alternatehistory.com

Given the small size and limited means of the Corsican kingdom in the 1760s, the state’s need for a navy may not be immediately apparent. The kingdom could never hope to assemble a fleet strong enough to ward off the great powers, nor did it have a large amount of merchant tonnage to protect. Yet the kingdom still possessed maritime interests which made some sort of armed naval capability essential, as King Theodore and his ministers were well aware. Re-establishing the navy after the Treaty of Paris became one of the king’s first priorities.

The primary maritime threat to Corsica was posed by the Barbary “regencies,” whose corsairs had long menaced Christian trade in the Mediterranean. The Barbary corsairs had been in decline during the early 18th century, but the general European wars in the 1740s and 1750s created a favorable environment for a comeback.[1] Whatever protection France had offered Corsican shipping by its presence was lost after the “liberation” of 1759. Corsica and Tunis had a treaty of peace, but the other regencies - Algiers in particular - saw the island as fair game. Many other states, including great naval powers like France and Britain, found tribute to be cheaper than protecting their merchant fleets and simply bought peace from the corsairs. Corsica, however, would not pay. Even if the meager state finances had allowed it, the very notion of giving tribute to the Corsicans’ ancient enemies - the rapacious Moors who had terrorized the isle for a thousand years - was intolerable.

When Don Santo Antonmattei took charge of the new ministry of “commerce and the navy” in 1761, he was starting virtually from scratch. The “navy” consisted of only one warship: The Cyrne, a 10-gun sloop purchased from the British which had seen service in “King Theodore’s War” a decade earlier. Its crew had taken it to Malta during the French occupation to avoid seizure, and when it returned it was in a sorry state from neglect and poor maintenance. Corsica had neither the facilities nor the craftsmen to make the necessary repairs. To make a fresh start, Theodore authorized Don Santo to send an “expedition” to England with instructions to purchase “a swift frigate, in good repair, of 20 to 30 guns” and to recruit experienced sailors and artisans. His chosen envoys were his close friend and fellow Morsiglian Giacomo Giacomini di Porrata, who had also been a merchant captain in the Americas; and Giovan Battista Peri (or Perez), a Corsican-born Knight of Malta and an experienced corsair captain. They were also accompanied by Giovan Felice Valentini, a cousin and close political ally of Secretary of State Pasquale Paoli, who was taking up his post as Corsica’s new ambassador to Great Britain.

It was a good time to be in the market for secondhand ships. Now that the war was over, English ports were full of prizes of war and other surplus. The Admiralty was not interested in selling its most recent classes of ships, but they were willing to part with some older ships which no longer represented the cutting edge of frigate design. Porrata and Peri made a thorough excursion: They met with the Senior Naval Lord Admiral Edward Boscawen, visited the naval yards at Plymouth and Liverpool, and sought out sailors and officers languishing on half-pay who would agree to return to Corsica with them.

The ship they chose was the Rose, a 24-gun “post ship” launched in 1743 which they managed to acquire for £910.[2] Back in Corsica it was re-christened as the frigate Capraia, an homage to the crown prince. Armed with a main battery of 9-pounder guns, the Capraia was a powerful ship for its size and a match for most corsair vessels in a one-on-one fight. Its sailing qualities, however, left something to be desired. As British post ships often spent long periods of time “on station” overseas, more consideration was given to seaworthiness, cargo space, and crew comfort than speed or weatherliness.

One of the ships Porrata and Peri had examined in England was the Saltash, a sister ship of Corsica’s own Cyrne (ex-Merlin). They did not buy it as their instructions called for the purchase of a frigate, but they were intrigued by the substantial changes which the British had made to it. They had completely changed the sail plan, replacing the sloop’s two-masted snow rig with a three-masted ship rig, and had substantially increased its armament from ten to fourteen 6-pounder guns. Porrata and Peri took some measurements, and upon their return suggested to Antonmattei that a similar overhaul might be attempted with the aging Cyrne. The ship was taken to Livorno for repairs and refitting, which proved rather expensive but successfully returned the ship to service.

Initially the navy’s only other type of vessel was the felucca, a common type of single-masted fishing boat. In naval service these were equipped with oars and armed with petriere (swivel guns) and sometimes one or two small carriage guns. Although too weak to fight corsairs, they could easily catch and overawe an unarmed smuggler and remained in use as coastal patrol vessels. Over the course of the 1760s the navy also acquired larger “tartans” or tartane, one or two-masted lateen-rigged merchant vessels, which became its favored auxiliary ships. The tartana actually had a deck (unlike the open felucca) and could carry more cargo and a more respectable armament. Naval tartane were typically equipped with 4 to 8 “falcons” (probably 3 or 4 pounder carriage guns) along with petrieri. We know the names of only two such ships, the Ventura and the Rondone, but the navy possessed at least four tartane in 1768.[3]

The Corsican navy got off to a rough start, and 1764 was a particularly ignominious year. In June, a naval felucca and a private merchant pinco were taken by the Algerians off Capo Muro, just 15 miles from Ajaccio. Just two months later the navy very nearly lost its new flagship off the coast of Bastia when it was approached by five corsair vessels under oars. Thanks to its own sweeps and several civilian craft which tied tow ropes to the frigate, the Capraia managed to crawl back within range of Bastia’s citadel, and the corsairs were warned off by fire from the shore battery.

In response to these events the navy commissioned two galiots from Corsican shipbuilders, the Santa Devota and the Beato Alessandro. These were small galleys with sixteen banks of oars and lateen sails, armed with three guns in the bow and a number of petrieri and spingardi. With their shallow drafts they could pursue corsair vessels hiding in inshore waters, and could also serve as towing ships. These ships proved very useful additions to the fleet, and assisted the sailing warships in capturing a handful of small corsair vessels in Corsican coastal waters.


Adequately crewing even this modest fleet was a major challenge. Some English sailors had been recruited by Porrata and Peri, but they did not last long; within weeks of their arrival Peri complained that the English were “particularly partial to our wine” and constantly drunk. Most were dismissed within a few months. As Corsican manpower was insufficient, the navy turned to other foreign sources, particularly Livorno and Malta. In 1770 only half the navy’s ordinary sailors were actual Corsicans.

The supply of native officers was considerably better. The kingdom had a modest but enthusiastic pool of experienced naval officers, most of whom were veterans of Maltese service - sometimes as actual knights, like Peri, but mostly as private corsairs who raided Turkish shipping under the legal protection of Maltese letters patent. Some had already sailed under a Corsican flag as privateers during the Revolution. These ex-corsairs had plenty of maritime experience and knew the Barbary enemy well, but most had served on feluccas and galleys and had little experience with modern sailing warships. To train them, the navy sought out foreign officers. British lieutenants Cole and Oakeley were hired by Porrata and Peri in England and fared better than their other countrymen, serving out their full contracts. A Dutchman, Lieutenant Pieters, was hired in 1763 on similar terms. The foreigners were known for imposing strict discipline, which did not endear them to either the crews or the proud ex-corsair Corsican officers. Nevertheless, they seem to have trained effective crews and imparted valuable skills to the Corsican officers.

The strategy of the Corsican navy during the 1760s was exceedingly conservative. Given the small size of the navy, the loss of even a single vessel meant losing a large investment in money, materiel, and manpower. It would be a massive blow to the strength of the navy and the prestige of the kingdom. As a result Corsican warships rarely left the coast, and after 1764 they were prohibited from sailing alone under most circumstances. The navy offered battle with the corsairs rarely and only under highly favorable conditions, such as when the squadron managed to find a single vessel or a handful of small ships cruising along the coast or hiding in a cove. Nevertheless, the navy had plenty of duties to keep its ships occupied. Because of Corsica’s difficult terrain and poor infrastructure, naval transport was often the fastest and cheapest way to move soldiers, goods, provisions, money, artillery, and munitions between the presidi, and this cargo needed to be protected. Naval transport was also necessary for the government’s salt provision, as most salt was produced on the eastern coast and needed to be moved elsewhere for distribution and sale. Although the navy’s anti-corsair patrols attract the most historical interest, by far the most common duty of Corsica’s warships was escorting the tartane, feluche, and private merchant craft.[4]


The only true “expedition” of the Corsican Navy in the 1760s was in 1767, when the Capraia and Cyrne took part in a joint cruise with the Sardinian Navy. The Kingdom of Sardinia was also trying to establish its first sailing navy and had followed essentially the same playbook as the Corsicans, sending a mission to England to purchase ships and hire sailors. As the main interest of the Sardinians was protecting their regular convoys between Finale and the island of Sardinia, which passed directly through Corsican waters, a capable Corsican squadron that could help keep those waters free of pirates was absolutely in their interest. After several years of training and convoy duty, Sardinia’s British officers suggested embarking on a long cruise to give the crews some experience and perhaps capture a few prizes.

The combined fleet - the 40-gun San Carlo, the 36-gun San Vittorio, the 24-gun Capraia, and the 14-gun Cyrne - cruised for 78 days, visiting Sicily, Malta, and the Barbary coast. The fleet sighted two unidentified xebecs off Pantelleria which escaped, but had better luck on the return journey, when they sighted an Algerian flotilla off the southwestern coast of Sardinia and gave chase. Several ships escaped, but the fleet managed to overtake a barque and a galiot, which were hopelessly outgunned and surrendered after a brief cannonade.

As even this little flotilla represented a considerable cost to the state, the Corsican government was always looking for alternative means to raise money and defray its expenditures. The navy’s ships often carried private goods or civilian passengers for a fee when they did not have pressing official business. In 1763 the government approved a tax on maritime insurance known as the sicurtà (“security”) which went directly to the naval budget. Even with these revenue sources the navy only stayed afloat - literally - with the help of private donors, including the king himself, Prince Federico, Don Santo, and a handful of other noblemen. There was also a “subscription” started by Jewish traders in Ajaccio to help fund the construction of the galiots; as their business was trade and coral fighting piracy was a matter of self-interest, but it was also a means to demonstrate their patriotism and loyalty to the state at a time when the religious future of the kingdom seemed uncertain.



Footnotes
[1] As an example, in 1737 the fleet of Algiers numbered fewer than twenty fighting ships, and the most formidable of them had a mere 18 guns. In 1760 this fleet had grown to twice its earlier size and included a pair of 26 gun xebecs.
[2] In British service the Rose mounted twenty 9-pdrs on the upper deck, two 9-pdrs on the lower deck, and two 3-pdrs on the quarterdeck. This configuration with a single pair of guns on the lower deck was something of a throwback; all future British frigates mounted their main guns only on the upper deck. In Corsican service the lower ports appear to have gone unused, and the main battery was only twenty 9-pounders. The Capraia remained a 24-gun ship, however, because the Corsicans added an additional pair of 3-pdr guns to the quarterdeck. This made the small quarterdeck rather crowded but also more defensible, which was considered worthwhile given the reliance of the Barbary corsairs on boarding tactics.
[3] The navy was always in need of tartanes and picked them up whenever it could get them at a discount. The Ventura was bought off the stocks in Livorno when the original owner went bankrupt, while the Rondone was a prize purchased from Tunisian corsairs in Ajaccio.
[4] The Capraia also served as the “royal yacht,” used by the king and his family members to traverse the isle when necessary. The frigate’s armament, seaworthiness, and (relative) roominess made it perfectly suited to transport Corsican dignitaries and royals.