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Internal Affairs during the War of 1877
Sultan Abdülhamid II
The Internal Situation of the Ottoman Empire during the War of 1877
Internally the Ottoman Empire had been so weak at the beginning of the war, the impression amongst some observers was that one last push from the Russians “would bring the crumbling edifice down”. This was not merely wishful thinking, as bankruptcy, rebellion and political infighting had characterised the mid-1870s in the empire, contributing to a sense of the empire’s weakness. Although it was the rebellions in Herzegovina and Bulgaria that would receive the most attention from European powers, the revolts in Anatolia which had included many Muslim participants, seemed to be more threatening for an Empire which relied almost entirely on its Muslim population for its military manpower. However far from providing the final blow to the Empire’s internal situation, the “War of ‘93” would become something of a rallying point for the Empire’s Muslim population as they rallied to its defence despite the reversals in the first part of the war, and enthusiastically celebrated its victories in the latter part [1]. The war would prove to be an anomalous example of a short war whose political dividends perhaps outweighed her costs, at least from an Ottoman perspective.
Patriotism and discipline as understood in the European sense were desperately lacking at the onset of war. Although the Bashibazouks were perhaps the most infamous sections of the Ottoman Army for their lack of discipline, this is not to say that the strict hierarchical order was present amongst the rest of the army. European observers spoke incredulously that “The Turkish private, when off duty, does not salute officers on the street… the social standing of the Turkish officer is below that of the French, German and Austrian”. The army lacked the kind of social prestige and respect that its contemporaries elsewhere in Europe had. The Muslim ethnic groups of the empire were perceived as apathetic and indeed, inferior racially to the Christians, who were presumed to be destined to take control of the European part of the empire sooner or later. One contemporary history argued “The Turks have not only been unsuccessful in the past, but as an inferior race they will be constitutionally unfit in future to raise the countries over which they rule to a level with the Aryan nations of Europe and America” [2]. For all the efforts of the Turkish state to reform itself during the prior decades, Europe still considered it to be vulnerable internationally and frail internally.
However when the Russians invaded Romania and crossed the Danube, the Ottoman state did not collapse in the way that many had anticipated. In an elaborate ceremony in which the standard of the prophet, amongst other holy relics, was taken out of storage in the Topkapi Palace, the Sultan Abdülhamid declared himself a Ghazi, or holy warrior for Islam, and the war against Russia a Jihad. Imams at Friday prayers whipped up a specifically Islamic fervour, preaching about the just cause of the Ottoman army which they framed as struggling for Islam itself, and imploring listeners to volunteer to fight. Some went as far as to suggest that defeat could mean the destruction of the Islamic world. With the stakes presented in such apocalyptic terms, it is no wonder that public enthusiasm for the war among the Muslim section of the Ottoman population grew throughout the war, though it did lead to a limited backlash against the Christian population within the Empire, which was increasingly associated with Russia. European consuls in Eastern Anatolia reported of some isolated killings of groups of Armenians, relatively insignificant in number but which troubled the Armenian community greatly.
Observers were taken somewhat by surprise at the zeal of the Muslim population, who seemed whipped up in a patriotic fury that had not been seen in previous wars. A correspondent for The Times reported “the fanatic Mohammedan spirit, seemingly long absent within the Turk, seems to have been awakened. Amongst the populace of Istanbul the Muslims seem particularly animated in their hatred of the Russians”. Stories of the unexpected Turkish resistance reached Western Europe, and the Sultan and his government managed to secure a war loan from Britain and France despite the default of 1875, a testament to the strategic importance afforded to the Ottoman Empire by the British in particular, who were still highly suspicious of Russian intentions. The revulsion of the British public following the Bulgarian Massacres was still too powerful a force to allow Disraeli to openly intervene on the part of the Ottomans, yet his association of a strong Ottoman Empire with the security of the Mediterranean and British India still led him toward aiding the Ottomans wherever possible.
The financial situation was also alleviated somewhat through the raising of private contributions from the empire’s civilian population to finance some of the war costs, as well as extraordinary taxes raised by Parliament, alongside a war loan raised in the money markets of London and Paris. Although accused of treachery by some, the largely Christian bankers of Galata in Istanbul also loaned money to the Ottoman government [3]. The appeals of the Sultan to Islamic sentiment in the empire as well as the Ulema generated a genuinely enthusiastic response, something that Abdülhamid would not soon forget. As the Russian forces were halted at Tarnovo, previous criticisms of both the Sultan and the cabinet became far more muted, as there seemed to be less to criticise regarding the conduct of the war. The mumblings in Parliament that the government was not prosecuting the war competently gradually ebbed away through the late summer months of 1877. The increasing popularity of the war amongst the Muslim population of the Empire raised the aura of the Sultan in particular, who was seen as a ruler willing to stand up to non-Islamic powers, although the Sultan had been against the idea of war originally.
Indeed within the cabinet the still-contentious debate surrounding the nature of the Constitution, as well as the direction of the empire as a whole was, for a time, subdued as both the conservatives and Young Ottomans focused first and foremost on the war effort. This had resulted in the formation of something resembling a unified front, as they had done during the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz. Although this united front would collapse soon after the end of the war, it did prevent conflict within the Ottoman government as it fought for its existence as a power. Later advocates for consensus within Ottoman politics would appeal to the “Spirit of ‘93”, which carried connotations of politicians shelving their rivalries in order to work for the common good. Both Hüseyin Avni Paşa and Midhat Paşa, who served as Minister of War and Grand Vizier respectively during the war, won somewhat undeserved reputations as pragmatic compromisers for their cooperation.
What the Ottoman campaigns had failed to do was to awe the Christians of the empire into ending insurrections as had been hoped. Thousands of Bulgarian volunteers had joined the Russian army in its initial offensives, and the population had been keen to welcome the Russians as liberators in the wake of the Bulgarian Massacres. Similarly there were insurrections on the part of Greeks and Serbs, whose countries remained neutral during the war but whose governments still coveted great amounts of Ottoman territory. Greek partisans operated in Arta and Thessaly, while the Serbs in Bosnia rose up in the hope of forcing their governments to support Russia’s floundering offensive, something the twice-defeated Serbian government refused to do. While Ottoman retaliation was somewhat softer than it had been during the height of the Bulgarian Massacres, the Christian populations remained disdainful of Ottoman rule and remained so even as it was apparent that the Russians would not be able to overcome Ottoman resistance. Armed resistance died down for the most part once an armistice had been signed, but a great deal of resentment and a continued yearning for independence meant that the war had not resolved the situation which had caused it. The war would not solve the question posed by Nationalist Revolutionaries in the Balkans.
By the end of the war, the defensive victory had made the reputations both of the Sultan as well as several of his ministers and generals. The value of Islam as a tool to rally the empire’s population had been demonstrated, and the prestige of the army in particular had been greatly advanced by its victories in the war. It had proved itself capable of defending the empire’s borders against a major threat without much in the way foreign support, with the exception of the war loan negotiated with France and Britain, which was something that it had not properly accomplished since the 18th century. Rather than responding with apathy and inertia, much of the Muslim population of the empire responded with enthusiasm to the war, and with the conclusion of the war regarded what was in actual fact an indecisive stalemate as a great victory. Though the population had been encouraged by the relatively successful outcome of the war, the internal conflicts which had led to it were still largely unresolved.
[1] – The war took place in the year 1293 of the Islamic calendar, hence the name.
[2] – This passage is not an invention of myself. It’s worth keeping in mind that this was before the rise of Japan as a great power, and as such racist theories like this had seemingly little to discredit them.
[3] – It’s worthwhile noting that even after the 1875 default in OTL, the Ottomans were able to draw on the bankers of Galata for additional loans, though these often came at higher interest rates than those raised in London and Paris.
* * * * * *
Author's Notes - The internal situation of the Ottoman Empire in the war was definitely a mixed one, as Bulgarian and (to a lesser extent) Armenian Christians welcomed the Russian invaders, but contemporary accounts attest to a strong patriotism at least amongst the Muslim section of the population in the Empire. The war has produced a temporary sense of unity, though as the war ends and the external enemy recedes, the internal rivalries between various politicians as well as the Sultan's attempts to assert himself will likely lead to bickering at the very least.
Sultan Abdülhamid II
The Internal Situation of the Ottoman Empire during the War of 1877
Internally the Ottoman Empire had been so weak at the beginning of the war, the impression amongst some observers was that one last push from the Russians “would bring the crumbling edifice down”. This was not merely wishful thinking, as bankruptcy, rebellion and political infighting had characterised the mid-1870s in the empire, contributing to a sense of the empire’s weakness. Although it was the rebellions in Herzegovina and Bulgaria that would receive the most attention from European powers, the revolts in Anatolia which had included many Muslim participants, seemed to be more threatening for an Empire which relied almost entirely on its Muslim population for its military manpower. However far from providing the final blow to the Empire’s internal situation, the “War of ‘93” would become something of a rallying point for the Empire’s Muslim population as they rallied to its defence despite the reversals in the first part of the war, and enthusiastically celebrated its victories in the latter part [1]. The war would prove to be an anomalous example of a short war whose political dividends perhaps outweighed her costs, at least from an Ottoman perspective.
Patriotism and discipline as understood in the European sense were desperately lacking at the onset of war. Although the Bashibazouks were perhaps the most infamous sections of the Ottoman Army for their lack of discipline, this is not to say that the strict hierarchical order was present amongst the rest of the army. European observers spoke incredulously that “The Turkish private, when off duty, does not salute officers on the street… the social standing of the Turkish officer is below that of the French, German and Austrian”. The army lacked the kind of social prestige and respect that its contemporaries elsewhere in Europe had. The Muslim ethnic groups of the empire were perceived as apathetic and indeed, inferior racially to the Christians, who were presumed to be destined to take control of the European part of the empire sooner or later. One contemporary history argued “The Turks have not only been unsuccessful in the past, but as an inferior race they will be constitutionally unfit in future to raise the countries over which they rule to a level with the Aryan nations of Europe and America” [2]. For all the efforts of the Turkish state to reform itself during the prior decades, Europe still considered it to be vulnerable internationally and frail internally.
However when the Russians invaded Romania and crossed the Danube, the Ottoman state did not collapse in the way that many had anticipated. In an elaborate ceremony in which the standard of the prophet, amongst other holy relics, was taken out of storage in the Topkapi Palace, the Sultan Abdülhamid declared himself a Ghazi, or holy warrior for Islam, and the war against Russia a Jihad. Imams at Friday prayers whipped up a specifically Islamic fervour, preaching about the just cause of the Ottoman army which they framed as struggling for Islam itself, and imploring listeners to volunteer to fight. Some went as far as to suggest that defeat could mean the destruction of the Islamic world. With the stakes presented in such apocalyptic terms, it is no wonder that public enthusiasm for the war among the Muslim section of the Ottoman population grew throughout the war, though it did lead to a limited backlash against the Christian population within the Empire, which was increasingly associated with Russia. European consuls in Eastern Anatolia reported of some isolated killings of groups of Armenians, relatively insignificant in number but which troubled the Armenian community greatly.
Observers were taken somewhat by surprise at the zeal of the Muslim population, who seemed whipped up in a patriotic fury that had not been seen in previous wars. A correspondent for The Times reported “the fanatic Mohammedan spirit, seemingly long absent within the Turk, seems to have been awakened. Amongst the populace of Istanbul the Muslims seem particularly animated in their hatred of the Russians”. Stories of the unexpected Turkish resistance reached Western Europe, and the Sultan and his government managed to secure a war loan from Britain and France despite the default of 1875, a testament to the strategic importance afforded to the Ottoman Empire by the British in particular, who were still highly suspicious of Russian intentions. The revulsion of the British public following the Bulgarian Massacres was still too powerful a force to allow Disraeli to openly intervene on the part of the Ottomans, yet his association of a strong Ottoman Empire with the security of the Mediterranean and British India still led him toward aiding the Ottomans wherever possible.
The financial situation was also alleviated somewhat through the raising of private contributions from the empire’s civilian population to finance some of the war costs, as well as extraordinary taxes raised by Parliament, alongside a war loan raised in the money markets of London and Paris. Although accused of treachery by some, the largely Christian bankers of Galata in Istanbul also loaned money to the Ottoman government [3]. The appeals of the Sultan to Islamic sentiment in the empire as well as the Ulema generated a genuinely enthusiastic response, something that Abdülhamid would not soon forget. As the Russian forces were halted at Tarnovo, previous criticisms of both the Sultan and the cabinet became far more muted, as there seemed to be less to criticise regarding the conduct of the war. The mumblings in Parliament that the government was not prosecuting the war competently gradually ebbed away through the late summer months of 1877. The increasing popularity of the war amongst the Muslim population of the Empire raised the aura of the Sultan in particular, who was seen as a ruler willing to stand up to non-Islamic powers, although the Sultan had been against the idea of war originally.
Indeed within the cabinet the still-contentious debate surrounding the nature of the Constitution, as well as the direction of the empire as a whole was, for a time, subdued as both the conservatives and Young Ottomans focused first and foremost on the war effort. This had resulted in the formation of something resembling a unified front, as they had done during the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz. Although this united front would collapse soon after the end of the war, it did prevent conflict within the Ottoman government as it fought for its existence as a power. Later advocates for consensus within Ottoman politics would appeal to the “Spirit of ‘93”, which carried connotations of politicians shelving their rivalries in order to work for the common good. Both Hüseyin Avni Paşa and Midhat Paşa, who served as Minister of War and Grand Vizier respectively during the war, won somewhat undeserved reputations as pragmatic compromisers for their cooperation.
What the Ottoman campaigns had failed to do was to awe the Christians of the empire into ending insurrections as had been hoped. Thousands of Bulgarian volunteers had joined the Russian army in its initial offensives, and the population had been keen to welcome the Russians as liberators in the wake of the Bulgarian Massacres. Similarly there were insurrections on the part of Greeks and Serbs, whose countries remained neutral during the war but whose governments still coveted great amounts of Ottoman territory. Greek partisans operated in Arta and Thessaly, while the Serbs in Bosnia rose up in the hope of forcing their governments to support Russia’s floundering offensive, something the twice-defeated Serbian government refused to do. While Ottoman retaliation was somewhat softer than it had been during the height of the Bulgarian Massacres, the Christian populations remained disdainful of Ottoman rule and remained so even as it was apparent that the Russians would not be able to overcome Ottoman resistance. Armed resistance died down for the most part once an armistice had been signed, but a great deal of resentment and a continued yearning for independence meant that the war had not resolved the situation which had caused it. The war would not solve the question posed by Nationalist Revolutionaries in the Balkans.
By the end of the war, the defensive victory had made the reputations both of the Sultan as well as several of his ministers and generals. The value of Islam as a tool to rally the empire’s population had been demonstrated, and the prestige of the army in particular had been greatly advanced by its victories in the war. It had proved itself capable of defending the empire’s borders against a major threat without much in the way foreign support, with the exception of the war loan negotiated with France and Britain, which was something that it had not properly accomplished since the 18th century. Rather than responding with apathy and inertia, much of the Muslim population of the empire responded with enthusiasm to the war, and with the conclusion of the war regarded what was in actual fact an indecisive stalemate as a great victory. Though the population had been encouraged by the relatively successful outcome of the war, the internal conflicts which had led to it were still largely unresolved.
[1] – The war took place in the year 1293 of the Islamic calendar, hence the name.
[2] – This passage is not an invention of myself. It’s worth keeping in mind that this was before the rise of Japan as a great power, and as such racist theories like this had seemingly little to discredit them.
[3] – It’s worthwhile noting that even after the 1875 default in OTL, the Ottomans were able to draw on the bankers of Galata for additional loans, though these often came at higher interest rates than those raised in London and Paris.
* * * * * *
Author's Notes - The internal situation of the Ottoman Empire in the war was definitely a mixed one, as Bulgarian and (to a lesser extent) Armenian Christians welcomed the Russian invaders, but contemporary accounts attest to a strong patriotism at least amongst the Muslim section of the population in the Empire. The war has produced a temporary sense of unity, though as the war ends and the external enemy recedes, the internal rivalries between various politicians as well as the Sultan's attempts to assert himself will likely lead to bickering at the very least.
- Nassirisimo
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