Soviet expeditionary force during the cold war

[ObssesedNuker]

I'm not totally convinced that being able to deploy combat forces to help friendly allies implies that the Soviets had the same type of "forced entry" capabilities and the ability to sustain divisional sized units in combat without host nation support that the U.S. did.

By that logic, the US never had that capability either. Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War were all done with host nation support. Panama was done effectively with host nation support (kind of an odd example when the US uses a military base to as the base to enact the invasion of the host nation of said base). Grenada was a sub-divisional effort. And... I'm rather blanking on any other example of the US conducting division+ level combat sustainment during the Cold War.

The USSR never had much capability to sustain an expeditionary force against naval resistance. They could send supplies via merchant vessels, however they had neither the number nor right type of escorts for convoy work let alone against surface forces.

Really? Because I'd argue that the host of surface vessels and the major logistics train the Soviets had built up would be able to handle any conceivable non-NATO navy in the world in the 1980s and even many of the NATO members were it a purely 1-v-1 fight (as impossible as that is).

 

[HB of CJ]

Every USN "688" boat would have to only sink 10 Russian Navy ships and boats. Then probably WW3 would start.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Every USN "688" boat would have to only sink 10 Russian Navy ships and boats. Then probably WW3 would start.

Well duh. Saying they'd only need to sink 10 ships is a bit of an exaggeration but there's no doubt in a symmetric blue-water battle that the USN whips the VMF like a red-headed step-child. The Soviet navy may have been the second most powerful in the world in the 80s, but the gap between the "second most powerful" and "most powerful" was tremendous. For the purposes of this thread, though, we're discounting USN since we're studying Soviet global power projection against third world countries where the Americans are unwilling to interfere for whatever reason.

 

[Blue cat]

By that logic, the US never had that capability either. Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War were all done with host nation support. Panama was done effectively with host nation support (kind of an odd example when the US uses a military base to as the base to enact the invasion of the host nation of said base). Grenada was a sub-divisional effort. And... I'm rather blanking on any other example of the US conducting division+ level combat sustainment during the Cold War.



Really? Because I'd argue that the host of surface vessels and the major logistics train the Soviets had built up would be able to handle any conceivable non-NATO navy in the world in the 1980s and even many of the NATO members were it a purely 1-v-1 fight (as impossible as that is).

From readings I did in the 1980's my understanding is that the U.S. had the ability to sustain a divisional level force in combat without host nation support. How feasible that would have actually been in practice is probably a good question.

Edit to add:
I suspect in practice air dropped only supply might have been problematic but a combination of over the beach and air dropped supply would have been well within the ability of the U.S. in the late Cold War era.

 

[Blue cat]

Well duh. Saying they'd only need to sink 10 ships is a bit of an exaggeration but there's no doubt in a symmetric blue-water battle that the USN whips the VMF like a red-headed step-child. The Soviet navy may have been the second most powerful in the world in the 80s, but the gap between the "second most powerful" and "most powerful" was tremendous. For the purposes of this thread, though, we're discounting USN since we're studying Soviet global power projection against third world countries where the Americans are unwilling to interfere for whatever reason.

Assuming no near by friendly bases did the Soviets really have the ability to sustain overseas naval forces in the face of any real resistance by the country or countries they might have intervened in (ie mines, fast attack craft, the odd SSM battery, maybe a diesel sub that torpedoes a high value naval asset far from a friendly port etc..)

Did the Soviets have a suitable fleet train to deal with reparing damaged warships overseas, (ie floating dry docks, specialized repair ships etc.) sustaining fleets of mine sweepers, hospital ships etc far from a friendly anchorage etc.

I suspect the U.S. would likely have been pulling old World War Two era assets out the moth ball fleet up to the end Cold War era to handle that type of issue. It is unclear to me if the Soviets had access to similar assets.

Edit to add:
I'm not saying the Soviet Navy wouldn't have "won" such a conflict but the costs (ie. Damaged high value warships potentially sinking under tow back to the USSR) might have been very high.

 

[gatordad699]

Looked here: http://www.navypedia.org/retro_view/yesterday_index.htm

Great site. Looked at 1980 and 1985.

Looked like they had a decent amount of large amphib ships in 1985.

Only floating dry dock reference I could find was the PD-50. Used for the Kuznetsov. It sank out from under the carrier a few years ago.

 

[Blue cat]

Looked here: http://www.navypedia.org/retro_view/yesterday_index.htm

Great site. Looked at 1980 and 1985.

Looked like they had a decent amount of large amphib ships in 1985.

View attachment 478274

Only floating dry dock reference I could find was the PD-50. Used for the Kuznetsov. It sank out from under the carrier a few years ago.

Thanks

 

[Alcsentre Calanice]

The Soviets did develop a quite powerful expeditionary power projection by the 1970s. The problem was that the performance of said arm was always contingent on the US not getting in the way.

And when did the US get in the way of the Soviets?

 

[Blue cat]

And when did the US get in the way of the Soviets?

Cuban missile crisis ?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

And when did the US get in the way of the Soviets?

Reading a thread more thoroughly is probably a useful thing to do...

Your underestimating the Soviets a bit there. The Yom Kippur War gave us a pretty good look at what sort of power projection force the Soviets could theoretically muster up by the 1970s: the Soviets intended to deploy seven VDV divisions and roughly a corps worth of mechanized naval infantry to Syria and Egypt until the USN went "lolno" and forced the Soviets to scale down their deployment to the couple of airborne divisions that they could airlift in. Ultimately, the war ended before the Soviets ever had to go through with any of their plans but it shows that the scale of the Soviets sealift capabilities and it's concurrent impact on their power projection had grown greatly during the 60s and 70s.

*emphasis added*

 

[Blue cat]

The soviets were always handicapped in power projection overseas during the cold war due to lack of a capable of a capable expeditionary force.Sure they had their airborne divisions but no rapidly deployed force through naval assets like the USMC

So let's imagine what kind of a force they can muster at the height of the cold war let's say in 1978 -1980

Goal is to provide some support for their allies in localized conflicts like
Angola civil war
Libya vs Egypt late 70s
South yemen
Horn of africa
Prevent coups against friendly regimes

What kind of naval vessels can they use ?
What kind of units would be most helpful? Mix of airborne troops , marine units , SAM UNIts , some mechanized infantry , ?
Fighter support ?
What kind of logistical support would be need ? How many transport aircraft or supply ships ?
What should be the ideal size of such a force ? Corp strength? Division strength ?
Etc

To sort of recap some other posts...

IMHO if there is a near by friendly port the Soviets can use (that ideally has dry dock and ship yard facilities as well as a near by large air port) then I suspect the Soviets can over time land what ever forces are needed to accomplish any likely objectives so long as the USN (and perhaps other NATO navies ?) allow the Soviets to do so.

I'd be curious in knowing how well the Soviets would do if they didn't have access to a near by friendly port, air port etc.

 

[I want to learn]

Reading a thread more thoroughly is probably a useful thing to do...



*emphasis added*

How was this done without acts of war?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

How was this done without acts of war?

By threats, brinkmanship, and shows of force.

 

[Chris S]

I'm not totally convinced that being able to deploy combat forces to help friendly allies implies that the Soviets had the same type of "forced entry" capabilities and the ability to sustain divisional sized units in combat without host nation support that the U.S. did.

But what you are describing isn't what one normally considers as an "expeditionary force". Most expeditionary forces rely to some extent on host nation support. For example the two bodies named "British Expeditionary Force" in 1914 and 1939 were planned with heavy reliance on being hosted by France. Similar reliance on host nation support was planned into expeditionary forces from the Dominions and Brazil during the world wars and French intervention in Africa during the Cold War depended heavily on host nation support.


In fact, besides Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada which other Cold War conflicts actually saw the US deploy expeditionary forces of division size or greater in combat without host support? I'm fairly sure Korea and Vietnam don't qualify. Panama is kind of iffy since many US forces were already stationed in Panama when the US intervention occurred. Haiti in 1994 was an unopposed intervention. Dominican Republic in the 1960s perhaps....but which other examples possibly come to mind?

 

[Blue cat]

But what you are describing isn't what one normally considers as an "expeditionary force". Most expeditionary forces rely to some extent on host nation support. For example the two bodies named "British Expeditionary Force" in 1914 and 1939 were planned with heavy reliance on being hosted by France. Similar reliance on host nation support was planned into expeditionary forces from the Dominions and Brazil during the world wars and French intervention in Africa during the Cold War depended heavily on host nation support.


In fact, besides Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada which other Cold War conflicts actually saw the US deploy expeditionary forces of division size or greater in combat without host support? I'm fairly sure Korea and Vietnam don't qualify. Panama is kind of iffy since many US forces were already stationed in Panama when the US intervention occurred. Haiti in 1994 was an unopposed intervention. Dominican Republic in the 1960s perhaps....but which other examples possibly come to mind?

With the likely exception of the Inchon landings I can't think of any post ww2 US operations that involved divisional sized combat operations without host nation support. (Maybe the 1958 Lebanon operations and the later operations in the Domican republic also come close ?)

In any event if one assumes a friendly host nation that allows for a peacefull off load in a port and provides a reasonable amount of host nation support then nations such as Canada for example could on paper at least have deployed brigade groups with tanks, self propelled artillery and APC's overseas during the Cold War. I don't think this is quite the type of answer the OP is looking for however.

The ability to actually land forces in the face of opposition and sustain them during combat without a near by friendly port is what sets super powers apart from nations such as Canada IMHO. By that measure I have my doubts that the Soviets could have exceeded the abilities that the UK demonstrated in the Falklands. In so far as the UK lost a number of major surface combatants in the Falkkands I suspect the Soviets would also have sustained significant naval losses in a similar setting.

 

[Khanzeer]

I'm not totally convinced that being able to deploy combat forces to help friendly allies implies that the Soviets had the same type of "forced entry" capabilities and the ability to sustain divisional sized units in combat without host nation support that the U.S. did.

what about their capability against non-NATO opponents like Iran, egypt, pakistan etc , will they be able sustain hostile "forced entry" operations against them ?

 

[Khanzeer]

The ability to actually land forces in the face of opposition and sustain them during combat without a near by friendly port is what sets super powers apart from nations such as Canada IMHO. By that measure I have my doubts that the Soviets could have exceeded the abilities that the UK demonstrated in the Falklands. In so far as the UK lost a number of major surface combatants in the Falkkands I suspect the Soviets would also have sustained significant naval losses in a similar setting.

Given the same level of opposition lets assume it is the soviets vs the argentines in the falklands 1982
pros
1-Soviets have quantitatively and qualitatively ( arguably) better AAW weapons [SAMs , CIWS]
2-Soviets have more numerous ASUW platforms if they can make it to Falklands [ Can the missile boats be brought in freighters ? ]
3-Considerable SSN support
Cons
1-Their fleet organic aircover is abysmal
2-considerably much less experience than RN in amphib operations

feel free to correct or add

 

[Khanzeer]

Really? Because I'd argue that the host of surface vessels and the major logistics train the Soviets had built up would be able to handle any conceivable non-NATO navy in the world in the 1980s and even many of the NATO members were it a purely 1-v-1 fight (as impossible as that is).

I think soviet surface fleet can engage and win in a 1 vs 1 against any non-US navy in the 70s and 80s , given their preponderance in cruise missiles and ASM [ even w/o support of AVMF and their SSN /SSGN force] however they are still essentially a sea denial not a sea control navy.Even if the red surface fleet sinks the enemy fleet i doubt if it has the training, experiance or doctrine in place to conduct a successful sea control operation and maintain a supply chain that would enable them to sustain a beachhead for long against any modern navy.

 

[Khanzeer]

To sort of recap some other posts...

IMHO if there is a near by friendly port the Soviets can use (that ideally has dry dock and ship yard facilities as well as a near by large air port) then I suspect the Soviets can over time land what ever forces are needed to accomplish any likely objectives so long as the USN (and perhaps other NATO navies ?) allow the Soviets to do so.

I'd be curious in knowing how well the Soviets would do if they didn't have access to a near by friendly port, air port etc.

I suspect very little even in their heyday, storming the hostile beach USMC style was well beyond the capability of soviet marines unless they are under constant aircover and very close to home

 

[Khanzeer]

I don't think this is quite the type of answer the OP is looking for however.

Looked here: http://www.navypedia.org/retro_view/yesterday_index.htm

Great site. Looked at 1980 and 1985.

Looked like they had a decent amount of large amphib ships in 1985.

View attachment 478274

Only floating dry dock reference I could find was the PD-50. Used for the Kuznetsov. It sank out from under the carrier a few years ago.

thanks but most if not all of these amphib ships require local air superority to perform their essential functions and since USSR lack AC it can be accomplished by

1-Having a minimal enemy air threat which can be neutralized by AAW weapons of escort ships
2-Rely on aircover provided by host nation airforces
3-Have soviet air force assests already in place in the host nation providing air cover by the time amphib arrive
[ in this case can soviets deploy their mig-21/23/25 jets by theur large transport airplanes ?]

This also requires soviet MCM , ASW platforms to do their homework to minimize losses amonst the amphibs