alternatehistory.com
V. The Battle of Ironton
At dawn on July 3, 1864, Polignac reported to Price, who had recently arrived on the field, that his scouts had found that the Federals had withdrawn from their positions in front of the line confronting the final Confederate defensive line set up on the evening of July 2. After Steele's withdrawal, Price planned to attack the federals at Ironton as soon as possible. Price ordered Walker to pursue Steele's force with Polignac's and Chuchill's divisions. Brigadier General Thomas N. Waul's brigade of Polignac's division was recalled from guarding the wagon train.
When Polignac reached the junction of Evans Road and Brokes Road with Luckett's and Looscan's brigades, he found Shelby's division of Parsons' corps had arrived at that location about dawn. Due to the wet ground, Walker decided to deploy Polignac's men and move them cross country to turn the Union right flank. Polignac moved his men forward with Luckett's brigade on the left and Looscan's on the right, with Fountain Head Lake to their left. Polignac's men captured a few Union stragglers and drove off a patrol guarding the southern end of Fountain Head Lake. When Polignac's men approached within several hundred yards of the Union defensive line at Pratt Road, he decided not to attack the apparently strong defenses but to send out combat patrols to test the line. They could not find a weak spot in the line so Polignac told his men to hold their ground.
When Polignac's troops moved off the Tafton Road, Walker sent Churchill's force up that road to a local farm where they met Clark's division, which had begun to arrive about 7:00 am, with Marmaduke's division following soon thereafter. After Churchill had met with Clark, he moved toward Ironton. Hawthorn's brigade discovered that Union infantry held the crossing in force. Churchill then sent Tappan's brigade to ford the creek and establish a position on the other side. Hawthorn then sent his force to follow Tappan's men across while the rest of Gause's brigade covered the right flank and rear of the division. Churchill then sent the brigade to take a wooded area between the creek and Pratt. The men got within a few dozen yards of the Union line and some of the men even briefly crossed the line and brought back some prisoners before being driven off. Hawthorn formed his brigade and moved them into the line. Gause's brigade also was brought forward to oppose the center of the Union line.
Polignac's division was on the left of the Confederate line and its farthest right brigade, Luckett's, was at first in contact with Hawthorn's brigade from Churchill's division but the brigade moved off to look for the rest of their division. Luckett then moved back to reform his line and to move to the right in thick woods about 400 yards south of the Union line. After this move, Luckett was across from Tappan's brigade, rather than from Hawthorn's brigade. The soldiers threw up log breastworks while waiting for further orders.
Waul's brigade of Polignac's division arrived at Tafton with the wagons at 11:00 am. After Waul allowed his men to rest until 1:00 pm, they moved up to the battle line to report to Polignac.
Price's plan of attack; Parsons' Corps called up
Major General Mosby M. Parsons
Price then planned an attack where Polignac would feint toward the Union right flank with Looscan's brigade, Parsons' infantry corps would attack the left flank and Churchill, joined by Luckett's brigade, would make a frontal attack on the Union entrenchments when they heard Parsons' attack begin.Price sent a staff officer to order up Parsons' Corps and an engineer to turn the front of Parsons' Corps obliquely to and a short distance from Pratt Road, about one mile east of Ironton.
The engineer reached Parsons at a farm at 1:00 p.m. with Price's instructions. Upon hearing Price's order, Parsons sent a staff officer to have the division commanders move up at once. The man gave Marmaduke and Clark the message and sent another officer to contact Shelby while he waited to see that the orders were obeyed as promptly as possible by the divisions at the farm.
Parsons went to see Price who briefly and tersely explained to him the tactical situation and plan of operations. Parsons then rode to examine the ground where his men were to be massed on and he sent his escort to patrol as far as Pratt Road to prevent the Federals from discovering his corps' movement.
Price told Parsons to advance with his entire corps in a two-division front oblique to the road with the third division following in reserve. He wanted the attack in a single blow and not piecemeal. Otherwise, Parsons could determine the number of assault waves and length of the line. Parsons decided that each division should put both of its brigades in front.
Marmaduke's division reached its designation first and deployed as Parsons instructed. Clark's division arrived soon after Marmaduke's. Parsons showed him where to set up and asked him to be as expeditious as possible in forming his line. Shelby's division arrived last and Parsons also asked him at least twice to move expeditiously.
If the angle in the Union line had been where Parsons was led to believe it was, Marmaduke's men would hit it first and Clark would be with him to reinforce the attack. Shelby's division would prevent the Union troops in the earthworks facing Pratt Road from reinforcing McLean's brigade which was holding the return. Parsons prepared a sketch map of the presumed situation for the division commanders. The instructions directed the corps to advance northwestwardly to the Pratt Road, wheel to the left, take a position at right angles to the road and that as soon as they were engaged, Polignac's and Churchill's men were to charge along the rest of the line. No cavalry were yet on the right with Parsons' corps but Fagan's troopers were reported to be advancing on Pratt Road towards Parsons' position.
The ground where Parsons' corps formed was rough, wooded and filled with ravines. Since the Union breastworks could not be seen from this location, the direction of advance depended on the roads and supposed location of the Union works along Pratt Road.
Parsons used all exertions possible to get his troops to the point of departure. The march appeared to be off to a good start. Clark received his orders at 2:00 pm. The division marched two and a half miles over a narrow, woody road, arriving at the marshaling area about 4:00 pm, which most observers agreed was reasonable time.Parsons offered to move with those troops which were ready if Price so directed, but Price wanted all the infantry to attack at once.
Shelby starts Parsons' attack; Price leads from the front
Brigadier General Joseph O. Shelby
When Shelby finished aligning his men, about 4:15 pm, the order was given for the attack. Price and Parsons rode at the front of Shelby's division. Confederate skirmishers drove in the Union outposts.
As Shelby's men crossed Pratt Road, they ran into Fagan's approaching cavalry. Price had ordered Fagan to strike towards Fish Creek, covering Parsons' right flank. Parsons soon realized that his corps had crossed Pratt Road east of the left of the Union line and Marmaduke's division was starting to diverge from Shelby's. Parsons thought that the Union line must be in the edge of the woods, about 300 yards from the road and continued to lead the corps toward the northwest.
McLean's Union brigade began to fire on Shelby's division after they crossed Pratt Road and entered a field beyond. This established that the Union line was not immediately across Pratt Road but 700 yards to 800 yards west of that intersection. The bad information about the location of the Union line had put Parsons' march off target, with two of the three divisions past the end of the Union line but in a position to strike from the rear.
Parsons later recalled that McLean's brigade was in a thick belt of woods, which disrupted their aim and reduced initial Confederate casualties. The Union refused left flank was shorter than 150 yards in length. Shelby realized the situation soon after the attack began and changed his front to the left to face the bend of the line. Shelby then led the line in the attack. Marmaduke, however, failed to adjust his movement when Shelby changed his front and Clark continue to follow Marmaduke north and west through the woods.
Shelby's men had faltered briefly when they became exposed to closer, more accurate firing from McLean's brigade. Price then rode along the battle line shouting encouragement. Shelby's right flank brigade under Colonel David Shanks had moved well ahead of Marmaduke's division and began to waver as the troops realized they might be exposed to a flank attack. On his horse, Price called for his battle flag. He rode among the soldiers shouting encouragement and orders to close ranks. His color sergeant was killed. Another staff officer was wounded and at least two other staff officers' horses were killed. Price and Shelby and his officers managed to quickly get the troops under control and order them forward again. This time some of McLean's defenders broke for the rear. The Union gunners limbered up their four artillery pieces and pulled out just as Shelby's men came over the earthworks. Shelby's men killed or captured all of McLean's men who had not fled.
As some of his men got away from the crumbling line, McLean had to be freed from under his wounded and grounded horse. An officer in one of McLean's regiments later wrote: "The Rebels simply run over us and crowded us so that it became impossible to shoot." The color-sergeant of the 5th Missouri Cavalry Regiment planted the first Confederate flag on the Union line.
Shelby had taken the key to the entire Union line, over 1,000 prisoners and eight battle flags.
Price ordered Shelby to halt and reform his division. When it was obvious that the Union line in fact had given way, Price ordered Shelby to move forward.
Parsons searches for Clark and Marmaduke
Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke
When Clark's and Marmaduke's divisions diverged from Shelby, Shelby sent a message to Clark to come up on his right. Price also sent orders to Clark and Marmaduke to come in on the right. Parsons sent staff officers in pursuit of them. Parsons established a command post in the field east of the return where he thought he could get information from all points and exercise control of the whole field assigned to his corps. Price, however, thought Parsons should have been leading from the front.When the staff officers did not report back promptly, Parsons himself went looking for the wayward divisions. He was fired upon when he reached a local landmark about 800 yards north of the end of the Union refused line, by the volleys that caused Shanks' brigade to recoil.
Marmaduke's division had come in several hundred yards from the road before they wheeled to the left, entirely missing the approximately 150 yards Union return line. Parsons first found Colonel Thomas R. Freeman's brigade and told him to form his brigade at right angles to its previous direction and wait until another brigade could close up on his right.Parsons and his staff officers could not find Marmaduke to tell him to move his other brigades. When Parsons came back from the woods, Freeman was gone, having been ordered forward by one of Price's staff officers who was also searching for Marmaduke. A patrol of Clayton's cavalry stopped Freeman's advance from concealed positions. Freeman brought up Ford's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion which drove out Clayton's men and allowed Freeman's brigade to resume their move to the west.
One of Parsons' staff officers found Marmaduke and had him swing to the right to join Freeman. Since Freeman had moved, Marmaduke proceeded toward the landmark, with the brigade of Colonel Colton Greene, encountering a few of Clayton's pickets as they progressed. Marmaduke then found and moved against Clayton's dismounted troopers, which still moved Marmaduke toward the northwest away from the main Union line.
Clark joins the main attack
Brigadier General John B. Clark jr.
Parsons finally found Clark about 800 yards north of the return at the landmark. Clark had pushed ahead of Marmaduke's division and had gone even further to the right of the end of the refused segment of the Union line. Clark realized something was wrong when he did not come up against fortifications after marching about one mile and only finding Clayton's outposts as opposition.
Colonel Simon P. Burns of Clark's division rode to the left when he heard increased firing and saw the Union left flank on the opposite side of the field. Clark also rode to the same spot and saw the Union movement along Pratt Road. A major then rode up and told Clark that Parsons wanted him to move toward Pratt Road by the left flank. Meanwhile, all of Clark's men except three regiments of Burns' brigade had moved off and joined Marmaduke's division.
Clark then led Burns' three regiments across the open field. Colonel Charles S. Mitchell saw the division flag moving to the left and followed Clark with his brigade. By the time Parsons returned to Pratt Road, Shelby's division had captured the return. Since no attack was now needed at the refused end of the Union line, Parsons sent a staff officer to tell Clark to push westward toward the Ironton Road. Clark turned his men to the right and headed west parallel to Pratt Road. Parsons then turned back toward the return to look again for Marmaduke's division.
The Second Union left flank line is breached
The collapse of McLean's brigade put both Salomon's and Bassett's brigades in danger of being outflanked and attacked from the rear. The three Union brigadier generals quickly threw up a new defensive line with light field works at a right angle to Pratt Road in the woods at the west end of an open field in order to protect Ironton Road. Clark's division soon charged against this line with Mitchell's brigade on the left and Burns''s brigade on the right. When Mitchell's men attacked, their right wing overcame the new Union line and then a Confederate regiment and a battalion headed toward Pratt Road while Clark's remaining troops maintained their pressure on that part of the Union line which was still holding out. Another of Mitchell's regiments and a battalion continued to pressure the Union line. Burns' regiments met stiff resistance and even engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. Some of Burns' men took cover in rifle pits where Mitchell's men had broken the line. Clark's men succeeded in breaking the line after a fight of about half an hour.
The generals and staff officers had to reform Burns' brigade and deploy the men at right angles to the Union line so they would not be trapped if the Federals managed a counterattack. Mitchell rushed two regiments to help. Together, these units put the Federals to flight, taking about 1,500 prisoners and several battle flags. Burns and Mitchell reorganized 150 to 200 stragglers and put them back into the battle. Mitchell saw Colonel Shanks' battle flag to the rear and asked Shanks to have his brigade assist Mitchell's men, which Shanks did. Suddenly confronted by a large number of Federals, Mitchell feared being caught in a cross-fire when the Federals suddenly threw down their arms and surrendered.
Price orders Shelby, Clark and Mitchell forward
As the second Union return line collapsed, Shelby and Price came forward. Price ordered Mitchell to take command of all the infantry in the vicinity and to push for Ironton. He did so with the help of one of Clark's staff officers. After being cautioned by Price and Shelby that his men were firing into their own cavalry, Mitchell told Price that he should go to a safer place. Instead, Price rode west on Pratt Road, following Clark and Burns who had just come up.
Clark had not paused with the victory at the second defensive line but continued to advance to Ironton where he met the men of Luckett's and Tappan's brigades who had just broken through the Union fortifications. Shelby's division then reached Ironton as well. On the right, Burns' brigade reached Ironton Road and captured an ambulance and wagon train.
Marmaduke moves forward
Marmaduke's troops also moved steadily across Ironton Road from the northern end of the field and captured seven ambulances and some wagons from Salomon's brigade. Marmaduke sent these wagons with many prisoners to the rear so fast that Marmaduke's provost marshalcould not keep an accurate count of them.
After Shelby's division had captured the return, Parsons again went to search for Marmaduke. He found Marmaduke's division in good order facing west. Parsons ordered Crawford to wheel to the left and drive south against Ironton because Parsons perceived that the Federals still held the crossroads because of artillery fire coming from that direction. Freeman's brigade led the attack on the left of Ironton Road with Greene's brigade and several of Burns' separated regiments coming up on the right. From woods in the south, the Federals fired steadily on the Confederate battle line.
When Union commander Frederick Steele finally arrived on the battlefield, he found that his subordinates, McLean, Bassett and Salomon, had formed a new line parallel to and east of Ironton Road and were fighting with Clark's division.
The third Union left flank is formed but collapses
Steele pulled Adams' brigade from the line west of Ironton along with two guns to shore up the line and added stragglers from McLean's and Salomon's brigades to the line in order to man a third line of resistance east of Ironton Road. Freeman's Confederate brigade faced fierce fire from Adams' brigade and an artillery battery but continued to advance with the support of Marmaduke's two other brigades and two of Burns''s regiments.
Adams' brigade broke when Freeman's men rushed into the woods and over their line, although Adams was able to reform part of the brigade. Seeing the disordered condition of Adams' brigade, and although the Federals still controlled the intersection, Steele gave up the fight at Ironton Road and ordered Adams to go across country to the Railroad. Freeman's brigade took a large number of prisoners from Adams' brigade and captured the two guns.
After Adams' brigade had been broken, Parsons told Marmaduke to oblique his division to the right and occupy Pratt Road west of Ironton to close the last line for Union retreat. Polignac's division was engaged in fierce combat to the southwest of Marmaduke. Marmaduke's left flank passed north of Ironton and Parsons split off for Ironton.
Edwards and Carr cover Union withdrawal
When Steele sent Adams off the field, he called for Edwards' brigade to come from the front and deploy on the west side of the city center at a right angle to Pratt Road. The Confederate forces would need to cross an open field to advance. Steele's objective was to gain time for the survivors of the shattered brigades of McLean, Bassett and Salomon to escape. Edwards' men threw up light field works and Anderson's and Ritter's brigades of Carr's cavalry division supported them to the south and west.
Fagan's cavalry had advanced on the right of Parsons' and scattered Clayton's picket line as well as screening the infantry. Fagan had to pause twice to break up pockets of resistance.The Confederate cavalrymen captured large numbers of prisoners during their advance.At about 9:00 pm, Fagan halted and reported his location to Price. Price sent instructions to have a cavalry detail relieve the infantry detachment then guarding the Fish Creek ford on Ironton Road.
After Clayton and his remaining troopers crossed Fish Creek, they remounted, crossed back and rode to the right to report to Steele. Realizing that they only could get trapped by continuing to fight, Steele ordered Clayton to rejoin Carr north of Fish Creek. They did so after recrossing the river to the west and reported to Carr after dark.
Walker's corps attacks
In line with Price's order, Walker ordered Churchill and Polignac to charge the Union works as soon as they heard the sound of battle from the attack to their right. They were to leave one brigade each in reserve to exploit any breakthrough. Churchill's men and Luckett's brigade of Polignac's division attacked the fortifications along Pratt Road when they heard the musketry from Parsons' corps. Luckett was at Polignac's command post where Polignac told him to call for his leading regiments so he could support Polignac's flank attack.
Within minutes of speaking with Polignac, Luckett heard the sound of firing, followed by the appearance of a staff officer who told him that Walker had sent Luckett's brigade into the attack. Polignac said he must be mistaken and rode off. Luckett headed for the front only to find that his brigade in fact had attacked, faltered and was pulling back in confusion. In his after action report, Luckett said the failure to maintain contact with Tappan's brigade, the removal of Looscan's brigade from his left and the fact his men were running out of ammunition caused the retreat.With Luckett's brigade no longer on his left, Churchill had to pull his division back. While the Union forces regrouped, Churchill supplied Luckett's men with more ammunition and the Confederate attack was resumed. After renewing their attack, Luckett's brigade fell back again but Churchill's division continued their attack against Bassett's and Salomon's brigades.
After Shelby's division broke the Union line, Bassett and Salomon had to withdraw a large number of their troops to man the new defensive line at right angles to Pratt Road. Nonetheless, Luckett's men were being held back at the breastworks and Price halted them temporarily because he was concerned that Shelby's men would fire into them. It was only after Adams' brigade was pulled out of the front line to form the third left flank line that Luckett's brigade made progress.
Ironton is taken
The Union detachments from Adams', Bassett's and Salomon's brigades could not carry on holding the front of the Union line when Confederate troops from Clark's division appeared on their left to add weight to the attack by Churchill's division who charged over the fortifications as Clark's men came up. Churchill and Polignac reported that they captured almost 1,000 prisoners and seized two battle flags and two guns during the battle.
After Walker's corps broke the front line at the intersection, Clark's and Shelby's divisions arrived at the scene, causing some disorder as units intermingled.After restoring organization to their commands, Churchill wheeled his division to the left and set up on Clark's left while Shelby's division was behind Clark's. Then the Confederate battle line moved to the west of the junction.
Parsons leads a final charge
Parsons found Marmaduke's division hesitating at the edge of the woods on the east side at the same time Polignac's division was being held back by Carr's men to the south and west. The Confederate soldiers were not heeding officers' orders to move forward against Edwards' line of breastworks. After a few minutes for reorganization of the units, Parsons took the corps flag and rode into the field with his staff officers and called for the men to follow. The men then rose and followed their officers and color bearers to attack Edwards' brigade, capturing many prisoners and dispersing the other Federals. In the attack, Parsons' horse was shot from under him just short of the Union line and an orderly was killed.
After Edwards' brigade had been scattered, Marmaduke's men moved west on Pratt Road about half a mile. After mopping up a few pockets of resistance, Parsons halted the pursuit since no more Federals could be seen and night was falling. Parsons had earlier sent his aide to tell Price he had gained the enemy's rear, taken over 1,500 prisoners and was pushing in a division as fast as he could.
When Steele ordered Edwards to the west side of the town, he ordered Carr to prepare to withdraw to the railroad. Carr covered his dismounted men with his mounted men and fought a successful delaying action as he slowly retreated. He had to speed up as Edwards' brigade collapsed. Yet, Fagan could not cut off many of Carr's men, who crossed Fish Creek far to the West and then marched to Ironton Road to report to Steele. Fagan followed Carr's men for about six miles but gave up and set up camp on the battlefield as darkness closed in.
The Confederates sustained nearly 850 casualties but Steele lost about 600 men killed and wounded and, most importantly, 2,400 taken prisoner. Combined with the losses from the previous day, the Union army had clearly lost more than a third of its original strength. While parts of Steele's force like Carr's cavalry and elements of Thayer's division were coherently retreating towards Little Rock and retaining their command structure, other units were in the process of simply disintegrating and were streaming in the general direction of the Arkansas River or minor outposts where they hoped to find safety and shelter.
At dawn on July 3, 1864, Polignac reported to Price, who had recently arrived on the field, that his scouts had found that the Federals had withdrawn from their positions in front of the line confronting the final Confederate defensive line set up on the evening of July 2. After Steele's withdrawal, Price planned to attack the federals at Ironton as soon as possible. Price ordered Walker to pursue Steele's force with Polignac's and Chuchill's divisions. Brigadier General Thomas N. Waul's brigade of Polignac's division was recalled from guarding the wagon train.
When Polignac reached the junction of Evans Road and Brokes Road with Luckett's and Looscan's brigades, he found Shelby's division of Parsons' corps had arrived at that location about dawn. Due to the wet ground, Walker decided to deploy Polignac's men and move them cross country to turn the Union right flank. Polignac moved his men forward with Luckett's brigade on the left and Looscan's on the right, with Fountain Head Lake to their left. Polignac's men captured a few Union stragglers and drove off a patrol guarding the southern end of Fountain Head Lake. When Polignac's men approached within several hundred yards of the Union defensive line at Pratt Road, he decided not to attack the apparently strong defenses but to send out combat patrols to test the line. They could not find a weak spot in the line so Polignac told his men to hold their ground.
When Polignac's troops moved off the Tafton Road, Walker sent Churchill's force up that road to a local farm where they met Clark's division, which had begun to arrive about 7:00 am, with Marmaduke's division following soon thereafter. After Churchill had met with Clark, he moved toward Ironton. Hawthorn's brigade discovered that Union infantry held the crossing in force. Churchill then sent Tappan's brigade to ford the creek and establish a position on the other side. Hawthorn then sent his force to follow Tappan's men across while the rest of Gause's brigade covered the right flank and rear of the division. Churchill then sent the brigade to take a wooded area between the creek and Pratt. The men got within a few dozen yards of the Union line and some of the men even briefly crossed the line and brought back some prisoners before being driven off. Hawthorn formed his brigade and moved them into the line. Gause's brigade also was brought forward to oppose the center of the Union line.
Polignac's division was on the left of the Confederate line and its farthest right brigade, Luckett's, was at first in contact with Hawthorn's brigade from Churchill's division but the brigade moved off to look for the rest of their division. Luckett then moved back to reform his line and to move to the right in thick woods about 400 yards south of the Union line. After this move, Luckett was across from Tappan's brigade, rather than from Hawthorn's brigade. The soldiers threw up log breastworks while waiting for further orders.
Waul's brigade of Polignac's division arrived at Tafton with the wagons at 11:00 am. After Waul allowed his men to rest until 1:00 pm, they moved up to the battle line to report to Polignac.
Price's plan of attack; Parsons' Corps called up
Major General Mosby M. Parsons
Price then planned an attack where Polignac would feint toward the Union right flank with Looscan's brigade, Parsons' infantry corps would attack the left flank and Churchill, joined by Luckett's brigade, would make a frontal attack on the Union entrenchments when they heard Parsons' attack begin.Price sent a staff officer to order up Parsons' Corps and an engineer to turn the front of Parsons' Corps obliquely to and a short distance from Pratt Road, about one mile east of Ironton.
The engineer reached Parsons at a farm at 1:00 p.m. with Price's instructions. Upon hearing Price's order, Parsons sent a staff officer to have the division commanders move up at once. The man gave Marmaduke and Clark the message and sent another officer to contact Shelby while he waited to see that the orders were obeyed as promptly as possible by the divisions at the farm.
Parsons went to see Price who briefly and tersely explained to him the tactical situation and plan of operations. Parsons then rode to examine the ground where his men were to be massed on and he sent his escort to patrol as far as Pratt Road to prevent the Federals from discovering his corps' movement.
Price told Parsons to advance with his entire corps in a two-division front oblique to the road with the third division following in reserve. He wanted the attack in a single blow and not piecemeal. Otherwise, Parsons could determine the number of assault waves and length of the line. Parsons decided that each division should put both of its brigades in front.
Marmaduke's division reached its designation first and deployed as Parsons instructed. Clark's division arrived soon after Marmaduke's. Parsons showed him where to set up and asked him to be as expeditious as possible in forming his line. Shelby's division arrived last and Parsons also asked him at least twice to move expeditiously.
If the angle in the Union line had been where Parsons was led to believe it was, Marmaduke's men would hit it first and Clark would be with him to reinforce the attack. Shelby's division would prevent the Union troops in the earthworks facing Pratt Road from reinforcing McLean's brigade which was holding the return. Parsons prepared a sketch map of the presumed situation for the division commanders. The instructions directed the corps to advance northwestwardly to the Pratt Road, wheel to the left, take a position at right angles to the road and that as soon as they were engaged, Polignac's and Churchill's men were to charge along the rest of the line. No cavalry were yet on the right with Parsons' corps but Fagan's troopers were reported to be advancing on Pratt Road towards Parsons' position.
The ground where Parsons' corps formed was rough, wooded and filled with ravines. Since the Union breastworks could not be seen from this location, the direction of advance depended on the roads and supposed location of the Union works along Pratt Road.
Parsons used all exertions possible to get his troops to the point of departure. The march appeared to be off to a good start. Clark received his orders at 2:00 pm. The division marched two and a half miles over a narrow, woody road, arriving at the marshaling area about 4:00 pm, which most observers agreed was reasonable time.Parsons offered to move with those troops which were ready if Price so directed, but Price wanted all the infantry to attack at once.
Shelby starts Parsons' attack; Price leads from the front
Brigadier General Joseph O. Shelby
When Shelby finished aligning his men, about 4:15 pm, the order was given for the attack. Price and Parsons rode at the front of Shelby's division. Confederate skirmishers drove in the Union outposts.
As Shelby's men crossed Pratt Road, they ran into Fagan's approaching cavalry. Price had ordered Fagan to strike towards Fish Creek, covering Parsons' right flank. Parsons soon realized that his corps had crossed Pratt Road east of the left of the Union line and Marmaduke's division was starting to diverge from Shelby's. Parsons thought that the Union line must be in the edge of the woods, about 300 yards from the road and continued to lead the corps toward the northwest.
McLean's Union brigade began to fire on Shelby's division after they crossed Pratt Road and entered a field beyond. This established that the Union line was not immediately across Pratt Road but 700 yards to 800 yards west of that intersection. The bad information about the location of the Union line had put Parsons' march off target, with two of the three divisions past the end of the Union line but in a position to strike from the rear.
Parsons later recalled that McLean's brigade was in a thick belt of woods, which disrupted their aim and reduced initial Confederate casualties. The Union refused left flank was shorter than 150 yards in length. Shelby realized the situation soon after the attack began and changed his front to the left to face the bend of the line. Shelby then led the line in the attack. Marmaduke, however, failed to adjust his movement when Shelby changed his front and Clark continue to follow Marmaduke north and west through the woods.
Shelby's men had faltered briefly when they became exposed to closer, more accurate firing from McLean's brigade. Price then rode along the battle line shouting encouragement. Shelby's right flank brigade under Colonel David Shanks had moved well ahead of Marmaduke's division and began to waver as the troops realized they might be exposed to a flank attack. On his horse, Price called for his battle flag. He rode among the soldiers shouting encouragement and orders to close ranks. His color sergeant was killed. Another staff officer was wounded and at least two other staff officers' horses were killed. Price and Shelby and his officers managed to quickly get the troops under control and order them forward again. This time some of McLean's defenders broke for the rear. The Union gunners limbered up their four artillery pieces and pulled out just as Shelby's men came over the earthworks. Shelby's men killed or captured all of McLean's men who had not fled.
As some of his men got away from the crumbling line, McLean had to be freed from under his wounded and grounded horse. An officer in one of McLean's regiments later wrote: "The Rebels simply run over us and crowded us so that it became impossible to shoot." The color-sergeant of the 5th Missouri Cavalry Regiment planted the first Confederate flag on the Union line.
Shelby had taken the key to the entire Union line, over 1,000 prisoners and eight battle flags.
Price ordered Shelby to halt and reform his division. When it was obvious that the Union line in fact had given way, Price ordered Shelby to move forward.
Parsons searches for Clark and Marmaduke
Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke
When Clark's and Marmaduke's divisions diverged from Shelby, Shelby sent a message to Clark to come up on his right. Price also sent orders to Clark and Marmaduke to come in on the right. Parsons sent staff officers in pursuit of them. Parsons established a command post in the field east of the return where he thought he could get information from all points and exercise control of the whole field assigned to his corps. Price, however, thought Parsons should have been leading from the front.When the staff officers did not report back promptly, Parsons himself went looking for the wayward divisions. He was fired upon when he reached a local landmark about 800 yards north of the end of the Union refused line, by the volleys that caused Shanks' brigade to recoil.
Marmaduke's division had come in several hundred yards from the road before they wheeled to the left, entirely missing the approximately 150 yards Union return line. Parsons first found Colonel Thomas R. Freeman's brigade and told him to form his brigade at right angles to its previous direction and wait until another brigade could close up on his right.Parsons and his staff officers could not find Marmaduke to tell him to move his other brigades. When Parsons came back from the woods, Freeman was gone, having been ordered forward by one of Price's staff officers who was also searching for Marmaduke. A patrol of Clayton's cavalry stopped Freeman's advance from concealed positions. Freeman brought up Ford's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion which drove out Clayton's men and allowed Freeman's brigade to resume their move to the west.
One of Parsons' staff officers found Marmaduke and had him swing to the right to join Freeman. Since Freeman had moved, Marmaduke proceeded toward the landmark, with the brigade of Colonel Colton Greene, encountering a few of Clayton's pickets as they progressed. Marmaduke then found and moved against Clayton's dismounted troopers, which still moved Marmaduke toward the northwest away from the main Union line.
Clark joins the main attack
Brigadier General John B. Clark jr.
Parsons finally found Clark about 800 yards north of the return at the landmark. Clark had pushed ahead of Marmaduke's division and had gone even further to the right of the end of the refused segment of the Union line. Clark realized something was wrong when he did not come up against fortifications after marching about one mile and only finding Clayton's outposts as opposition.
Colonel Simon P. Burns of Clark's division rode to the left when he heard increased firing and saw the Union left flank on the opposite side of the field. Clark also rode to the same spot and saw the Union movement along Pratt Road. A major then rode up and told Clark that Parsons wanted him to move toward Pratt Road by the left flank. Meanwhile, all of Clark's men except three regiments of Burns' brigade had moved off and joined Marmaduke's division.
Clark then led Burns' three regiments across the open field. Colonel Charles S. Mitchell saw the division flag moving to the left and followed Clark with his brigade. By the time Parsons returned to Pratt Road, Shelby's division had captured the return. Since no attack was now needed at the refused end of the Union line, Parsons sent a staff officer to tell Clark to push westward toward the Ironton Road. Clark turned his men to the right and headed west parallel to Pratt Road. Parsons then turned back toward the return to look again for Marmaduke's division.
The Second Union left flank line is breached
The collapse of McLean's brigade put both Salomon's and Bassett's brigades in danger of being outflanked and attacked from the rear. The three Union brigadier generals quickly threw up a new defensive line with light field works at a right angle to Pratt Road in the woods at the west end of an open field in order to protect Ironton Road. Clark's division soon charged against this line with Mitchell's brigade on the left and Burns''s brigade on the right. When Mitchell's men attacked, their right wing overcame the new Union line and then a Confederate regiment and a battalion headed toward Pratt Road while Clark's remaining troops maintained their pressure on that part of the Union line which was still holding out. Another of Mitchell's regiments and a battalion continued to pressure the Union line. Burns' regiments met stiff resistance and even engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. Some of Burns' men took cover in rifle pits where Mitchell's men had broken the line. Clark's men succeeded in breaking the line after a fight of about half an hour.
The generals and staff officers had to reform Burns' brigade and deploy the men at right angles to the Union line so they would not be trapped if the Federals managed a counterattack. Mitchell rushed two regiments to help. Together, these units put the Federals to flight, taking about 1,500 prisoners and several battle flags. Burns and Mitchell reorganized 150 to 200 stragglers and put them back into the battle. Mitchell saw Colonel Shanks' battle flag to the rear and asked Shanks to have his brigade assist Mitchell's men, which Shanks did. Suddenly confronted by a large number of Federals, Mitchell feared being caught in a cross-fire when the Federals suddenly threw down their arms and surrendered.
Price orders Shelby, Clark and Mitchell forward
As the second Union return line collapsed, Shelby and Price came forward. Price ordered Mitchell to take command of all the infantry in the vicinity and to push for Ironton. He did so with the help of one of Clark's staff officers. After being cautioned by Price and Shelby that his men were firing into their own cavalry, Mitchell told Price that he should go to a safer place. Instead, Price rode west on Pratt Road, following Clark and Burns who had just come up.
Clark had not paused with the victory at the second defensive line but continued to advance to Ironton where he met the men of Luckett's and Tappan's brigades who had just broken through the Union fortifications. Shelby's division then reached Ironton as well. On the right, Burns' brigade reached Ironton Road and captured an ambulance and wagon train.
Marmaduke moves forward
Marmaduke's troops also moved steadily across Ironton Road from the northern end of the field and captured seven ambulances and some wagons from Salomon's brigade. Marmaduke sent these wagons with many prisoners to the rear so fast that Marmaduke's provost marshalcould not keep an accurate count of them.
After Shelby's division had captured the return, Parsons again went to search for Marmaduke. He found Marmaduke's division in good order facing west. Parsons ordered Crawford to wheel to the left and drive south against Ironton because Parsons perceived that the Federals still held the crossroads because of artillery fire coming from that direction. Freeman's brigade led the attack on the left of Ironton Road with Greene's brigade and several of Burns' separated regiments coming up on the right. From woods in the south, the Federals fired steadily on the Confederate battle line.
When Union commander Frederick Steele finally arrived on the battlefield, he found that his subordinates, McLean, Bassett and Salomon, had formed a new line parallel to and east of Ironton Road and were fighting with Clark's division.
The third Union left flank is formed but collapses
Steele pulled Adams' brigade from the line west of Ironton along with two guns to shore up the line and added stragglers from McLean's and Salomon's brigades to the line in order to man a third line of resistance east of Ironton Road. Freeman's Confederate brigade faced fierce fire from Adams' brigade and an artillery battery but continued to advance with the support of Marmaduke's two other brigades and two of Burns''s regiments.
Adams' brigade broke when Freeman's men rushed into the woods and over their line, although Adams was able to reform part of the brigade. Seeing the disordered condition of Adams' brigade, and although the Federals still controlled the intersection, Steele gave up the fight at Ironton Road and ordered Adams to go across country to the Railroad. Freeman's brigade took a large number of prisoners from Adams' brigade and captured the two guns.
After Adams' brigade had been broken, Parsons told Marmaduke to oblique his division to the right and occupy Pratt Road west of Ironton to close the last line for Union retreat. Polignac's division was engaged in fierce combat to the southwest of Marmaduke. Marmaduke's left flank passed north of Ironton and Parsons split off for Ironton.
Edwards and Carr cover Union withdrawal
When Steele sent Adams off the field, he called for Edwards' brigade to come from the front and deploy on the west side of the city center at a right angle to Pratt Road. The Confederate forces would need to cross an open field to advance. Steele's objective was to gain time for the survivors of the shattered brigades of McLean, Bassett and Salomon to escape. Edwards' men threw up light field works and Anderson's and Ritter's brigades of Carr's cavalry division supported them to the south and west.
Fagan's cavalry had advanced on the right of Parsons' and scattered Clayton's picket line as well as screening the infantry. Fagan had to pause twice to break up pockets of resistance.The Confederate cavalrymen captured large numbers of prisoners during their advance.At about 9:00 pm, Fagan halted and reported his location to Price. Price sent instructions to have a cavalry detail relieve the infantry detachment then guarding the Fish Creek ford on Ironton Road.
After Clayton and his remaining troopers crossed Fish Creek, they remounted, crossed back and rode to the right to report to Steele. Realizing that they only could get trapped by continuing to fight, Steele ordered Clayton to rejoin Carr north of Fish Creek. They did so after recrossing the river to the west and reported to Carr after dark.
Walker's corps attacks
In line with Price's order, Walker ordered Churchill and Polignac to charge the Union works as soon as they heard the sound of battle from the attack to their right. They were to leave one brigade each in reserve to exploit any breakthrough. Churchill's men and Luckett's brigade of Polignac's division attacked the fortifications along Pratt Road when they heard the musketry from Parsons' corps. Luckett was at Polignac's command post where Polignac told him to call for his leading regiments so he could support Polignac's flank attack.
Within minutes of speaking with Polignac, Luckett heard the sound of firing, followed by the appearance of a staff officer who told him that Walker had sent Luckett's brigade into the attack. Polignac said he must be mistaken and rode off. Luckett headed for the front only to find that his brigade in fact had attacked, faltered and was pulling back in confusion. In his after action report, Luckett said the failure to maintain contact with Tappan's brigade, the removal of Looscan's brigade from his left and the fact his men were running out of ammunition caused the retreat.With Luckett's brigade no longer on his left, Churchill had to pull his division back. While the Union forces regrouped, Churchill supplied Luckett's men with more ammunition and the Confederate attack was resumed. After renewing their attack, Luckett's brigade fell back again but Churchill's division continued their attack against Bassett's and Salomon's brigades.
After Shelby's division broke the Union line, Bassett and Salomon had to withdraw a large number of their troops to man the new defensive line at right angles to Pratt Road. Nonetheless, Luckett's men were being held back at the breastworks and Price halted them temporarily because he was concerned that Shelby's men would fire into them. It was only after Adams' brigade was pulled out of the front line to form the third left flank line that Luckett's brigade made progress.
Ironton is taken
The Union detachments from Adams', Bassett's and Salomon's brigades could not carry on holding the front of the Union line when Confederate troops from Clark's division appeared on their left to add weight to the attack by Churchill's division who charged over the fortifications as Clark's men came up. Churchill and Polignac reported that they captured almost 1,000 prisoners and seized two battle flags and two guns during the battle.
After Walker's corps broke the front line at the intersection, Clark's and Shelby's divisions arrived at the scene, causing some disorder as units intermingled.After restoring organization to their commands, Churchill wheeled his division to the left and set up on Clark's left while Shelby's division was behind Clark's. Then the Confederate battle line moved to the west of the junction.
Parsons leads a final charge
Parsons found Marmaduke's division hesitating at the edge of the woods on the east side at the same time Polignac's division was being held back by Carr's men to the south and west. The Confederate soldiers were not heeding officers' orders to move forward against Edwards' line of breastworks. After a few minutes for reorganization of the units, Parsons took the corps flag and rode into the field with his staff officers and called for the men to follow. The men then rose and followed their officers and color bearers to attack Edwards' brigade, capturing many prisoners and dispersing the other Federals. In the attack, Parsons' horse was shot from under him just short of the Union line and an orderly was killed.
After Edwards' brigade had been scattered, Marmaduke's men moved west on Pratt Road about half a mile. After mopping up a few pockets of resistance, Parsons halted the pursuit since no more Federals could be seen and night was falling. Parsons had earlier sent his aide to tell Price he had gained the enemy's rear, taken over 1,500 prisoners and was pushing in a division as fast as he could.
When Steele ordered Edwards to the west side of the town, he ordered Carr to prepare to withdraw to the railroad. Carr covered his dismounted men with his mounted men and fought a successful delaying action as he slowly retreated. He had to speed up as Edwards' brigade collapsed. Yet, Fagan could not cut off many of Carr's men, who crossed Fish Creek far to the West and then marched to Ironton Road to report to Steele. Fagan followed Carr's men for about six miles but gave up and set up camp on the battlefield as darkness closed in.
The Confederates sustained nearly 850 casualties but Steele lost about 600 men killed and wounded and, most importantly, 2,400 taken prisoner. Combined with the losses from the previous day, the Union army had clearly lost more than a third of its original strength. While parts of Steele's force like Carr's cavalry and elements of Thayer's division were coherently retreating towards Little Rock and retaining their command structure, other units were in the process of simply disintegrating and were streaming in the general direction of the Arkansas River or minor outposts where they hoped to find safety and shelter.
- Lothar
- Word Count: 4.3k