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While some parties throughout history have played down the importance of 'The Influence of Sea Power Upon History' and indeed it being portrayed as the sudden gospel for naval power on the world is not particularly true, it’s value cannot be overstated to both the general public and governmental bodies. Mahan’s way of words describing the various strengths and weaknesses of both maritime and land locked nations played up to the social Darwinism commonly found within this time period. As the various other powers of the world were ideologically reinforced to build their navies up along the lines of Britain, the influence on the civilian population was arguably just as significant.

As January 1895 rolled around, a new civilian organization was formed in Britain referred to as the ‘Navy League’. Their purpose was clearly outlined as “spreading information showing the vital importance to the British Empire of the naval supremacy upon which depends it’s trade, empire and national existence.” Many of the patrons of the league extended from the British aristocrats down to the common hobbyist, the thread of imperialist pride held the organization together. While the league itself grew, it eventually hit a puzzling contradiction. The organization pushed for the improvement of port facilities in the Dominions and the establishment of naval reserves in the colonies however at the same time, their ingrained support of the Admiralty caused issues. Admiralty ideals of a centrally controlled Royal Navy with colonial monetary contributions clashed with the growing sentiment aboard for locally controlled squadrons, leaving the Navy League uncomfortably sitting on their hands.


The flowing ideals of imperial and nationalist pride were felt throughout the dominions although surprisingly, the first non-Britain based branch of the Navy League was set up in Toronto in 1895 with many more following in the years to come. At this point though, the League mainly pushed a straight naval equivalent to the land-based militia, not so much a national naval force. With Prime Minister Laurier and his Liberal government coming to power in 1896, the Navy League doubled their efforts in hopefully bringing a new Prime Minister into their corner. Yet again though, Laurier like Macdonald before him was a rather uninformed spectator of naval matters. Following a lengthy memo forwarded to Ottawa by the Colonial Defense Committee, Laurier was swept up and hurried to the Colonial Conference. A meeting about naval matters before the formal proceedings found Laurier far over his head in an embarrassing state. After a proposal from himself for a general fund for empire defense, he was quickly rebuffed by the premier of New South Wales regarding the fact that while his area had been financially supporting their local naval squadron, Canada was essentially sitting back and doing nothing.

Laurier’s frankly laughable statements regarding the fact that “Canada was in no need of naval protection” and therefore should not have to pay any donations forward to the general needs of the Empire made him the fool of the meeting. After this initial embarrassment, Laurier had realized two things. His limited experience in the matter meant he would need experienced opinions for any actions to be taken, opinions that the Admiralty thus far had been unhelpful in providing alongside the fact that any promises would have to both please the Admiralty and his own Liberal base, something about as likely as the sky falling down around his shoulders. Therefore, when naval matters were thus brought back to light within the conference itself, Laurier had taken the stance of silence. When it was offered that Laurier be given a private audience with one of the Admiralty’s Sea Lords for guidance, Laurier shocked all in attendance when he announced there was nothing to discuss. He followed closely with a statement closely reading as such, “The naval question does not have the same importance to Canada as it does for many of the other colonies, due to the fact that war with the United States is not a serious possibility. Any differences between the two nations is simply family troubles.”


The issue was settled for Canada and Laurier had escaped financially unscathed for the moment. While Australia and New Zealand both reinforced naval commitments to Britain, Canada was noted as to have no made such an offer by the leading figures of the Conference. Ironically after this meeting, Laurier was practically forced into looking into matters of defending Canada from a potential US invasion after the 1895 Venezuela Crisis had shown how unready Canadian defenses truly were. A memorandum titled “Naval Control on the Great Lakes” found its way to both the leader of the Militia and the Fisheries Protection Service. It outlined arming small vessels with stocks of British purchased Lee Enfield rifles and Maxim machine guns and detailed plans for equipping the three previously built Fisheries protection ships with 6 and 12 pounder weapons. The Petrel, Curlew and Acadia had been designed to take these weapons but not expressly fitted as to not invalidate the Rush-Bagot Agreement and spark a naval arms race on the Lakes. To help rapidly fit out in a crisis, these weapons and their related materials were to be transferred from the Militia to the Fisheries Service.

Following another commission organized by Laurier to help place Canada’s military footing somewhat securely, Major General Edward Leech had made a surprising recommendation. The main pillar of this report would be alongside the armament fitting on various ships, Canada would require a naval orientated militia. The related excerpt from the publicly released section of the report reads as follows.

“As a most important element in the defense of Canada, I cannot impress the necessity of the naval defense of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. The Militia Act of 1886 contemplated the formation of a naval brigade, and I strongly recommend that, steps should be taken with that same intention. Training ships with instructional staff might be obtained from the Admiralty. I feel sure that the formation of such a force would be productive of most valuable results, not only as a strong and most important element of defense, but as a means of educating the seafaring population, and of improving the shipping interests in the inland waters of Canada.”

The size of such a naval brigade was hoped to be 2,000 strong with 1,500 being trained sailors for combat purposes and 500 as firemen for various ashore facilities. Two-armed training ships able to also be used in a wartime situation were also proposed alongside more combat orientated refits to Fisheries craft and training for existing personnel. Large stocks of quick firing guns of various calibers were also requested to be stored in secure warehouses alongside major lake bound cities for use in emergency conversions of local ships into warships. These measures were further reinforced as the United States boldly put forward a change to the Rush-Bagot Agreement in 1898. Since the onset of the Spanish-American war, the Americans had been keen to utilize their naval industries on the lakes and more so forced a change stating that if they could build warships on the Lakes for uses outside of the Lakes, the Canadians and British could operate two unarmored but armed vessels under 1,000t for “naval instruction and training” alongside 6 police, revenue and fisheries cutters. After further stipulating that only one warship could be built on the Lakes at a time and would have to completely vacate the Lakes before another could be started, the Canadians and British relented, not wishing for the Americans to throw away the treaty and fill the Lakes with warships.


In the end, all of the Commission findings bar the transfer of guns to the Fisheries service would slowly fade following the joint Canada-UK commission to resolve the Alaska boundary dispute. Even with the plucky prodding of Vice Admiral Jackie Fisher from his basing in Halifax being pushed away by a busy and frustrated Laurier, the naval issue was once again left to simmer. Even with yet another set back though, Laurier and his government had finally validated the idea of Canadian naval elements with serious consideration and members of both political parties had taken notice. Ears were raised, queries were placed and the rumor mill within Ottawa had more material than usual.

The world stage had made matters of naval defense an issue not particularly able to be hidden away from. Modern naval issues and warships could be perused in copies of Brassey or Janes and the newly finished Spanish-American war especially had alarmed nations all over the world. Commodore Dewey’s bold assault into Manilla Bay and the subsequent destruction of the Spanish fleet alongside its shore defences was troubling. Gobbling up Spanish possessions in the area, Canada especially was provided with a front row seat regarding what their neighbor was truly capable of. The Toronto Navy League worked tirelessly to underline the fact that “a Canadian naval reserve or drilled militia with the most modern weapons and realistic training able to be provided is absolutely essential to a sound national defense.” This general concept was widely circulated, reaching Canadian politicians all across the nation, even making its way to the Governor General and Laurier himself. While the proposed use of Royal Navy reserve ships for training did conjure the ghost of HMS Charybdis from it’s recently dug grave, the sentiment was further sweetened by League estimates that a force of 5,000 men could be potentially kept at a ready status for a yearly expenditure of only $250,000.

While all of this was occurring on the mainland, Vice-Admiral Fisher was eager to find a pet project to satisfy his boredom within the dreary Halifax station. With Ottawa not particularly willing to bite, a naval reserve setup from the relatively untapped colony of Newfoundland would have to do.