Was a North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War inevitable?

[Lascaris]

So. Diem purged large numbers of people who were known to be amenable to colonial authority?
And then was surprised that those who replaced them sympathised with anti-colonialist crusaders of North Vietnam rather than with American stooge, allowing South Vietnam to be infiltrated by Vietcong.
Well.

Bao Dai's rule was ineffective because Americans wanted him gone more than they wanted to defeat Vietcong.
Diem got to power only because Americans were supporting him, and Vietnam needed American aid.
Americans wanted to dismantle colonial empires. They wanted them gone, even if it meant turning power over to people who hated America, as was often the case. They would overthrow moderates who colonial power left behind as they recognised independence of their former colonies. Those who replaced them ended up far more cruel, corrupt, and crazy than "colonial collaborators". Then those new leaders collaborated with the Soviets, or in rare cases, with Americans.

They Diem him in power. They don't get the credit for removing him after he's done all the damage.

If I may so suggest why not move your POD back in 1945? Say the aircraft carrying Duy Tan back to Vietnam does not crash he returns to Vietnam on schedule and retrieves his throne. The 1st Indochina war still happens ending up in a treaty similar to OTL and the north still supports insurrection in the south, while in the south Duy Tan and Diem have to settle in a rather uneasy relationship till Diem is removed from power at about the time of OTL without an outright coup. This way you have in the South an emperor with impeccable nationalist credentials and the legitimacy of the dynasty internally and excellent credentials with the west thanks to his ww2 record. Plus you did not have Diem alienating the majority Buddhist population for nearly a decade.

Oh for some more fun you could even posit the French providing some limited involvement in the second war, with their influence in Vietnam not destroyed by force after 1954...

 

[lionhead]

A more stable South Vietnam is indeed the key. If the South Vietnamese can control their own country and fight by themselves all they need is American material support. With that they can prevent the VC from growing large enough and thus prevent an increase of NVA troops in the South, leaving the North weaker because they aren't geting results and bombing would actually have effect on the population. They wont do the hamlet thing so the South population stays behind their government and actually help fight the infiltrations so search-and-destroy tactics won't be needed. That way the US can slowely increase its support and harass the borders and North vietnamese supply(and tackle any attempt to cross borders with Laos and Cambodia). China and the USSR won't backoff that easy though, unless they keep demanding sending troops which the Vietnamese will outright refuse always and they might decrease their support. If by that time Nixon is president(or Johnson still i suppose) You might see some real on-the-ground action in North Vietnam that might topple the Ho Chi Minh regime or force them into peace talks so the CIA and Vietnamese intelligence can weed out the communists.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

On paper, the Soviets had enough on hand for Icebreaker; we both know that's a false myth. In reality, the oil embargo had largely left the South Vietnamese without mechanized support and, perhaps more critically, their own air power. Adding to this was the decline of American aid, particularly in terms of spare parts which further hindered their Air Force as well.

Except the ARVN did have everything on paper to do much better then they actually did, particularly given that the force they were fighting was much smaller by every measurement. At the time of the 1975 offensive, South Vietnamese ammunition, fuel, and spare part stocks were sufficient for approximately 55 to 60 days at the accelerated rate of operation required to beat off the VPA offensive. The main problem was not a lack of fuel or ammunition or spare parts, but a lack of accounting procedures to determine where everything was and where they needed to be. Suffice to say, stock levels were not a limiting factor on the capability of South Vietnamese air and mechanized forces, but rather their ability to move the stocks to the frontline. This resulted in repeated scenes like the Communists overrunning ARVN artillery units with only three rounds for their 155mm guns and then find that a ways behind the guns was an ammunition depot stuffed with ten thousand unused shells. As it was, the South Vietnamese did employ 500 more artillery pieces, 4 times the number of armored vehicles and 259 times the number of aircraft the VPA did.

It should similarly be pointed out that appealing to Icebreaker is flawed because it ignores that the Soviets in 1941, like the ARVN, did have the resources on paper to do much better at the task it was actually required to do (that is, major defensive operations) then actually proved to be the case. That it did not do as well as it could have proved to be because of critical failures in personnel and leadership factors... just like the ARVN in 1975.

1972-1975 was actually the peak of Chinese aid to North Vietnam, so I'm not sure where you got these numbers. 1973 was actually the peak year of supply and it was only because of said supply from 1973-1975 that they were even able to attack in '75; the PRC had to aid them in rebuilding their offensive capabilities. If Nixon were still in and used American air power to stop the NVA, the decline in relations with China means there won't be that aid for another try:

The figures in the wiki article pretty clearly shows that the Chinese supplied record numbers of supplies like ammunition in 1968 that it never again matched in any other year of the war, therefore supporting the assertion that 1968 was the peak year. In fact, the linked to article explicitly calls 1968 the peak year on page 31. The Wikipedia article and it’s cited source also discuss significant declines in relationship which they identify starting as early as 1966.

Furthermore, the scale of assistance needs to be contextualized with the scale of demands. Your source says the Chinese supplied some 4.5 million artillery shells in 1973-75. That sounds like a lot, but between 1 March of 1974 and 27 March of 1975, when it was mostly attempting to conserve ammunition, the ARVN expended 4,578,744 rounds of artillery ammunition. [Ira Hunt, "Losing Vietnam,"] This was under a conservation mindset, where the ARVN cut ammunition expenditures by as much as 50% or more so it could maximize the number of stocks available in the event of a major VPA offensive. So in one year, while in a period of conservation during a relatively quiet period of operations, the ARVN still expended roughly the same amount of artillery ammunition than the VPA received from the Chinese in three. If the VPA expended its artillery ammunition at anything approaching the rate the ARVN did, it's certainly not hard to see how Chinese supplies by themselves might have been inadequate to the task.

Also worth considering is that the severance/decline of Chinese supply did not prevent the Vietnamese from embarking on offensive operations in Cambodia of similar scale to the 1975 one in 1978 and then almost immediately afterwards mounted a successful defensive operation against a massive Chinese invasion, so that’s pretty conclusive proof that the VPA could still mount offensive operations after 1975 despite the vastly worsened relations with China.

 

[History Learner]

Except the ARVN did have everything on paper to do much better then they actually did, particularly given that the force they were fighting was much smaller by every measurement. At the time of the 1975 offensive, South Vietnamese ammunition, fuel, and spare part stocks were sufficient for approximately 55 to 60 days at the accelerated rate of operation required to beat off the VPA offensive. The main problem was not a lack of fuel or ammunition or spare parts, but a lack of accounting procedures to determine where everything was and where they needed to be. Suffice to say, stock levels were not a limiting factor on the capability of South Vietnamese air and mechanized forces, but rather their ability to move the stocks to the frontline. This resulted in repeated scenes like the Communists overrunning ARVN artillery units with only three rounds for their 155mm guns and then find that a ways behind the guns was an ammunition depot stuffed with ten thousand unused shells. As it was, the South Vietnamese did employ 500 more artillery pieces, 4 times the number of armored vehicles and 259 times the number of aircraft the VPA did.

It should similarly be pointed out that appealing to Icebreaker is flawed because it ignores that the Soviets in 1941, like the ARVN, did have the resources on paper to do much better at the task it was actually required to do (that is, major defensive operations) then actually proved to be the case. That it did not do as well as it could have proved to be because of critical failures in personnel and leadership factors... just like the ARVN in 1975.

South Vietnamese, Americans and even the North Vietnamese all agree it was aid cuts, not anything inherent to the system:

The figures in the wiki article pretty clearly shows that the Chinese supplied record numbers of supplies like ammunition in 1968 that it never again matched in any other year of the war, therefore supporting the assertion that 1968 was the peak year. In fact, the linked to article explicitly calls 1968 the peak year on page 31. The Wikipedia article and it’s cited source also discuss significant declines in relationship which they identify starting as early as 1966.

1968 was indeed the year of the most ammunition but 1973 saw more weapons, artillery, artillery shells, radio transmitters, telephones, tanks, planes, and automobiles sent than in 1968 or basically any year; in other words, 1973 was the peak in essentially all categories. 1968 did see four divisions of AA troops from the PLA in Vietnam and 1968-1972 was a trough in supply before picking back up again.

Furthermore, the scale of assistance needs to be contextualized with the scale of demands. Your source says the Chinese supplied some 4.5 million artillery shells in 1973-75. That sounds like a lot, but between 1 March of 1974 and 27 March of 1975, when it was mostly attempting to conserve ammunition, the ARVN expended 4,578,744 rounds of artillery ammunition. [Ira Hunt, "Losing Vietnam,"] This was under a conservation mindset, where the ARVN cut ammunition expenditures by as much as 50% or more so it could maximize the number of stocks available in the event of a major VPA offensive. So in one year, while in a period of conservation during a relatively quiet period of operations, the ARVN still expended roughly the same amount of artillery ammunition than the VPA received from the Chinese in three. If the VPA expended its artillery ammunition at anything approaching the rate the ARVN did, it's certainly not hard to see how Chinese supplies by themselves might have been inadequate to the task.

This is a misleading comparison, because attempting to compare value by what other armies have is a nonstarter for understanding how important China was as a source to the VPA. Cite what the VPA received in that time frame from other sources, such as the USSR or domestic production, as well what existing stocks were.

Also worth considering is that the severance/decline of Chinese supply did not prevent the Vietnamese from embarking on offensive operations in Cambodia of similar scale to the 1975 one in 1978 and then almost immediately afterwards mounted a successful defensive operation against a massive Chinese invasion, so that’s pretty conclusive proof that the VPA could still mount offensive operations after 1975 despite the vastly worsened relations with China.

It's not because it took four years for said operation to finally be carried, and ignores that Cambodia lacked anything close to what the ARVN was; same goes for the border battles between China and Vietnam concurrent to the Cambodian invasion.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

South Vietnamese, Americans and even the North Vietnamese all agree it was aid cuts, not anything inherent to the system:

It says that Davidson and Veith claim the problem was supply stocks but does not state the South Vietnamese, Americans, or North Vietnamese governments all agree it was the cuts. Additionally, their non-anecdotal analysis is entirely based on the conditions among "the teeth" that, as I already noted, can just as well be attributed to problems in organization and distribution among "the tail" as it could to any lack of "tail" to begin with. On the other hand, the VPA's official history notes how unexpectedly vital captured ARVN supplies were to the conduct of the offensive, with the 17,000 rounds of artillery ammunition captured in the relatively small Central Highlands depots equaling the amount of ammunition the PAVN had originally planned to expend in the entire 1975 campaign! The subsequent fall of Hue, which saw another 100 tons of ammo captured (about another 10,500 rounds in 105mm ammunition). Your cited source doesn't even exactly repudiate the idea that the ARVN overall fought poorly in 1975, merely noting it fought well in the campaigns of 1972 (which is true, but it also tellingly ignores why that was and what was actually different between the three years). Now, if one wants to actually examine the effects the system of leadership had on the ARVN as opposed to the severance of American aid, then one has to look no further then the contrast between the 1975 performance of the 1st ARVN division and the 18th.

The 1st Division had a reputation of being the best in the ARVN and so was a choice posting for the sons of the rich and powerful. By 1975, it’s formerly skilled officers had either died in earlier operations or been sidelined by political factors and replaced largely with pampered wannabe-generals. It was on the defensive perimeter around Hue when the Communists attacked. Though facing only a regiment, the division commander panicked after only 48 hours of fighting and surrendered his entire division, opening a huge gap in the ARVN lines, leading to the surrender of two other divisions and the rapid collapse of the entire defense of Hue. The Communists were so impressed with the readiness of the division to surrender that after only a brief 1 week "re-education" they put the 1st Division back to work moving supplies for their advancing Corps.

By contrast, the 18th Division had a reputation as the absolute worst in the ARVN. It had formerly been the 10th, but was renamed as "Number 10" was Vietnamese slang for "the worst." The division had recently been assigned to the command of General Le Minh Dao. Dao was one of the best commanders in the ARVN, so good that the government identified him as a potential threat and promptly shuffled him off to the sort of dead end career post the 18th was supposed to be in response. Dao whipped the 18th into shape, replacing the incompetent subordinate officers, retraining the division and rebuilding morale. The 18th was well to the rear and took no part in the early battles around the Central Highlands, Hue and Da Nang... all disasters that saw the bulk of Vietnam's million-man army evaporate. By the time the Communists were advancing on Xuan Loc where the 18th had drawn up its lines there was little left to block the road to Saigon.

To date in the campaign other ARVN units had regularly folded in hours or days to smaller VPA forces, surprising even the Communists who had expected a stiffer fight. At Xuan Loc the 5,000 men of the 18th faced an entire Corps of over 40,000. The Communists attacked, expecting an easy victory but were repulsed. They brought up more troops and attacked again, penetrating into the town before a series of ferocious counter-attacks again drove them out. They then pounded the town with heavy artillery and tried again in a masssive assault of tanks and infantry. After house to house and street by street fighting in which the infantry of the 18th knocked out dozens of T-54 tanks the VPA was again thrown back. When the 18th had been expected to maybe by a few days, it had now held for over a week.

The ARVN dared to hope that they might actually win, and plans were made to reinforce the 18th with the 1st Airborne Brigade, another of the South's elite formations. A massive helicopter drop was planned near Xuan Loc. Tragically the Ops Officer for the 1st Airborne sold the entire plan to the Communists, and the 1st Brigade dropped into one of the largest ambushes in history and was quickly annihilated.

With other ARVN units to the west breaking, half its riflemen casualties, almost out of ammunition, cut off and encircled with no chance of any reinforcement, the 18th's position had become hopeless. The VPA drew up six divisions around Xuan Loc and offered the 18th a chance to surrender. General Dao stalled through the day, and then in the night lead his two remaining regiments in a daring breakout to the south, punching through the Communist lines and escaping with his surviving troops to Saigon.

Dao and his men had held for an incredible two weeks in a stand that would be legendary in any army. In the ARVN it was a legend tinged with tragedy: the battle had come too late, and the South Vietnamese government had not been able to do anything productive with the time won... the 11th hour had already passed. Saigon was still undefended and the ARVN proved unable to rally despite the momentary rush of hope. A week after the fall of Xuan Loc, Saigon surrendered and the war was over.

Had the bulk of the ARVN in 1975 enjoyed the sort of leadership by men even men half as good as Dao, the VPA offensive would have been handily crushed regardless of the state of American aid. Instead, leader’s like Dao were shunned and shunted into dead-end career posts where they couldn’t fundamentally alter the strategic situation while fops like those who commanded the 1st were promoted. Given such a command culture and given that the bulk of ARVN enlisted on average did not believe the South Vietnamese government to be a legitimate one, it’s unsurprising that the 1st division was the rule, the 18th the exception, and it’s hard to see why just giving the Vietnamese more stocks would suddenly change that.

This is a misleading comparison, because attempting to compare value by what other armies have is a nonstarter for understanding how important China was a source to the VPA. Cite what the VPA received in that time frames from other sources, such as the USSR or domestic production, as well existing stocks are.

Well, for what the Soviets sent, I can only find the monetary figures at the moment: 1.395 billion (in 1975 dollars) in military aid and another 1.765 billion in economic aid. As for what the Vietnamese existing stocks in 1975 were... well, the VPA’s official history places the total stock of shells army wide in 1975 at 100,000. That is all types, for both towed and vehicle-mounted guns. A little under 1/5th were initially allocated to the 1975 offensive, with the capture of munitions from South Vietnam making up the rest.

It's not because it took four years for said operation to finally be carried, and ignores that Cambodia lacked anything close to what the ARVN was; same goes for the border battles between China and Vietnam concurrent to the Cambodian invasion.

That the operation was carried out in 1979 is not proof that it could not have been carried out earlier: there are any number of reasons why the VPA might not have carried out the operation sooner (not least because their relations with the Khmer Rouge in 1975 were actually pretty good, at least compared to how they would be later, and it took awhile for relations to sour enough to the point that invasion was deemed a prudent measure) and that Cambodia couldn't put up the same sort of resistance the ARVN might have been able too doesn't change that the VPA was rolling in with forces roughly equivalent to what it had rolled in with back in 1975, which suggests the ability to move and sustain such forces in combat.

Also, in looking for the Soviet figure of aid provided, I found that Chinese aid didn't terminate until 1978, which makes the entire discussion something of a moot point.

 

[History Learner]

It says that Davidson and Veith claim the problem was supply stocks but does not state the South Vietnamese, Americans, or North Vietnamese governments all agree it was the cuts.

They cite Van Tien Dung, who was the commander in charge of the 1975 offensive and John E. Murray, who was U.S. defense attache to Vietnam. Murray wrote that the U.S. aid cuts doomed the ARVN to defeat and given Dung's AAR formed the basis for the VPA's official history, that's pretty damning.

Additionally, their non-anecdotal analysis is entirely based on the conditions among "the teeth" that, as I already noted, can just as well be attributed to problems in organization and distribution among "the tail" as it could to any lack of "tail" to begin with. On the other hand, the VPA's official history notes how unexpectedly vital captured ARVN supplies were to the conduct of the offensive, with the 17,000 rounds of artillery ammunition captured in the relatively small Central Highlands depots equaling the amount of ammunition the PAVN had originally planned to expend in the entire 1975 campaign! The subsequent fall of Hue, which saw another 100 tons of ammo captured (about another 10,500 rounds in 105mm ammunition). Your cited source doesn't even exactly repudiate the idea that the ARVN overall fought poorly in 1975, merely noting it fought well in the campaigns of 1972 (which is true, but it also tellingly ignores why that was and what was actually different between the three years). Now, if one wants to actually examine the effects the system of leadership had on the ARVN as opposed to the severance of American aid, then one has to look no further then the contrast between the 1975 performance of the 1st ARVN division and the 18th.

The 1st Division had a reputation of being the best in the ARVN and so was a choice posting for the sons of the rich and powerful. By 1975, it’s formerly skilled officers had either died in earlier operations or been sidelined by political factors and replaced largely with pampered wannabe-generals. It was on the defensive perimeter around Hue when the Communists attacked. Though facing only a regiment, the division commander panicked after only 48 hours of fighting and surrendered his entire division, opening a huge gap in the ARVN lines, leading to the surrender of two other divisions and the rapid collapse of the entire defense of Hue. The Communists were so impressed with the readiness of the division to surrender that after only a brief 1 week "re-education" they put the 1st Division back to work moving supplies for their advancing Corps.

By contrast, the 18th Division had a reputation as the absolute worst in the ARVN. It had formerly been the 10th, but was renamed as "Number 10" was Vietnamese slang for "the worst." The division had recently been assigned to the command of General Le Minh Dao. Dao was one of the best commanders in the ARVN, so good that the government identified him as a potential threat and promptly shuffled him off to the sort of dead end career post the 18th was supposed to be in response. Dao whipped the 18th into shape, replacing the incompetent subordinate officers, retraining the division and rebuilding morale. The 18th was well to the rear and took no part in the early battles around the Central Highlands, Hue and Da Nang... all disasters that saw the bulk of Vietnam's million-man army evaporate. By the time the Communists were advancing on Xuan Loc where the 18th had drawn up its lines there was little left to block the road to Saigon.

To date in the campaign other ARVN units had regularly folded in hours or days to smaller VPA forces, surprising even the Communists who had expected a stiffer fight. At Xuan Loc the 5,000 men of the 18th faced an entire Corps of over 40,000. The Communists attacked, expecting an easy victory but were repulsed. They brought up more troops and attacked again, penetrating into the town before a series of ferocious counter-attacks again drove them out. They then pounded the town with heavy artillery and tried again in a masssive assault of tanks and infantry. After house to house and street by street fighting in which the infantry of the 18th knocked out dozens of T-54 tanks the VPA was again thrown back. When the 18th had been expected to maybe by a few days, it had now held for over a week.

The ARVN dared to hope that they might actually win, and plans were made to reinforce the 18th with the 1st Airborne Brigade, another of the South's elite formations. A massive helicopter drop was planned near Xuan Loc. Tragically the Ops Officer for the 1st Airborne sold the entire plan to the Communists, and the 1st Brigade dropped into one of the largest ambushes in history and was quickly annihilated.

With other ARVN units to the west breaking, half its riflemen casualties, almost out of ammunition, cut off and encircled with no chance of any reinforcement, the 18th's position had become hopeless. The VPA drew up six divisions around Xuan Loc and offered the 18th a chance to surrender. General Dao stalled through the day, and then in the night lead his two remaining regiments in a daring breakout to the south, punching through the Communist lines and escaping with his surviving troops to Saigon.

Dao and his men had held for an incredible two weeks in a stand that would be legendary in any army. In the ARVN it was a legend tinged with tragedy: the battle had come too late, and the South Vietnamese government had not been able to do anything productive with the time won... the 11th hour had already passed. Saigon was still undefended and the ARVN proved unable to rally despite the momentary rush of hope. A week after the fall of Xuan Loc, Saigon surrendered and the war was over.

Had the bulk of the ARVN in 1975 enjoyed the sort of leadership by men even men half as good as Dao, the VPA offensive would have been handily crushed regardless of the state of American aid. Instead, leader’s like Dao were shunned and shunted into dead-end career posts where they couldn’t fundamentally alter the strategic situation while fops like those who commanded the 1st were promoted. Given such a command culture and given that the bulk of ARVN enlisted on average did not believe the South Vietnamese government to be a legitimate one, it’s unsurprising that the 1st division was the rule, the 18th the exception, and it’s hard to see why just giving the Vietnamese more stocks would suddenly change that.

With respect, this is a whole lot of nothing. Relating the tactical story of the 18th Division or the ARVN as a whole does nothing to answer the root causes of the poor performance, which my citations and myself assert was engendered by U.S. aid cuts that left the South Vietnamese seriously lacking in all logistical categories. As the citation in question states that overall stocks were actually rather low (Not a function of a poor logistical network), the VPA commander in charge stated the U.S. aid cuts were decisive and the U.S. defense attache likewise considered it so, my contention is that it was the loss of U.S. support that led to the collapse of the South Vietnamese. Whether or not the VPA captured stocks of artillery shells does nothing to answer this charge, and is at best anecdotal evidence.

Well, for what the Soviets sent, I can only find the monetary figures at the moment: 1.395 billion (in 1975 dollars) in military aid and another 1.765 billion in economic aid. As for what the Vietnamese existing stocks in 1975 were... well, the VPA’s official history places the total stock of shells army wide in 1975 at 100,000. That is all types, for both towed and vehicle-mounted guns. A little under 1/5th were initially allocated to the 1975 offensive, with the capture of munitions from South Vietnam making up the rest.

In 1975 alone, China provided 915,000 artillery shells to North Vietnam. Given this is 925% of the VPA's stocks, that's extremely telling.

That the operation was carried out in 1979 is not proof that it could not have been carried out earlier: there are any number of reasons why the VPA might not have carried out the operation sooner (not least because their relations with the Khmer Rouge in 1975 were actually pretty good, at least compared to how they would be later, and it took awhile for relations to sour enough to the point that invasion was deemed a prudent measure) and that Cambodia couldn't put up the same sort of resistance the ARVN might have been able too doesn't change that the VPA was rolling in with forces roughly equivalent to what it had rolled in with back in 1975, which suggests the ability to move and sustain such forces in combat.

That Cambodia lacked the same military capabilities as the ARVN is very important, as that means very reduced expenditures in munitions.

Also, in looking for the Soviet figure of aid provided, I found that Chinese aid didn't terminate until 1978, which makes the entire discussion something of a moot point.

What kind of aid was provided?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

They cite Van Tien Dung, who was the commander in charge of the 1975 offensive and John E. Murray, who was U.S. defense attache to Vietnam. Murray wrote that the U.S. aid cuts doomed the ARVN to defeat and given Dung's AAR formed the basis for the VPA's official history, that's pretty damning.

They cite a contextualess quote from Dung, not his AAR. That the South Vietnamese and American military establishments should blame to deflect from their own respective (if rather different) failures is also hardly surprising. But the fact remains that the VPA's official history disagrees and there are reasons from the actual history of the battle (as well as greater military history) of why the explanation is unconvincing.

With respect, this is a whole lot of nothing. Relating the tactical story of the 18th Division or the ARVN as a whole does nothing to answer the root causes of the poor performance, which my citations and myself assert was engendered by U.S. aid cuts that left the South Vietnamese seriously lacking in all logistical categories. As the citation in question states that overall stocks were actually rather low (Not a function of a poor logistical network), the VPA commander in charge stated the U.S. aid cuts were decisive and the U.S. defense attache likewise considered it so, my contention is that it was the loss of U.S. support that led to the collapse of the South Vietnamese.

That just shows you don't understand the implications. Were the loss of US aid truly the "root cause" of the ARVN's poor performance, either the 18th division should have performed as poorly as the rest of the ARVN or the rest of the ARVN should have performed as well as the 18th (the latter of which would have meant a radically different outcome to the campaign given how well the 18th did, with a ARVN victory instead of a total collapse). After all, the 18th division should have been affected by the loss of US support just the same as everyone else. Possibly even more so, as it's status as a low-quality division in a lax would have accorded it lower supply priority. Yet the fact remains that the 18th divisions performance was legendary compared to the ignominable collapse of the rest of the ARVN. Neither you or the book can account for this discrepancy, so the book tries to deal with it by ignoring it and you try to deal with it by claiming it as "nothing". The differences in leadership and the greater command culture of the ARVN, on the other hand, explain both the collapse of the greater ARVN and why the 18th managed to be the exception perfectly.

Whether or not the VPA captured stocks of artillery shells does nothing to answer this charge, and is at best anecdotal evidence.

The VPA capture of large stocks of ARVN supplies (on the order of 5 billion dollars total by the end of the campaign) is not proof of large stocks of ARVN supplies? Seriously?

In 1975 alone, China provided 915,000 artillery shells to North Vietnam. Given this is 925% of the VPA's stocks, that's extremely telling.

Well, it does mean that with planned expenditures of 17,000 shells, the Vietnamese would have close to a million shells come 1976, when they planned to launch the final campaign and with the Central Highlands they'd be in a even better strategic position then they began the campaign of 1975.

That Cambodia lacked the same military capabilities as the ARVN is very important, as that means very reduced expenditures in munitions.

Well, the Vietnamese did receive about twice as much aid from the USSR to sustain their campaign in Cambodia and against the Chinese punitive invasion in the first three years of it as they received from the USSR for the entire Vietnam War. So it doesn't sound that expenditures were much reduced...

What kind of aid was provided?

Not stated. The link just says "Chinese aid continued until 1978".

 

[History Learner]

They cite a contextualess quote from Dung, not his AAR. That the South Vietnamese and American military establishments should blame to deflect from their own respective (if rather different) failures is also hardly surprising. But the fact remains that the VPA's official history disagrees and there are reasons from the actual history of the battle (as well as greater military history) of why the explanation is unconvincing.

Dung's quote was on the 1975 campaign and the effect of aid cuts on the South; my comment was that, given this is the man whose AAR presumably formed the basis for the official VPA record, that's telling. As for Murray, he stated this in late 1973, when the South had yet to fall, so partisan blame shifting doesn't fly either. To whit, the VPA's official history, from what you've related, only states that they captured ARVN stocks; this says nothing about the logistical network of said force. Do we take the German capture of American fuel stores during the Bulge as indicative of an ineffective American supply system?

That just shows you don't understand the implications. Were the loss of US aid truly the "root cause" of the ARVN's poor performance, either the 18th division should have performed as poorly as the rest of the ARVN or the rest of the ARVN should have performed as well as the 18th (the latter of which would have meant a radically different outcome to the campaign given how well the 18th did, with a ARVN victory instead of a total collapse). After all, the 18th division should have been affected by the loss of US support just the same as everyone else. Possibly even more so, as it's status as a low-quality division in a lax would have accorded it lower supply priority. Yet the fact remains that the 18th divisions performance was legendary compared to the ignominable collapse of the rest of the ARVN. Neither you or the book can account for this discrepancy, so the book tries to deal with it by ignoring it and you try to deal with it by claiming it as "nothing". The differences in leadership and the greater command culture of the ARVN, on the other hand, explain both the collapse of the greater ARVN and why the 18th managed to be the exception perfectly.

Except it really doesn't; just because the 18th Division, in a single engagement, performed admirably doesn't say anything about the wider state of the ARVN's logistics. Any number of localized factors could explain this.

The VPA capture of large stocks of ARVN supplies (on the order of 5 billion dollars total by the end of the campaign) is not proof of large stocks of ARVN supplies? Seriously?

It's really not, especially not without a breakdown of what that entails; is that $5 Billion worth of solely ammunition and fuel, or does it also include South Vietnam's air force, which was the 5th largest in the world at the time (IIRC)? It's statistical games without a firm explanation of what the metrics are.

Well, it does mean that with planned expenditures of 17,000 shells, the Vietnamese would have close to a million shells come 1976, when they planned to launch the final campaign and with the Central Highlands they'd be in a even better strategic position then they began the campaign of 1975.

Not really, given that in 1974 the Chinese had supplied them with 1,390,000 shells, yet they only had 100,000 by 1975.....

Well, the Vietnamese did receive about twice as much aid from the USSR to sustain their campaign in Cambodia and against the Chinese punitive invasion in the first three years of it as they received from the USSR for the entire Vietnam War. So it doesn't sound that expenditures were much reduced...

If we're including combat with the Chinese, probably not, but my point was with regards to Cambodia specifically.

Not stated. The link just says "Chinese aid continued until 1978".

Therein lies the rub; it could've been very minimal. If we can get a breakdown of what the North produced, the Soviets sent and the Chinese sent, we could have an idea of exactly how important Chinese aid was.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Could the ARVN's implosion of leadership and morale and infiltration by communists have been staved off with more US dough? Is it true that losing 90% of its budget had no impact on the ARVN's supply situation? I'm not sure which argument I find less convincing tbh...

 

[History Learner]

Could the ARVN's implosion of leadership and morale and infiltration by communists have been staved off with more US dough? Is it true that losing 90% of its budget had no impact on the ARVN's supply situation? I'm not sure which argument I find less convincing tbh...

By 1973, U.S. observers considered 70% of the ARVN to be up to American standards, with some ranking the force as a whole only behind the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF in the free world. The past Spring, in 1972, the ARVN had taken 40,000 losses but inflicted 100,000 in return on the PAVN during the latter's Easter Offensive; this left the North exhausted and forced to rebuild for three years until it could finally launch another strategic offensive in 1975. 1973, however, was the start of the Oil embargo and that fall Congress made the first aid cuts. My book citation earlier specifically cites supply shortages as having a bad effect on morale, combined with the loss of assurance that the Americans would provide naval and air support.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Dung's quote was on the 1975 campaign and the effect of aid cuts on the South; my comment was that, given this is the man whose AAR presumably formed the basis for the official VPA record, that's telling. As for Murray, he stated this in late 1973, when the South had yet to fall, so partisan blame shifting doesn't fly either. To whit, the VPA's official history, from what you've related, only states that they captured ARVN stocks; this says nothing about the logistical network of said force. Do we take the German capture of American fuel stores during the Bulge as indicative of an ineffective American supply system?

Again, Dung's quote is contextualess: we don't know when precisely he said it, to whom, and where. Murray could smell where the wind was going in '73, as could pretty much anyone who witnessed the failure of the ARVN to stop the VPA in 1972. And the comparison with the Bulge would only be indicative of an ineffective American supply system only works if the German's captured those stocks while American vehicles at the front were paralyzed for a lack of fuel at the time the Germans were capturing those stocks... yet they weren't.

Except it really doesn't; just because the 18th Division, in a single engagement, performed admirably doesn't say anything about the wider state of the ARVN's logistics. Any number of localized factors could explain this.

The difference in leadership being just such a localized factor.

It's really not, especially not without a breakdown of what that entails; is that $5 Billion worth of solely ammunition and fuel, or does also include South Vietnam's air force, which was the 5th largest in the world at the time (IIRC)? It's statistical games without a form explanation of what the metrics are.

I mean, the fact that what air support the VPA did manage to summon up constituted of captured South Vietnamese aircraft indicates that yeah it also includes South Vietnam's air force... as well as the fuel, munitions, and spare parts to keep them going. But the relevant source does specify 130,000 tons of ammunition among the figure.

Not really, given that in 1974 the Chinese had supplied them with 1,390,000 shells, yet they only had 100,000 by 1975.....

Which just means they expended their stock at that rate and had to cut back. We have what the VPA planned to expend in 1975 (<17,000) prior to them going for broke when they realized the ARVN were weaker then they thought and the Americans weren't going to lift a finger. The 1975 offensive wasn't intended to be as ambitious as it turned out to be, after all. Had the Americans intervened with air power, the VPA wouldn't have done what they did OTL and gone for a blitzkrieg. Instead, they would have gone to ground, let the American air intervention pass, and continue preparing for the real offensive in 1976. With the Central Highlands in their control, the next assault would have taken it.

If we're including combat with the Chinese, probably not, but my point was with regards to Cambodia specifically.

But my original post discussing it did include combat with the Chinese.

Therein lies the rub; it could've been very minimal. If we can get a breakdown of what the North produced, the Soviets sent and the Chinese sent, we could have an idea of exactly how important Chinese aid was.

Then again, even such minimalism could have been a function of the war being over and had it continued, so might the previous levels of aid.

Could the ARVN's implosion of leadership and morale and infiltration by communists have been staved off with more US dough? Is it true that losing 90% of its budget had no impact on the ARVN's supply situation? I'm not sure which argument I find less convincing tbh...

Prolifigate money injected into a corrupt system tends to just result in greater circulation. Indeed, some of the problems the ARVN experienced in 1975 stemmed from a consequence of it being so dependent on American assistance that it didn't know how to fight within it's own means. That said, I didn't say that the loss of American aid had no impact on the ARVN's supply situation. Just that the impact was not severe enough to explain the collapse and the supplies the ARVN did have were more then enough for well motivated and led soldiers to have succeeded with. Hell, in military history terms, there are instances of well motivated and led soldiers succeeding with less then what the ARVN had in '75.

By 1973, U.S. observers considered 70% of the ARVN to be up to American standards, with some ranking the force as a whole only behind the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF in the free world. The past Spring, in 1972, the ARVN had taken 40,000 losses but inflicted 100,000 in return on the PAVN during the latter's Easter Offensive; this left the North exhausted and forced to rebuild for three years until it could finally launch another strategic offensive in 1975.

Which goes to show how the Americans weren't paying attention (or trying to spin the situation in as favorable as light as they could): ARVN high level leadership during the offensive was almost uniformly atrocious and totally incapable of responding to the threat. For example the commander of the 3rd Division failed to place his division on alert despite warnings of impending attack, and then abandoned his unit and flew to Saigon once the attack began. A number of battalion commanders fought tenaciously (and unfortunately for the ARVN's future a great many of these talented junior officers died in the process) but overall the ARVN was unable to effectively respond.

ARVN artillery and armored units were also outmatched by their Communist opponents, with their guns routinely silenced by NVA counterbattery fire, and their armored forces unable to counter NVA tanks. Early in the offensive, an ARVN Armored Brigade was decisively defeated by an NVA Tank Regiment with disastrous effects on local morale.

ARVN infantry units also lacked co-ordination and aggression and the NVA almost always maintained the initiative, moving quickly and striking almost at will. Again, this had a demoralizing effect and relatively small NVA units were often able to rout larger ARVN formations.

The Communists were ultimately - and only - stopped by massive application of American airpower, both on the front and in the Linebacker II raids on North Vietnam itself. However it should be pointed out that even when they stopped their offensive, which took three months of the application of said air power, the NVA did not give up the land they had captured, leaving them with large salient into ARVN defensive areas that severely compromised the South's defensive positions.

The NVA also learned from their defeat and refined their strategy and tactics, in particular they stressed greater flexibility for all commands which helped when they had to improvise a much larger campaign then originally intended in 1975, while the ARVN actually degenerated and degraded.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

By 1973, U.S. observers considered 70% of the ARVN to be up to American standards,

And by 1973 the American military itself was in a pretty deep rut, and was only beginning to restructure itself out of that rut.

with some ranking the force as a whole only behind the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF in the free world.

And there were some pundits who would claim that the Rhodesian Security Forces were the best of the west. Moving on.

The past Spring, in 1972, the ARVN had taken 40,000 losses but inflicted 100,000 in return on the PAVN during the latter's Easter Offensive;

This would mean that the US air campaign didn't kill any PAVN personnel. As in literally 0, as 100,000 is the US' high end estimate for communists killed in the Easter Offensive.

My book citation earlier specifically cites supply shortages as having a bad effect on morale, combined with the loss of assurance that the Americans would provide naval and air support.

I'm not surprised they had an effect. But the ARVN's moral and OpSec issues weren't new. For instance the plan for Lam Son 719 had also been leaked well in advance and said operation ended with ARVN troops clinging to the bottoms of medical Hueys in a desperate race to get out, despite being two years before the aid cuts.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I'm not surprised they had an effect. But the ARVN's moral and OpSec issues weren't new. For instance the plan for Lam Son 719 had also been leaked well in advance, despite being two years before the aid cuts.

1970 and the campaigns in those years in neighboring Laos and Cambodia tended to be the high point of the ARVN's effectiveness during the Vietnamese War. But not only were both of the leading generals responsible for these successes killed during the campaign (in helicopter accidents that I'm of half-a-mind to label "suspicious"), those ops were also done in conjunction with American forces who, though their numbers were declining, were still heavily involved in the operations. So the failings of the rest of the ARVN leadership were masked by the skills of Generals Tri and Thanh, and the continuing presence of large numbers of American ground forces helped stiffen the shaky leadership of the ARVN's less competent junior officers.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

1970 and it's campaigns in those years in neighboring Laos and Cambodia were indeed the high point of the ARVN's effectiveness during the Vietnamese War. But not only were both of the leading generals responsible for these successes killed during the campaign, those ops were also done in conjunction with American forces who, though their numbers were declining, were still heavily involved in the operations. So the failings of the rest of the ARVN leadership were masked by the skills of Generals Tri and Thanh, and the continuing presence of large numbers of American ground forces helped stiffen them.

On what planet was Lam Son 719 anything but a catastrophe for the ARVN?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

On what planet was Lam Son 719 anything but a catastrophe for the ARVN?

I rather misread your post and thought you were talking about the overall ARVN performance in 1970 rather then Lam Son 719 in particular. My bad.

 

[History Learner]

Again, Dung's quote is contextualess: we don't know when precisely he said it, to whom, and where. Murray could smell where the wind was going in '73, as could pretty much anyone who witnessed the failure of the ARVN to stop the VPA in 1972. And the comparison with the Bulge would only be indicative of an ineffective American supply system only works if the German's captured those stocks while American vehicles at the front were paralyzed for a lack of fuel at the time the Germans were capturing those stocks... yet they weren't.

He made the quote in his 1977 book on the 1975 offensive, were he directly laid the blame of the ARVN's decline in combat capabilities directly on the loss of aid:

The difference in leadership being just such a localized factor.

Sure, leadership in that particular instance could've been the deciding factor for the better than average performance of the 18th Division. That does not, however, dispute any of my charges; it's an attempt at a cherry pick, rather.

I mean, the fact that what air support the VPA did manage to summon up constituted of captured South Vietnamese aircraft indicates that yeah it also includes South Vietnam's air force... as well as the fuel, munitions, and spare parts to keep them going. But the relevant source does specify 130,000 tons of ammunition among the figure.

And that's exactly my point; arguing that because they captured $5 Billion worth of equipment means the problem was in the logistics network falls flat when one realizes that it's a statistical illusion. It does nothing to answer the overall point of shortages and rather uses the aircraft, for example, to obfuscate that question.

Which just means they expended their stock at that rate and had to cut back. We have what the VPA planned to expend in 1975 (<17,000) prior to them going for broke when they realized the ARVN were weaker then they thought and the Americans weren't going to lift a finger. The 1975 offensive wasn't intended to be as ambitious as it turned out to be, after all. Had the Americans intervened with air power, the VPA wouldn't have done what they did OTL and gone for a blitzkrieg. Instead, they would have gone to ground, let the American air intervention pass, and continue preparing for the real offensive in 1976. With the Central Highlands in their control, the next assault would have taken it.

If they only had 100,000 on hand, after two million shells shipped in from the Chinese over 1974-1975, that implies a very heavy rate of expenditure and that the loss of support from China would be major in any real environment of contention from the ARVN. This is critical, because if we presume that 1975 plays out like you suggest, by the time they recover from it it'll be 1978 and Chinese aid will have been cut. End game, as I said in my original post.

But my original post discussing it did include combat with the Chinese.

Something else I forgot is that the Chinese effort was a border battle, not extensive strategic, conventional offensives that had come to mark the war from 1972 to 1975 for the PVA.

Which goes to show how the Americans weren't paying attention (or trying to spin the situation in as favorable as light as they could): ARVN high level leadership during the offensive was almost uniformly atrocious and totally incapable of responding to the threat. For example the commander of the 3rd Division failed to place his division on alert despite warnings of impending attack, and then abandoned his unit and flew to Saigon once the attack began. A number of battalion commanders fought tenaciously (and unfortunately for the ARVN's future a great many of these talented junior officers died in the process) but overall the ARVN was unable to effectively respond.

ARVN artillery and armored units were also outmatched by their Communist opponents, with their guns routinely silenced by NVA counterbattery fire, and their armored forces unable to counter NVA tanks. Early in the offensive, an ARVN Armored Brigade was decisively defeated by an NVA Tank Regiment with disastrous effects on local morale.

ARVN infantry units also lacked co-ordination and aggression and the NVA almost always maintained the initiative, moving quickly and striking almost at will. Again, this had a demoralizing effect and relatively small NVA units were often able to rout larger ARVN formations.

The Communists were ultimately - and only - stopped by massive application of American airpower, both on the front and in the Linebacker II raids on North Vietnam itself. However it should be pointed out that even when they stopped their offensive, which took three months of the application of said air power, the NVA did not give up the land they had captured, leaving them with large salient into ARVN defensive areas that severely compromised the South's defensive positions.

The NVA also learned from their defeat and refined their strategy and tactics, in particular they stressed greater flexibility for all commands which helped when they had to improvise a much larger campaign then originally intended in 1975, while the ARVN actually degenerated and degraded.

The ARVN butchered the NVA in 1972, completely destroying their armored element and inflicting 100,000 deaths to 40,000 of their own; NVA commanders literally had manpower shortages after it and their units were so exhausted that it took until 1975 for another major offensive to be attempted. Air power alone doesn't explain this at all, but even then that's not an argument against my position; I'm arguing continued American support, both in logistics and air power, would be decisive in allowing South Vietnam to make it until China turns on the North and from there it's game over.

 

[History Learner]

And by 1973 the American military itself was in a pretty deep rut, and was only beginning to restructure itself out of that rut.

Objective measures, not relative.

And there were some pundits who would claim that the Rhodesian Security Forces were the best of the west. Moving on.

They probably were, given that during Operation Dingo they managed to inflict 1,000 to 1 casualty rates; no, you read that right. No one argues the Red Army or the Roman Legions weren't very effective armies despite them no longer being around either, in response to this line of reasoning.

This would mean that the US air campaign didn't kill any PAVN personnel. As in literally 0, as 100,000 is the US' high end estimate for communists killed in the Easter Offensive.

100,000 is from the PVA itself.

I'm not surprised they had an effect. But the ARVN's moral and OpSec issues weren't new. For instance the plan for Lam Son 719 had also been leaked well in advance and said operation ended with ARVN troops clinging to the bottoms of medical Hueys in a desperate race to get out, despite being two years before the aid cuts.

The ARVN checked an NVA offensive in 1972, but then failed to do so again in 1975. What had changed between then? The loss of American aid, which even, as already cited now, the North recognized as the contributing factor.

Finally, something else I'd like to point out is that literally every argument about corruption, morale, etc in regards to Vietnam kinda falls flat when one brings up South Korea. Literally everything claimed about the ARVN can be lobbed at SK, but the difference between the two was that the U.S. continuously kept support going to the ROK long enough for them to find their feet.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Objective measures, not relative.

Meaning?

They probably were, given that during Operation Dingo they managed to inflict 1,000 to 1 casualty rates; no, you read that right.

So then, given that the RSF was still kicking in 1973, you're admitting that the idea that the ARVN was third best in the west, "only behind the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF" is a load of rubbish.

100,000 is from the PVA itself.

The source is irrelevant, you attributing all that 100,000 to the ARVN assumes the US air campaign killed no one.

What had changed between then?

Quite a lot, the US peaced out in that timeframe after all. The PAVN also learned some lessons from 1972. I'll agree that supply and related defeatism was probably the biggest factor in the 1975 collapse, but it was far from the only one and I'm skeptical that simply keeping up aid levels would be sufficient to allow the ARVN to hold indefinitely.

 

[History Learner]

Meaning?

The ARVN was judged by the objective measures set for their American counterparts, not to the relative actual value it held at that time.

So then, given that the RSF was still kicking in 1973, you're admitting that the idea that the ARVN was third best in the west, "only behind the U.S. Armed Forces and the IDF" is a load of rubbish.

No, because the ARVN ceased to exist and the U.S. had really hit the dolodrums by the late 1970s when my example of Operation Dingo happened; military effectiveness isn't a static value. Again, does anyone claim the Red Army or the Roman Legions weren't effective in their day because they no longer exist?

The source is irrelevant, you attributing all that 100,000 to the ARVN assumes the US air campaign killed no one.

100,000 is the lower end is the point, but yeah I digress. Thing is, sure, the ARVN didn't kill all of them but that's kinda meaningless in the context of a hypothetical where the U.S. keeps up air support as I propose. Further, one can likewise apply this to the NVA; the Viet Cong, for example, also killed ARVN soldiers during the offensive.

Quite a lot, the US peaced out in that timeframe after all. The PAVN also learned some lessons from 1972. I'll agree that supply was probably the biggest factor in the 1975 collapse, but it was far from the only one and I'm skeptical that simply keeping up aid levels would be sufficient to allow the ARVN to hold indefinitely.

It was enough for South Korea, and they didn't have the added benefit of China going hostile to North Korea like she did with North Vietnam in just a few years.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

The ARVN was judged by the objective measures set for their American counterparts, not to the relative actual value it held at that time.

Ok then. It'd be interesting to see what percent of US forces were deemed to be up to snuff.

No, because the ARVN ceased to exist and the U.S. had really hit the dolodrums by the late 1970s when my example of Operation Dingo happened; military effectiveness isn't a static value.

So, you're saying only the militaries active in a specific year can be compared with each other? If that's the case then that also means the only western armies that the ARVN was better than were those of Cambodia, Laos, Guatemala, Rhodesia, South Korea, and Portugal. And I'm skeptical of them being better than the last two.

Thing is, sure, the ARVN didn't kill all of them but that's kinda meaningless in the context of a hypothetical where the U.S. keeps up air support as I propose.

That means the US staying in the war, which naturally also means much more than continued aid.

Further, one can likewise apply this to the NVA; the Viet Cong, for example, also killed ARVN soldiers during the offensive.

Yeah but after Tet VC combat units were mostly just rebadged PAVN units.

It was enough for South Korea, and they didn't have the added benefit of China going hostile to North Korea like she did with North Vietnam in just a few years.

South Korea had something better, North Korea was an unstable pile of ruble after the UN and Chinese rolled over it, and South Korea had a somewhat respected government. South Korea also had a demographic advantage over the North, while the opposite was true in Vietnam.