alternatehistory.com
Chapter II: Preparing an Invasion (Part 1)
While Frederick Steele and his battered host headed north to lick their wounds in Little Rock, closely monitored by eager Confederate scouts, a war council between Edmund Kirby Smith and Sterling Price took place west of the Saline River. After having reviewed the weather conditions, the decision was quickly made to move most of the infantry back to Camden and to give the men a well-deserved rest there, the current situation had to be discussed and new plans to be made. Judged from the outsidem the Rebels in the Trans-Mississippi theater had achieved great feats. Within a few weeks, 30,000 seasoned veterans under Nathaniel Banks in Louisiana had been frightened to death and put to flight by 12,000 hastily assembled troops under Richard Taylor. Shortly afterwards, a also numerically superior Union army had been driven out of the Arkansas heartland. However, these successes on the battlefield were not enough to resolve the conflicts in the Confederate leadership.
To accomplish what had been done around Camden, Kirby Smith, under the vociferous protest of Richard Taylor, had stripped the latter of a significant portion of his forces in Louisiana. Taylor, a Louisianan, had failed to convince Kirby Smith of the need to press the advantage in his home state. Although being influenced by personal issues, Kirby Smith's decision was a military sound one. Many an officer in Louisiana suggested, that had Kirby Smith not turned north to Arkansas but pressed the advantage along the Red River, the Confederates could have effectively destroyed Banks and his fleet. This assumption, however, appears to be strongly erroneous. From the beginning on Kirby Smith and Taylor had maintained a relationship strained to the breaking point. The commander of the Army of Western Louisiana was convinced,that aggressive action against Banks was the only way towards victory. Kirby Smith, on the other hand, pursued a 'Fabian' policy of defence by using interior lines to mass the limited resources and manpower of the theater at threatened points, then quickly move to counter additional threats elsewhere. This was mainly used to minimize risk for the overstretched Rebel forces and to prepare powerful counterstrikes. After Banks had been put to flight, Taylor wanted to pursue him in order to drive him into the river. Kirby Smith disagreed. Despite the impressive victory at Mansfield and the violent exchange of blows at Pleasant Hill, Banks' army continued to outnumber the Confederates by more than two to one. An additional, probably even more important factor was the existence of the Federal fleet. With their heavy guns, it would be even more difficult to carry out an effective and decisive attack. Kirby Smith was not only worried about Steele's parralel thrust, but, given the balance of power in Louisiana, did not believe in the possibility of a victory against Banks, which in the worst case would have been able to wipe out his own army as well.
However, Taylor not only remained inconsistent with the assessment of the strategical and tactical situation, but also became increasingly insolent. He claimed that the decision to move against Steele was 'a hideous failure' and that by depriving him of the means of carrying to fruition his success on the Red River, Kirby Smith had turned the fruits of Mansfield into 'dust and ashes'. Angry and scornful comments were telegraphed back and forth in the days following the fight at Jenkins' Ferry until the department commander had enough. In a neutral tone, he calmly asked Taylor to send him Polignac's infantry division and three cavalry brigades under James P. Major. Taylor literally exploded and furiously sent Kirby Smith his formal resignation request, which was happily accepted. A few weeks later, Richard Taylor set out to take over the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. Harry T. Hays, who had previously commanded the Louisiana Tigers Brigade and had been badly wounded during the Battle in the Wilderness, was appointed as the new commander of the District of West Louisiana.
But this argument was not the only one that Kirby Smith had to wage. The department commander had fought various controversies with Sterling Price, who had been under his control since crossing the Mississippi River in 1862. One of the reasons for these squabbles was the fact that the exile governor of Missouri, Thomas C. Reynolds, who had a deep aversion to Price, tried various means to discredit him. He had been afraid that Price would rise to become Missouri's military dictator due to his popularity among the troops and would thus push him off of the political stage. Price's reputation fell in Kirby Smith's eyes when the former evacuated Little Rock in October 1863 and withdrew from Frederick Steele's advancing army. While Kirby Smith had to acknowledge that, by judging the balance of power, this had been the only strategically valid option, the operation still caused significant territorial losses and the blame was placed on Price. Regardless of these events, the latter began to lobby even more for a return to Missouri during the winter of 1863 to 1864. As a basis for discussion, he sent various letters and news from the state to Reynolds and Kirby Smith. According to these documents, the sympathy for the Confederate cause was still strong and tens of thousands of volunteers were ready to gather under the banners of the south. A certain frustrated undertone was still prevalent with Price, however, because he simply could not understand why large masses had not yet risen against the Union's occupying forces. He had to admit bitterly that many Missouri men were waiting for his arrival before they would raise their arms against the perceived tyranny. These marginal disappointments did not, however, result in deferring the goal of succesfully liberating Missouri. Additionally, the reactions of his superior to Price's propositions grew much more positive in the wake of the Camden Expedition.
After Steele's crossing of the Saline River, there were two enemy armies in the Trans-Mississippi theater on the retreat. While an attack on Banks did not seem expedient for the reasons already discussed and in the light of the open hostility between Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor, a march on Little Rock followed up with an invasion of Missouri enjoyed increasing popularity within the Confederate command structure. Compared to the Louisiana marshes, reclaiming the capital of Arkansas offered significantly more prestige and a far greater blow to the fighting morale of the northern states in an important election year. In addition, the forces of the southerners already outnumbered Steele's at the time, which increased the chances of success. In a presentation of ideas that he enunciated repeatedly over the days following the conclusion of the Battle of Jenkins Ferry, Price suggested that Kirby Smith devote his efforts to raising an army of thirty thousand men in Arkansas that could then eject Steele from Little Rock. With the Federals out of the way, Missouri would be open to Confederate recruiting officers and a subsequent reconquest of the state. Due to the convincing performance in the past campaign, Kirby Smith was won over by this train of thought. He had seen with his own eyes how Price neglected his own physical integrity in favor of the cause and that had impressed him deeply. Especially because Reynolds had always characterized him as a show-off. The three pillars of the upcoming operation were quickly defined. First, the movement would be predicated on controlling the Arkansas River valley, which would then serve as a springboard for the invasion into Missouri. Second, Kirby Smith would hold nothing bac, using all of his available infantry and cavalry in the offensive. Third, Kirby Smith wanted to move quickly. Therefore he ordered the infantry divisions of Thomas J. Churchill, Mosby Parsons, John G. Walker and Camille A. J. M. Prince de Polignac to assemble at Camden preparatory to an expedition. These were to be joined by the cavalry divisions of James F. Fagan, John S. Marmaduke, Joseph O. Shelby and James P. Major, and it was envisaged that two of these four divisions would subsequently be used as infantry. This measure was to be implemented because there was a serious shortage of well-maintained mounts in Arkansas and the Trans-Mississippi theater as a whole.
Chapter II: Preparing an Invasion (Part 1)
While Frederick Steele and his battered host headed north to lick their wounds in Little Rock, closely monitored by eager Confederate scouts, a war council between Edmund Kirby Smith and Sterling Price took place west of the Saline River. After having reviewed the weather conditions, the decision was quickly made to move most of the infantry back to Camden and to give the men a well-deserved rest there, the current situation had to be discussed and new plans to be made. Judged from the outsidem the Rebels in the Trans-Mississippi theater had achieved great feats. Within a few weeks, 30,000 seasoned veterans under Nathaniel Banks in Louisiana had been frightened to death and put to flight by 12,000 hastily assembled troops under Richard Taylor. Shortly afterwards, a also numerically superior Union army had been driven out of the Arkansas heartland. However, these successes on the battlefield were not enough to resolve the conflicts in the Confederate leadership.
To accomplish what had been done around Camden, Kirby Smith, under the vociferous protest of Richard Taylor, had stripped the latter of a significant portion of his forces in Louisiana. Taylor, a Louisianan, had failed to convince Kirby Smith of the need to press the advantage in his home state. Although being influenced by personal issues, Kirby Smith's decision was a military sound one. Many an officer in Louisiana suggested, that had Kirby Smith not turned north to Arkansas but pressed the advantage along the Red River, the Confederates could have effectively destroyed Banks and his fleet. This assumption, however, appears to be strongly erroneous. From the beginning on Kirby Smith and Taylor had maintained a relationship strained to the breaking point. The commander of the Army of Western Louisiana was convinced,that aggressive action against Banks was the only way towards victory. Kirby Smith, on the other hand, pursued a 'Fabian' policy of defence by using interior lines to mass the limited resources and manpower of the theater at threatened points, then quickly move to counter additional threats elsewhere. This was mainly used to minimize risk for the overstretched Rebel forces and to prepare powerful counterstrikes. After Banks had been put to flight, Taylor wanted to pursue him in order to drive him into the river. Kirby Smith disagreed. Despite the impressive victory at Mansfield and the violent exchange of blows at Pleasant Hill, Banks' army continued to outnumber the Confederates by more than two to one. An additional, probably even more important factor was the existence of the Federal fleet. With their heavy guns, it would be even more difficult to carry out an effective and decisive attack. Kirby Smith was not only worried about Steele's parralel thrust, but, given the balance of power in Louisiana, did not believe in the possibility of a victory against Banks, which in the worst case would have been able to wipe out his own army as well.
However, Taylor not only remained inconsistent with the assessment of the strategical and tactical situation, but also became increasingly insolent. He claimed that the decision to move against Steele was 'a hideous failure' and that by depriving him of the means of carrying to fruition his success on the Red River, Kirby Smith had turned the fruits of Mansfield into 'dust and ashes'. Angry and scornful comments were telegraphed back and forth in the days following the fight at Jenkins' Ferry until the department commander had enough. In a neutral tone, he calmly asked Taylor to send him Polignac's infantry division and three cavalry brigades under James P. Major. Taylor literally exploded and furiously sent Kirby Smith his formal resignation request, which was happily accepted. A few weeks later, Richard Taylor set out to take over the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. Harry T. Hays, who had previously commanded the Louisiana Tigers Brigade and had been badly wounded during the Battle in the Wilderness, was appointed as the new commander of the District of West Louisiana.
But this argument was not the only one that Kirby Smith had to wage. The department commander had fought various controversies with Sterling Price, who had been under his control since crossing the Mississippi River in 1862. One of the reasons for these squabbles was the fact that the exile governor of Missouri, Thomas C. Reynolds, who had a deep aversion to Price, tried various means to discredit him. He had been afraid that Price would rise to become Missouri's military dictator due to his popularity among the troops and would thus push him off of the political stage. Price's reputation fell in Kirby Smith's eyes when the former evacuated Little Rock in October 1863 and withdrew from Frederick Steele's advancing army. While Kirby Smith had to acknowledge that, by judging the balance of power, this had been the only strategically valid option, the operation still caused significant territorial losses and the blame was placed on Price. Regardless of these events, the latter began to lobby even more for a return to Missouri during the winter of 1863 to 1864. As a basis for discussion, he sent various letters and news from the state to Reynolds and Kirby Smith. According to these documents, the sympathy for the Confederate cause was still strong and tens of thousands of volunteers were ready to gather under the banners of the south. A certain frustrated undertone was still prevalent with Price, however, because he simply could not understand why large masses had not yet risen against the Union's occupying forces. He had to admit bitterly that many Missouri men were waiting for his arrival before they would raise their arms against the perceived tyranny. These marginal disappointments did not, however, result in deferring the goal of succesfully liberating Missouri. Additionally, the reactions of his superior to Price's propositions grew much more positive in the wake of the Camden Expedition.
After Steele's crossing of the Saline River, there were two enemy armies in the Trans-Mississippi theater on the retreat. While an attack on Banks did not seem expedient for the reasons already discussed and in the light of the open hostility between Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor, a march on Little Rock followed up with an invasion of Missouri enjoyed increasing popularity within the Confederate command structure. Compared to the Louisiana marshes, reclaiming the capital of Arkansas offered significantly more prestige and a far greater blow to the fighting morale of the northern states in an important election year. In addition, the forces of the southerners already outnumbered Steele's at the time, which increased the chances of success. In a presentation of ideas that he enunciated repeatedly over the days following the conclusion of the Battle of Jenkins Ferry, Price suggested that Kirby Smith devote his efforts to raising an army of thirty thousand men in Arkansas that could then eject Steele from Little Rock. With the Federals out of the way, Missouri would be open to Confederate recruiting officers and a subsequent reconquest of the state. Due to the convincing performance in the past campaign, Kirby Smith was won over by this train of thought. He had seen with his own eyes how Price neglected his own physical integrity in favor of the cause and that had impressed him deeply. Especially because Reynolds had always characterized him as a show-off. The three pillars of the upcoming operation were quickly defined. First, the movement would be predicated on controlling the Arkansas River valley, which would then serve as a springboard for the invasion into Missouri. Second, Kirby Smith would hold nothing bac, using all of his available infantry and cavalry in the offensive. Third, Kirby Smith wanted to move quickly. Therefore he ordered the infantry divisions of Thomas J. Churchill, Mosby Parsons, John G. Walker and Camille A. J. M. Prince de Polignac to assemble at Camden preparatory to an expedition. These were to be joined by the cavalry divisions of James F. Fagan, John S. Marmaduke, Joseph O. Shelby and James P. Major, and it was envisaged that two of these four divisions would subsequently be used as infantry. This measure was to be implemented because there was a serious shortage of well-maintained mounts in Arkansas and the Trans-Mississippi theater as a whole.
- Lothar
- Word Count: 1.4k