Exit the Haze: Hitler – The Master strategist who resurrected Germany as a global power

Status
Not open for further replies.
Reader mode
Chapter 12: Operation Barbarossa: The attack on the Ukraine
  • Index

    • Gudestein

    Chapter 12: Operation Barbarossa: The attack on the Ukraine
    The opening events of the attack into Ukraine were spearheaded by the 1st Panzer group and the 6th army attacking out of Souther Poland between the Pripjet Marshes and the Carpathians, which broke through the Soviet 5th Army early in the attack. The Hungarian army supported by a Luftwaffe fighters and CAS simultaneously attacked due east across the border taking and inflicting heavy losses. In the northernmost part the Hungarians came to engage the Soviet 15th Mechanized corps which inflicted heavy casualties, but also depleted the mobility of the Soviet Mechanized formations. The 1st Panzer group and the 6th army faced counter-attacks by the 22nd Soviet Mechanized corps, that was largely broken up by infantry formation of the 6th army*. 1st Panzer group was subsequently clear to break east towards Kiev, while dispatching parts of the 6th army south-east towards Uman including an armored division and threatening to outflank the Soviet forces facing the Hungarians and the northern parts of the Rumanian border**.
    Further south, elements of the 11th army including a mountain division attacked out of Romania in the north and the German 12th army attacked in the south. The 12th army with the Romanian army broke through the Soviet 9th independent army and raced onwards towards Odessa. In the utter chaos inflicting the Southern Front German armored forces managed to maintain momentum and occupy Odessa “on the run” already on the 13th***. The German 12th army raced forward towards Kherzov and crossed the Dniepr before getting bogged down in Soviet counterattacks.
    In summary, within the first 3 weeks of the battle, the 1st Panzer group managed to penetrate 450 km’s towards Kiev before running out of supplies shortly before reaching Kiev itself, while the 6th army outflanked the Soviet Southwestern Front in concert with Romanian forces and encircled the remnants in a pocket west of Vinnitsja. The 1st Panzer group was getting to far ahead of its supply line and at this time instead performed a perpendicular attack resulting an encirclement near Uman which was completed on the 7th of July. The Southern flank managed to rout the Soviet southern front while secure birdgeheads across the Dniepr and inflicting heavy losses on Soviet counterattacks****.
    Supplementing the initial air attacks was submarine minelaying from a large portion of the type II submarine force in the night preceding the 10th and a penetration of Italian midget submarines into the port of Sevastopol. The Italian divers managed to mine the Sevastopol and two cruisers which sunk during the night at a heavy loss of life*****.

    *IOTL the Hungarians were not part of the initial assault on Hitlers insistence, here they shield the northern flank of AGS which result in only mild fighting for the 1st panzer group which can the race on ahead.
    **This looks more like OTL, but with an added deep armored thrust directly towards Kiev to the North to get the attention of the reinforcements. The noted armored division is raised additional because of the lesser African involvement ITTL.
    ***clear difference from OTL were Odessa was laid under siege.
    ****OTL they were stuck at the Diestr river.
    *****Italians are more part of the planning ITTL.
     
  • Index
    • DrakonFin

    DrakonFin

    Gudestein said:
    On the cell phone so a brief reply. The pressure put on the Finn’s IOTL is as far as I can see undocumented and presumably trade via Sweden was an option in neutrality. IOTL Hitler personally intervened to allow food supplies to the Finns and what he had promised to allow that is unknown. No record I know of gives an official guarantee pre-war.
    But take this and your own arguments to see why they couldn’t say no ittl. Hitler, has reserved 4 battleships and an air fleet in the arctic sea and ITTL he can starve neutral Finland. He also thinks ittl that the strategic situation is dangerous and REALITY want the Finnish help. No-one in such a bad situation as the Finn’s resisted Hitler the gambler/blackmailer iotl.

    In general,
    The Finnish choice not to help Germany more is admirable once they have given the choice to help Germany (And fortunately it turned out good for the Finns and the world).
    If they had no other choice IOTL remains unknown (it doesn’t help the argument that the president wanted all of the Kola Peninsula), but ITTL they didn’t have any choice.
    Click to expand...

    I'll just note that if Finland agrees to ally with Germany, attack the USSR, allow German troops to attack Murmansk through Finnish Lapland, as per the OTL, and then even join in an attack against the Murmansk railway, this would be all very good for Germany in comparison to an option where Finland tries to be neutral and ends up annexed by the USSR, or as a battleground between Germany and the USSR. Under the circumstances, outside your writer's fiat, Hitler has no good reason to reject such a deal with Finland even if they would draw the line on attacking Leningrad directly. Like I said, it is a very good deal for the Axis, they get 400 000 plus soldiers to join the war against the USSR, holding hundreds of kilometers of front and tying down many divisions of Soviet troops (and joining in to bottle up the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Leningrad), under a competent leadership as an ally that will need just limited support in the coming campaign.

    Instead of taking this good deal, and having the Finns as a limited but willing ally, you have Hitler force the Finns into a fight that is in direct opposition to their national interest, by holding a gun to their head. This is the way you make highly unreliable allies. Finns really don't like it when foreigners tell then what to do, and threaten to starve them if they don't comply. The Finnish leadership would understand that this is a deal that will get the nation fucked, in more than one way. Mannerheim would be livid with rage, and generally you could expect the Finns to be much less liable to cooperate with the Germans under such circumstances. This plan has all the chances to go wrong for Germany, and rather lead to a worse performance up north than even in the OTL situation.
     
    Last edited:
    BlackDragon98

    BlackDragon98

    Banned
    DrakonFin said:
    I'll just note that if Finland agrees to ally with Germany, attack the USSR, allow German troops to attack Murmansk through Finnish Lapland, as per the OTL, and then even join in an attack against the Murmansk railway, this would be all very good for Germany in comparison to an option where Finland tries to be neutral and ends up annexed by the USSR, or as a battleground between Germany and the USSR. Under the circumstances, outside your writer's fiat, Hitler has no good reason to reject such a deal with Finland even if they would draw the line on attacking Leningrad directly. Like I said, it is a very good deal for the Axis, they get 400 000 plus soldiers to join the war against the USSR, holding hundreds of kilometers of front and tying down many divisions of Soviet troops (and joining in to bottle up the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Leningrad), under a competent leadership as an ally that will need just limited support in the coming campaign.

    Instead of taking this good deal, and having the Finns as a limited but willing ally, you have Hitler force the Finns into a fight that is in direct opposition to their national interest, by holding a gun to their head. This is the way you make highly unreliable allies. Finns really don't like it when foreigners tell then what to do, and threaten to starve them if they don't comply. The Finnish leadership would understand that this is a deal that will get the nation fucked, in more than one way. Mannerheim would be livid with rage, and generally you could expect the Finns to be much less liable to cooperate with the Germans under such circumstances. This plan has all the chances to go wrong for Germany, and rather lead to a worse performance up north than even in the OTL situation.
    Click to expand...
    I'm agreeing with Drakon here.
    Have the Finns cut off the Murmansk railway at kondolarska, where it's a perfect bottleneck. (map on my earlier posts)
    Then take Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula.
    It would cut off any outside supply to the USSR and the port of Murmansk is a good base for U-boats to strike at Soviet shipping/warships from Archangel.
    Bottling up the Red Baltic fleet and Leningrad is the max that the finns can do.
    The Soviet fortifications in Karelia (Stalin Line) are too strong for the Finns to break thru.
     

    Gudestein

    DrakonFin said:
    I'll just note that if Finland agrees to ally with Germany, attack the USSR, allow German troops to attack Murmansk through Finnish Lapland, as per the OTL, and then even join in an attack against the Murmansk railway, this would be all very good for Germany in comparison to an option where Finland tries to be neutral and ends up annexed by the USSR, or as a battleground between Germany and the USSR. Under the circumstances, outside your writer's fiat, Hitler has no good reason to reject such a deal with Finland even if they would draw the line on attacking Leningrad directly. Like I said, it is a very good deal for the Axis, they get 400 000 plus soldiers to join the war against the USSR, holding hundreds of kilometers of front and tying down many divisions of Soviet troops (and joining in to bottle up the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Leningrad), under a competent leadership as an ally that will need just limited support in the coming campaign.

    Instead of taking this good deal, and having the Finns as a limited but willing ally, you have Hitler force the Finns into a fight that is in direct opposition to their national interest, by holding a gun to their head. This is the way you make highly unreliable allies. Finns really don't like it when foreigners tell then what to do, and threaten to starve them if they don't comply. The Finnish leadership would understand that this is a deal that will get the nation fucked, in more than one way. Mannerheim would be livid with rage, and generally you could expect the Finns to be much less liable to cooperate with the Germans under such circumstances. This plan has all the chances to go wrong for Germany, and rather lead to a worse performance up north than even in the OTL situation.
    Click to expand...
    BlackDragon98 said:
    I'm agreeing with Drakon here.
    Have the Finns cut off the Murmansk railway at kondolarska, where it's a perfect bottleneck. (map on my earlier posts)
    Then take Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula.
    It would cut off any outside supply to the USSR and the port of Murmansk is a good base for U-boats to strike at Soviet shipping/warships from Archangel.
    Bottling up the Red Baltic fleet and Leningrad is the max that the finns can do.
    The Soviet fortifications in Karelia (Stalin Line) are too strong for the Finns to break thru.
    Click to expand...
    I guess my arguments was meant to imply that Germany had the means to force an at least formally speaking more full cooperation. In reality it is two parties with some overlapping and some divergent goals that have to find an understanding. With the Finnish president speaking of taking all of the Kola Peninsula, there were weak hearts to be pressured or tempted as it fits. In the end Finland getting all its goals on the back of German efforts, with the Germans making a life and death struggle to preserve them is unacceptable and understandable from their special perspective.
    I think it was not Soviet strength that prevented the Finns from moving towards Leningrad IOTL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_invasion_of_the_Karelian_Isthmus
    ITTL, the Finn's would have received a few Sturmgeschütz
    III Ausf A and an additional Luftwaffe Airfleet. I think it is not unthinkable that a faster complete breakdown could happen with the supply lines cut by the Luftwaffe and with the Sturmgeschütz
    could break through some of the harder obstacles in the line.

    Having said all this, Mannerheim ITTL still back off from a bloody urban combat and stops the offensive post-Stalin Line, outside Leningrad. It is the successes of AGN that leads to the fall of Leningrad, although the last advance is made easier by the further Finnish offensive. ​
    ​
     
    Last edited:
    Chapter 13: The strategic fight against Britain until the beginning of Barbarossa
  • Index

    • Gudestein

    Chapter 13: The strategic fight against Britain until the beginning of Barbarossa
    Air war over Britain: After the limited scale feint at an attempt to wrestle control of the British air space in the summer and early autumn of 1940, Germany did not maintain any aerial bombing campaign over the British mainland, but focused on supporting the Kriegsmarine, while the bomber fleet was saved and expanded for Barbarossa.
    Western Approaches: In the Atlantic prior to operation Barbarossa and for most of the remainder of 1941, the Germans concentrated on submarine attacks in the western approaches using their type VII fleet, supported by Land based aircraft such as the maritime version of the He-111, the FW-200 as well as Do-24 and DO-26 long range reconnaissance planes. In this theater the new versions of the He-177B, the Do217 and the extreme long-ranged JU290 was eagerly awaited, but not yet ready in numbers*. The focus on areas were the Kriegsmarine and and Luftwaffe could collaborate also meant that the Kriegsmarine largely stayed out of the western and mid-Atlantic**
    In the spring of 1941 Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had returned from operation Berlin and had a machinery refit in Germany. Bismarck started its sea trials in the Baltics as soon as the ice broke sufficiently and the Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin followed in the early summer***. Bismarck and Gneisenau relocated to Trondheim in April and Altafjord in early June, followed by Scharnhorst, Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin just before the invasion of the SU.
    Keeping track of these units became a major obsession point for the British and the Germans located plenty of fighter units, anti-aircraft artillery, smoke-machines and radar installation to prevent any surprise British attacks. For the immediate times, the threat that such strong units presented, with the added ability to call in land based aircraft, it meant that the British gave up on any pretense to support the Russians using the arctic route during the arctic summer****.
    After recalling the type IX’s to the Baltic’s for expansion of the fleet, training of submariners and to build Milchkühe variants the Kriegsmarine initiated a minor offensive in the Indian ocean from late spring 1941. Initially, the Germans could keep 10 submarines on patrol, but the number would rise as a large output of the German submarine production had shifted to type IX’s from July 1940 and the extremely long-ranged type IX/D was being introduced. With the absence of convoys in this theater and the extreme difficulties of implementing them during the 11000 nautical miles trip south of Africa, the offensive would soon prove costly for the resupply efforts of the British forces in Africa. It is additionally noteworthy that the reasoning for the offensive was to convince Stalin that Germany focused on the Middle East and not on the Soviet Union before Barbarossa, and extensive efforts were being made into implementing tactics, and a training reserve was being kept back in case aid for the Soviet Union would commence through a middle-east route.
    Political consequences of a de-intensified western war: The motive for Hitler in recalling the type IX’s was partly to expand the fleet, and partly as they were less needed for a war focused on the western approaches. Hitler had planned this to avoid confrontation with the USA. Hitler had been tempted to initiate a bombing campaign against British cities, but had refrained from this partly because he felt the Luftwaffe strength was insufficient, partly to preserve and expand the strength in the bomber fleet, and last, but not least, to avoid victimizing the British in US popular opinion.
    The decision to grant back part of the southwestern French Atlantic coast to the Vichy regime also was taken partly to fool the Soviets that France would participate in an offensive out of the Levant, and partly to signal that Germany was interested in de-escalating the war. Furthermore, Germany taped propaganda newsreels about the happy life in both Vichy and occupied France, and clearly signaled to the Vichy regime that backing of this message was part of an up-coming release of Paris to the Vichy regime.
    The most important result of these policies was that Roosevelt had to inform Churchill that it was impossible to obtain backing for the Lend-Lease act in March 1941, and that Britain had to maintain imports on a cash-and-carry basis.

    * As the majority of sinkings were from the type VII and not the type IX which are withdrawn and used for training from July 1940-May 1941 and the use of a committed naval Luftwaffe arm is a major butterfly, I consider this priority neutral in the damage cost to British shipment.
    **There are no clashes or stand-offs between US and German ships IITL and there is no need for US help beyond the destroyer for bases agreement that increased the number of British convoy escorts.
    ***From the OTL assumption that she was 85% complete when work stopped. The trials will reveal that Bf109T is a very bad carrier aircraft and they would look for replacements. I assume the FW-190 is the obvious choice ITTL?
    ****In comparison to OTL if you imagine TTL 2 weeks ahead, the Russians lose out on convoys Dervish and PQ1-3.
     
    Last edited:
  • Index

    • Gudestein

    So, perhabs the biggest strategic Butterfly is out of the box, may be much more important than the fall of Leningrad, Odessa and the succesful encirclements by AGS.
     
    Chapter 14: German operations and policies in conquered Soviet territories:
  • Index

    • Gudestein

    Chapter 14: German operations and policies in conquered Soviet territories:
    In mid-1940, Hitler rejected the first draft of General-plan Ost produced by Himmler as to intrusive towards the immediate war aims. While the operations in Poland was allowed to proceed, it was emphasized that all plans must be subjugated to supplying the advancing armies and to exploit the resources of the conquered territories. It was intended to unite the Baltic people and the Ukrainians in a fight against communism and draw on their support until the Soviet Union had been decisively beaten, and Germanization of the conquered areas could be implemented. What this meant was that the preservation of industries should be attempted and the rapid reconstruction of the railroads was of the essence. In particular, the conquest of the Ukraine posed a difficult conundrum. Food needed to be scavenged in the field to support the army through areas of difficult resupply, while a rapid reconstruction of the railways and maintenance of the workforce in the field would be required to obtain the Ukrainian harvest and bring it back to Germany. The compromise that would be upheld in the Baltics and Ukraine was a restriction on looting, in principle to 50%, with the issuing of a certificate so that the same farmers would not be looted twice. Local rural workforce was to be mobilized for regauging local feeder rail lines.
    Trough Belorussia and western Russia, the rural bounty was considered less important and the need to maintain relations with the local populations didn’t exist. The policy would be to punish the Russians for having fed the plague of communism and enslave surpluss people to work in the German industries. Throughout the Soviet Union, captured communist party officials were to be interrogated and returned to Germany proper. Here they would be killed in specially designed camps. This was deemed essential to spare the locals the necessities of the new age.
     
  • Index

    • Gudestein

    sonofrome said:
    So how much does this affect Ukrainian attitudes to Germany? Does it mean a complete lack of partisans?
    Click to expand...
    Its up for discussion. I dont know and neither does Hitler ITTL. Its an attempt to get something out if the Ukraine and support the build up of infrastructure before reaching further East.
    If partisan activity remains heavy ITTL, well then the Ukrainians will suffer a more harsh and random occupation before they get exterminated according to the long term plan.
     
    Sport25ing

    Sport25ing

    Gudestein said:
    The trials will reveal that Bf109T is a very bad carrier aircraft and they would look for replacements. I assume the FW-190 is the obvious choice ITTL?
    Click to expand...

    If possible, even the Italian-made Reggiane Re.2001 OR

    en.wikipedia.org

    Italian aircraft carrier Aquila - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

    "After conducting comparative flight trials, the Italians eventually settled on the Re.2001 as their standard carrier fighter/fighter-bomber and even the Germans concluded it had better potential than their own counterpart, the Messerschmitt Bf 109T."
     

    ferdi254

    Banned
    To have the USA stop LL it would take much more than this. They started just 6 months earlier OTL and for them the strategic situation has not changed at all. GB is standing alone against Germany and the USSR and is broke.

    Stopping LL at this time would mean to give them both Europe and large parts of Asia with the Gulf area directly threatened and a UK which could no longer help. And why stop now? Just because Hitler is handing out unimportant land to a puppet regime? He still has the Benelux, Norway and has carved out half of Eastern Europe.
    Without LL GB would have had to ask for terms within months and would not be able to send support to the USSR at all so moving the fleet and supporting assets would just be waisting ressources.

    IMO to stop the USA from supporting the UK something much more drastic needs to happen and even if Germany withdraw from all western countries plus Africa and declared a unilateral ceasefire... it would still be Germany and the USSR plus Japan against the then alone USA. No good strategic option at all.

    And btw LL was a boom for the US industry as well, so cutting it would be unpopular.
     

    Gudestein

    ferdi254 said:
    To have the USA stop LL it would take much more than this. They started just 6 months earlier OTL and for them the strategic situation has not changed at all. GB is standing alone against Germany and the USSR and is broke.

    Stopping LL at this time would mean to give them both Europe and large parts of Asia with the Gulf area directly threatened and a UK which could no longer help. And why stop now? Just because Hitler is handing out unimportant land to a puppet regime? He still has the Benelux, Norway and has carved out half of Eastern Europe.
    Without LL GB would have had to ask for terms within months and would not be able to send support to the USSR at all so moving the fleet and supporting assets would just be waisting ressources.

    IMO to stop the USA from supporting the UK something much more drastic needs to happen and even if Germany withdraw from all western countries plus Africa and declared a unilateral ceasefire... it would still be Germany and the USSR plus Japan against the then alone USA. No good strategic option at all.

    And btw LL was a boom for the US industry as well, so cutting it would be unpopular.
    Click to expand...
    Roosevelt agrees with you and would have done it earlier, its the Congress and senate you need to win ower. It happened in March 1941 because the mood was ready for it. ITTL it should be delayed. How much is anyones guess?
    What you are using are strategic arguments Roosevelt already understood, they wont work with the populace.
    ITTL its more why help someone when his neighbors just want to be friends.
     

    ferdi254

    Banned
    Sorry had a mistake in my post. The USA had already 1940 started to increase armaments (not LL) really big time so LL was just a logical conclusion.

    Yes with less bombings the mood in the population was not going to swing that fast and far toward LL but 69% of the US population were in favor Feb 41. The votings in the houses were far from close.

    Hitler would have to make much more serious concessions to have the US population and politicians change the mood that much.
     

    Gudestein

    ferdi254 said:
    Sorry had a mistake in my post. The USA had already 1940 started to increase armaments (not LL) really big time so LL was just a logical conclusion.

    Yes with less bombings the mood in the population was not going to swing that fast and far toward LL but 69% of the US population were in favor Feb 41. The votings in the houses were far from close.

    Hitler would have to make much more serious concessions to have the US population and politicians change the mood that much.
    Click to expand...
    I have to correct you there. Cash and carry was fundamentally very different from lend-lease. You can buy / you can have from the US tax payer.
    Also, anyone can buy is sort of neutral, lend -lease is taking sides as a de facto part in a war. Not a small difference either. That is why Germany declared war.
    They can obviously still buy what they can pay.
    IOTL all the arguments used to swing the mood was the desperate defense, fire-bombings of cities, that told the US populace that Britain had to defend themselves against an aggressor. It wasn’t about the Defense of the British Empire.
    I think that with Roosevelt trying hard there will be some wiggle room to get support through, but maybe not on the unlimited scale of lend-lease, or maybe not without a larger cost.
     
    Last edited:
    Reader mode
    Top
    Status
    Not open for further replies.
    Top