Exit the Haze: Hitler – The Master strategist who resurrected Germany as a global power

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That was OTL. ITTL Hitler knows the SU could be a tough not to crack, and just letting the Finns take what they want without helping to win the war is not on the table in negotiations pre-war.
Compared to OTL the Finns receive more support, including and air fleet to protect the civilians and assurance of grain supplies that they only got later IOTL. Just grap some land with German support was not on the table.

More support alone would not cut it. Mannerheim saw attacking Leningrad as too risky both militarily and politically, he was not going to bloody Finnish hands in that particular atrocity. Taking part in an invasion of Leningrad, in his view, would make it impossible for Finland to survive should the USSR rebound to win the war anyway. And he would have convinced the political leadership of this, too. It was not in Finland's interest to "help Germany win the war", deciding the greater war was between Berlin and Moscow.

Giving the Finns seriously more resources and weapons can buy a Finnish campaign against the Murmansk railway. But it does not buy a Finnish assault against Leningrad, not with the OTL Finnish leadership in place. It is just not consistent with the main priorities of the Finnish nation, as seen by its top military and political leaders. You'd need a bona fide puppet Finland, a military dictatorship run by pro-Nazi officers to realize a Finnish attack directly into Leningrad. And then again, such a divisive leadership could not unite Finland behind the attack against the USSR, so in such a case the Germans would end up needing to send more resources and their own men into Finland than IOTL, anyway.
 

Femto

Banned
More support alone would not cut it. Mannerheim saw attacking Leningrad as too risky both militarily and politically, he was not going to bloody Finnish hands in that particular atrocity. Taking part in an invasion of Leningrad, in his view, would make it impossible for Finland to survive should the USSR rebound to win the war anyway. And he would have convinced the political leadership of this, too. It was not in Finland's interest to "help Germany win the war", deciding the greater war was between Berlin and Moscow.

Giving the Finns seriously more resources and weapons can buy a Finnish campaign against the Murmansk railway. But it does not buy a Finnish assault against Leningrad, not with the OTL Finnish leadership in place. It is just not consistent with the main priorities of the Finnish nation, as seen by its top military and political leaders. You'd need a bona fide puppet Finland, a military dictatorship run by pro-Nazi officers to realize a Finnish attack directly into Leningrad. And then again, such a divisive leadership could not unite Finland behind the attack against the USSR, so in such a case the Germans would end up needing to send more resources and their own men into Finland than IOTL, anyway.
The Finns are kinda of idiots. If they are not disposed to attack with full force then why did they join the war in the first place? They were VERY lucky to not become a SSRs after the war.
 
The Finns are kinda of idiots. If they are not disposed to attack with full force then why did they join the war in the first place? They were VERY lucky to not become a SSRs after the war.

Your comment sort of betrays that you have not studied the Finnish position during WWII and the difficulty of being a sane, democratic nation caught between totalitarian giants, one of which attacked Finland first and was later the biggest existential threat to Finland while being allied with the major democracies of the day - which the Finns really didn't want to fight against (namely, Britain and the US).

Finland did not join the war in 1941 to be on the winning side. It joined the war to survive. In 1940-41, Germany was the only realistic source of support. The Finnish leaders believed that the choice was either allying with Germany, or then waiting alone for Stalin to complete the job he started in the Winter War, to annex Finland and purge its bourgeois society (like was happening in the Baltic states).

There is also the practical point to make that attacking Leningrad with enough force to make a difference, and then having to be responsible for occupying the city at least in part would have caused the Finnish military countless losses of men and materiel, maybe enough to cripple it as a fighting force for years to come. And then it would also have necessarily made Finland directly complicit in war crimes that would have made the country a pariah in the eyes of the very same leading democracies of the day on whose goodwill Finland might need to depend on when the war is over.

Finland did not have the resources to break the USSR and create the conditions for an Axis victory. Obviously, as even Germany didn't have such resources in the end. Simply put, joining the attack against the USSR "with full force", ie. "going all in" to support Nazi Germany never was the smart option. Trying it might have well broken Finland itself, and it would have exactly been the easiest way to try and make sure Finland would have become an SSR.

Finland came out of WWII independent, democratic and unoccupied by foreign forces, despite having gone into the war from a very difficult position in 1939 and fought for years against one of the biggest nations on the winning side, a totalitarian giant which would control half of Europe for the next four decades. As final results go, the Finnish leadership's decisions during the war were apparently not bad at all.
 
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Femto

Banned
Your comment sort of betrays that you have not studied the Finnish position during WWII and the difficulty of being a sane, democratic nation caught between totalitarian giants, one of which attacked Finland first and was later the biggest existential threat of Finland while being allied with the major democracies of the day - which the Finns really didn't want to fight against (namely, Britain and the US).

Finland did not join the war in 1941 to be on the winning side. It joined the war to survive. In 1940, Germany was the only realistic source of support. The Finnish leaders believed that it was either allying with Germany, or then waiting alone for Stalin to complete the job he started in the Winter War, to annex Finland and purge its bourgeois society (like was happening in the Baltic states).

There is also the practical point to make that attacking Leningrad with enough force to make a difference, and then having to be responsible for occupying the city at least in part would have caused the Finnish military countless losses of men and materiel, maybe enough to cripple it as a fighting force for years to come. And then it would also have necessarily made Finland directly complicit in war crimes that would have made the country a pariah in the eyes of the very same leading democracies of the day on whose goodwill Finland might need to depend on when the war is over.

Finland did not have the resources to break the USSR and create the conditions for an Axis victory. Obviously, as even Germany didn't have such resources in the end. Simply put, joining the attack against the USSR "with full force", ie. "going all in" to support Nazi Germany never was the smart option. Trying it might have well broken Finland, and it would have exactly been the easiest way to try and make sure Finland would have become an SSR.

Finland came out of WWII independent, democratic and unoccupied by foreign forces, despite having gone into the war from a very difficult position in 1939 and fought for years against one of the biggest nations on the winning side, a totalitarian giant who would control half of Europe for the next four decades. As final results go, the Finnish leadership's decisions during the war were apparently not bad at all.
Their position was very clear: if they weren't strong enough to contribute to the fall of the USSR then they should've persecuted a path of neutrality and earlier “Finlandization”. Again, they are very lucky the USSR didn't simply annex them after the Germans were defeated.
 
Their position was very clear: if they weren't strong enough to contribute to the fall of the USSR then they should've persecuted a path of neutrality and earlier “Finlandization”. Again, they are very lucky the USSR didn't simply annex them after the Germans were defeated.

You mean Finland should have chosen something like the path taken by the Baltic states? What they did was to accommodate Moscow's wishes, and look what it got them. Annexation and loss of independence for decades. I think you make the mistake of assuming that in 40-41 Finland could have chosen neutrality and "Finlandization" like these things happened after 1945. In reality, that option was not yet on the table.

You know that Stalin never did anything out of the goodness of his black, calculating heart. He did not occupy Finland for a reason: Finland had stopped a Soviet attack to conquer it twice. By 1945, Stalin had come to the conclusion that trying to break Finland by force was not worth the resources needed for it. With Germany beaten, Finland was again a small peripheral nation, and neutralizing it was enough to make sure it could not be an enemy stepping stone against the USSR in the future. Hence the postwar decisions to tie Finland into the USSR through diplomacy, treaties and trade, not military power. The Finnish leadership, by its wartime decisions, created the conditions to make Stalin choose this path, to make what in his view was the right cost/benefit calculation. If Finland was lucky not to be occupied, then we can say that the Finns made their own luck in convincing Stalin to stop trying to occupy the nation.
 
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Your comment sort of betrays that you have not studied the Finnish position during WWII and the difficulty of being a sane, democratic nation caught between totalitarian giants, one of which attacked Finland first and was later the biggest existential threat to Finland while being allied with the major democracies of the day - which the Finns really didn't want to fight against (namely, Britain and the US).

Finland did not join the war in 1941 to be on the winning side. It joined the war to survive. In 1940-41, Germany was the only realistic source of support. The Finnish leaders believed that the choice was either allying with Germany, or then waiting alone for Stalin to complete the job he started in the Winter War, to annex Finland and purge its bourgeois society (like was happening in the Baltic states).

There is also the practical point to make that attacking Leningrad with enough force to make a difference, and then having to be responsible for occupying the city at least in part would have caused the Finnish military countless losses of men and materiel, maybe enough to cripple it as a fighting force for years to come. And then it would also have necessarily made Finland directly complicit in war crimes that would have made the country a pariah in the eyes of the very same leading democracies of the day on whose goodwill Finland might need to depend on when the war is over.

Finland did not have the resources to break the USSR and create the conditions for an Axis victory. Obviously, as even Germany didn't have such resources in the end. Simply put, joining the attack against the USSR "with full force", ie. "going all in" to support Nazi Germany never was the smart option. Trying it might have well broken Finland itself, and it would have exactly been the easiest way to try and make sure Finland would have become an SSR.

Finland came out of WWII independent, democratic and unoccupied by foreign forces, despite having gone into the war from a very difficult position in 1939 and fought for years against one of the biggest nations on the winning side, a totalitarian giant which would control half of Europe for the next four decades. As final results go, the Finnish leadership's decisions during the war were apparently not bad at all.
I believe that the Finns did not have enough strength to attack Leningrad ITTL.
Cutting off the Murmansk railway at Kondolaska or whatever the city is called is the most they can do.
After Murmansk is cut off they can take it and the Kola Peninsula, but that's pretty much the extent of their capability.
 
Chapter 11: Barbarossa on the path towards Moscow
Chapter 11: Barbarossa on the path towards Moscow
On the western front the Luftwaffe destroyed its opposing air force on the ground while the panzer groups crossed the Bug river and raced towards the Russian interior. The 2nd and 3rd panzer group linked up behind Minsk on the 17th and captured the city on the 18th, thereby also completing the encirclement of the Soviet Western front. The German Panzer resumed the offensive on the 19th, while leaving the liquidation of the pocket for the infantry. The Panzers subsequently performed an encirclement of an ill-prepared Soviet 5th mechanized corps when closing a pocket near Orsja on the 25th and repelled counterattacks by the VIIth mechanized corps. Between the 25th and the 2nd of July, the infantry caught up, and positions were established near Vitebsk and Mahiljou thus forming a coherent North-South line from Vitebsk to Mahiljou. Further attacks were stopped by rain storms. The Red Army made counterattacks during the poor weather, but to limited effect, while the standstill allowed the Soviet Union to bring up further fresh reinforcements.
To whom the nearly two weeks of limited movement would be of the most benefit remains unknown, because the Germans could also assemble in jump off points, move forward the air bases and establish a rail connection all the way to Orsja, with a new regional supply dump in Minsk. Furthermore, at the time the Germans resumed a major offensive on the 7th of July towards Smolensk, Leningrad had been surrounded, and parts of the transport aerial units relocated to Minsk. The staggering success in Leningrad and the rapid advance towards Minsk gave the Germans a substantial optimism towards the coming operations in this theater. Consequently, the General staff, notably von Bock, Halder and Guderian put pressure on Hitler to allow the next priority to be an offensive towards and beyond Smolensk. The knowledge that reinforcements would be forthcoming from AGN in the near future and the ability to muster lavish air support were decisive arguments in favor for soundly defeating the Red Army Forces currently in front of AGC, rather than prioritizing AGS were logistical issues needed resolution before mobile attacks could be conducted at full scale.
*The attacks towards Minsk are as OTL, only changed to the new start date. The change occurs afterwards were the panzer groups contributed to liquidating the Minsk pockets, but ITTL leave it for the infantry. This was a major point of disagreements IOTL in the German general staff, again with Guderian favoring progression, but only with parts of the Panzers. Consequently, the Germans make another smaller encirclement before Smolensk at Orsja. The effect here would be a further battered SU (some of the forces which counterattacked after Minsk IOTL have now been encircled and spent on weaker counterattacks) and a follow-on jump off point closer to Smolensk for the Germans. The Germans are roughly a week ahead of OTL when they start the TTL’s battle of Smolensk on the 7th of July (so they lost a week ITTL), but starting further ahead, in a much better state having spent 2 weeks rounding up pockets, resupplying and getting their supply lines straight.
 
Your comment sort of betrays that you have not studied the Finnish position during WWII and the difficulty of being a sane, democratic nation caught between totalitarian giants, one of which attacked Finland first and was later the biggest existential threat to Finland while being allied with the major democracies of the day - which the Finns really didn't want to fight against (namely, Britain and the US).

Finland did not join the war in 1941 to be on the winning side. It joined the war to survive. In 1940-41, Germany was the only realistic source of support. The Finnish leaders believed that the choice was either allying with Germany, or then waiting alone for Stalin to complete the job he started in the Winter War, to annex Finland and purge its bourgeois society (like was happening in the Baltic states).

There is also the practical point to make that attacking Leningrad with enough force to make a difference, and then having to be responsible for occupying the city at least in part would have caused the Finnish military countless losses of men and materiel, maybe enough to cripple it as a fighting force for years to come. And then it would also have necessarily made Finland directly complicit in war crimes that would have made the country a pariah in the eyes of the very same leading democracies of the day on whose goodwill Finland might need to depend on when the war is over.

Finland did not have the resources to break the USSR and create the conditions for an Axis victory. Obviously, as even Germany didn't have such resources in the end. Simply put, joining the attack against the USSR "with full force", ie. "going all in" to support Nazi Germany never was the smart option. Trying it might have well broken Finland itself, and it would have exactly been the easiest way to try and make sure Finland would have become an SSR.

Finland came out of WWII independent, democratic and unoccupied by foreign forces, despite having gone into the war from a very difficult position in 1939 and fought for years against one of the biggest nations on the winning side, a totalitarian giant which would control half of Europe for the next four decades. As final results go, the Finnish leadership's decisions during the war were apparently not bad at all.
The result ended OK for Finland because they exhausted the Soviet offensives in 1944. Phew. Thats why they still exist. It was a terrible gamble to join Barbarossa as it is and the best chance for getting anything out of it was clearly if the Germans could win. They sort of gambled without trying 100%. Really rare that this works.
As for why Stalin should think its OK you help cut the Murmansk railway, but if you help take Leningrad then I'll hold a grudge? It just doesnt make sense, and i stand by that respect was won in 1940 and confirmed in 1944. They didnt have to take their losses in 1944 as in 1940 they proved themselves very different from the Baltic states.

Joining the war in 1940 was madness, but nevertheless a madness confirmed IOTL. The president wanted all of the Kola Peninsula, while Mannerheim went by the policy of taking back what was lost (and a few times some more). If the only option was to go all in (at least until Leningrad and Karelia was taken as it is ITTL), Mannerheim would have to do what his government wanted.
Their position was very clear: if they weren't strong enough to contribute to the fall of the USSR then they should've persecuted a path of neutrality and earlier “Finlandization”. Again, they are very lucky the USSR didn't simply annex them after the Germans were defeated.
I totally agree, although as the Germans looked like they might not win, the distancing policy became more and more reasonable. But why to take the gamble if you dont want to win as they did IOTL: Crazy
I believe that the Finns did not have enough strength to attack Leningrad ITTL.
Cutting off the Murmansk railway at Kondolaska or whatever the city is called is the most they can do.
After Murmansk is cut off they can take it and the Kola Peninsula, but that's pretty much the extent of their capability.
ITTL they didnt take Leningrad despite a stronger air support. They waited until the AGN joined them so they could take most of the losses. What happens next is tricky. The railway was not easy to cut IOTL, but possible indeed.
 
Foreword: This is intended as a short TL inspired by this thread (
). It stipulates a diplomatically and strategically wise Hitler (still a raving psychopath) which is quite a paradox considering how WW2 unfolded in OTL. Or is it? With the exception of the invasion of Poland, where Hitler thought the Anglo-French would not declare war, Hitler was doing exceptionally well. Outmaneuvered diplomatic opponents, overruled most of his Generals to go for the jugular against France in 1940 despite its risks, endorsed the glider attack on Eben Emael, yet at the time of his peak triumph, Hitler’s nerves began to crumble. During the decisive days in the Battle of France, he was described as faced with extreme anxiety, outburst unusual even for him at this time, an anxiety ultimately likely implicated in the halt order.

Causes of this could be natural stress, but also very likely injected medications prescribed by his personal physician Theodor Morell (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_Morell, there is not the symptom that would be impossible to imagine with that kind of drug abuse). Thus, the POD and the embedded hypothesis is that Adolf Hitler in this TL is detached from Theodor Morell (POD), and that he would thereby continue his streak (hypothesis) were most of the daring decisions are for the better of the German war effort.
I assume that the pod, the hypothesis and the butterflies will each be scrutinized ITTL, but please try to structure the comments. Eg. when discussing the butterflies accept the POD and hypothesis, because otherwise it quickly becomes meaningless.

You've changed Hitler's addiction to drugs? And nothing else? And you expect that alone to allow Germany to come out of World War 2 at least as well (if not better) than how it went in?

Not a chance.

The United States is going to come in on the side of the UK, by latest the summer of 1942.
After that, the writing is on the wall. Indeed, Germany will come out worse than OTL because of all those buckets of instant sunshine.

I'll read it. Always interesting, but it won't be plausible. It simply isn't enough.
Hitler's 'winning' move was not to press further after September 1938. That's it. Nothing else after that can really save Germany.

I can't see any other outcome
 
The result ended OK for Finland because they exhausted the Soviet offensives in 1944. Phew. Thats why they still exist. It was a terrible gamble to join Barbarossa as it is and the best chance for getting anything out of it was clearly if the Germans could win. They sort of gambled without trying 100%. Really rare that this works.
As for why Stalin should think its OK you help cut the Murmansk railway, but if you help take Leningrad then I'll hold a grudge? It just doesnt make sense, and i stand by that respect was won in 1940 and confirmed in 1944. They didnt have to take their losses in 1944 as in 1940 they proved themselves very different from the Baltic states.

Joining the war in 1940 was madness, but nevertheless a madness confirmed IOTL. The president wanted all of the Kola Peninsula, while Mannerheim went by the policy of taking back what was lost (and a few times some more). If the only option was to go all in (at least until Leningrad and Karelia was taken as it is ITTL), Mannerheim would have to do what his government wanted.

If you look at the Finnish position in 1940 in detail, you will see that Finland was *totally alone*. Together, the Soviets and the Germans could practically blockade all Finnish routes of foreign trade. The British trade policies towards Finland were also practically increasingly hostile. Any trade Finland could do through Petsamo, or with the help of Sweden (who tried to maintain her own neutrality quite forcefully) was not enough to keep the Finns alive. The loss of the Karelian Isthmus removed a lot of the best farmland Finland had, leading to a situation where Finland couldn't feed her people and was unable to get the needed food from abroad.

In 1940 Finland was facing both famine (by late 1941) and a hostile Soviet Union that meddled in its internal affairs, shot down a Finnish civilian airliner, and went on to occupy and annex the Baltic states. Finland sorely needed foreign help, and after the (unrealistic) defensive union with Sweden was shot down in flames, too, there was only one realistic source for food, weapons and support - Nazi Germany.

This is the background of Finland allying with Germany and joining Barbarossa. I don't think it is possible to understand Finland's choices in 1940-41 if you don't understand and appreciate the position where Finland was, and where staying alone, doing nothing to get foreign help, would have been a massively irresponsible thing to do by the Finnish government. It would have risked starvation and eventual Soviet occupation, and possibly becoming a battleground between the USSR and Germany, anyway, like Poland and the Baltic states, without the Finns in a position to do anything to stop this. Better to make unoptimal choices and maintain a measure of control than do "the right thing" and potentially lose all control of your nation's destiny.

Going "all in" with Germany was never the only option. Why? Because even a lukewarm Finland as an ally would tie down Soviet resources, guard a major stretch of front, and relieve the pressure German armies would be under. Finland could deliver a lot of goods Germany needed, above all various wood products and Petsamo nickel. But a Finland that is not an ally, or one that is occupied by the USSR, would give no benefits to Germany. IOTL, Finland could get away with just a limited input because the benefits of Finland as an ally, even a conditional one, heavily outweighed the possibility of Finland being entirely outside German control, or then an area that the Germans would have to invade and occupy by force. If the Finns say "no" to attacking Leningrad, the Germans can well drop the point and settle with lesser participation. They win, comparatively speaking, anyway if Finland is an ally, and stand to lose if it isn't.

As for the Murmansk railway versus Leningrad.... The Murmansk railway was just that, a railway running through some woods. With enough troops and support you can possibly take it and hold it, among with a stretch of northern wilderness. Leningrad, however, was a city of millions. Taking it, and holding it, would take significantly more resources. It would cause significantly more losses. Losses Finland can't afford. And even in the best case, occupying it would make the Finns directly responsible for those millions of Soviet civilians. As Finland could not feed them (it could not feed itself), and the Nazis would not feed them (but would let the "sub-humans" starve), the occupation of Leningrad would make Finland directly responsible for the death of countless civilians. Now, I wouldn't want to even try to spin that atrocity to make Stalin or the Western Allies forget it any time soon - by comparison, taking and holding a bit of railway would be a lot more easier to present as going after a legitimate military objective in any case.

I totally agree, although as the Germans looked like they might not win, the distancing policy became more and more reasonable. But why to take the gamble if you dont want to win as they did IOTL: Crazy

A desperate man grasps at any straw to survive. Beggars can't be choosers. You can choose any old saying here to illustrate the Finnish position in 40-41, if it helps you see the decision between the Devil and the deep blue sea Finland was forced to make in those circumstances. Winning might be nice, but it is optional. Surviving, on the other hand, is necessary.
 
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sonofrome

Banned
You've changed Hitler's addiction to drugs? And nothing else? And you expect that alone to allow Germany to come out of World War 2 at least as well (if not better) than how it went in?

Not a chance.

The United States is going to come in on the side of the UK, by latest the summer of 1942.
After that, the writing is on the wall. Indeed, Germany will come out worse than OTL because of all those buckets of instant sunshine.

I'll read it. Always interesting, but it won't be plausible. It simply isn't enough.
Hitler's 'winning' move was not to press further after September 1938. That's it. Nothing else after that can really save Germany.

I can't see any other outcome
Do you not think that different strategic decisions and well as luck, can plausibly result in a different outcome? The differences stack up even further against the allies with what is going on in the Mediterranean.
 
Do you not think that different strategic decisions and well as luck, can plausibly result in a different outcome? The differences stack up even further against the allies with what is going on in the Mediterranean.

Years ago, I posted a simple comment regarding a UK+USSR (only) v Axis Europe timeline. It was simple:

"Nazi Germany (hardly the most efficient of countries) has decided to take on the biggest country in the world, the biggest economy in the world and the biggest empire in the world, all at the same time. Take ONE of those away, and the Nazis will still probably lose (And that's not counting the massive inefficiencies in their system)."

Skimming ahead, it looks like Germany has had a go at the SU in this timeline too. I haven't read, but I assume the UK is still in it (it would be pretty much ASB if it wasn't) which therefore virtually guarantees US involvement soon.

Hitler is off the drugs. Whoppee do. No way Germany can beat the three biggest powers in the world. Forget it. They are doomed.

Germany's way out of this mess was PRE March 1939, or maybe a complete reorganisation in the summer of 1940 (A massive coup and restored civilian government/military junta who screamed for proper peace and managed to restore Germany's 1914 borders). The first is out because the POD is the summer of 1940. The second is out because no one would coup Hitler when they were winning.
 

sonofrome

Banned
"Nazi Germany (hardly the most efficient of countries) has decided to take on the biggest country in the world, the biggest economy in the world and the biggest empire in the world, all at the same time. Take ONE of those away, and the Nazis will still probably lose (And that's not counting the massive inefficiencies in their system)."
So you're just simplifying the war down to country stats basically. This doesn't work. In WW1 Germany was up against all those powers, plus France and Italy, and they almost won. In the hundred years war, England with a population a quarter that of France, almost won. It is much more nuanced than stats. Your hypothesis would only work if you had both sides full armies facing each other on a vast flat plane, that is not the reality of war.
The USA economy and Great Britain empire can only actually hurt the axis if they battle, which they can't stuck on their Island and North America. Things that did't happen OTL, that could of happened, like the fall of the Suez canal, could have resulted in a Nazi victory. As long as Albert Speer is made Armaments Minister, like OTL, armaments production will more than double in the course of Operation Barbarossa, and all it takes after that is for Red army to make just a few more stupid mistakes, like they showed well capable of doing IOTL. This could precipitate in a soviet collapse of leadership as the Germans march toward Moscow. Who knows....
 

ferdi254

Banned
sonofrome, even if the USSR is out of the war end of 42 with Germany getting a large chunk and takes the oil at Baku intact it is still some 90 million Germans (being very generous here) plus some 45 Italian (which may stay in the war without landings) who have to occupy nearly all of Europe and then somehow have to beat back the USA and the UK (some 250 million without the empire). Yes, a Germany that can concentrate on AA, fighters, proximity fuses, SAM´s, rockets for fighters... and does all the right things when it comes to subs with the new resources which will delay the US build up for about a year may be able to delay the USA/UK air win by 2-3 more years so it will be 1947/48 before the German airforce was whittled down as it was in 1944/45.
An overlord style invasion would then be pretty much impossible as the coasts would be much more heavily defended and pulling a win against a Wehrmacht that can fully concentrate on the West would most likely be seen as too risky by the Allies, but why bother? Once the Luftwaffe is out of the game, atomic bombs will start to rain on Germany. And no way could Germany have gotten those with a POD after 1941.
 

sonofrome

Banned
An overlord style invasion would then be pretty much impossible as the coasts would be much more heavily defended and pulling a win against a Wehrmacht that can fully concentrate on the West would most likely be seen as too risky by the Allies, but why bother? Once the Luftwaffe is out of the game, atomic bombs will start to rain on Germany. And no way could Germany have gotten those with a POD after 1941.
Woah woah woah.... Ok, so your saying an outright invasion would be almost impossible and would have too many casualties, yes I agree. But hold up on the Nukes. Ignoring the fact that Britain will have to leave after fall of Suez and unrest in India, how would their be any support for the full on destruction of European cities? People in Britain and America didn't know about the holocaust, all they see is German tyranny descending over Europe, but not anything as monstrous as what actually happened. Europe would not be destroyed for this, I don't see how its possible, and it would turn public opinion against the allied governments not to mention what it would do to the sentiments of Germans, unless Goebbels style propaganda is implemented or something.
 
So you're just simplifying the war down to country stats basically. This doesn't work. In WW1 Germany was up against all those powers, plus France and Italy, and they almost won. In the hundred years war, England with a population a quarter that of France, almost won. It is much more nuanced than stats. Your hypothesis would only work if you had both sides full armies facing each other on a vast flat plane, that is not the reality of war.

So your take down of my strategic points are:

1. Lets dig out the 100 year war, completely inappropriate to industrialised warfare; and
2. Germany nearly won World War I (No, they didn't but that's a different argument) and were up against US, UK, Russia, France and Italy (except they weren't facing ALL of those at any one time, and the Russia of 1914 is a very different beast than the Soviet Union of 1941).

It's been made elsewhere, but the Soviet Union is NOT going to surrender. For my point of reference, I refer you to the Bulgarian ambassador's commentsin 1941.
The United Kingdom is NOT going to surrender, and yes they CAN hurt Germany.
The United States IS going to DOW Germany sooner or later, and then its game over.

But this isn't what this timeline is about. It's changing one thing and that being having the UK and Soviet Union crack out the lead paint and get guzzling. It's been called 'Hitler isn't on drugs' but really it should be titled: "Cracking out the lead paint: How a common household item caused the Allies to surrender to Germany."
 

ferdi254

Banned
The valiant so far both UK and USSR are still in the game and I do not see any big changes compared to OTL on their side. Just Germany avoiding some of the mistakes it did OTL. So wait and see I would say.

Sonofrome unrest in India needs to get to a very high point to make the UK leave and even if and Suez gets lost why would they surrender as long as the USA props them up? And I have not heard about many moral quivers that ran through those two countries in 42-45 about the bombing of German cities. It is pure speculation how Hitler or the army would have reacted against a dozen of such bombs but my best guess is not that many.
 
If you look at the Finnish position in 1940 in detail, you will see that Finland was *totally alone*. Together, the Soviets and the Germans could practically blockade all Finnish routes of foreign trade. The British trade policies towards Finland were also practically increasingly hostile. Any trade Finland could do through Petsamo, or with the help of Sweden (who tried to maintain her own neutrality quite forcefully) was not enough to keep the Finns alive. The loss of the Karelian Isthmus removed a lot of the best farmland Finland had, leading to a situation where Finland couldn't feed her people and was unable to get the needed food from abroad.

In 1940 Finland was facing both famine (by late 1941) and a hostile Soviet Union that meddled in its internal affairs, shot down a Finnish civilian airliner, and went on to occupy and annex the Baltic states. Finland sorely needed foreign help, and after the (unrealistic) defensive union with Sweden was shot down in flames, too, there was only one realistic source for food, weapons and support - Nazi Germany.

This is the background of Finland allying with Germany and joining Barbarossa. I don't think it is possible to understand Finland's choices in 1940-41 if you don't understand and appreciate the position where Finland was, and where staying alone, doing nothing to get foreign help, would have been a massively irresponsible thing to do by the Finnish government. It would have risked starvation and eventual Soviet occupation, and possibly becoming a battleground between the USSR and Germany, anyway, like Poland and the Baltic states, without the Finns in a position to do anything to stop this. Better to make unoptimal choices and maintain a measure of control than do "the right thing" and potentially lose all control of your nation's destiny.

Going "all in" with Germany was never the only option. Why? Because even a lukewarm Finland as an ally would tie down Soviet resources, guard a major stretch of front, and relieve the pressure German armies would be under. Finland could deliver a lot of goods Germany needed, above all various wood products and Petsamo nickel. But a Finland that is not an ally, or one that is occupied by the USSR, would give no benefits to Germany. IOTL, Finland could get away with just a limited input because the benefits of Finland as an ally, even a conditional one, heavily outweighed the possibility of Finland being entirely outside German control, or then an area that the Germans would have to invade and occupy by force. If the Finns say "no" to attacking Leningrad, the Germans can well drop the point and settle with lesser participation. They win, comparatively speaking, anyway if Finland is an ally, and stand to lose if it isn't.

As for the Murmansk railway versus Leningrad.... The Murmansk railway was just that, a railway running through some woods. With enough troops and support you can possibly take it and hold it, among with a stretch of northern wilderness. Leningrad, however, was a city of millions. Taking it, and holding it, would take significantly more resources. It would cause significantly more losses. Losses Finland can't afford. And even in the best case, occupying it would make the Finns directly responsible for those millions of Soviet civilians. As Finland could not feed them (it could not feed itself), and the Nazis would not feed them (but would let the "sub-humans" starve), the occupation of Leningrad would make Finland directly responsible for the death of countless civilians. Now, I wouldn't want to even try to spin that atrocity to make Stalin or the Western Allies forget it any time soon - by comparison, taking and holding a bit of railway would be a lot more easier to present as going after a legitimate military objective in any case.



A desperate man grasps at any straw to survive. Beggars can't be choosers. You can choose any old saying here to illustrate the Finnish position in 40-41, if it helps you see the decision between the Devil and the deep blue sea Finland was forced to make in those circumstances. Winning might be nice, but it is optional. Surviving, on the other hand, is necessary.
On the cell phone so a brief reply. The pressure put on the Finn’s IOTL is as far as I can see undocumented and presumably trade via Sweden was an option in neutrality. IOTL Hitler personally intervened to allow food supplies to the Finns and what he had promised to allow that is unknown. No record I know of gives an official guarantee pre-war.
But take this and your own arguments to see why they couldn’t say no ittl. Hitler, has reserved 4 battleships and an air fleet in the arctic sea and ITTL he can starve neutral Finland. He also thinks ittl that the strategic situation is dangerous and REALITY want the Finnish help. No-one in such a bad situation as the Finn’s resisted Hitler the gambler/blackmailer iotl.

In general,
The Finnish choice not to help Germany more is admirable once they have given the choice to help Germany (And fortunately it turned out good for the Finns and the world).
If they had no other choice IOTL remains unknown (it doesn’t help the argument that the president wanted all of the Kola Peninsula), but ITTL they didn’t have any choice.
 
You've changed Hitler's addiction to drugs? And nothing else? And you expect that alone to allow Germany to come out of World War 2 at least as well (if not better) than how it went in?

Not a chance.

The United States is going to come in on the side of the UK, by latest the summer of 1942.
After that, the writing is on the wall. Indeed, Germany will come out worse than OTL because of all those buckets of instant sunshine.

I'll read it. Always interesting, but it won't be plausible. It simply isn't enough.
Hitler's 'winning' move was not to press further after September 1938. That's it. Nothing else after that can really save Germany.

I can't see any other outcome
Thanks for the input, and a good discussion you have started and for discussing the consequences independently of the hypothesis.
It has proven interesting to go through Hitler’s decisions in 1940-41 and see them with a different lense. Much to my surprise as I thought his detrimental meddling really took off later. But no, it was also at the tactical level early on in Barbarossa and quite crucially so.
If you take the big perspective I am inclined to agree with you a long way, but be prepared for a major surprise that will turn this upside down. I left a few hints in the updates and comments.
 
I can't see Hitler changing generalplanost but maybe he will be more pragmatic with his handling of the East? He could tolerate certain initial acts of local nationalists such as the "Act of the restoration of the Ukrainian State" but it would have to be a temporary co opt authority along with the Reichskommisirait, so he can let Bandera run a "quisling regime", and do the same with Radaslau Astrouski, albeit plan settlement. (its worth noting the Japanese planned settlement in territories nonetheless had no problem setting up puppet states.) Sure, he would eventually turn on these but he may see the usefulness in them temporarily being deployed against the Soviets.

If this is too radical of a solution, he could just be more accommodating to the nationalists initially, promising them a latter role and trying to use them for the time being, then turn on them.
 
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