alternatehistory.com

If the international community weren’t already angered by Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, they definitely were now. Propaganda produced by Baghdad aside, it was really, really hard to justify the Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.

But while Iraq failed to impress members of the international community, there was great admiration for it from numerous people in Muslim (especially Arab) countries. Many saw Saddam as a hero, the man who would restore Arabs to their rightful glory. The same sentiment was not shared in non-Arab Muslim countries, instead they saw Saddam as a Muslim leader who stood against the west (and, in certain circles, they admired him for fighting Shia Iran). When Kuwaiti refugees living around the border fled following the Iraqi invasion to larger cities such as Dammam Iraqi propaganda said that Iraqi troops were told not to target them by direct orders from Saddam (this was false, of course, and not just that, Saddam was planning on attacking refugee camps if the initial invasion went well), but in spite of the fact that this never happened there were people who believed it. Many Kuwaiti refugees died on their way to Dammam, which put Saudi Arabia in a bad light. The lack of sympathy Saudi Arabia received on the outset of war from the Muslim World eventually led to problems for it and its allies both during and after the war.

Following the first couple of days into the war, the Iraqi invasion was halted at Hafar al-Batin. By then, the initial shock of the invasion experienced in Saudi Arabia had eroded, and now the nation and its military was mostly prepared for war. The Iraqi military, which had been high on its earlier victories at the beginning of the war, was not expecting the Saudi military to reorganize and resist the Iraqi invasion with more force than they had before. Saddam, recognizing the propaganda value of this battle, declared the battle of Hafar al-Batin to be the “mother of all battles”.

The Iraqi military’s technology was outdated when compared to the Saudi military. This was to be expected. Saudi Arabia had been an American ally even after the Cold War, Iraq only received some aid from the US for fighting Iran. Iraqi tank designs, such as the T-55 were outdated. Only the Republican Guard, which made up a small amount of the total Iraqi military, had access to new equipment. Most of the Iraqi military in Hafar al-Batin had been composed not of the Republican Guard (which was responsible for taking most of the Iraqi occupied land) but rather the Iraqi military, which, when compared to the Republican Guard, wasn’t as well trained, well led, and well equipped.

Yet the Saudi military was put in an even worse situation. Most of the troops defending Hafar al-Batin had been ones which already were defeated by Iraq at Khafji and at other border areas. Had it not been for the lack of Republican Guard units in Hafar al-Batin, the battle would not have lasted that long. The Saudis were put on the back foot. When Iraqi reinforcements came, it did not take long for the Saudi positions at Hafar al-Batin to be crushed.

Following the battle of Hafar al-Batin, Saddam saw it fit to declare the establishment of the “Socialist Arab Republic”. At first, Saddam wanted to annex all of Saudi Arabia and didn’t want to declare a puppet government, but his advisers convinced him of the absurdity of this move. The person leading the “Socialist Arab Republic” was Ali Hassan al-Majid, who at one point was briefly the minister of interior of Iraq. His cabinet consisted of other Iraqi officials along with some no-names from Saudi Arabia in order to give the puppet government some legitimacy.

The capture of Hafar al-Batin and the subsequent establishment of the Socialist Arab Republic had convinced the Saudi government that they could not take on Saddam alone. Already people were predicting that Iraq could reach Riyadh by spring. Not only that, but they were reports that Yemen was beginning to prepare an invasion of Saudi Arabia themselves, in order to aid Iraq. There were some who wanted to wait until America intervened, but as time went on it seemed less and less of a possibility. The concept of the “American betrayal” began to become prevalent among the Saudi government and Kuwaiti resistance. Soon, not only was America not going to intervene, but many Saudis did not want them to, anyhow.

A coalition would have to be built in the Middle East itself. Jordan and the UAE, two countries which had been mobilizing its troops following the Iraqi invasion were willing to join. Both Jordan and the UAE were friendly towards Saudi Arabia and had economic and military ties, and they saw a fall of Saudi Arabia to ultimately be harmful to themselves. However, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE all knew that even with the latter two joining they could only delay the inevitable. Their militaries were small, and in around the same shape as the Saudi military, which, as shown previously, had not been doing well against Iraq. The same was for Qatar, Egypt, and Oman, three other Arab nations which were willing to help Saudi Arabia but did not have a quality, or large, military. Even if they could stop Iraq, it would take a long time to cause a situation which would force it to the negotiating table.

So Saudi Arabia appealed to two other countries which had a decent military and could potentially ally with Saudi Arabia against Iraq - Pakistan and Syria.

Pakistan was traditionally an ally of Saudi Arabia and much of its economy was dependent on it. Yet there was unease among the more Saudi sympathetic members of its civilian government and military to support Pakistan intervening because there was a sizeable group of pro-Saddam members of the Pakistani military and civilian government. Not only that, but Saddam was seen as a hero in certain political corners in Pakistan. He had stood up to Iran, the US and the rest of the west. He was the “true leader of Muslims,'' according to them (this was in spite of the fact that in the 1970s Saddam had funded groups in Iranian Baluchistan which also wanted an independent Pakistani Baluchistan). This led to Pakistan not responding to any Saudi overtures for an alliance.

Syria’s case was odd. Like Iraq, it was a Baathist government with little positive feelings for the Saudi state. But this was not to say that there was any Baathist camaraderie between Syria and Iraq. Hafez al-Assad hated Saddam for numerous reasons. For one, under Saddam, Iraq funded Muslim Brotherhood militants against Assad in the 1980s. Syria aligned itself with Iraq’s enemy, Iran. There was very little love for Saddam from Assad. As such, Assad was open to the possibility of Syria aligning itself with Saudi Arabia against Saddam. There was a risk, though, as much of Syria’s population was Sunni Muslim and many supported Saddam against the Saudis. Still, the Syrian government had quashed rebellion before, why wouldn’t they do it again, if rebellion were to occur? There was also economic benefits to Syria joining. Saudi Arabia had promised to invest in Syria if they were to join the anti-Iraq coalition. Assad saw this as a way to get back at Saddam for funding the Muslim Brotherhood against him, and saw an alliance with the Gulf states as beneficial for Syria in the long run.

Signs of an anti-Saddam coalition being in the works became known to Iraq. While Iraq could probably take on Syria and Jordan, along with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar, it could not take all of them at once. Saddam also knew that there was no way to prevent such a coalition from emerging unless he withdraws from Saudi Arabia, which, at this point, was out of the question. The only option left was to weaken Saudi Arabia enough in a short amount to the point where it decides that it isn’t worth fighting Iraq even with a coalition.

On the night of February 21st, 1991, a series of air strikes took place along the northeast of Saudi Arabia, in which much of its oil is located. Those air strikes were committed by the Iraqi Air Force, and were done with the thinking that by doing so they would weaken Saudi Arabia and force it to the negotiating table. The air strikes were limited, with over 100,000 barrels of oil being spilt. On the same night the Yemeni Air Force also did their own series of airstrikes, which were done on military bases in Najran. Those airstrikes didn’t do much damage, but that wasn’t the point of them. The point was that now Saudi Arabia was facing a war on two fronts, a war which they could not possibly hope to win by themselves.

The airstrikes which were committed by both Iraq and Yemen was the impetus for the building of the anti-Iraq coalition. On February 23rd, the UAE, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman declares war on Iraq and Yemen. A day later, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan (which had an economy dependent on Saudi Arabia, and as such saw the Iraqi airstrikes as enough of a reason to declare war on them when they wouldn’t previously) also declared war on them.

In the west, anger with Iraq had reached a breaking point. War with Iraq, once seen as a minority position, had become mainstream. General military action against Iraq received even more support as it punished Iraq without forcing American soldiers to actually invade and fight a long war.

Whether or not military action against Iraq was popular in the US or not, Iraq’s aggression had come to the point were the Dukakis administration could not shrug it off any longer. If Iraq were to take Saudi Arabia’s oil fields, the economic situation would be akin to that, or perhaps even worse, than in the 1970s. Not only that, but there would be little time for the economic situation to be fixed by the 1992 election, which was already seen as an election in which Dukakis could lose.

On March 1st, 1991, at around 1 AM, Task Force Normandy entered Iraqi airspace...