Retreating from Sherman's advancing armies, General Johnston withdrew across Peachtree Creek just north of Atlanta, and laid plans for an attack on part of the Army of the Cumberland as it crossed Peachtree Creek. On July 17, he received a telegram from Confederate President Jefferson Davis relieving him from command. The political leadership of the Confederacy was unhappy with Johnston's lack of aggressiveness and replaced him with Hood.In contrast to Johnston's conservative tactics and conservation of manpower, Hood had a reputation for aggressive tactics and personal bravery on the battlefield. He formally took command on July 18 and launched the attempted counter-offensive.
It was not until July 19 that Hood learned of Sherman's split armies advancing a swift attack from multiple directions. Thomas's Army of the Cumberland was to advance directly towards Atlanta, while the Army of the Tennessee under the command of Major General James B. McPherson quickly moved several miles towards Decatur so as to advance from the northeast. This was apparently an early premonition of Sherman's general strategy of cutting Confederate supply lines by destroying railroads to the east. Thomas would have to cross Peachtree Creek at several locations and would be vulnerable both while crossing and immediately after, before they could construct breastworks.
Hood hoped to attack Thomas while his Army of the Cumberland was still in the process of crossing Peachtree Creek. He sent forth the corps under Alexander P. Stewart and William J. Hardee as well as an additional division from Cheatham's corps, Hindman's, to meet the Army of the Cumberland. By so doing, the Southerners could hope to fight with rough numerical parity and catch the Northern forces by surprise. Hood thus sought to drive Thomas west, further away from McPherson. This would have forced Sherman to divert his forces away from Atlanta.
On the morning of the 20th, Hood began moving his troops into line. However, he soon learned that Cheatham was too far north to cover the Union advance from Decatur. In response, he instructed the Tennessean to slide to the south and ordered Hardee and Stewart to sidestep a half-mile each to maintain contact with their right. Unfortunately, Cheatham continued to shift south for not one but two miles. Hardee could not move a half-mile and still maintain contact. Without further instructions from Hood, who was not on the field, Hardee continued to march to his right, while a frustrated and angry Stewart, eager to attack, followed. Time and opportunity were rapidly slipping by. As Hood’s corps moved to the right, Union artillery served notice that the long-feared Yankee hordes were rapping on Atlanta’s door. The brief shelling gave noisy proof that McPherson was moving on the city, albeit at snail-like speed.
Finally, at 3:30 p.m., the bulk of the Army of Tennessee was ready to advance toward Peachtree Creek. Thomas was ill-prepared for the coming attack. Although captured Rebels had told him that heavy enemy forces were in his front, Thomas had still not fully deployed his lines. On his left, Brig. Gen. John Newton’s detached division from the IV Corps was busily entrenching and throwing up barricades on a ridge top along Peachtree Road, three-fourths of a mile south of the creek. Major General Joseph Hooker’s XX Corps, to Newton’s right, was largely undeployed and arrayed in an irregular V-shaped pattern. His 3rd Division, led by Brig. Gen. William T. Ward, milled about in the creek bottom several hundred yards to Newton’s right and rear. Beyond Ward, Brig. Gen. John W. Geary had formed his 2nd Division along and beyond Collier Road, which ran east to west and connected Peachtree and Howell’s Mill roads. To Geary’s right and 500 yards to the rear, Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams’ 1st Division rested near the creek and along nearby ridges. Major General John Palmer’s XIV Corps was entrenched still farther to the right and rear and seemed in no hurry to move abreast of Hooker. The long saunter to the right was not a complete disaster for Hood. Although Newton and Geary were spending the afternoon busily strengthening their positions, by sheer luck Hardee’s line now overlapped the Union left. Major General William Bate’s division had moved unobserved into the gap to the east of Newton. His assignment was to deliver a devastating blow to the Union flank while Maj. Gen. William H.T. Walker’s division assailed the front. Hardee anxiously awaited Bate’s attack, but it never came. The Tennessean was trapped in a tangle of brush and briars in Clear Creek valley, to the east of Peachtree Road, and could not find Newton’s left.
Hardee then ordered Walker forward. Advancing two of his brigades along the right and left of Peachtree Road, Walker’s whooping gray lines ran headlong into a semicircular line of Union barricades and breastworks. Newton’s 5,000 battle-tested Midwesterners, still shoring up their defenses, dropped their shovels and unleashed a murderous fire on the stunned Confederates. Those who had forced their way around Newton’s right quickly found themselves under a galling flank fire and retreated in short order. Walker’s right, moving along the slopes east of the road, fared better, at least momentarily. Newton had formed his line in a ‘T,’ with Colonel John W. Blake, temporarily in command of Brig. Gen. George Wagner’s brigade, posted in the rear and fronting Peachtree Road. Blake’s men had just commenced building barricades of posts and rails when Walker’s men burst from the woods. For a while, it appeared that Walker would turn Newton’s left, but massed artillery near Peachtree Creek, which Thomas himself had posted, took the steam out of Walker’s assault with shot, shell and canister. For all his trouble, Walker had gained nothing.
As Hardee attacked on the extreme right, Stewart ordered his right division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William W. Loring, into action. Relaying Hood’s orders, Stewart told Loring’s men, ‘We must carry everything, allowing no obstacle to stop us.’ He said that the fate of Atlanta depended on the outcome of the battle. His soldiers took the message to heart. On Loring’s right, Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Featherston led his Mississippians some 800 yards over the ridges and deep ravines to their front. The rough ground and dense growth of vines and brambles formed an almost impenetrable jungle that scrambled the Mississippians’ lines but did not stop them from chasing off the enemy skirmishers. Stopping and reforming, Featherston waited in vain for the expected attack of Hardee’s left division, commanded by Brig. Gen. George Maney and posted in the woods to Featherston’s right.
Hearing nothing on his right and assuming that there were no Federals in Maney’s front, Featherston ordered his men forward on the double-quick. Yelling as they ran, they soon hit Ward's right and dashed into the gap between Ward and Geary, striking the former's three brigades in front and temporarily driving back his advancing blue lines. Ward's right soon gave way in considerable confusion but then re-formed and opened a deadly fire on the Mississippians’ right. Featherston now found his outnumbered troops nearly surrounded and under a murderous fire from the front, right and rear. Those in front of Ward seemed completely addled.
At that critical moment, Maney struck. His four brigades, guided by the sound of combat, smashed into Ward's center and left flank. The freshly reformed Union brigades were again forced back and were slowly but surely driven against Newton's rear. Due to Walker's long range musketry that pinned Newton in place, it was not possible for the federals to realign their formation. Suddenly, Bate appeared on Walker's right after stumbling through the undergrowths for nearly half an hour. His men assailed Newton's left, that rested at the bank of Peachtree Creek. Bate succeeded in driving Newton's exhausted brigades to the north-west and, most importantly, beyond Collier's bridge.
Witnessing the unraveling federal line, Hardee turned to his reserve division, Patrick Cleburne's. He turned to the battle-hardened Irishman and simply said 'Break them, drive them into the river'. Cleburne saluted without a word in return and began to shout orders. His four brigades advanced in a single line, passed Walker's spent men and hurled themselves against the small tip of Warf's and Newton's improvised V-shaped formation. The federals had enough. Their line broke and the formation began to fall apart. As a disorganized mob, the two divisions fled north, Cleburne, Maney and Bate at their heels. When they reached the creek, hundreds threw themselves into the water to escape. The majority however lay down their weapons and surrendered. Thomas' left flank was finished.
The center of the Army of the Cumberland was also under assault. Loring’s other brigades advanced in line with Featherston and struck Geary in front. Following Thomas’ general orders to advance toward Atlanta, the Union brigadier had spent the morning driving enemy skirmishers from the ridges around Collier Road and throwing up rail barricades. That done, he advanced his skirmishers again. Brigadier General Thomas M. Scott’s largely Alabamian brigade suddenly burst from the woods in the Union front and seconds later on the right, at a range of less than 75 yards. Giving a Rebel yell and firing steadily, they rushed the first line and captured a stand of colors. The Rebel assault struck Geary as magnificent. ‘Pouring out from the woods they advanced in immense brown and gray masses, with flags and banners,’ he wrote, ‘many of them new and beautiful, while their general and staff officers were in plain view, with drawn sabers flashing in the light, galloping here and there as they urged their troops on to the charge.’ Geary could not help but notice, too, that the enemy seemed to rush forward ‘with more than customary nerve and heartiness in the attack,’ which was unfortunate for his surprised New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians and Ohioans.
Geary had stacked his three brigades one behind the other on the ridges and ravines south of the Peachtree Creek valley. With Williams’ division still hundreds of yards to the rear, Scott’s men completely enveloped Geary’s right. A colonel of a Pennsylvania regiment became aware of the battle not by the sounds of firing but by ‘the disorganized masses of men as they rushed by the right of my line.’ The soldiers seemed panic-stricken, and the officers ‘manifested a lack of energy, coolness, and determination’ that was ‘truly deplorable.’ Many threw away knapsacks, guns and accouterments in their pell-mell flight.
Riding up on a splendid horse, Hooker rallied Geary’s hard-pressed troops and helped reform the lines. The New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians and Ohioans quickly reformed and linked up with Williams’ left brigade. Artillery batteries posted on the ridge and across the creek poured a rapid fire of case shot, shells and canister into the victory-sensing Confederates. At one point, the swarming Southerners overran a section of guns but fell back when other artillery and rallying infantry opened fire at close range. Ultimately, Geary’s reformed lines were able to blunt the attack. Together with the advance of Williams’ left brigade and with murderous artillery fire, Geary’s assault eventually sent the battered, bloodied and exhausted Confederates back toward a sheltering ravine. Almost simultaneously with Loring, Stewart sent Edward Walthall’s and Samuel French's divisions up the Howell’s Mill Road.
Brigadier General Joseph Knipe’s Union brigade quickly formed a line around the Embry House in an effort to stave off the advance of Walthall’s left. The Arkansas brigade soon passed down a ravine, struck Knipe in flank and briefly challenged the strongly entrenched left of the XIV Corps near the creek. However, Knipe changed front to the west to catch at least part of the advancing Confederates in flank. The musketry was so rapid and the afternoon heat so intense that some weapons ignited prematurely, sending bullets and ramrods flying. To relieve the pressure on the Confederate left, division artillery chief Major William L. Preston personally posted a battery on the slope of an open field to the left of the road. As the battery lieutenant rapidly shifted fronts to counter fire from two directions, a shot from an opposing battery struck and killed the major. Meanwhile, Walthall’s right brigade was passing down an 80-foot-deep ravine to the east of Howell’s Mill Road. Colonel E.A. O’Neal’s Alabama and Mississippi troops, ‘yelling like demons,’ temporarily unnerved the Federal brigade in their front. In hand-to-hand fighting, O’Neal forced his way through to an open field, but like his predecessors under Loring, he was taken in flank by Geary’s men, who now held the ridge top. Before long, French's, O’Neal’s and all of Walthall’s men had to retrace their steps.
Suddenly, it became dangerous for Hood's force, as out of nowhere Palmers lead divisions arrived from the West. Walthall's and French's troops as well as the rest of Loring's division were in no shape to confront the slowly advancing federals while Hardee's men were busy processing several thousand prisoners to the rear. Stewart eventually ordered Hindman's division forward. The former Tennesseean lawyer, who was bitterly feuding with Hood at that time, stopped Palmer's advance units in their tracks. As the confederate leader cheered his men however, a stray bullet hit him in the neck and wounded him mortally. Palmer was discouraged by the stiff resistance to his front and the disturbing news from fugitives of Newton's and Ward's divisions. He decided to stand his ground and wait for further orders. The Confederates slowly pulled back to their earthworks.
Although the firing continued until dark, the battle had essentially ended. Their left flank had been virtually destroyed but Thomas' army had held and the field belonged to them. They had suffered nearly 9,000 casualties including 4,000 prisoners from Newton's and Ward's divisions. In turn they had inflicted 2,500 on their opponents and captured seven stands of colors. What essentially ended as a draw gave nonetheless hope to Hood and his army, mostly due to the lopsided losses.
Order of Battle:
Army of the Cumberland, Major General George H. Thomas, 40,000 men present.
IV. Corps, Major General Oliver O. Howard, 5,000 men present.
Second Division, Brigadier General John Newton, 5,000 men.
XIV. Corps, Major General John M. Palmer, 20,000 men.
First Division, Brigadier General John H. King, 6,000 men.
Second Division, Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis, 6,000 men.
Third Division, Brigadier General Absalom Baird, 8,000 men.
XX. Corps, Major General Joseph Hooker, 15,000 men.
First Division, Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams, 5,000 men.
Second Division, Brigadier General John W. Geary, 5,000 men.
Third Division, Brigadier General William T. Ward, 5,000 men.
Army of Tennessee, General John B. Hood, 35,000 men present.
Hardee's Corps, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee, 18,000 men.
Maney's Division, Brigadier General George E. Maney, 5,000 men.
Cleburne's Division, Major General Patrick R. Cleburne, 5,000 men.
Walker's Division,Major General William H. T. Walker, 5,000 men.
Bate's Division, Major General William B. Bate, 3,000 men.
Stewart's Corps, Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart, 12,000 men.
Loring's Division, Major General William W. Loring, 4,000 men.
French's Division, Major General Samuel G. French, 4,000 men.
Walthall's Division, Brigadier General Edward C. Walthall, 4,000 men.
Cheatham's Corps, Lieutenant General Benjamin F. Cheatham, 5,000 men present.
Hindman's Division, Major General Thomas C. Hindman, 5,000 men.