alternatehistory.com

As both Niobe and Rainbow had finally been successfully acquired, their replacements in the shape of a domestic shipbuilding program had to be started as quickly as possible. The choice for domestic construction came with risks and rewards. The cost of building warships at home was estimated to be at minimum, a 30% increase to the cost of any ships from experienced British yards. This alongside the fact that Canada had zero knowledge in building modern warships, worried Laurier that the entire program would see slow downs, delays, and eventual cancellation. The upsides though were also attractive, the building up of Canadian marine infrastructure would provide advantages for the civilian market while also potentially opening up Canada to foreign export orders in the future, it was also much more palatable for such large sums of money to be spent at home opposed to abroad. Regardless of where the ships themselves would be built however, it was clear that Canada would require the assistance of the Admiralty and as such, Kingsmill entered into talks with the Admiralty in March of 1910. The Canadian officer originally requested help with vetting a list of reputable shipbuilding firms alongside the inevitable handling of secretive and valuable Admiralty design documents. In response to this request, the Admiralty effectively threw open the doors eagerly to Canada. Alongside meeting Kingsmill’s requests, the Admiralty offered to assist any native Canadian firms looking to apply and to provide qualified Royal Navy staff to oversee production and act as quality control staff.


Kingsmill and Desbarats were both relatively excited to hear this news however, it was quickly clarified to the Admiralty that any overseers they sent would be hired by the Canadian government and most importantly, the contract itself was for the Canadian government and not the Admiralty. These ships were to form the lauded Canadian navy and the British would have to keep this in mind. In the intervening period before the tenders were accepted, the program was somewhat modified. The Boadicea class cruiser previously included was cut out of the program with the stipulation that Niobe would be retained as an active combatant in its place. This was done partially as a cost saving measure but mainly it was due to the fact that the scout cruiser concept was rather flawed. Boadicea herself featured the same top speed as a Bristol class, very similar crewing requirements and was only somewhat lighter than the aforementioned cruiser. The Bristol featured basically the same armament of a Boadicea on each broadside. So in the end, the ship proved to be a white elephant, not even able to effectively lead destroyer squadrons any better than a Bristol due to her slow speed. The Bristol class cruisers were specified to be the improved Weymouth subclass which entailed a major increase in firepower over the original Bristol class, moving from largely a split 6” and 4” main battery to a uniform 6” main battery. The River class destroyers were confirmed to be of the modern Acorn class. Another modification was also made to the timetable of the construction as the department had acknowledged the delays possible with domestic construction. All of the ships would be completed over the span of 6 years with the first cruiser being finished within 3 years with the remaining pair coming into service each following year. The first pair of destroyers would also be delivered in the first 3 years while the remaining ships would have to be delivered at 9-month intervals.

Over 12 shipbuilding companies had contacted the Canadian government to express interest but once the formal tender was released in February of 1911, only 7 sent in official applications by the deadline of May 1911. One of those firms, Thames Iron Works, was instantly disqualified due to the fact that they were a British firm that mistakenly bid under the assumption that the ships were to be built in Britain. The following firms tendered bids,


While one of the bidders was never identified, the most promising firm was the recently established Canada Vickers yard. The Canadian government had previously authorized large subsidies which were available to any companies for the construction of drydocks, shipbuilding facilities or any other relevant maritime infrastructure. Utilizing this opportunity to establish a foothold in Canada, the Vickers Limited leased an extremely valuable piece of property in Quebec in order to build a shipyard. The Montreal shipyard was easily the most advanced in Canada, eventually including a completely covered and heated work area and the floating drydock Duke of Connaught. Vickers Limited would prove itself in the future to be one of the most valuable firms for the Canadian Navy going forward as a rare experienced firm with massive pull and resources at home in Britain and abroad. In the end, the estimations regarding the premium for domestic construction proved to be correct. The highest bid for the built in Canada program came out to be $13,000,000 while the lowest was $11,300,000. The mistaken bid by Thames Iron Works provided a valuable comparison as their price came out to be $8,500,000 for British built vessels.


The tenders were proceeding at a respectable pace, an inevitable clash between the Admiralty and Canadian government was threatening to blow the foundation out from underneath the entire naval initiative. The question of the Royal Canadian Navy’s legal authority was brought center stage, with all of the imperial elitism and colonial resentment dragged along with it.