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Although Prime Minister Laurier was invited to participate in the summer of 1909 ‘Imperial Conference for the Naval and Military Defense of the Empire’, he considered it unwise to send all of the pro-naval contingent across the pond in case of some local political incident. Due to this and his somewhat tiring nature of the subject matter, Laurier dispatched the familiar duo of the Ministers of Marine and Militia, Brodeur and Borden, accompanied by their advising staff, Rear Admiral Kingsmill, and Major General Lake. The original purpose of this meeting was to solidify the small flotilla strategy of home defense being looked into by both Australia and Canada but following a recent report from the China squadron, that soon changed. The Admiral in commanded had sent an assessment to the Admiralty outlining how the coastal defenses in the area of Hong Kong had degraded heavily in the past few years. Fisher quickly denounced the legitimacy of these claims, stating that Britain could sent a squadron of powerful dreadnoughts and armored cruisers to defend the area at a moments notice. This opened up a particularly troublesome can of worms as while the renegotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant they had powerful allies in the sector, shifting large Royal Navy resources to the East would potential antagonize both Japan and Germany into a response.

This alongside the fact that Fisher had yet to replace the ships on foreign stations he had pulled out and scrapped years earlier, pushed the Admiralty to suggest a new idea. The naval defense discussion started with its familiar conciliatory remarks, making sure to include all of the financial or otherwise contributions of the dominions to the Empire. The Admiralty fully explained that any help, financial, or otherwise was appreciated however, it had a new stipulation. If Dominions wanted to build their own local naval forces, the Admiralty wished to have a homogeneous and sound foundation on which a national navy could be built, essentially a commitment to future actions. This would minimize logistical strain on the dominions and allow them to integrate into each others’ formations if found to be necessary. As the Admiralty would state:

“A dominion government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet unit; and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in it’s component parts in time of war. The advantage of a unit of this kind if that it is capable of rapid combination with other similar fleet units. We have now, as you know, in the far east, the eastern fleet. There are three divisions, the Australian division, the China division, and the East Indies division. In the case of Canada also we think that the fleet unit might in the future form an acceptable system, particularly with regards to the Pacific. If we had another fleet unit of this kind on the Pacific coast of Canada we should have, under circumstances under which they could be easily united, no less than four of these divisions, and they would together constitute a very powerful fleet.”

In somewhat of a rapid departure (although not completely out of left field given the Canadian delegations previous run in with attempts at home for capital ships), the Admiralty was now advocating for a miniature fleet to be purchased, largely to help act as a future counter to Japanese ambitions in the future and act as a sort of capital ship reserve. In the eyes of the Admiralty, local defensive units would be useless against the Japanese as they lack seagoing capacity and the rapidly growing Imperial Japanese Navy could simply sweep these vessels from the sea. The fleet units themselves were to consist of a 1 Invincible class battlecruiser, 3 Town class cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 submarine and the necessary auxiliary support ships. It was projected this unit would require upwards of 2,300 personnel and would require an initial overall cost of £3,700,000 plus another £600,000 for annual operations. As Laurier and like minded planners had specifically avoided any ships of this size, let alone a full-on fleet unit, the Canadian delegation had to act quickly to show the impossibility of this plan. Minister Broduer pointed out that McKenna had indeed covered the advantages of having a fleet unit for the Pacific but had not mentioned anything in regard to the Atlantic. McKeena replied with,

“I only referred to the Pacific squadron in it’s relation to the other squadrons we should have on the further side of the Pacific Ocean and the possible combination of them all into one fleet. With regards to the Atlantic side, it is so very much nearer to our own home waters, and we are so much freer consequently to send vessels of our own, that I do not think that there is quite the same urgency on the Atlantic side as on the Pacific side. While both oceans alike are open to you, the Atlantic coast is very much nearer to our own scene of operations. Please Minister, tell us the lines upon which you would like to proceed, and then ask us whether we can offer any suggestions upon that. We do not want to appear to be pressing you.”


It was obvious that the Admiralty and the Canadian delegation had ulterior motives and ever the cautious man, Brodeur declined to comment, retreating for the moment to gather a response. When the conference resumed days later, the Canadian delegation lead the opening discussion. Minister Borden took the helm at this point and read to record the Foster resolution of Mark 1909. The three main principals behind the formation of a Canadian Navy was as such, Canada wished to act on it’s own authority but with council and direction from the Admiralty. Canada wanted to act upon Lord Tweedmouth’s policy lines laid in the 1907 Conference and the fact that Canada wanted to go beyond simple financial donations to Britain in times of need. Borden also stipulated that he would like clarification regarding Canadian control over it’s forces in wartime, best means of allowing interchangeability within the naval services of the Dominion and plans for the period of transition if this fleet unit concept was to be taken to heart. Borden was quick to clarify one thing though, Canada required a two-ocean fleet, politically and militarily. While it was indeed true that Britain was in a position to readily send assistance to the Atlantic coast, the coasts themselves spanned well over 4,000 miles apart. The majority of Canada’s population lived closer to the Atlantic and to station a very expensive naval unit far away from the majority of the nation would be politically disastrous.

Borden would close with “If there is anything at all in the idea, as I believe there is, of allowing the people to see for themselves what they are doing in these matters of defense, I am inclined to think that we should start on both coasts at once, that would be the only thing that would satisfy our people thoroughly.”

Minister Brodeur took the stand next, hoping to drive home Canada’s position on the issue. Beginning with an expression of gratitude towards the Admiralty for validating the principal of dominion autonomy within the issue of naval defense. Following this, Brodeur presented the fact that Canada’s wishes had evolved past merely a small coastal defense force and the existing Fisheries Protection service was not a suitable baseline to expand in order to make up such a force. He explained that while Canada did need more effective local based defense, Ottawa was worried about creating a fleet able to be used in Imperial conflicts, effectively reigniting some of the issues found during the Boer War. That being said though, Canada was willing to establish potentially a cruiser force although, not of the caliber requested in the fleet unit. At this point though, it seemed as both delegations had reached a stalemate. While the Australians had accepted the fleet unit concept, the Canadians wished to have a local naval force of a smaller type and within manageable limits. This did not bode well for the Admiralty, partially pushed along by Admiral Fisher and his personal quest to implement the battlecruiser concept, which he had already been somewhat unable to accomplish. In the end however, the Admiralty was a multi-faceted organization and their political and military leaders often had very differing opinions. When push came to shove, it seemed the British government overrode the authority of the Admiralty, viewing the forcing of the naval issue as undermining the political harmony of the dominions and their cooperative nature.


After one of the daily conferences, Brodeur and McKeena convened for dinner in the evening. During this event, Brodeur seemed to have successfully explained the political landmine of a Canadian Navy at home alongside the various other matters at hand. In a latter to Laurier, Brodeur would state:

“It was pretty late when we parted, and on the way out he said to me I understand the whole situation you find yourself in. We are going to get along just fine. I am going to prepare another document for you that I’ll sign once you’ve seen it and confirmed you’re happy with it, and I’ll make sure it’s done in a way that will support the principals of your House resolution.”

The events of the next day would solidify this fact as McKeena addressed the value of any kind of Dominion naval force, even if it is substantially weaker than the proposed fleet units. More so, McKeena proposed creating a subcommittee between the Canadian delegates and Admiralty staff to better discuss their own specific naval matters in a private setting. With these discussions soon approaching, Brodeur asked Minister Borden to have a dinner meeting with Admiral Fisher, as Borden was already familiar with him and hopefully to smooth out any issues alongside convincing the old salt. This tactic did not end up working on Fisher, ending with both parties departing out from under a cloud of negativity. As per usual, Fisher was steadfast in his position. Canada would not have a navy period unless they started with a capital ship and it would have to be positioned on the Pacific coast, this was nonnegotiable. When they reconvened, Fisher stood by his fleet unit concept and it was not until McKeena planted his foot and explained promptly to Fisher that the fleet unit plan was not feasible to Canada. With more force behind the opposition, Fisher acquiesced and requested a financial number the Canadians would consider reasonable, largely in order to help the Admiralty to tailor a package for their needs. Brodeur was not particularly ready to answer that question however, he presented two figures of $3,000,000 and $2,000,000 as yearly estimates. This number was extrapolated as being a fairly safe number as Robert Borden had previously stated the naval budget should be half that of the militia, bringing it to the above largest number.

Brodeur seemed to also have anticipated some bargaining, leaving himself some room to move if needed. The lower number was never truly looked at realistically by the Canadian delegation however, it effectively served to pull Admiralty attention away from larger schemes while concentrating their thinking on ensuring the larger of the two plans would be accepted, as was already basically agreed upon internally by the Canadians. Soon after, the Admiralty would prove true to their world and produced the two schemes. The first scheme was rated at £600,000 and while it did not cover the miscellaneous fisheries service and hydrographic work, it covered the upkeep of Halifax and Esquimalt plus the fleet in question. That fleet would consist of 1 Boadicea class cruiser, 4 improved Bristol sub class cruisers and 6 destroyers of the improved River class. Submarines were not considered as they required heavily specialized personnel. The cheaper £400,000 plan cut the Boadicea class cruiser alongside 1 Bristol and 2 destroyers. The more expensive plan very much reflected a fleet unit with the battlecruiser replaced by two other cruisers. While the personnel required to man the ships was somewhat high, their slow roll out over a period of time would allow recruitment and Royal Navy supplements to mitigate this issue. It was planned to have the Boadicea and the destroyers present on the Atlantic and the Bristol’s split between both coasts, giving both coasts a very effective modicum of protection and capacity.


In the end, the specific fleet unit concept pitched to Canada was a compromise and definitely did wound the pride of some Admiralty members, although the result of a completely ocean-going unit even simply made of cruisers was definitely valuable. Even Fisher who had the most personally invested into the battlecruiser concept remarked about his optimism, “This means eventually Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India running a complete navy. We manage the job in Europe, and they’ll manage it against the Yankees, Japs and Chinese as occasion requires it out there.” This scheme was definitely realistic and plausible however, it had heavily outgrown the original purpose of the trip, setting up a dominion defense force of largely coastal vessels grown out of an extended fisheries protection service. The change to an ocean going fleet able to actively participate in imperial wars drastically altered the purpose behind any naval discussions from here on, especially within French speaking areas of Canada. Laurier, Brodeur and Borden seemed all rather contempt with the plan proposed to them however, the ripple effect of this would affect the navy for years to come.

McKeena was a private supporter of the Canadian Naval ambitions and while he could not publicly go against the statement of the Admiralty regarding fleet units only, he was willing to assist Canada completely if Laurier personally took responsibility in his stand against the Admiralty. If Laurier publicly disagreed with financial contributions to the Admiralty, McKenna would assist him in the alternatives. Laurier was feeling relatively confident with moving forward with the issue, obviously his previous ideas of simply expanding the Fisheries service as the base of the navy was insufficient and the people would likely accept such a rationale. Laurier was riding high and the time to strike an act into parliament was soon upon them. As a closing statement, Minister Borden addressed the Admiralty committee.

“The previous resolution passed unanimously by the Canadian government referred to a certain specific statement made by the first sea lord of the Admiralty in 1907, from which it might, and I think it does, appear that it might be possible, at any rate it led us to believe it would be possible to begin the establishment of a navy in a smaller way than that indicated in the proposed Admiralty memorandum. This is to say, I inferred, from the first lords previous 1907 statement, that we could begin with smaller ships and build the larger ones later on. But the ideal of Canada is the construction of a navy as complete as possible, first for local defense, and secondly to cooperate with the imperial navy.”

Brodeur himself felt rather optimistic as well regarding the results of the conference, stating the following to Laurier in a letter,

“The fact that the government and the Admiralty in particular, has been persuaded of the uselessness of claiming a contribution so far as Canada is concerned is, I feel, a big step forward. We also note that your idea at the 1902 conference has won some acceptance. You were alone at that time in seeking endorsement of our independence in the area of naval defense. Today, Australia is supporting your views and has even taken some effective measures towards this goal.”

Both the Australians and Canadians would leave the conference with much larger naval ambitions than they arrived with, although only one would fulfill said ambitions for the immediate future. Laurier confidently pushed this scheme forward regardless, believing in his powerful grasp on Parliament and the support of the people. Immediate measures were taken and Brodeur spoke with McKeena, who was very helpful in the fact that he recommended Canada take on two cruisers immediately for training purposes. Brodeur was especially pushing for even a single ship to fill the fisheries protection gap on the Pacific coast as no modern vessel was there for any period of time. Although while the government made internal moves to ensure success, the lack of transparency within the public soon turned into wild and unfounded speculation, a rather destructive and troublesome effect.