Canadian politics in regard to the nations naval policy sent the minds of Germans officers spinning, although what was protected information wise was not particularly useful. Rumors regarding Borden’s dreadnought donation to the Royal Navy was relayed but all parties involved seem to have accepted this was a dubious possibility. While the Canadian Navy was actively foundering in port, the Germans laid the foundation for any future actions against Britain or the United States. The information present in the ‘Cruiser Handbook’ would proven vital to the actions of the Imperial German Navy against Canada and Britain through the early months of World War I.
German naval developments were spurred onward by international conflicts such as the Spanish-American war and the various American annexations of Pacific islands. In order for a nation to survive on the world stage, it required a strong naval force. The Germans saw American expansionism in the Pacific as a direct rivalry to their own ambitions there. Germany would go so far as to draft multiple plans regarding attacks on the American mainland, seemingly never stopping to question the logistics or foolishness of such actions. These plans moved away from cruiser warfare and advocated for direct action on the mainland. Such actions included full military occupations of Norfolk, Hampton Roads and Newport News in Virginia with a strike through Chesapeake Bay up into Baltimore and Washington. These plans were eventually replaced by alternatives which called for the seizing of the Azores alongside various bays in Maine and South Carolina which the Germans would use as staging areas for the destruction of the USN. Various versions of the war plans called for 150,000 men to capture Cape Cod. While these various plans were kept on the record and tweaked for years, they were hopelessly optimistic and would have likely been complete suicide for the German fleet. It is interesting to see that in this period of tension, Britain also experienced similar issues with the United States but instead of heavily planning invasions or military action, the British took the action of rapprochement. It seems the Germans held a rather low amount of respect for the various American armed forces branches given their showings against the Spanish and other parties, judging their own forces as likely to succeed against them due to sheer training and willpower alone. The mindset of Germany is well expressed by a former naval attaché in Washington who stated, “A declaration of war by Germany against the United States is only possible if we have an alliance with England and if our flank facing France is covered by Austria, Italy and possibly Russia as well.”
It seems that sometime around 1903, German warships began extensive scouting of Canadian and American coastlines for potential military actions. From the period of 1903 to 1904, SMS Gazelle, SMS Falke and SMS Panther all surveyed both coasts of North America. Falke and Panther specifically are of great interest specifically given their hidden objective of locating what was referred to as 'unterstutzungplatze' or 'U-places'. These areas would be hidden ports, anchorages or other vital areas in which raiding cruisers could gather, rest and hide from enemy eyes. Lengthy trips throughout 1905-1906 reported on various settlements, soundings, defenses, and local landmarks along the entire west coast of North America, all the way into Alaska. All of this information was aggregated into the 'Cruiser Handbook' and passed out to any commanding officers in charge of Cruiser Warfare. Extensive charting was conducted on both coasts alongside photographic info and invasion plans for Puget Sound and the straits of Juan da Fuca.
SMS Bremen in 1909 as she visits New York city. Her distinctive yellow upperworks, white hull and ram bow were rather striking to onlookers.
Even though the West Coast of North America was viewed as the 'soft underbelly' compared to the East Coast, German planning largely revolved around the more valuable Eastern Coast. SMS Bremen was dispatched in 1907 to gather information on the harbors of Halifax and Quebec City after the Royal Navy’s departure from Halifax. Handwritten orders specified identifying any changes in the bases defenses or operations alongside rumored fortifications being built in the St Lawrence. This “tour” by Bremen proved to be one of the most valuable in years. Alongside various goodwill stays throughout the period, shore parties heavily photographed building areas for new batteries, ruins of the old fortifications and got as accurate information on the current batteries as possible. It was revealed that the defenses of Quebec were essentially completely neglected while Halifax proved to be rather fairly defended. The location and caliber of batteries were noted however, the mixture of deteriorating older defenses and new construction greatly confused the Germans as they fairly did not seem to understand Canadian internal defense politics.
SMS Freya visited Halifax in August of 1908 however, her entrance was less than stellar. On her way into Halifax, a heavy bank of fog was encountered and a local schooner was cut in half. 9 locals were killed and while the Halifax Herald did run the story on their front page, the text itself was rather muted and fair towards the Germans. For their part, the crew of Freya attended a large church parade and sermon in honor of the victims of the accident. This visit resulted in the revelation that certain passages and narrows around Halifax were not navigable by larger ships and through interviews with Canadian artillerymen, the true caliber of their guns was discovered, smaller than expected. Bremen would visit the East coast again in 1911 and 1912, visiting Quebec, Montreal, Sydney, Charlottetown, and Halifax. Cruiser warfare was heavily practiced in the gulf of St Lawrence, entailing torpedo drills, gunfire exercises on locally purchased targets and small arms practice. Bremen’s surprise visit to Saint John, New Brunswick in May of 1912 proved to be a particularly eventful endeavor. Clad in the white and yellow of the German East Asia Squadron, Bremen contrasted heavily with the dull grey of Royal Navy vessels normally found around the coast of Canada. The Charlottetown Guardian said that the particular color scheme gave her the “appearance of a big pleasure yacht” but the inclusion of the prominent ram bow and heavy guns showed she was built for fighting rather than amusement of the public.
The mayor of the city had been delighted and invited the commanding officers on a tour of the harbor/city in his automobile. Throughout the drive, the mayor went into great detail in regard to the dredging of the nearby bay and the improvement of the surrounding dockyard. Alongside a gift of the Saint John’s Standard, a special issue of the newspaper containing a full diagram and description of the discussed port improvements. His final act as a host involved him promising to send the original harbor plans through the German embassy. Throughout this visit and the many others, the Germans gathered a complete picture of Saint Johns and its non-existent defenses. Various newspapers through the town condemned and praised the Germans visit although discourse came to such a head that the mayor personally apologized to his guests, who graciously accepted.
Ships bands and ceremonial guards were common place on port visits, the crew of SMS Gneisenau can be seen here in their tropical white uniforms.
The cruisers SMS Viktoria Louise and SMS Hertha visited Halifax through 1912 and 1913, the commanding officers of both ships stating in their reports;
“The huge cruiser Niobe has not left drydock for the past nine months. The breeches of all guns were removed and she is without maintenance personnel. Sailors from HMS Cornwall called the Niobe rotten and that a voyage aboard her would be a risky endeavor. The training of cadets has ground completely to a halt and as the Director of the Naval College told me, cadets had to find work ashore to ‘earn dollars’ as soon as they go on leave. Officers complain openly of difficulties with the cadet’s social education, being bitter regarding how the younger men were listless and had lost all joy in their work. Cadets come from very divergent social circles and there was abundant difficulties in recruiting sons of French-Canadian parents. The officers themselves seemed generally not particularly enthusiastic about their duties and the English officers regarded their Canadian comrades as colonial and therefore inferior. It seemed nobody wanted to undertake tough demanding work of the service or in business anymore. Businessmen and industrialists in Canada seem to view the naval question as merely an election slogan. All of the English sea officers aboard Niobe are in some respect inferior, either physically or professionally compared to Royal Navy personnel. The dockyards themselves are present in a melancholy aspect. Freshwater cannot be brought aboard ships as there is no barge and the coaling area is heavily cramped.”
Besides direct spying and information gathering on military matters, officers of the ships attempted to gather information on Canadian politics and naval policy. It seems that the backwards and extremely convoluted state of Canadian politics in regard to the nations naval policy sent the minds of Germans officers spinning, although what was protected information wise was not particularly useful. Rumors regarding Borden’s dreadnought donation to the Royal Navy was relayed but all parties involved seem to have accepted this was a dubious possibility. While the Canadian Navy was actively foundering in port, the Germans laid the foundation for any future actions against Britain or the United States. The information present in the ‘Cruiser Handbook’ would proven vital to the actions of the Imperial German Navy against Canada and Britain through the early months of World War I.
- RelativeGalaxy7
- Word Count: 1.7k