Didn't Henry VI inherit mental illness from his maternal grandfather? I don't think his father living longer would change that.
WI: Henry V lives longer
- Thread starter StevenIronside
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Didn't Henry VI inherit mental illness from his maternal grandfather? I don't think his father living longer would change that.
Is possible who the illness will never be fully developed under different circumstances. Plus with a longer living Henry V and younger children of Henry and Catherine to secure the succession the English situation will be much more stable.
My point is that Agincourt wasn't just remembered as a great victory, it was remembered as a great and surprising victory. I don't think you can just handwave this away by saying "Oh, of course people would say that, they had to please their anti-Armagnac lords", because propaganda considerations would apply to the recording of virtually every battle of the time period, but most battles weren't portrayed as having a surprising outcome.
Or else they just weren't expecting the English to advance in the face of such superior numbers, and consequently weren't ready to launch an immediate attack. According to the French chroniclers, the French charge, when it did come, was disorganised and not at full strength, which would suggest that they hadn't been formed up and ready for immediate action at the start of the battle.
This would also explain why the crossbows and other infantrymen didn't take much part in the battle: the French army was taken by surprise, and didn't have an opportunity to form up properly before going into action.
Even if all the English archers were travelling on horseback, which can't actually be presumed, they'd still have had supply waggons, camp followers, and the like, who'd have slowed them down. Plus a lot of the English had picked up diseases at the siege of Harfleur, which would have further slowed them down.
To sum up, you are repeating the traditional English scenario of the stupid and inept French without even trying to look at the other possibilities, which do not involve fundamental stupidity, inexperience and other similar factors. The argument that the French were vastly superior in the numbers because otherwise Agincourt would not be remembered as a surprising victory is not very convincing because this status exists (AFAIK) mostly on the interested side and to a great degree is a byproduct of a propaganda. How about Trafalgar saving Britain from the French invasion? Or how about Poltava getting practically the same status in the Russian propaganda? This does not mean that Agincourt was not important victory, it most definitely was because, while (according to Jean Favier) it did not immediately change much in the Franco-English situation, it resulted in a fundamental political change within France leaving John Fearless as the most politically experienced and military powerful figure with a resulting English-Burgundian alliance.
If anything, as I already mentioned, Montgomery (there is no reason to doubt either his military competence or patriotism) spent a single word on it vs. 6 pages on Crecy. Why? Because Crecy was a surprise, the 1st major battle which demonstrated advantage of the English tactical system. By the time of Agincourt it was the old news so for the French it was more along the lines “oops, we had been beaten again”. When the tables are reversed, I don’t recall the English sources considering any of the French victories as “great” or “unexpected”. Did the English expect to lose at Patay, Fromigny or Castillon?
To start with, if the French had “such a superior numbers”, why would they chose a narrow position which did not allow them to use these numbers in any meaningful way? Just few hundred meters back or forward they’d have a wide opening allowing a wider front. Why were they waiting for the reinforcements (including Brabant troops) if they already had vastly superior numbers? Why didn’t they engage in a battle few days earlier when the armies were facing each other? (Delbruck considered this an indication of their numeric weakness). Then, by that time, with the English system being well-known and feared, it became reasonably obvious that the best way to deal with it is to attack the English before they take a good defensive position (it does not look like the French had any field artillery so the “ultimate solution” was not yet available) so just waiting (for what?) did not make a slightest tactical sense.
Why, if they were so superior in numbers, didn’t they attack until forced to do by the English fire?
Why, if d’Albert did not have any influence, was the bulk of the French knights dismounted? If the story based upon their chivalric arrogance and an absence of subordination is true, then we probably should expect rather Monthlery schema where in absence if the strong leadership most of the knights chose to fight on a horseback than one of Poitiers where most of them had been dismounted on a royal order. Shouldn’t there be protests (from the Duke of Orleans and down the social ladder) that d’Albert (and Bussicout?) chose a position which prevents an effective deployment of the superior numbers of the French knights?
They did not expect the English attack? Fine, but if they had (as the Burgundian sources imply) many thousands archers and crossbowmen, why wouldn’t they use them to guard the front? After all, the French were not completely inexperienced nincompoops. BTW, the Burgundian sources give reasonably sane numbers of the men at arms (which fit Delbruck’s numbers) leaving the “huge part” to the unrealistic numbers of the archers (not available at that time) and the foot soldiers which did not manifest themselves in any way before, during or after the battle or even campaign in general. Are there any documents explaining how they had been raised, paid, etc.? BTW, how would they be raised in a rather dynamic campaign to start with? France of that time was quite short of the foot soldiers so this could not be done by a click of the fingers, especially in the area where the Armagnac faction was not too popular.
Even with the dysenteria (getting which was not exclusively English privilege), the English army consisted of the professionals (biography of St. Louis can give you an idea how the medievals we’re dealing with dysenteria without slowing down
) used to the long marches. The peasant levy (why would anybody decide to call it on that stage of the 100YW when uselessness of the idea was obvious) would move in a much lower tempo slowing down the rest of the army even if just because it would involve a much greater train slugging along a single road. OTOH, a reasonably small (see the Burgundian numbers) force of the predominantly man at arms with some crossbowmen would move at approximately the same or even higher tempo (because they would not waste time on looting and burning each and every village on their way).Then, while trying to explain how these thousands of the archers and crossbowmen were deprived of fighting, you are avoiding an explanation of how they were raised in the first place. If we stick to the Burgundian numbers, there would be approximately 3,000 crossbowmen (comparable to the number of the Italian mercenaries at Crecy) and 8,000 archers split between the advance detachment (which means that half of these numbers should be easily available to react to the English advance and fortification of the position) and the main body. Where and how had they been raised? The crossbowmen were professionals so there should be some indication of their existence: people of that period had been bureaucratic enough and, they would have to be raised (and paid) over a big part of France and marched to the region of fighting but somehow they were not present in the numbers adequate for preventing the English crossing of the Somme. 8,000 French archers is even more intriguing taking into an account that the edicts ordering archer practices and organization of the free archers were a matter of future and that the French archers did not manifest themselves in any serious way during the 100YW. There were some but, as de Comnin stated, they were useless unless available in the big numbers.
Anyway, this subject was discussed ad nuaseum many years ago on then functioning SHM to a complete stalemate and I do not think that we are going to end up with some fundamental discovery or with convincing each other so I’d rather stop then continue at a risk of ending up with too heated discussion.
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I don't the French were stupid and inept. They were caught off-guard by an unexpectedly aggressive enemy and forced into battle in unadvantageous circumstances; that sort of thing has happened plenty in military history, so there's nothing implausible about it happening here as well.
I don't know enough about Russian propaganda to comment on that, but Trafalgar is actually a good comparison: it was undoubtedly a significant victory, and was seen as such at the time, but nobody ever claimed it was a military upset, because it quite clearly wasn't.
If the French were so expectant of being defeated, why did they offer battle in the first place?
When the tables are reversed, I don’t recall the English sources considering any of the French victories as “great” or “unexpected”. Did the English expect to lose at Patay, Fromigny or Castillon?
You can go into battle without expecting to lose, but still not be surprised when you do. E.g., if the two armies are of comparable strength, you might reasonably decide to hazard a battle, but a resultant defeat wouldn't be perceived as an upset.
Was it? England and France hadn't fought since 1389, and the last major pitched battle had been at Poitiers, 59 years earlier. IOW, plenty of time for institutional memory of how to fight the English to fade.
All I will say here is that most scholars of the period seem to accept the idea that the English were outnumbered at the battle, so apparently the people who actually specialise in this topic don't think there's any difficulty with the idea that France could raise a lot of troops.
Archival records of this period are sufficiently incomplete to make this sort of argumentum ad silentium dubious, to say the least.
They were. There's a reason Henry had to divert his army to the south, to find an undefended crossing-point.
Have to point out that you appear to be trying to claim the French lost due to frontally attacking a superior force in strong defensive terrain despite knowing the English archers would cut them to pieces! So either the French were stupid and inept or you are badly wrong on the numbers.
There is a 3rd option: you did not get what was written. Their idea was to wait for the reinforcements but the English forced them to attack by their maneuver. For the detailed description and the numbers you can read Delbruck - his book is available in English.
How are the French forced to attack ? The bulk of the English army is basically static once deployed, totally dependent on being attacked ( a weakness exploited by the French many times ). As the French have superior cavalry numbers to counter any mounted sally, they can just pull back and await their reinforcements. Sorry, the French let themselves be goaded into defeat.
Why would I want to read a pre WW1 book with claims that even French historians now dismiss. The odds were almost certainly less than the traditional 5 to 1 but Contamine suggests 2 to 1 and Curry at 3 to 2 is the lowest I know of in recent discussions.
Regarding the lack of experience, Poitiers was, indeed, far away but in between the French managed to kick the English from most of their French holdings so this battle does not really matter. Ditto for the leaders: d’Albert started his career fighting under Du Guisclin, Bousicaut also had a lot of military experience.
Regarding unexpected English attack, even Keagan could not come with a quite convincing explanation on how was it possible to miss all the time which required English to advance to their position, hammer stakes into the ground and sharpen them while being within less then 200 meters from the French position. If the French were not there (theory of them being busy having a lunch or whatever), then English barrage would be immaterial. If the French had “Burgundian numbers” of archers and crossbowmen in an advance detachment, surely they would be placed at the front (if they did not expect the English attack, why would they place their knights ahead of them) and it would not take too much time for all these archers to start shooting back. If there were thousands of them, they’d make at least some damage to the English counterparts. If the French had been waiting for the reinforcements, it was quite reasonable for them to take a position which they could hold (and they chose one with a narrow front, which would not make sense if they had much bigger numbers). They made a fundamental mistake in underestimating English much superior firepower but if the Burgundian numbers were correct, the superiority would be not to big, if any.
“Most scholars of the period” as an argument is not very convincing because quality means at least as much as quantity and Delbruck was a very serious figure in the military history, especially when the numbers were concerned. Razin (who was a professional military) seemingly chose his numbers over those of the British authors. Tellingly enough, the English version of Agincourt on wiki does not even mention Delbruck and there is an interesting discrepancy in the “Burgundian numbers” between the English and Russian articles on the subject. The English version talks about 8,000 men at arms in a vanguard and 1,400 (or 2,400) on the wings while in the Russian text there are 800 men at arms at the vanguard, 600 and 800 on the flanks with approximately the same numbers as in vanguard in the main division. Now, in Flavier’s history of the 100YW i is written than in preparation to this campaign the government required from the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans to raise 500 men at arms and 300 crossbowmen each. Not a single word about the archers and yet in the “Burgundian numbers” we have 4,000 archers and 1,500 crossbowmen in vanguard only. Of course, taking into an account that the “Burgundian numbers” are claiming the French total up to the 50,000, why should they be taken seriously? And if the archive records are absent or dubious (quite agree on that), how are we supposed to make any qualitative judgement at all? Just based on the statement of the English chaplain that the French had been “swarming as locust”, a couple of Burgundian writers who had been interested in presenting the Armagnac effort in a negative light, were not high enough positioned at the time of a battle to knew the real numbers (and came with something unrealistic)? Judging by the comments of some of these scholars and projections based exclusively on the descriptions of the “eyewitnesses and contemporaries” they never heard about the method of critical analysis as applicable to the military history.
All of the above does not mean that that Delbruck was necessary correct but the same goes for those holding the opposite view. His description looks logical without allowance for the stupidity factor, which is more than I can tell about those of Keagan (gap in time with the English advance, exaggerated effectiveness of a longbow, density during the cavalry charge, etc.) and Seward.
As far as crossing of the Somme is involved, Henry did not try to cross in the “historic” place because he got information that it is guarded by d’Albert with (only) 6,000 troops. The following next days involve mentioning only of the French patrols of the men at arms, up to few hundred each. Not too many of them because the English found the suitable unguarded crossing.
And about the “upset”, you still did not tell who exactly used this term and in which context.
Are you seriously asking this question? For the answer you don’t even need Delbruck: Keagan discussed this issue in the great details and even Wiki article talks about it. The English advanced from their initial position within an effective longbow range, hammered stakes into the ground, sharpened them and started shooing, thus provoking the French attack. That was Henry’s brilliant tactical decision which produced and won the battle. The French had been waiting for the reinforcements in a rather logical expectation that if the English go to the offensive, they would be at disadvantage (including both being lighter and having a mud at their rear). Henry’s maneuver produced an effective combination of the offensive and defensive tactics, which gave the English all possible advantages. If the French had the numbers of the archers and crossbowmen claimed by the Burgundians, the English fire could be countered. But they clearly did not have the needed numbers.
As for the seemingly reasonable French retreat, you are talking a feudal army (and one assembled on ad hoc basis, not the professional mercenary troops). It could not easily maneuver and any order to retreat could easily provoke a panic. Of course, a pride factor can’t be completely discounted either. And of course, they had been actively contributing to their defeat. This, however, does not prove that they have the overall superior numbers (their superiority in the men at arms is not questioned).
Why would you want to read one of the greatest military historians of the modern time? Well, obviously nobody forces you, especially if you think that the more recent is better by definition. But without reading him you don’t know what you are arguing against: you claimed that the numbers had to be wrong and I pointed to you the source of the numbers and the related schema of the battle. Agreement or disagreement with Delbruck is entirely up to you. To me it does not make a slightest difference because a definite proof of a specific version is impossible.
As far as my personal experience goes, this specific battle had been discussed for years on SHM with participation of the professional medievalists, a demonstrated failure to convince anybody to change his or her point of view, and resulting labeling as “The Second Battle That Shalt not be mentioned”.
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Henry V died not even a year after the birth of his son. Even if he dies at age 40 we'll probably have a younger brother for Henry VI, which would at minimum completely reshuffle the War of the Roses
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Everyone here seems to be overlooking a certain French peasant girl who was 3 years old @ the time of Agincourt. Are we saying ITTL Joan of Arc is butterflied away? If not, does Henry defeat her & have her burned?Logically, I guess you’d argue that was would have happened. But IOTL Joan defeated experienced English generals like Bedford(& won @ Patay a victory almost as overwhelming as Henry’s @ Agincourt). Besides, Joan’s entire career is so amazing that if it hadn’t actually happened we’d all snort it’s as ASB as you can get.
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Second important issue was mentioned but had been “drown in the mud” of Agincourt discussion: Henry’s victory was instrumental in a temporary weakening of the Armagnac party (and linked to it “royal party”) with a resulting raise of the Burgundian influence (John the Fearless was quite popular in Paris even before this, mostly because his opponents were blamed for the lousy economic situation). While John made a pact with Henry and even recognized his right to the throne, the practical component of that agreement was quite vague: Burgundy promised to join English only when they are clearly winning.
Where is a guarantee that a longer living Henry would be able to achieve something close to the obvious strategic victory? And where is a guarantee that if this happening the Duke of Burgundy does not find it more advantageous to patch relations with the Armagniacs (for a suitable compensation) rather than to have uncomfortably powerful King of France?
Then, of course, the whole issue of the rights to the throne was a touchy one because both Burgundian and Royal agreement to recognize Henry’s claim was going against the recognized legal tradition and probably required more than just a couple signatures (Burgundian recognition of the claim most probably was simply irrelevant from a legal point of view and signature of the insane king made under the duress also was not the last word in the issue). More or less the same goes for the coronation: to make it legitimate in a national view it should be done in a right place by the right person and preferably with an impressive presence of the French aristocracy. After all, Henry VI had been crowned (in Paris) and nobody paid attention. It is quite possible that the war would be going on and, taking into an account the English reluctance to pay for it in a long term, it would probably continue more or less along the OTL lines: the English would be able to squeeze the Armagnac forces out of the Northern France but the shortage of resources would be a major handicap. Siege of Orleans was clearly done with the inadequate resources.
I’d say that Joan or a similar figure could appear just because France needed some token unifier (Joan was extremely important in returning a fighting spirit to the French but most of a generalship had been done by the professionals like Dubois and La Hire). Circumstances, personality and timing could be different.
Couple of points. Henry V was the best captain of the era. There is something to be said for the rightfully crowned king being recognized as the best general. Agincourt, while famous, wasn't Henry's important act. After Agincourt, Henry recognized that warfare had changed. It wasn't about raiding through territory. Henry realized that if he wanted to conquer France, he had to take every strong point starting at the channel and going south step by step.
Finally, Henry as King of France and England has options. I have read that both Henrys 4 and 5 wanted to crusade. Here is the deal for the Dauphin. Recognize me as King of France so I can make you King of Jerusalem.
Finally, Henry as King of France and England has options. I have read that both Henrys 4 and 5 wanted to crusade. Here is the deal for the Dauphin. Recognize me as King of France so I can make you King of Jerusalem.
The recent Anglo-French campaigns had been matters of sieges and raiding. Being experienced in this kind of war doesn't equate to knowing the best way to defeat an English longbow-based army in pitched battle.
Nobody's said that the French weren't there, only that some of them were, resulting in their forces being less strong than they should have been. As for why they wouldn't attack before the English had advanced, maybe they were waiting for enough men to come back, or they expected the English to charge and were waiting to receive their attack.
That's no less a problem for your preferred account -- if the French were sitting tight because the English outnumbered them, why didn't they form their army up into a defensive formation in case the English tried anything? Why put themselves in a position where they could be forced to attack in the first place?
I don't think Delbruck is considered a serious figure in medieval military history, actually. Few if any medievalists would accept his idea that "military science ends with the Romans and begins again with the Renaissance".
They're not. Literally no modern historian bases their numbers on "the Burgundian chroniclers said so". Instead they look at the course of the battle, how contemporaries reacted to it, and so on.
Well, that would explain your problem about how the English were able to cross the Somme -- the French army was big and unwieldy, and couldn't react in time to oppose them.
Come to think of it, it would also explain why the French might choose to fight in a narrow space -- they wanted to corner and destroy the English army, and were worried it might slip away again.
But you said earlier that "If the story based upon their chivalric arrogance and an absence of subordination is true, then we probably should expect rather Monthlery schema where in absence if the strong leadership most of the knights chose to fight on a horseback than one of Poitiers where most of them had been dismounted on a royal order". So were the French over-proud or not?