April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
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Times were different I suppose. Hard to know how the other men in his regiment felt about it - they might have agreed with what he did.
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The witnesses whose evidence brought about his citation were from another unit, not his own.
I've stood at the point near Krithia where he faced the routed mob. It is pretty open. I can understand why he did it, and his actions did hold together a disintegrating front, but to be awarded a VC does seem to be a little excessive.
The urban myth was that he was appointed to the staff as an ADC and never saw action again, but that must be untrue as he was awarded two Military Crosses. No doubting his bravery - died of Spanish Flu. Wasn't aware of MC + Bar until unexpectedly coming across his grave.
I've stood at the point near Krithia where he faced the routed mob. It is pretty open. I can understand why he did it, and his actions did hold together a disintegrating front, but to be awarded a VC does seem to be a little excessive.
The urban myth was that he was appointed to the staff as an ADC and never saw action again, but that must be untrue as he was awarded two Military Crosses. No doubting his bravery - died of Spanish Flu. Wasn't aware of MC + Bar until unexpectedly coming across his grave.
Something else will be coming along later in 1943 for the FAA and the USN, Vought's Corsair. Just don't believe the stuff on the web about the Corsair's carrier service.
The Corsair's long nose was overcome by a banked approach to the carrier. It's landing gear stiffness and tendency to blow tires were the real stumbling blocks to it's carrier deployment. But they were quickly overcome by Vought.
Tom Blackburn, in his book "The Jolly Rogers" details that his squadron, VF-17 was due to be sent to the Pacific aboard Bunker Hill (CV-17). They were to be the first carrier-borne Corsair squadron in the Pacific. They had received their first Corsairs in February 1943, and completed carrier quals aboard Charger, a CVE.
VF-17 completed shakedown with Bunker Hill on 10 August 1943, but was pulled at the last second after going all the way to Pearl Harbor with their carrier and replaced with VF-18 flying Hellcats VF-17 would have been the only Corsair squadron aboard the carriers and no supply line was in place to support them. (They were subsequently assigned to land bases with Marine Corsairs.) Blackburn makes it very clear in his book that this supply line concern was the reason the VF-17 did not join their carrier and had NOTHING to do with the planes characteristics. In fact, his men practiced carrier landings every time they approached a field.
As for the myth of the "FAA finally figuring out the Corsair" the FAA did not receive it's first Corsair until May, 1943. By that time, VF-17 was already using Corsairs and training with Charger, and was fully intended to be the first CV Corsair squadron. The first FAA operational squadron was 835 in August 1943, when/after VF-17 had already deployed for Bunker Hill's shakedown.
Finally, I'd recommend Blackburn's book. He later went on to be skipper of Midway (CV-41).
Regards,
Makes perfect sense to me, everything always comes down to logistics....
0800 Hours, 16 January 1943, Cox’s Bazar, India – The assault transports MS Sobieski and SS Duchess of Atholl escorted by the destroyers HMS Laforey and HMS Lightning, the light cruiser HMS Ceres, and the Indian minesweepers HMIS Bengal and HMIS Bombay pulled into Cox’s Bazar and almost as soon as the transports were tied up to the piers, personnel from the British 6th Infantry Brigade began boarding. The landing ship RFA Derwentdale and three freighters were joined by the destroyer transport USS Waters for a run down to Akyab and Ramree Island for their part in the upcoming mission while another two freighters from the convoy that had originated in Trincomalee were sent up to Chittagong. Lieutenant General Slim had made it clear that getting the 6th Infantry Brigade embarked and underway had the highest priority.
1000 Hours, 16 January 1943, Chittagong, India – While the primary focus of the fighting in Burma was around Akyab, the campaign further north on the border with India was getting increasing attention. In order to provide additional air support for the Allied troops from V Corps, the Hurricane I equipped No. 1 Squadron of the Indian Air Force and No. 7 Squadron with its Fairey Battles were ordered to transfer to airfields in Assam and on 16 January, both squadrons departed their airfields near Chittagong for Dimapur north of Imphal. That the two squadrons could be spared from the action in and around the Arakan was a sign of Allied commanders’ increasing confidence in the progress of the campaign along the Burmese coast.
1700 Hours, 16 January 1943, Christmas Island, Indian Ocean – HMS Manxman was clear of Christmas Island and heading for the Sunda Strait 300 miles to the north at 33 knots. Darkness would fall in another hour and Lieutenant Command Hopper was confident his ship could approach the strait undetected and they could complete their mission and be well clear of the area by the sunrise.
A few hours after HMS Manxman departed Christmas Island, the landing ship RFA Derwentdale and the destroyer transport USS Waters arrived at Ramree Island after drooping the three freighters they were escorting off at Akyab. The next morning, the two ships along with the commando carrier HMS Albatross were scheduled to embark the troops from No. 5 Commando and Riain’s Raiders for their part in XV Corps’ upcoming operation.
A few hours after HMS Manxman departed Christmas Island, the landing ship RFA Derwentdale and the destroyer transport USS Waters arrived at Ramree Island after drooping the three freighters they were escorting off at Akyab. The next morning, the two ships along with the commando carrier HMS Albatross were scheduled to embark the troops from No. 5 Commando and Riain’s Raiders for their part in XV Corps’ upcoming operation.
0300 Hours, 17 January 1943, Sunda Strait, Indian Ocean – HMS Manxman had just finished depositing the last of her mines in the mouth of the Sunda Strait and her situation was getting worse. A few minutes earlier she had dispatched a converted fishing boat the Japanese used for local patrol duty but not before the doomed craft could get off a distress call that brought another patrol boat/fishing boat and a Dave floatplane from the nearby seaplane base. The Japanese thought the patrol craft had run afoul of an Allied submarine running on the surface and both the crew of the patrol boat and the floatplane were surprised to encounter an enemy vessel moving much faster and firing much heavier guns than a submarine could. The patrol boat met the same fate of her sister but the pilot of the Dave had the presence of mind to climb for altitude and send a message back to his base stating that an enemy battleship was operating near the southern end of the Sunda Strait and heading due south at 30 knots. The pilot then dropped two 100-pound bombs, both of which missed, before setting a return course for his base while another Dave was launched to try and keep tabs on what had to be an enemy task force operating in the area.
After his radar operators assured him the enemy reconnaissance plane as heading away, Lieutenant Commander Hopper onboard HMS Manxman made a decision that he knew would either save or doom his ship. Instead of heading for Christmas Island he ordered his navigator to turn southwest and increase speed to 38 knots, steer for the nearest rain squall, and then using the weather as cover, make a run for Port C instead of Christmas Island. Hopper’s logic was simple, he figured the Japanese would expect him to run for Christmas Island so he decided not to go there. With three hours of darkness remaining, he figured he could run hard to the southwest and disappear into the vast spaces of the Indian Ocean south of Java and get away clean.
After his radar operators assured him the enemy reconnaissance plane as heading away, Lieutenant Commander Hopper onboard HMS Manxman made a decision that he knew would either save or doom his ship. Instead of heading for Christmas Island he ordered his navigator to turn southwest and increase speed to 38 knots, steer for the nearest rain squall, and then using the weather as cover, make a run for Port C instead of Christmas Island. Hopper’s logic was simple, he figured the Japanese would expect him to run for Christmas Island so he decided not to go there. With three hours of darkness remaining, he figured he could run hard to the southwest and disappear into the vast spaces of the Indian Ocean south of Java and get away clean.
Given how terrible Japanese search practices were Hooper's plan is actually very likely to work
Well actually not being hit is life but speed can help with that
They're likely to assume that the top speed of warship(s) in question is around 30 knots and draw the search area too small to contain it. But search planes could still get slightly lost and stumble over the Manxman.
Let's see what happens.
38 knots, or 43.7 miles, assuming they have til 6am at the latest, they can move roughly 130 miles.
That of course assumes a Japanese plane finds them right at 6am more then likely, they'd be okay at least another hour or so after sunrise, and this also depends if the Japanese immediately launch a strike, or wait for scouts to find her before sending bombers out.
That of course assumes a Japanese plane finds them right at 6am more then likely, they'd be okay at least another hour or so after sunrise, and this also depends if the Japanese immediately launch a strike, or wait for scouts to find her before sending bombers out.
Finding a Warship at sea is not easy, even today a well handled warship can avoid detection for a considerable length of time. The fact he changed course and is moving much faster then expected is enough to put him out of scouting range fairly easily. The second point and one that any attacking aircraft have to consider is the time it takes to get to him. Aircraft are faster being 4 to 5 times his speed while cruising to target. However fuel is a factor and for every 5 nm they are closer he travels 1nm. after flying for an hour and not finding him they will need to search using precious fuel. That search is usually on the last course and a fan on either side.
Baring a major mistake he is home free. At dawn he will decide to either burn fuel and get out of range or change course again and slow down to avoid leaving a wake
Baring a major mistake he is home free. At dawn he will decide to either burn fuel and get out of range or change course again and slow down to avoid leaving a wake
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