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After some deliberation, it was decided that the pair of contracts for the new fisheries patrol ships would be awarded to Vickers, Sons & Maxim in the UK and Polson Iron Works Limited in Toronto. It was decided to source two separate designs as Vigilant being smaller would be more fitting for the inferior Canadian yard while playing to the operational theaters of both ships. Canada herself was envisioned as the open ocean-going Atlantic patrol ship, therefore needing to be more heavily armed, larger and faster than her generally lake dwelling sister ship. Both ships had the basic requirements of requiring a ram bow, steel construction, fairly high speed and a mixture of 3 pdr and automatic weapons for their main armament. As the 'fleet flagship', Canada was to be fitted with a top of the line Marconi wireless set, something incredibly uncommon for such a small ship. While the fact that Canada and Vigilant were built as much for the fisheries service as they were for a future naval force is rather evident with hindsight, commentators of the time were generally unaware of this secondary purpose. Both ships were generally classified as third-rate cruisers, largely stemming from the tradition of Royal Navy third rate cruisers to be used in overseas and local fisheries enforcement duties from time to time.

While the ships would not be completed for some time, the announcement of their procurement kicked the proverbial hornet’s nest. The British Submarine Boat Company almost immediately extended an offer to the Canadian government for an order of submarines. Laurier’s refusal of this offer was unfortunate but rather understandable, jumping the gun with military procurement before a navy was even established was too much of a risk. The reinforcement of the fact that these ships would be mainly uses for enforcement duties was something vital for the moment, largely not to spook the more French aspects of the Canadian government. The major hurdle coming up was largely the establishment of the Naval Militia which required basically all attention available. Discussion had fluidly swirled around the various establishments in Ottawa, largely stating their want for any training for reservists to be taught in both English and French and such training and general structure should be based off similar Royal Navy programs.

Ever the slow and cautious type, Laurier held off seriously bringing up any naval matters within the Senate or Parliament for the foreseeable future. While he was somewhat sure the support for the Militia was there, the polls for the coming election would be held soon and now would be the worst time for a blemish of any kind upon his image. This seemed to be a particularly wise decision as whenever reference was brought to the ‘naval project’ within the House of Commons over the various 1904 sessions, there was often disagreements about the spread of relevant information. On many separate occasions, both the opposition and Laurier’s party itself voiced their tentative support of naval action if they could be provided with additional details, something Laurier and Prefontaine were not ready to disclose. Members of the House pointed out that Laurier and his officials had spoke for a Canadian Navy/Naval Militia as far back as 1902 and at this point, they should have details to share. Backed into a corner, Prefontaine would eventually budget aside a fairly substantial sum of money from the Departmental treasury to help organize the militia however, members of the House would not allow him to spend such money without an official bill being passed.


Prefontaine and Laurier were contempt with ignoring any other attempts at questioning at this point until one of the members of the opposition threatened to launch an official inquiry into the proposed naval militia. Recent scandals within other departments of the Canadian government had just finally been settled and further potential inquiries was the last thing Prefontaine or Laurier wanted at this point. With the election quickly approaching and the new pair of Fisheries cruisers still waiting final funding approval, Laurier finally ordered his ministers and fellow Liberals to drop the issue altogether. A public reaction to a naval militia bill could potentially be seen as a challenge to the authority of the Royal Navy, something Laurier wanted to mitigate in the upcoming election. Anything resembling defense turned out to be a nonissue during the 1904 election and Laurier happily returned to power with even more influence over his previous position. Prefontaine was similarly enthusiastic, having retained his position at his Department and having the funding for his pair of new patrol ships successfully pushed through Parliament.

1904 and 1905 would quickly develop into key periods for the Canadian government with the promotion of Jackie Fisher as the Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord. As far back as December of 1903, there was talks between the Admiralty and the Militia Minister during the Committee of Imperial Defense regarding the Canadian governments take over of the Esquimalt and Halifax Royal Navy dockyards. The Royal Navy had been recently working to minimize their “unnecessary” overseas bases in order to help consolidate resources in more vital areas and save money, Esquimalt was one of the bases that had been slowly been whittled down while Halifax was still somewhat busy. The Minister of the Militia had expressed that Canada would likely be interested in these bases if the Admiralty did not need them, a gamble he took without Laurier’s express approval. Fishers ruthless culling of older second and third line warships that almost exclusively inhabited Canadian waters meant that the Canadian bases would not serve a valuable purpose to the Royal Navy any longer, especially in the chance of a conflict with the US. Fisher mainly wanted to concentrate assets around important worldwide choke points such as the Straits of Dover, the Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, Gibraltar and Singapore.



Official talks between the Admiralty and Canada were ongoing as of November 1904 and seeing this as a way to appease people and lay some foundation for potential naval development, Laurier jumped at the idea. It was confirmed in February 1905 that the Royal Navy commanding officer of Esquimalt would be retiring without replacement and the base itself would be vacated in March, also coming with that was the disbanding of the Pacific Squadron as a whole. As news of the closures and winding down of Royal Navy protection of both coasts begun circulating, the public was quite close to being outraged. Calls ranged from asking for Admiralty protection once again to defiantly pushing for a homegrown Canadian Navy, largely falling upon deaf ears. Luckily though by February of 1905, Canada had agreed to take over operation and upkeep of both bases as of July 1st, 1905. The fortifications of both areas would be manned by the Militia while the bases themselves would fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Marine and Fisheries. Agreements were met in which while Canada would assume full control of both bases and all of its infrastructure, the Royal Navy could still operate out of and use these bases within reason. While this deal was somewhat bittersweet, the opportunity to have two relative modern and well positioned bases with intact infrastructure was quite valuable. Surprisingly as well, the personnel required for the manning of the shore based defenses and garrisons was rather quickly found as the Militia received a flood of new volunteers and people wishing to transfer stations, although the financial strain on the Militia itself was later identified as a problem.

As both Canada and Vigilant came off the slips in June and September of 1904 and began their various sea trials, it seemed like Canada’s naval affairs was finally beginning to be successfully worked out. With talks of Canada embarking on a trial winter cruise in order to gauge interest in a naval militia, expectations throughout the various parties of the Government was rather high.