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Even while Canada was putting themselves up against the Fenian’s, their neighbors across the border had thrown them into somewhat of an unpleasant situation. In 1866, the Americans had come to the decision to preemptively end the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. The treaty itself was extremely valuable due to the fact that it classified a large section of Canadian raw agricultural and material exports for the United States as duty free, side stepping the previous American tariff on natural resource imports into the country. The Americans in return received fishing rights off the East Coast of Canada alongside joint navigation rights to the interior waterways of Canada. Even once America pulled out of this treaty however, her fishing fleets continued their normal routes along the inshore waters of the Maritime Provinces and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Ottawa was furious with the United States for circumventing their treaty and continuing to allow their fishermen to roam freely on Canadian territory yet, even more ire was directed towards Britain.

London of late had been preoccupied in maintaining a sound and friendly relationship with the United States, British Officials were squarely unwilling to adopt any measures which would protect the local Canadian fishermen’s rights and livelihoods in their own home waters. A half-hearted measure of a licensing system was put into place, but it was nowhere near adequately enforced on either Canada or Britain’s part. The dissatisfaction within the Canadian Government came to a head when the Royal Navy officially informed Canada that it would be decreasing its overall presence in the North American station after 1869, meaning there would be a large decrease in the amount of naval ships to help enforce fishing disputes. The Minister of Marine and Fisheries of the time, Peter Mitchell, set about announcing that the Canadian government would commission six armed schooners manned by what he termed “Marine Police”. These officers would hold authority backed by the Canadian Government by relation, hopefully that of the Royal Navy itself. In his own words, “All national rights of fishery on our own coasts are threatened and the time has arrived when we must either abandon this authoritative right or assert to maintain it.”

These schooners proved to be a sound investment in 1870 alone, twelve American vessels were seized after being caught illegally fishing by the schooners La Canadienne, Daring and Lady Head. The United States soon settled these differences alongside many more under the 1871 Treaty of Washington. Alongside the implementation of the treaty, the nation bore witness to a large trimming of the United States Navy in the wake of the American Civil War, so the need for the Marine Police themselves was also disbanded in 1873. Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald would comment about the situation, “There is not the slightest chance of a row between the United States and England so with that, Canada ought to take advantage of this to keep down our militia estimates.”

Sir John A. Macdonald himself would not be long for the Canadian political system and was succeeded by Alexander Mackenzie’s Liberal government in 1873. A new figurehead of the nation was followed by the same tired requests from Britain, this time regarding the reinforcement of artillery-based defenses in Quebec, Montreal and Kingston. The Royal Navy argued that over the last twelve years in Halifax alone, they had invested substantial time and funding into the upkeep and gradual upgrading of the garrison and coastal defenses. Ottawa shot back with what was rapidly becoming their favorite response, they would be more than willing to supplement or replace British troops garrisoned in Canadian ports during wartime but nothing more. Ottawa’s main concern was to avoid any kind of commitment to Britain that could potentially lead the Admiralty to cut down the North Atlantic Squadron even further.

The British had recently begun construction in Esquimalt on the West Coast in order to establish a significant naval station in the Pacific, partially under the rare influence of Ottawa. When British Columbia was admitted into Canada in 1871, part of the agreement with Ottawa was the establishment and maintenance of a significant naval base within the province. This was seen as a double edged sword by various Canadian politicians as investment by the Royal Navy in Canada and their associated protection for the other coast was indeed rather agreeable however, some figures put forward that this “Pacific Station” could eventually see the Royal Navy weaken their Atlantic standing to spread their defensive obligations across two coasts. Projected telegraph lines and the future trans-Canada railway made the potential usefulness of Esquimalt to the Royal Navy steadily increase. Similarly to the pledge made on the East Coast, Ottawa would provide militiamen for coastal defenses and garrisons but as ever, they did not seek to overstep their bounds and fund anything considered “naval” in character.


The next major jolt to the Canadians was the Russo-Turkish War (1877 – 1878) and the following breakdown of Anglo-Russian relations. Panic erupted among citizens of British Columbia who worried about the potential for a Russian attack on the West Coast. The Mackenzie government would respond to these cries by issuing a request to London for the stationing of “fast cruisers” in Pacific waters. London would provide nothing but sharp rebuke, affirming that they alone would decide the stationing of Royal Navy warships in a crisis. Although the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 would put an tamper to the panic somewhat, the brief scare caused the Royal Navy to again request financial investment of Canada into their own defense. Besides the ever-present issue of coastal defense batteries, the Admiralty recommended that Canada consider arming merchant ships in order to potentially push off enemy raiders alongside an investment in naval mines. Naval mines were not well regarded by Canadian officials due to the perceived damage and interference they would cause in the civilian maritime trade. Sharper individuals within both parties would counter with the fact that raiders would also interfere with civilian trade yet predictably, the issue was quietly pushed aside.

Prime Minister Mackenzie would state “Canada is above shirking her duty in providing the defense of her own coast.” All parties who heard this decree knew it was little more but a bold-faced lie. Small improvements were implemented in Esquimalt such as a garrison of troops and gun batteries borrowed from the Royal Navy, but this was nowhere near a suitable commitment. Control of the Canadian government would again return to John A. Macdonald and yet, Canada’s approach to the issue of naval defense would stay rather flat footed and noncommittal at first. The Prime Minister would later begin to take a slightly more positive outlook on the topic of naval defense. He confirmed that Canada could arm “swift ships of commercial nature” at her own expense to protect her many shores but most importantly, he proposed the idea of Britain recruiting personnel in Canada, if of course Britain was ready to foot the bill for doing so. This all came with the caveat that regardless of anything proposed, “London should not expect Canadian commitments during times of peace and furthermore, Ottawa’s support of any naval spending must address Canadian needs”.

Ironically, a call for action was put fourth by the Leader of the Canadian land-based Militia, Major General Edward Selby-Smyth. His persistent cautioning of the fact that Canada’s various ports were “for all extents and purposes, defenseless” helped push his idea that a naval branch of the Militia would be a key improvement. This proposed naval branch was as he described, “not for adding to the naval strength and supremacy of the empire beyond the purposes contemplated in the Colonial Defense Act.” Some speculate this amendment to the former statement came as a result from threats to his position from upon high in Ottawa. As one could expect, the politicians were not particularly willing to further increase militia spending in a period of peace and did not want to establish another set of naval militias. Somewhat miraculously though, they seemed finally willing to make something approaching a commitment. The Admiralty in London was informed that Canada was willing to host a warship for training in home waters if it was supplied by the Admiralty. This offer was stipulated with the clause that acceptance of a vessel would not imply an explicit obligation that Canada would form any kind of naval militia in the immediate future.

With this encouraging potential start, the Department of Marine and Fisheries dispatched a representative to Britain to inspect the warship offered by the Admiralty, a steam corvette named HMS Charybdis.