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Chapter III: Clearing Arkansas (Part 1)
Chapter III: Clearing Arkansas (Part 1)

The Battle of Fort Smith


In addition to Little Rock, where Frederick Steele and his Union army had withdrawn after the defeat in the Camden Expedition, there were two other notable garrisons in northern Arkansas that were occupied by Federal troops. Besides Helena in the east, which had already been the scene of heavy fighting in 1863 and where Confederate attempts to capture the city had been beaten back with heavy casualties, Fort Smith on the border with the Indian Territory was another important military outpost.

The original fort was established on December 25, 1817 by Major William Bradford in order to maintain harmony between the local Osage Indians, who had long been dominant in this territory, and a band of Cherokee who had migrated west, under pressure from European Americans, from their traditional territory in the Southeast. This time would later be historically referenced as the "First Fort." It ended in 1824 when the US Army abandoned Fort Smith after constructing Fort Gibson further west.

As a result of the increased tensions with local Indians following the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and local white settlers who encroached on their territory, the U.S. Army created a second Fort Smith in 1838 near the original's ruins. This is the beginning of the historical "Second Fort" period. During General Zachary Taylor's command of the fort in the 1840s, it became a supply depot for other forts within the Indian Territory.

Following its seizure by forces of the state of Arkansas in April of 1861, Fort Smith became an important post for the Confederate army. Along with the arsenal in Little Rock, Fort Smith was one of only two significant U.S. military installations in Arkansas and as such played a vital role in Confederate plans to defend the state. The facilities of the fort provided housing for troops and mountain barriers to the north would help stall Union attempts to retake the post for two years. Troops from the fort took part in the Battle of Wilson's Creek in 1861 as well as the disastrous Confederate defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge in 1862. Following the latter battle, General Earl Van Dorn led his Southern army out of Arkansas and the handful of troops left at Fort Smith provided virtually the only defense for the entire western half of the state. General Thomas Hindman was assigned to built a new army for what soon became the Trans-Mississippi Department and Fort Smith became the centerpiece of his efforts. Massive camps grew in the surrounding prairies and the storehouses of the fort provided uniforms, arms and provisions to Hindman's army. Sadly, such supplies were often depleted and many men suffered and died from hunger, cold and disease. Hindman's army returned to Fort Smith after a tactical stalemate at the Battle of Prairie Grove and soon evacuated the area and marched to Little Rock. A smaller Confederate force held the fort until August of 1863, when it was abandoned without the firing of a shot as a large Union command approached from the west. The retreating Confederates ambushed part of the Federal army at the Battle of Devil's Backbone while the main body moved to occupy the now evacuated fort.

In early 1864, Fort Smith was the scene of a bureaucratic conflict of powers after the original Federal District of the Frontier had been split up. The Indian Territory and Fort Smith, although belonging to Arkansas, were designated the District of the Frontier in the Department of Kansas and placed under the command of Colonel William R. Judson. The areas in Arkansas were designated the District of the Frontier in the Department of Arkansas and placed under the command of General John Milton Thayer. Thayer's troops were attached to the VII Corps during the Camden Expedition as the "Frontier Division".

On February 23, 1864 Blunt replaced Judson in command of the District of the Frontier, Department of Kansas. Blunt commanded until April 17 when his district was discontinued. Fort Smith was transferred to Thayer's district and the rest of the Indian Territory was divided among other districts.

The confused hierarchy was only one of the reasons that made the outpost a target for a Confederate attack in late May 1864. Sterling Price's approach was to confuse Frederick Steele in his run-up to moving against Little Rock and to delude him about his true intentions. Since Fort Smith also possessed an impressive weapon store, he ordered Brigadier-General Joseph O. Shelby to ride west with his Iron Brigade and an artillery battery, join two brigades from the Indian Territory, and take the fort. When the support brigades would subsequently transfer the captured handweapons, ammunition and equipment to the Indian Territory, Shelby would cross the Arkansas River and disseminate information that he, as the vanguard of Price's army, would clear the way to Missouri. This should convince Steele, at least temporarily, that Price was not planning a direct attack on him, but would pass by him and his garrison. Following a later successful battle against Steele, the capture of Fort Smith would also mean that the remains of the Union forces would have to retreat eastwards to the Mississippi River and would therefore no longer be able to intervene in Price's real invasion.



Shelby, the Iron Brigade and Collins' battery left Camden on the morning of May 14, 1864. On late May 18, they merged with Stand Watie's and Tandy Walker's brigades as well as Howell's battery at Bonanza, Sebastian County, Arkansas, 12 miles south of Fort Smith. The combined forces under Shelby's command included 3,200 men and 12 guns. Opposing them in the vicinity of the fort were 1,800 men in the 1st Arkansas and 18th Iowa Infantry Regiments, the 2nd Kansas Cavalry Regiment and two howitzers with the 2nd Indiana Battery led by Colonel John Edwards.

After he had been informed about the nearing Rebel host and its strength, Edwards was in a dilemma, because he knew he could not hope to sufficiently man the fortifications of the outpost with the forces available to him. He therefore made the tactically sound decision to make a stand on ground of his own choosing in front of the town before Shelby could invest Fort Smith's breastworks. It was a bold initiative to face Shelby in the open in the face of overwhelming odds and it would not be expected by the Confederate commander.

It was early on May 19, 1864. Shelby's 3,200 cavalry neared Fort Smith by two roads, the Fort Towson Road and the Line Road, from the south. Edwards had with him his infantry and cavalry, leaving his two howitzers behind in the safety of the fortifications. He anchored his left wing, consisting of the 1st Arkansas Infantry of Lieutenant Colonel Elkanon J. Searle, on high ground overlooking the prairie. He placed Lieutenant Colonel Hugh J. Campbell's 18th Iowa Infantry in the center. The right flank was protected by some swampy ground around a tight bend in Poteau River, a tributary of the Arkansas River. Edwards placed his weakest unit, Major Julius G. Fisk's 2nd Kansas Cavalry, on his right flank.

Shelby's Iron Brigade under Colonel David Shanks engaged Edwards' defences first. They approached by the Fort Towson Road with the 5th Missouri Cavalry in the advance. Shanks threw the regiment out to the left of the road and ordered them to advance on foot against the Federal right. One account said this probing attack was promptly repelled. Another Confederate account said the attack overwhelmed the Union defences. Whatever happened Shanks wisely followed immediately with a furious cavalry attack on Edwards' right wing which was defended by the Kansas cavalrymen. The 5th Missouri broke through the green Kansans on the Federal right and threatened to flank the blue line. Edwards boldly counterattacked with his personal escort supported by some other mounted cavalry and there was some brutal hand to hand combat. The Federals were heavily outnumbered. By the end of the melee Edwards and his horse ended up covered in blood and his counterattack was repulsed. By this time Watie's Indian Brigade had arrived by the other road. Colonel William P. Adair, who commanded the advance regiment (the 2nd Cherokee) heard the sound of battle at a distance of three miles and rode his men hard towards the sound of the guns. He deployed his men to the right of the road and his men advanced dismounted. The outgunned Federals put up a fight but in a short time they were pushed back.

The engagement only lasted a little over an hour but in that time the issue was decided. Edwards' desperate counter attack had been repulsed and his right flank had been turned. He had no choice but to withdraw. The brief battle had degenerated into a confused retreat with the hopelessly outnumbered Union men in flight, trying to reach the safety of the fort. In the end Edwards' retreat was made in good order back to Fort Smith, but there was no doubt he had been beaten by Shelby.

After entering the fort, the wounded Edwards met with former district commander William R. Judson and quickly informed him of the situation and, knowing that the town would probably fall, advised him to leave the defence of the outpost to him. The longer he could keep the Rebels out the more time there would be to evacuate by river or destroy the valuable war materiel present in the stores. Edwards also advised Judson to leave the garrison before it became surrounded. Judson immediately handed over command to Edwards and, taking his advice, left immediately.

There was no way to know for sure where along the defences Shelby would attack, so Edwards was obliged to spread his men thin over the whole length of the outer defences. This meant he had enough men to place one every four or five feet. Because the distance was large from one point in the walls to another, it would also be difficult to adequately reinforce positions that were under heavy attack in time.

Shelby appeared south of the city about 2 PM with two brigades of cavalry and two batteries of artillery totalling about 2,500 men. When he saw the fortifications it was as he had expected. As usual, Shelby did not underestimate his opponent by wasting any time. The Iron Brigade backed by one battery of artillery approached by the Line Road which entered Fort Smith from the south east Stand Watie's brigade supported by Howell's battery approached by the Fort Towson Road which entered Fort Smith from the south. Shelby ordered his two brigades to deploy in line of battle across their respective avenues of approach. The battle opened with an exchange of artillery fire. Some of the Confederate projectiles fell short of the fortifications and struck buildings in the city, including some private houses. Cannonballs were later found embedded in the walls of a number of civilian homes.

Following Watie's suggestion, Shelby had ordered about three hundered of Watie's Indians in the 1st and 2nd Cherokee Regiments to stand by, waiting for dark, so they could cross a swampy area to the west of the Fort Towson Road and seize the opposing earth works in order to roll up th enemy's right flank. When this was accomplished the plan was for the two brigades to launch a general assault all along the line joining the two roads. Colonel Shanks was waiting for the signal to attack but soon grew impatient. Under his own initiative, he decided not to wait, but rather to launch an attack of his own in order to force the issue.

Supported by an intense barrage from Collins' Missouri battery, Shanks' men advanced first on horseback along the Line Road and then dismounted, attacking as infantry, firing their rifles as they moved forward. In line of battle Elliott's Missouri Cavalry were on the right and, from right to left, were marching the 12th, 11th and 5th Missouri Cavalry as well as Crisp's Missouri Cavalry, four regiments and a battalion in all consisting of 1,400 officers and men. They had to advance over several dozen yards of open field to reach the earthworks and the advance was slowed somewhat on the flanks by a ravine and some boggy ground. They were exposed to a combination of musket and artillery fire and the casualties were high. Opposing them from behind the fortifications were men from Searle's 1st Arkansas Infantry who were thought to be the best of Edwards' men in Fort Smith. They in turn were subjected to a murderous hail of bullets from the massed rifles and shotguns coming at them. The thin line of Federals returned small arms fire as best as they could. Their artillery fired round shot at the advancing Union troops when cannister would have inflicted more damage. Even so, the Confederate troops suffered a fair number of dead and wounded before they mounted the fortress' dirt ramparts. When the Rebels reached the earthworks the fire fight turned into a brawl with the Federals wielding their muskets as clubs and the Rebels using their rifle butts to crack heads. In the end the outgunned defenders were overwhelmed. It took less than 30 minutes for that part of the Union earthworks defending the Line Road to be taken.

The Federals fell back to a half finished inner work of defences close to the edge of the town, where the wounded and tired Colonel Edwards gave the men encouragement to stand their ground.

General Shelby arived on the south east part of the battlefield just as Shanks' men took the Line Road earthworks. When he saw the Confederate battle flags flying over the Union line he became excited and sent word to Watie of the success, suggesting an attack from the south in a similar fashion west of the Fort Towson Road. He also ordered Shanks to press home the attack on the inner works. Shelby's blood was up. He personally led the 11th Missouri Cavalry in a gallant mounted charge. The rallied Federals, however, stopped the charge with a well directed outpouring of musketry. Shelby himself was briefly unhorsed when his favorite horse was wounded. It was now dark but the 11th Missouri Cavalry quickly reformed and joined the 5th and 12th Missouri Cavalry in a dismounted assault, which after some desperate fighting carried the field.

When Stand Watie saw what Shanks had accomplished he decided to copy him. He ordered his brigade forward across a swamp to the west of the Fort Towson Road that was deemed to be impassable by the enemy. Watie's men only encountered light resistance from poorly equipped and trained Kansas Cavalry. They were easily pushed back from the outer works.

Confederate battle flags were now seen all along the outer works between the two roads and Rebel troops started pouring into Fort Smith itself. House to house fighting broke out, as did a fire which spread among some of the houses.

The Federals made another stand at the depot where the fighting became intense. By 7 PM the Rebels were able to use their advantage in numbers to flank the Federals again thanks to the arrival of Tandy Walker's brigade of 700 men, forcing them to retreat. The battle was over and for the Federals it was every man for himself. Edwards and some other officers and about half the men escaped to the other side of the Arkansas River. He literally had to cut his way out of Fort Smith and he and his men were pursued by Shelby's cavalry till well after midnight.

Shanks' command lost 10 dead and 90 wounded. Total Confederate losses were 128 dead and wounded. This imbalance in casualties was hardly unexpected. Shanks' men suffered the worst casualties because they had engaged the 1st Arkansas, the only large body of troops Edwards had that were a real match for Shelby's cavalry.

Nobody knows how many Federals were killed and wounded. Nearly 1,200 were taken prisoners while hundreds more escaped with Edwards over the river.

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