Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

Geon

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Referring back to my earlier post (#186) I now recall that John Ford did do a documentary on Midway! He even included footage of the actual attack on the airfield. I could imagine this film being expanded big time to show the "gallant resistance of our armed forces on both land and sea!"
 

Outstanding timeline on an Allied invasion of Japan after Anami's military coup actually succeeds - and let us just say, biological and chemical weapons make an appearance in a plausible and well researched way.

Very much worth a read if you have time. Red did his homework.
 
Referring back to my earlier post (#186) I now recall that John Ford did do a documentary on Midway! He even included footage of the actual attack on the airfield. I could imagine this film being expanded big time to show the "gallant resistance of our armed forces on both land and sea!"

If I were the army censors, I would use it to make Midway look like Wake, the Alamo, the Lost Battalion and Bunker Hill all rolled into one. Have some of the survivors tour the states selling war bonds, giving out autographs.
 
As Athelstane implies in his response the U.S. and UK had enough Lewisite, Mustard, Phosgene, and in the case of the British, Anthrax to render just about any Japanese held island, up to and including Okinawa more or less uninhabitable.

CW and BW are only actually useful if the other side can't play in the same game. Italy could use it in Ethiopia because the Ethiopians couldn't respond in kind. Just the United States, on the other hand, spent $1.7 BILLION (1942 USD) from 1942-45 to increase its stockpile of CW agents by 143,000 TONS. The U.S. also have a declared "no first use" policy in accordance with the 1925 Geneva Convention on CW usage.

The Japanese didn't use CW against the WAllies because it is never smart to start a rock throwing fight if you are at the bottom of a well with a pile of gravel and the other guy is looking down at you from the surface with a pile of 50 pound granite stones.

Preparations for use of biological weapons against the US in the field are noted though the submarine carrying them apparently sunk.

https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/17/...-japan-confronting-gruesome-war-atrocity.html
 

CalBear

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For comparison's sake, how large was the US stock of chemical weapons by mid-1945? After the occupation of Japan SCAP disposed of 100,000 tons of chemical weapons in the Home Islands alone (which is about as much as was used in all of World War I). This is without factoring in biological weapons, which killed up to 2 million people in China without producing a decisive result.

The Japanese had no hope of using WMDs on the Allies in any way that would have changed the outcome of the war, but in the event the Americans used poison gas during an invasion of the mainland the IJA was in a position to respond. Unfortunately for the civilian population, there were almost no measures in place to prepare them for chemical warfare and they would have been defenseless.
The U.S. produced the 143K (some sources say 146K) ton as noted between 1941-45. Sources vary on the amount retained post WW I to a degree that I am not confident that I have found a seriously reliable figure (literally saw numbers ranging from a few thousand tons to over 40,000 tons).
 

CalBear

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Preparations for use of biological weapons against the US in the field are noted though the submarine carrying them apparently sunk.

https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/17/...-japan-confronting-gruesome-war-atrocity.html
The part that makes the Japanese effort with Plague against the U.S. West Coast so bizarre is that Plague is endemic across the Western states. Rats and squirrels are found dead from the disease one a semi-regular basis. There are actual on-going reporting requirements documenting higher than normal dead rodent observations for Forestry personnel, or at least there were (you rarely see dead rodents in a "wild" area, the small predators/scavengers usually clean them up in short order).
 
For comparison's sake, how large was the US stock of chemical weapons by mid-1945? After the occupation of Japan SCAP disposed of 100,000 tons of chemical weapons in the Home Islands alone (which is about as much as was used in all of World War I). This is without factoring in biological weapons, which killed up to 2 million people in China without producing a decisive result.

The Japanese had no hope of using WMDs on the Allies in any way that would have changed the outcome of the war, but in the event the Americans used poison gas during an invasion of the mainland the IJA was in a position to respond. Unfortunately for the civilian population, there were almost no measures in place to prepare them for chemical warfare and they would have been defenseless.

There is an incident in Bari Italy from 1943 from a ship named the John Harvey carrying chemical weapons but this was unknown to the people there at the time. A German bombing let loose the mustard gas - resulting military casualties exceeded 600, civilian casualties were unknown, and it was kept quiet. Reportedly there were two thousand of these bombs weighing 100 pounds each (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/cbw/cw.htm).

Overall chemical weapon production from the US during world war 2 was approx. 146,000 *tons* (https://denix.osd.mil/rcwmprogram/history/)
 
As others have said the chances of taking Midway island are slim and none.

I think the damage inflicted to Eastern and Sand Islands during the battle as well as the impact of losing Midway is being underestimated. The damage from the May 22 fire is still not repaired, requiring aircraft fuel to be drawn by hand from 55 gallon drums instead of refueling from a more centralized system. In the bombings from the Japanese carriers the generator was damaged, not only compromising the electrical supply but also the fresh water supply as well. Several of the land-based aircraft are damaged or destroyed - many are somewhat older as well. An ammunition pit for the aircraft took a severe hit amidst all of this with loss of .50 cal rounds and bombs. Yes, the men on the island could return fire, but now you've got (a) another bombing run from the carriers about to commence and (b) a lot of people with concerns for (ironically) running short of fresh water. McClusky got lucky and caught the carriers refueling for that second strike - I believe that strike does even more damage and potentially knocks out the water supply, which the Japanese are expecting due to the already decoded message. Land-based aircraft for reinforcement are distant and will take time to get out there. Yes, the runways are intact, but few aircraft remain airworthy and many more need repairs. I believe the logistical needs of the damaged base are thus underestimated - without sufficient water, the base likely surrenders in a few days, and potentially for the same reason used as a ruse in the first place. One of the damaged American bomber aircraft almost killed Nagumo and his staff on the bridge of his carrier in a kamikaze attack - perhaps that is why he launched the second wave at all. Example: sixty-six Midway-based aircraft in the air at 06:15 on 04 June (not counting the carriers of course) saw twenty return by 07:00 with only one Wildcat and one Buffalo were in flyable shape. Of note, the fog was thick enough on the next day to prevent detection of incoming ships by air, and while the invasion force was ready and the troops on the ground largely intact, their water supplies and any possible air support come into question. Now take away the US carriers, their air support, their fresh water, and put the main Japanese task force nearby. Were the US Navy decimated at Midway, Sand and Eastern islands are on their own.

The Japanese naval superiority is fleeting, the ships can only maintain themselves at sea for a very limited period (during the Guadalcanal fighting the IJA was warned that naval support was only available for two weeks then the fleet had to retire to refuel and resupply, there is a reason the USN build a fleet train) That takes no account of ammo expenditure btw. So any remaining garrison has an airbase and only needs periodic reinforcement convoys.

They need a lot more than that if the second strike takes place.

Operation FS is a fantasy

It's taken very seriously by both the US and British governments, especially prior to Midway, for potentially isolating Allied shipping between the US and Australia/New Zealand.

This is not Victory disease ( aka we were so good only we could beat ourselves, not our fault) but more we had an entirely flawed war plan which becomes apparent within a 6 weeks of Pearl Harbour and we were trying to fix it ( is our fault the cities are ash and GIs are everywhere.)

Six weeks indeed. Below is some information from Yasumasa Matsudiara, and for those willing to look there were some very interesting peace proposals with Japan around the same time - February 1942.
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur Reports/MacArthur V2 P2/Appendix.htm

With the US carrier force destroyed the IJN will withdraw to refit, the losses on the air groups will have been horrendous then argue about what to do next with the IJA refusing to release more forces until the ones they have are supplied and moved, which the IJN cannot do because it does not have the shipping.

As soon as Midway is taken they'll probably retreat as you state. Take away McClusky's lucky find especially by having him return to his carrier and the Japanese losses are not so egregious, especially in comparison. They're also likely to begin looking at French Frigate Shoals or Tern Island for a forward base - as will the US.

And inside a month the allied Carrier force is likely to be Sara, Wasp, Victorious, Formidable and maybe lights. Plus a fairly humungous land based air force.

From what bases? Pearl is fortified but requires a lot of resupply and will likely become a very large encampment. Johnson Island, some of the Phoenix Islands, etc. will also likely get fortified/enlarged immediately, and the Allies have essentially predicted Operation FS which they have to worry about as well. They are not likely to have a whole lot of offensive operations until early 1943 when the Essex-class carriers start becoming available.
 
Even if the Japanese can take Midway with a force smaller and far weaker in terms of the troops, air support, and naval support, they will be left with a wasteland. You point out the damage the island took during the battle. If there is an actual fight over the island, the end result will be the island is useless. If the Japanese try to garrison it (instead of just bugging out), they are now left with trying to supply a garrison with everything it needs when their nearest base is Wake Island over 1000 miles and that is not a very robust facility and the Marshalls are almost 2000 miles away.
 
Frankly Athelstane, you should write a TL on the Japanese making an aggressive move into Papua New Guinea and the Solomons in April 1942 (basically no OPERATION C). There are some details in a Darwin capture thread we ran around in a few months back.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/the-japanese-take-darwin-in-world-war-ii.461264/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Ocean_raid

You have two really easy PODs that push the Japanese in this direction. First, the Navy Staff wanted to cut Australia off from the US and this is geared toward that. Second, have the early March raids by the Lexington and Yorktown against Lae cause the Japanese to shit a brick over US activity and have them conclude the US is moving into the Solomons in a big way.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Lexington_(CV-2)#Lae-Salamaua_raid
 
Frankly Athelstane, you should write a TL on the Japanese making an aggressive move into Papua New Guinea and the Solomons in April 1942 (basically no OPERATION C). There are some details in a Darwin capture thread we ran around in a few months back.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/the-japanese-take-darwin-in-world-war-ii.461264/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Ocean_raid

You have two really easy PODs that push the Japanese in this direction. First, the Navy Staff wanted to cut Australia off from the US and this is geared toward that. Second, have the early March raids by the Lexington and Yorktown against Lae cause the Japanese to shit a brick over US activity and have them conclude the US is moving into the Solomons in a big way.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Lexington_(CV-2)#Lae-Salamaua_raid

Can't tell you how tempting it is, but I'm such a perfectionist on research, that I never really get very far on this kind of thing.
 
I hate to do this, but I feel I have to.

I think the damage inflicted to Eastern and Sand Islands during the battle as well as the impact of losing Midway is being underestimated. The damage from the May 22 fire is still not repaired, requiring aircraft fuel to be drawn by hand from 55 gallon drums instead of refueling from a more centralized system. In the bombings from the Japanese carriers the generator was damaged, not only compromising the electrical supply but also the fresh water supply as well. Several of the land-based aircraft are damaged or destroyed - many are somewhat older as well. An ammunition pit for the aircraft took a severe hit amidst all of this with loss of .50 cal rounds and bombs. Yes, the men on the island could return fire, but now you've got (a) another bombing run from the carriers about to commence and (b) a lot of people with concerns for (ironically) running short of fresh water. McClusky got lucky and caught the carriers refueling for that second strike - I believe that strike does even more damage and potentially knocks out the water supply, which the Japanese are expecting due to the already decoded message. Land-based aircraft for reinforcement are distant and will take time to get out there. Yes, the runways are intact, but few aircraft remain airworthy and many more need repairs. I believe the logistical needs of the damaged base are thus underestimated - without sufficient water, the base likely surrenders in a few days, and potentially for the same reason used as a ruse in the first place. One of the damaged American bomber aircraft almost killed Nagumo and his staff on the bridge of his carrier in a kamikaze attack - perhaps that is why he launched the second wave at all. Example: sixty-six Midway-based aircraft in the air at 06:15 on 04 June (not counting the carriers of course) saw twenty return by 07:00 with only one Wildcat and one Buffalo were in flyable shape. Of note, the fog was thick enough on the next day to prevent detection of incoming ships by air, and while the invasion force was ready and the troops on the ground largely intact, their water supplies and any possible air support come into question. Now take away the US carriers, their air support, their fresh water, and put the main Japanese task force nearby. Were the US Navy decimated at Midway, Sand and Eastern islands are on their own.

I'm genuinely puzzled at some of these points.
  • Water supply: Having no drinking water would be a grave issue. But the loss of the power generator and the water lines in the bombing attack didn't pose any immediate threat to the garrison. The water tanks wer eintact. Neither Colonel Shannon's after action report, nor Nimitz's, reports any difficulty here. Shannon makes clear that despite the damage, the garrison was in no immediate danger.
  • While above ground buildings were seriously damaged, none of the atoll's sited artillery, bunkers, or fortifications took any damage. Neither did the tanks. There would be little in the way of creature comforts, but they were still in position to provide an intact defense.
  • Total KIA from the morning attack, in fact, came to....exactly 6.
  • In any event, if you know anything about Shannon and his unit, surrender was simply not part of his vocabulary.
At any rate, I think Parshall and Tully in Appendix 5 of Shattered Sword paint the picture of Midway's near invulnerability, though if you want it in more purple tones, there is always @Calbear:

As I noted, its Tarawa, but with better fortifications, more heavy machine guns, light tanks, PT boats inside the lagoon, command detonated mines, and a 7:5 defender:attacker ratio.

The U.S. his Tarawa with 35,000 troops, equipped with Amtracs, forward air controllers coordinating strikes from 11 fast carriers and 5 CVE, naval gunfire observers directing fire from 12 battleships and 8 CA (all of which were heavily loaded with bombardment shells), against ~2,500 Japanese combat troops and a roughly equal number of civilian laborers. The U.S. took the Atoll, at a cost of 1,069 KIA and 1,600 WIA. That was with a 6:1 advantage in numbers

The Japanese planned to have their assault troops wade across 2-400 yard of waist to chest deep water against defenses including 48 .50 cal hmg, 36 .30 cal mg, 37mm anti boat guns equipped to fire canister, 20mm dp guns, six light tanks, and some 1,500 IEDs put together by the Marine defense force while waiting for the attack. This does not include the 3" AAA, 5" and 7" anti-ship batteries (the 7" guns could penetrate the belt of the best IJN heavy cruisers at 12,000 yards). All told there were around 7,000 American personnel on Midway, mostly Marines, including Marine ground crew and some Naval and Army personnel, mainly ground crew. The total Japanese landing force, including two pure construction battalions, was under 5,000 men.

As noted above, great day to be a shark or a seagull.

Ichiki's men are going to hit the reef, and they're going to be butchered. Lacking any reserves, Nagumo and Kondo will have no choice but to withdraw, aside from any grudge shelling of the island on the way out. They'll need some weeks to assemble a fresh, serious amphibious attack. And by that time...

It's taken very seriously by both the US and British governments, especially prior to Midway, for potentially isolating Allied shipping between the US and Australia/New Zealand.

They *had* to take it seriously, because they were far from certain just what Japanese capabilities really were. Today, of course, we know.

Six weeks indeed. Below is some information from Yasumasa Matsudiara, and for those willing to look there were some very interesting peace proposals with Japan around the same time - February 1942.
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur Reports/MacArthur V2 P2/Appendix.htm

I'm puzzled here, too, because reading the link, I don't see any reference to a 1942 Allied peace initiative. Am I missing something? Wrong link?
 
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I'm genuinely puzzled at some of these points.
  • Water supply: Having no drinking water would be a grave issue. But the loss of the power generator and the water lines in the bombing attack didn't pose any immediate threat to the garrison. The water tanks wer eintact. Neither Colonel Shannon's after action report, nor Nimitz's, reports any difficulty here. Shannon more makes clear that despite the damage, the garrison was in no immediate danger.
  • While above ground buildings were seriously damaged, none of the atoll's sited artillery, bunkers, or fortifications took any damage. Neither did the tanks. There would be little in the way of creature comforts, but they were still in position to provide an intact defense.
  • Total KIA from the morning attack, in fact, came to....exactly 6.
  • In any event, if you know anything about Shannon and his unit, surrender was simply not part of his vocabulary.
The distillation system itself is affected - even if the tanks are intact you've got only a limited supply of fresh water. Per the OP: the USN is smashed in this scenario. At least one of the aircraft hangars is in trouble and there are not many planes available to fly, at least some of the fuel oil on the base is also on fire. Yes the runways are in good shape and the garrison is there, and what comes next will be bloody. But note that now the Marine garrison would have a limited water supply and an intact Japanese fleet with landing force approaching. And at least one of the aircraft hangars is in trouble. Now you have another bombing run pending followed by a few thousand Japanese troops ready to land who have air cover and naval support no longer available to the Americans.

They *had* to take it seriously, because they were far from certain just what Japanese capabilities really were. Today, of course, we know.

A crushing defeat at Midway will not help matters either. The airfield at Guadalcanal will give Japanese aircraft additional reach, so the airfield still gets attention but the fleet can also hit any other number of places.

I'm puzzled here, too, because reading the link, I don't see any reference to a 1942 Allied peace initiative. Am I missing something? Wrong link?

Try a few lines in re: Emperor and peace.
 
The distillation system itself is affected - even if the tanks are intact you've got only a limited supply of fresh water. Per the OP: the USN is smashed in this scenario. At least one of the aircraft hangars is in trouble and there are not many planes available to fly, at least some of the fuel oil on the base is also on fire. Yes the runways are in good shape and the garrison is there, and what comes next will be bloody. But note that now the Marine garrison would have a limited water supply and an intact Japanese fleet with landing force approaching. And at least one of the aircraft hangars is in trouble. Now you have another bombing run pending followed by a few thousand Japanese troops ready to land who have air cover and naval support no longer available to the Americans.

Well, if Shannon were down to just a few days of water, that would be a fairly urgent situation to demand help for, wouldn't it? And yet, he didn't.

But I just can't see how surrender is going to even be an issue. If Nagumo sinks Fletcher's carriers on June 4, invasion is going to follow in short order - probably another bombing attack at dawn, and then Ichiki's men go in. They're slaughtered in fairly short order. Kondo has no men in reserve; he's low on shells; Nagumo is low on aircrew and oil. There might be some desultory shelling on the way out, but they're certainly not going to demand Shannon's surrender over the radio. And Shannon is not going to offer it. Even at Wake, Devereux and Cunningham only surrendered once the Japanese had overrun most of the island. Shannon won't do any less here.

So that's that: the task forces leave. Shannon dials Pearl to report in, and asks for water and/or replacement generator, stat.
 
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marathag

Banned
Yes the runways are in good shape and the garrison is there, and what comes next will be bloody. But note that now the Marine garrison would have a limited water supply and an intact Japanese fleet with landing force approaching. And at least one of the aircraft hangars is in trouble. Now you have another bombing run pending followed by a few thousand Japanese troops ready to land who have air cover and naval support no longer available to the Americans
And Midway is still a harder nut than Tarawa after all that.
They have yet to get a living man ashore
 
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