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IX. Rosecrans and the Department of Missouri
The head of Missouri's Union military department, Major General William S. Rosecrans, was relatively new to the region. He had been sent to Missouri almost as an exilee in January 1864 to lead a department of which was only demanded tp provide manpower and supplies to other, more important places. Rosecrans had long feared a Confederate invasion of Missouri, but he was left with almost no devices to counter it. By July 1st, he had only 11,400 troops besides some local militias. Although the bulk of this force was made up by two divisions of Major General Andrew J. Smith's XVI Corps, all in all 7,500 veterans in five brigades, the remaining units, a provisional infantry brigade and two cavalry outfits, were largely comprised of men who had yet to see the elephant. Those men were the only mustered force to defend a state of sixty-nine thousand square miles. It was not additionally helpful that the troops had to be scattered about the state in several geographical districts to maintain a show of law and order while suppressing the ever-present bands of Confederate guerrillas. This task was near impossible because of their limited numbers, the terrain and the strength of rebel sympathies in the local populace. Rosecrans therefore had made several calls for reinforcements and as a result angered and annoyed Halleck and Grant to the extreme. Other measures therefore had to be taken.
Since the beginning of the war, Missouri had struck a variety of deals with the federal authorities to maintain a viable home defense force. The first offshoot of this was the Missouri State Militia (MSM), which mustered men into a federally subsidized longterm active duty. The militia was conceived in 1861 and began its service in 1862 as a full-time military force. Equipment and finances were provided by the federal government, but the units were under the control of the Union governor of Missouri who had the right to appoint officers for the MSM. The size of the militia was limited to 10,000 in February 1862 to control expenses and the majority of these men were spread all over the state to hunt after Confederate recruiters and all sorts of troublemakers. As befitted locally raised units in a guerilla conflict, the MSM more often than not engaged in a bitter, bloody war with the guerillas. Such a struggle engendered lawless behaviour, and MSM units rarely hesitated to apply scorched-earth tactics. Although the service of the MSM was characterized, in part, by these sorts of outrages, they tended also to be well equipped and tactically versed. By the summer of 1864, the MSM had experienced two years of almost nonstop small-unit patrolling and combat. Its greatest tactical weakness would be in operating in anything beyond company strength as the various regimental commanders rarely, if ever, took the field at the head of the entire regiment. Rosecrans tried to combat that via splitting the units up to battalion-sized groups and gave command to several injured or invalid combat officers. One important asset of the MSM however was its mobility. The force was composed almost exclusively as cavalry and provided the Federals with the opportunity to speedily redeploy men in orderly fashion to counter threats.
The Federal command could, in theory, count on another kind of militia for assistance during a time of crisis. Established in the summer of 1862, the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) registered all able-bodied males not already serving in a military force. It thus provided a readily available list of troops that could be trained and activated to guard depots, suppress local disorders or fight in engagements, if need be. If measured only by the raw numbers, the EMM was a great success, but it often proved more of a liability than a benefit. While many units could be counted on to serve loyally, others were riddled with all manner of ex-Confederate veterans, Southern sympathizers and bushwhackers.
Difficulties with the EMM, and the open disaffection of some units could not have come at a worse time in early July, 1864. Rumors ran wild that Price and his cohorts were ready to invade. Indeed, paranoia swept the state. The Liberty Tribune of July 5th proclaimed fantastically: „Fagan coming up the line between Missouri and Kansas with 5,000. Shelby with 3,000 in Lafayette, Marmaduke in Jackson with 3,500. Col. Thomas McCarty on Hannibal Railroad with 26,000. The main column, 240,000 strong, on way to capture St. Louis.“ Although Rosecrans knew, those numbers were not to be taken seriously, he was now informed, that the rebels were up to something. Therefore he mobilized all his available troops to Jefferson City and St. Louis in order to await further confirmation on the direction of the Confederate thrust into Missouri.
At St. Louis, first and foremost Major General Andrew J. Smith's men were gathered. He had two divisions under Colonels Joseph J. Woods and David Moore available as well as two light batteries of artillery. Next was a provisional brigade, consisting of the 7th Kansas, 13th Missouri and Merril's Horse, commanded by Colonel Edward F. Winslow. Two more brigades of Enrolled Missouri Militia under Brigadier Generals E. C. Pike and Thomas Ewing and 5,000 Home Guard commanded by Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown also answered the call. These forces were able to field more than 18,000 troops and 8 guns.
Jefferson City was the major gathering point for the Missouri State Militia. Two brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Egbert B. Brown and Clinton B. Fisk as well as a brigade of Enrolled Missouri Militia under Colonel John F. Philips made up the backbone of the infantry. They were supported however by two cavalry brigades under Brigadier Generals John McNeil and John B. Sandborn and a small battery of artillery. All in all, about 8,000 men and two guns were formed near the state capital.
St. Louis, 18,400 men, 8 guns
XVI Corps, Major General Andrew J. Smith, 7,500 men.
1st Division, Col Joseph J. Woods, 3,000 men.
2nd Brigade, Col Lucius F. Hubbard, 2,000 men.
47th Illinois, 12th Iowa, 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th Minnesota, 8th Wisconsin
3rd Brigade, Col Sylvester G. Hill, 1,000 men.
35th Iowa, 33rd Missouri
3rd Division, Col David Moore, 4,500 men.
1st Brigade, Col T. J. Kinney, 1,500 men.
58th, 119th Illinois, 89th Indiana
2nd Brigade, Col James I. Gilbert, 1,500 men.
14th, 27th, 32nd Iowa, 24th Missouri
3rd Brigade, Col Edward H. Wolfe, 1,500 men.
49th, 117th Illinois, 52nd Indiana, 178th New York
Other Forces
1st EMM-Brigade, Brigadier General E. C. Pike, 2,400 men.
5 Battalions, Enrolled Missouri Militia
2nd EMM-Brigade, Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, 2,000 men.
4 Battalions, Enrolled Missouri Militia
Provisional Brigade, Col Edward F. Winslow, 1,500 men.
7th Kansas, 13th Missouri, Merril's Horse
Home Guard, Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown, 5,000 men.
Battery H, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, Cpt William C. F. Montgomery
4 guns
Battery L, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, Cpt Charles H. Thurber
4 guns
Jefferson City, 8,200 men, 2 guns
1st MSM-Brigade, Brigadier General Egbert B. Brown, 2,500 men.
5 Battalions, Missouri State Militia
2nd MSM-Brigade, Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, 1,800 men.
4 Battalions, Missouri State Militia
3rd EMM-Brigade, Col John F. Philips, 1,500 men.
3 Battalions, Enrolled Missouri Militia
1st Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier General John McNeil, 1,400 men.
17th Illinois, 13th Missouri, 5th Missouri Militia Cavalry Regiments
Battery of 5th Missouri Militia Cavalry, Lt Adam Hillerich
2 guns
2nd Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier General John B. Sandborn, 1,000 men.
2nd Arkansas, 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry
IX. Rosecrans and the Department of Missouri
The head of Missouri's Union military department, Major General William S. Rosecrans, was relatively new to the region. He had been sent to Missouri almost as an exilee in January 1864 to lead a department of which was only demanded tp provide manpower and supplies to other, more important places. Rosecrans had long feared a Confederate invasion of Missouri, but he was left with almost no devices to counter it. By July 1st, he had only 11,400 troops besides some local militias. Although the bulk of this force was made up by two divisions of Major General Andrew J. Smith's XVI Corps, all in all 7,500 veterans in five brigades, the remaining units, a provisional infantry brigade and two cavalry outfits, were largely comprised of men who had yet to see the elephant. Those men were the only mustered force to defend a state of sixty-nine thousand square miles. It was not additionally helpful that the troops had to be scattered about the state in several geographical districts to maintain a show of law and order while suppressing the ever-present bands of Confederate guerrillas. This task was near impossible because of their limited numbers, the terrain and the strength of rebel sympathies in the local populace. Rosecrans therefore had made several calls for reinforcements and as a result angered and annoyed Halleck and Grant to the extreme. Other measures therefore had to be taken.
Since the beginning of the war, Missouri had struck a variety of deals with the federal authorities to maintain a viable home defense force. The first offshoot of this was the Missouri State Militia (MSM), which mustered men into a federally subsidized longterm active duty. The militia was conceived in 1861 and began its service in 1862 as a full-time military force. Equipment and finances were provided by the federal government, but the units were under the control of the Union governor of Missouri who had the right to appoint officers for the MSM. The size of the militia was limited to 10,000 in February 1862 to control expenses and the majority of these men were spread all over the state to hunt after Confederate recruiters and all sorts of troublemakers. As befitted locally raised units in a guerilla conflict, the MSM more often than not engaged in a bitter, bloody war with the guerillas. Such a struggle engendered lawless behaviour, and MSM units rarely hesitated to apply scorched-earth tactics. Although the service of the MSM was characterized, in part, by these sorts of outrages, they tended also to be well equipped and tactically versed. By the summer of 1864, the MSM had experienced two years of almost nonstop small-unit patrolling and combat. Its greatest tactical weakness would be in operating in anything beyond company strength as the various regimental commanders rarely, if ever, took the field at the head of the entire regiment. Rosecrans tried to combat that via splitting the units up to battalion-sized groups and gave command to several injured or invalid combat officers. One important asset of the MSM however was its mobility. The force was composed almost exclusively as cavalry and provided the Federals with the opportunity to speedily redeploy men in orderly fashion to counter threats.
The Federal command could, in theory, count on another kind of militia for assistance during a time of crisis. Established in the summer of 1862, the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) registered all able-bodied males not already serving in a military force. It thus provided a readily available list of troops that could be trained and activated to guard depots, suppress local disorders or fight in engagements, if need be. If measured only by the raw numbers, the EMM was a great success, but it often proved more of a liability than a benefit. While many units could be counted on to serve loyally, others were riddled with all manner of ex-Confederate veterans, Southern sympathizers and bushwhackers.
Difficulties with the EMM, and the open disaffection of some units could not have come at a worse time in early July, 1864. Rumors ran wild that Price and his cohorts were ready to invade. Indeed, paranoia swept the state. The Liberty Tribune of July 5th proclaimed fantastically: „Fagan coming up the line between Missouri and Kansas with 5,000. Shelby with 3,000 in Lafayette, Marmaduke in Jackson with 3,500. Col. Thomas McCarty on Hannibal Railroad with 26,000. The main column, 240,000 strong, on way to capture St. Louis.“ Although Rosecrans knew, those numbers were not to be taken seriously, he was now informed, that the rebels were up to something. Therefore he mobilized all his available troops to Jefferson City and St. Louis in order to await further confirmation on the direction of the Confederate thrust into Missouri.
At St. Louis, first and foremost Major General Andrew J. Smith's men were gathered. He had two divisions under Colonels Joseph J. Woods and David Moore available as well as two light batteries of artillery. Next was a provisional brigade, consisting of the 7th Kansas, 13th Missouri and Merril's Horse, commanded by Colonel Edward F. Winslow. Two more brigades of Enrolled Missouri Militia under Brigadier Generals E. C. Pike and Thomas Ewing and 5,000 Home Guard commanded by Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown also answered the call. These forces were able to field more than 18,000 troops and 8 guns.
Jefferson City was the major gathering point for the Missouri State Militia. Two brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Egbert B. Brown and Clinton B. Fisk as well as a brigade of Enrolled Missouri Militia under Colonel John F. Philips made up the backbone of the infantry. They were supported however by two cavalry brigades under Brigadier Generals John McNeil and John B. Sandborn and a small battery of artillery. All in all, about 8,000 men and two guns were formed near the state capital.
St. Louis, 18,400 men, 8 guns
XVI Corps, Major General Andrew J. Smith, 7,500 men.
1st Division, Col Joseph J. Woods, 3,000 men.
2nd Brigade, Col Lucius F. Hubbard, 2,000 men.
47th Illinois, 12th Iowa, 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th Minnesota, 8th Wisconsin
3rd Brigade, Col Sylvester G. Hill, 1,000 men.
35th Iowa, 33rd Missouri
3rd Division, Col David Moore, 4,500 men.
1st Brigade, Col T. J. Kinney, 1,500 men.
58th, 119th Illinois, 89th Indiana
2nd Brigade, Col James I. Gilbert, 1,500 men.
14th, 27th, 32nd Iowa, 24th Missouri
3rd Brigade, Col Edward H. Wolfe, 1,500 men.
49th, 117th Illinois, 52nd Indiana, 178th New York
Other Forces
1st EMM-Brigade, Brigadier General E. C. Pike, 2,400 men.
5 Battalions, Enrolled Missouri Militia
2nd EMM-Brigade, Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, 2,000 men.
4 Battalions, Enrolled Missouri Militia
Provisional Brigade, Col Edward F. Winslow, 1,500 men.
7th Kansas, 13th Missouri, Merril's Horse
Home Guard, Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown, 5,000 men.
Battery H, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, Cpt William C. F. Montgomery
4 guns
Battery L, 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, Cpt Charles H. Thurber
4 guns
Jefferson City, 8,200 men, 2 guns
1st MSM-Brigade, Brigadier General Egbert B. Brown, 2,500 men.
5 Battalions, Missouri State Militia
2nd MSM-Brigade, Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, 1,800 men.
4 Battalions, Missouri State Militia
3rd EMM-Brigade, Col John F. Philips, 1,500 men.
3 Battalions, Enrolled Missouri Militia
1st Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier General John McNeil, 1,400 men.
17th Illinois, 13th Missouri, 5th Missouri Militia Cavalry Regiments
Battery of 5th Missouri Militia Cavalry, Lt Adam Hillerich
2 guns
2nd Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier General John B. Sandborn, 1,000 men.
2nd Arkansas, 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry
- Lothar
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