I hate to do this, but I feel I have to.
I think the damage inflicted to Eastern and Sand Islands during the battle as well as the impact of losing Midway is being underestimated. The damage from the May 22 fire is still not repaired, requiring aircraft fuel to be drawn by hand from 55 gallon drums instead of refueling from a more centralized system. In the bombings from the Japanese carriers the generator was damaged, not only compromising the electrical supply but also the fresh water supply as well. Several of the land-based aircraft are damaged or destroyed - many are somewhat older as well. An ammunition pit for the aircraft took a severe hit amidst all of this with loss of .50 cal rounds and bombs. Yes, the men on the island could return fire, but now you've got (a) another bombing run from the carriers about to commence and (b) a lot of people with concerns for (ironically) running short of fresh water. McClusky got lucky and caught the carriers refueling for that second strike - I believe that strike does even more damage and potentially knocks out the water supply, which the Japanese are expecting due to the already decoded message. Land-based aircraft for reinforcement are distant and will take time to get out there. Yes, the runways are intact, but few aircraft remain airworthy and many more need repairs. I believe the logistical needs of the damaged base are thus underestimated - without sufficient water, the base likely surrenders in a few days, and potentially for the same reason used as a ruse in the first place. One of the damaged American bomber aircraft almost killed Nagumo and his staff on the bridge of his carrier in a kamikaze attack - perhaps that is why he launched the second wave at all. Example: sixty-six Midway-based aircraft in the air at 06:15 on 04 June (not counting the carriers of course) saw twenty return by 07:00 with only one Wildcat and one Buffalo were in flyable shape. Of note, the fog was thick enough on the next day to prevent detection of incoming ships by air, and while the invasion force was ready and the troops on the ground largely intact, their water supplies and any possible air support come into question. Now take away the US carriers, their air support, their fresh water, and put the main Japanese task force nearby. Were the US Navy decimated at Midway, Sand and Eastern islands are on their own.
I'm genuinely puzzled at some of these points.
- Water supply: Having no drinking water would be a grave issue. But the loss of the power generator and the water lines in the bombing attack didn't pose any immediate threat to the garrison. The water tanks wer eintact. Neither Colonel Shannon's after action report, nor Nimitz's, reports any difficulty here. Shannon makes clear that despite the damage, the garrison was in no immediate danger.
- While above ground buildings were seriously damaged, none of the atoll's sited artillery, bunkers, or fortifications took any damage. Neither did the tanks. There would be little in the way of creature comforts, but they were still in position to provide an intact defense.
- Total KIA from the morning attack, in fact, came to....exactly 6.
- In any event, if you know anything about Shannon and his unit, surrender was simply not part of his vocabulary.
At any rate, I think Parshall and Tully in Appendix 5 of
Shattered Sword paint the picture of Midway's near invulnerability, though if you want it in more purple tones,
there is always @Calbear:
As I noted, its Tarawa, but with better fortifications, more heavy machine guns, light tanks, PT boats inside the lagoon, command detonated mines, and a 7:5 defender:attacker ratio.
The U.S. his Tarawa with 35,000 troops, equipped with Amtracs, forward air controllers coordinating strikes from 11 fast carriers and 5 CVE, naval gunfire observers directing fire from 12 battleships and 8 CA (all of which were heavily loaded with bombardment shells), against ~2,500 Japanese combat troops and a roughly equal number of civilian laborers. The U.S. took the Atoll, at a cost of 1,069 KIA and 1,600 WIA. That was with a 6:1 advantage in numbers
The Japanese planned to have their assault troops wade across 2-400 yard of waist to chest deep water against defenses including 48 .50 cal hmg, 36 .30 cal mg, 37mm anti boat guns equipped to fire canister, 20mm dp guns, six light tanks, and some 1,500 IEDs put together by the Marine defense force while waiting for the attack. This does not include the 3" AAA, 5" and 7" anti-ship batteries (the 7" guns could penetrate the belt of the best IJN heavy cruisers at 12,000 yards). All told there were around 7,000 American personnel on Midway, mostly Marines, including Marine ground crew and some Naval and Army personnel, mainly ground crew. The total Japanese landing force, including two pure construction battalions, was under 5,000 men.
As noted above, great day to be a shark or a seagull.
Ichiki's men are going to hit the reef, and they're going to be butchered. Lacking any reserves, Nagumo and Kondo will have no choice but to withdraw, aside from any grudge shelling of the island on the way out. They'll need some weeks to assemble a fresh, serious amphibious attack. And by that time...
It's taken very seriously by both the US and British governments, especially prior to Midway, for potentially isolating Allied shipping between the US and Australia/New Zealand.
They *had* to take it seriously, because they were far from certain just what Japanese capabilities really were. Today, of course, we know.
Six weeks indeed. Below is some information from Yasumasa Matsudiara, and for those willing to look there were some very interesting peace proposals with Japan around the same time - February 1942.
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur Reports/MacArthur V2 P2/Appendix.htm
I'm puzzled here, too, because reading the link, I don't see any reference to a 1942 Allied peace initiative. Am I missing something? Wrong link?