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The Second Boer war (usually simply referred to as The Boer war within Canadian circles) was seen as the first “Imperial war” where Canadians as a nation were directly involved. This conflict served to highlight the divisive nature of Canadian politics as a whole and was valuable foreshadowing to any potential Canadian naval developments. The Liberal government consisted of two main support bases, French Canadians based in Quebec and English imperialists based largely in Ontario but also spread throughout the country. "Quebeckers" generally wanted nothing to do with anything supporting the overall British Empire and would quite reliably cry out when even an inkling of Imperial sentiment was showed. Yet on the other side, the English Canadians generally pushed for increased assistance in the name of the Empire and decried inaction. Laurier’s status as both a prominent Quebec politician alongside some of his clumsily timed and poorly thought-out Imperialist statements early in his career had put him in an awkward situation, one where he was almost always forced into compromise. With the vehement support and opposition for sending support for the war in South Africa, naval matters fell by the wayside rather quickly, at least for Laurier.


Ironically, the next push for naval development would come from Laurier’s soon to be mortal enemy, A Halifax born Lawyer named Robert Liard Borden. Borden succeeded Sir Charles Tupper as leader of the Conservative Party in 1901 and strangely as one of his first movements in such a position was “a resolution in favor of the formation of a Royal Navy reserve amongst our sea faring men”. This was broadly accepted across party boundaries at the meeting of the British Empire League in 1901, one Liberal MP going so far as to add that Canada would soon need to make a choice about operating a large fleet of vessels to stop unlicensed American pillaging of fisheries on the West Coast. The Navy League secretary was quick to confirm their complete support with even the French members in attendance endorsed the idea, stopping before direct support though. French MP Frederick Debartzch Monk would state “French Canadians would not stand aloof in the studying of naval proposals and in the potential formation of a navy league, Quebeckers would give a good account of themselves.” A branch of the navy league would not be formed in Quebec for many years though, largely being seen as an Imperialistic sham however, Canada wise support for naval endeavors was slowly mounting.

One detail which was largely unknown to Laurier and the major Canadian politicians was the difference in the nationwide branches of the Navy League. The various branches would regularly have conflicting goals and ideas, greatly contrasting with the view from Ottawa that the League as a whole was completely homogeneous and only worked to spread the good work of naval affairs. Details could never be agreed upon if the methods to come to those details never matched. As this was going on, it appeared that the stars were beginning to align for naval developments in Canada. The hard-line view of “one sea, one navy” from London and the Admiralty had begun to thaw somewhat. London had asked the Admiralty of any changes to Canada’s strategic situation within the last few years and if the earlier recommendations and ability to create a naval reserve was still present. The Admiralty responded that no change had been made strategically however, they stated “as it is believed to be essential to the efficiency of a naval force that it should be administered by a separate department, my lords are of the opinion that any naval force which may be raised should be under the Canadian minister of the Marine and Fisheries and should be closely affiliated with the Royal Navy.” This specific statement both secured the fact that the Admiralty had no major objections to a local Canadian naval force and also stated that they believed the Marine and Fisheries should control it, not the Department of Militia and Defense.


Barely a week later, more support came from within the Admiralty itself. At the inaugural meeting of the Victoria Branch of the Navy League, Rear Admiral A.K. Bickford, the Pacific Station commander, expressed his support for a Canadian naval reserve with a short speech. He would later draw the Admiralty's attention to the “dangerously weak state of the Pacific Squadron” however, this largely fell on deaf ears. The British were more than aware of the status of their pacific based units and its poor state was mostly on purpose. The expansion of the US pacific based units within the area had made it impractical to station enough modern warships in pacific waters to stand up to such a force, not even taking into account the fact that such a move would be a clear diplomatic shot over the bow of the US. London was in no position to push the United States into any negative views given their recent embarrassments within South Africa, the United States was one of the few remaining nations without any ill feelings towards the Empire. With America being excluded from the famous “two power standard” measure of the Royal Navy alongside the Admiralty effectively allowing the Americans full reign to create the Panama Canal, the British view was largely to allow America to have the Pacific in regards to North America.

As the soldiers trickled back from South Africa, they carried very different sentiments as they did when they had departed. Respect and admiration for their British comrades was replaced by open doubts and contempt for the British officers under which they served. A mixture of elitism towards colonial servicemen and incompetence within some of the gutless political appointee British officers had shaken Canadian confidence in their British counterparts. Widely held belief was that that their own units were every bit as competent or even more so than their British brothers, deserving to be commanded by fellow Canadians. The Militia did not want to mindlessly adhere to British military doctrine any longer and inevitably of the decline of both the Atlantic and Pacific squadrons, this new mindset eventually trickled itself into the naval minded figures within Canada. In fact, this era within Canada militarily was largely defined by a decrease in both Britain’s presence and confidence in their competency from a military point of view. The demand for increased professionalism and independence from their British counterparts was rapidly surfacing.


With the adoption of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance alongside the fears of a three-pointed Russian, German and French naval advances, the Admiralty had rapidly began decommissioning and removing active combatants from their far-flung colonies, concentrating them home in Britain for some decisive Mahanian engagement. As the Admiralty moved to enact this new overarching plan, the drawing down of Royal Navy assets across the Empire brought up countless red flags. The Navy League of Victoria had been talking about such an issue happening for years, Canadian Maritime interests without Royal Navy protection would have nothing whatsoever. A complete withdraw would have been disastrous for Canada, the public outcry and lack of protection would be something that Canada would be unable to rectify by herself without spending astronomical amounts of money. At the 1902 Imperial Conference in London, Laurier reaffirmed Canada’s distaste for direct contributions and said the following, “The Dominion of Canada highly values the measure of local independence which has been granted to it from time to time by Imperial authorities and considering that Canadian expenditures for defense services are confined to the military side, if the protection of Canadian shores could not be guaranteed by the Royal Navy, then Canada’s government would be prepared to consider naval defense as well.” This dual-purpose ploy and statement from Laurier alongside a statement resolving to create a naval reserve quite soon placed Laurier’s skill as a politician front and center.

The Admiralty did not want to convey the fact that they could not meet their responsibilities in protecting Canada and the other colonies but it also did not want to force action on a subject that was previously discussed with disdain in Canada, the fact that Laurier had even entertained the idea was major progress in the eyes of the Admiralty. Before the Conference ended, the First Lord tried to reinforce the idea of one united British fleet, able to move wherever needed at a moment notice to protect itself. In the view of the Admiralty, an allotment of ships to a certain area would only serve as cannon fodder to a properly prepared and organized opposing naval force. These messages of removing colonial protection did not sit well with the colonial governments and affected them for quite a time to come. Even with all of this going on in Europe though, Laurier was desperately needed back within Canada. His current Minister of Public Works had become almost militantly opposed to Laurier due to his actions in South Africa and was actively stirring up a rather large fuss within Canada, finally being resolved when Laurier removed him in a massive cabinet shift later that year. The newly appointed Minister of the Department of Marine and Fisheries was the former Montreal mayor, Joseph Raymond Fournier Préfontaine and his overall impact on the formation of a Canadian Navy would be rather sizable in the future.