I don't see why Russia would ally with Austria. Logically, yes, they should try and prevent a massive German state from forming. But they were reeling with hatred for the Austrian state (Crimean betrayal) and were impressed with the Prussian one (January uprising for example- Prussia offered to give troops to crush the uprising). If they smelt Austrian weakness, they would use it to grab a sizeable chunk of the Balkans- and to stop Austria's growing influence. Why is Greece involved?
WI: WW1 happened in the 1860s/1870s over German unification?
- Thread starter Disraeli2004
- Start date
My guess is that it'd turn into a merged anti-Ottoman conflict on one end and an anti-Prussian on another. Obviously history would likely have to be tweaked a bit beforehand but on a certain level Austria and Russia have joint interests in regards to weakening the Ottomans, and they have some level of joint interests in regards to weakening Prussia. Hence the UK would be drawn into a conflict protecting the Ottomans and Prussia by proxy, in part due to them being against the Russians and in part due to complications stemming from their mutual conflicting interests with France.
In many ways it's like a replay of the Seven Years War.
But the problem is that Austria and Russia don't really have joint intrest in weakening the Ottomans and the crisis is mainly about the shape of German unification. Russian relations with Austria was very poor, whereas relations with Prussia were cordial. Russia had no intrest in fighting Prussia in either 1866 or 1870, but they had have an intrest in fighting Austria. They had refused to help them at all after Crimea and given that Austria isn't likely to do very well at all, it would be an opportunity to seize Galicia and wreck the Hapsburgs, creating new states that would fall firmly under Russia's sphere of influence. By this point, Austria was hostile to Russian expansion in the Balkans- as they feared it would weaken a state that was gunning for its destruction.
Picking *American* ports on opposite ends of the same country seems more than coincidence and would bring pause to those in Europe who might recognize the Confederacy.
Von Roon became minister of war around late 1859, his reforms will be opposed at first (budgetary control plays a role in this) but gain traction as time goes on.
There is thought that had Frederick Wilhelm III survived longer or Wilhelm met his end via Annie Oakley's revolver that the Germans and British might indeed have become Allies. They were already partitioning Portuguese colonies in 1914, if they continued cooperation as such into later years...
IDK, Britain seemed to do alright against the Russian navy during the Crimean War, so I don't see why they'd struggle a decade or so later.
Well, according to the article you linked to, it was because having Russian ships in neutral ports would make it impossible for the Royal Navy to destroy them all in the event of war. So not a coincidence, but not a sign that Russia was going to fight for the Union, either.
As for "would bring pause to those in Europe who might recognize the Confederacy", is there nay evidence of it doing so? Any government officials in Britain or France expressing concern about having to fight the Russians if they recognised the CSA?
https://www.voltairenet.org/article169488.html
Russia was asked to join a multimational intervention and declines to do so, ships from Russia are posted in the US afterwards where tgey can also strike weaker French and UK holding if war arises (whether from reasons involving the Confederacy or Poland or something else).
Britain never had any desire to join the USCW, and on the one occasion when they were close, the Trent affair, tensions were diffused because Lincoln agreed to hand over the captured diplomats and issue an apology, not because of the Russian navy.
Britain was divided about joining the ACW. Those who considered intervention wanted Russia as part of the group but Russia refused. UK and especially France still toyed with intervention. If the Polish question in 1863 goes differently we have a potential for global war.
Austria minus Bohemia would have a very hard time waging war on anyone. Cisleithania (and therefore the Habsburgs) would be much weaker than Transleithania and the powerful Hungarian lobby that was against intervening in the Franco-Prussian war. More than that, the loss of Bohemia, its coal, and all its human resources would effectively neuter Austrian industry. The economic fallout of this would be brutal, to say nothing of the empire's much-reduced ability to make the weapons and equipment necessary for all the post-Königgrätz reforms.
This would also be big for Germany too. Would Bohemia have been annexed into the Kingdom of Prussia proper, or "liberated" into the German Federation? Judging by their treatment of the Poles, I doubt the Prussians would be overly tolerant of Czech nationalism.
While I think you could reasonably escalate the Franco-Prussian War into a much larger conflict, I'm not sure you'd get a truly WW1-style conflict (if that's what you're going for). The financial and military innovations needed to make a war that huge last that long hadn't become standard across Europe yet, so you'd probably get a shorter conflict with outcomes that aren't quite as dramatic as the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
I believe the Kaiser wanted to annex Bohemia after Koniggratz (along with Saxony) but France was giving indicators that it was about to jump in on Austria's side. Bismarck wanted the war over ASAP so he talked the Kaiser down, annexations were thus limited.
This is, ironically, an interesting point of divergence in itself. Austria would definitely have fought on if they knew the price of defeat was losing Bohemia. There were a lot of hysterics at the time declaring Austria's ejection from German politics as its fall from great power status, but Bohemia would have been a nearly irrecoverable loss.
A very good point. My point was the peace of Prague would be so humiliating that it perhaps brings in French intervention immediately (hence Bismarck's hysterics and window jumping theatrics, he knew that an advance on Berlin would prompt intervention from France), but certainly convince Austria that they would need to act in any way they could stop further Prussian encroachment, the annexation a loss of an extremely vital bit of territory that they need to survive. A joint scheme with the French is agreed, if they don't jump in in 1866. I don't think the Habsburg would be immediately destroyed and could fight one last conflict, seen as the one where they could save themselves, unless the Peace of Prague dissolves the empire entirely. In that case there would be immediate great power intervention against Prussia.
We've been over this already. Wilhelm wanted some border territory in Bohemia, not the whole province. Since he was also willing to take less territory from Hanover et al, the risk of French intervention would be slight, as Prussia's total gains would not differ much from OTL.
? The annexation of Bohemia destroys an existing balance of power by threatening to completely destroy Austria. The annexation of Hanover, whilst shocking, did not really change the overall balance, other than confirming the fact that Prussia was the pre-eminent power within Germany; France was not willing to intervene to prevent this.
Indeed, but the annexation of, say, Riechenberg, Karlsbad and the Egertal does not. It leaves Austria still a great power, though no doubt a disgruntled one. But she was disgruntled even OTL.
I think the way to bring Austria into a war in 1870 isn't to change the outcome of the Austro-Prussian war. You'd either be damaging Austria too much, or just harming it a bit and causing resentment, which wasn't enough for its participation OTL. While there was genuine interest in Vienna for intervening on France's side to get revenge and even some preparations made to that end, there were too many political interests invested in sitting things out (namely, the entirety of Budapest). There would have to be some kind of incident or outrage that would bring the entire empire on board with punishing Prussia, or to have Prussia suffer some kind of major setback in the Franco-Prussian War that would make intervention look relatively easy.
A good point. Firstly, it can be resolved by making the Austro-Prussian war the war that escalates (the Prussians refuse to stop and march on Vienna; France is drawn in. They were threatening to do this and Bismarck thought it was imminent). Secondly, I think that horrible balance between absolute destruction lie actually within Wilhelm's proposed peace- take territory but don't dissolve the empire. One must remember that France was considered a stronger power than Prussia in 1870- and that war could be the last opportunity for Austria to rectify this awful humiliation. If they survive an alternate 1866, they would intervene on the side of France to regain lost territory (I might add that the Austrian Empire as such did not lose a single foot of territory in our 1866), as this was their last opportunity to do so, and the tide of public opinion would push them towards intervention.
Only if France is clearly winning.
Austria will need several weeks to mobilise, by which time it will be clear how the wind is blowing. If it's anything like OTL she won't act no matter what her grievances.
And in any case the Tsar would veto it. He might not act to rescue a defeated Prussia, but he'll be happy enough to support a victorious one