How long would it have taken the British Empire and the Soviets to defeat the Nazis alone?
- Thread starter A Piece of History
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Stalin was unhappy with the losses, but “losses Stalin is unhappy with” is not the same as “unsustainable losses”. The claim that Soviet commanders lied about their losses is made without any basis and represents little more then conspiracy theory level denial of the historical data. I might as well claim the Germans lied about their losses to avoid upsetting Hitler, as there’s just as much evidence for it. That Soviet official histories after the war exaggerated their accomplishments does not change what Soviet internal reports during the war reported.
The Soviets internal reporting could lie like no tomorrow about what they killed, in a manner that went beyond the usual over claiming, but when it came to what they lost they were brutally frank.
That the Soviet forces were still mustering up and deploying for their attack when the Germans withdrew does not change that those forces were there the attack. Suffice to say, the Germans still grinding themselves away at Soviet AT defenses they had become fully enmeshed in after Prokhorovka is not going to leave them in a better position to repel it. At least they got a few weeks worth of rest IOTL...
Except your quote doesn’t challenge that idea at all? It says that the Soviets didn’t launch a major attack between the 12th and the 15th. But that isn’t evidence the Soviets couldn’t attack. After all, if that were true then 4th Kharkov flat out wouldn’t have happened. But it did happen. Not only did it happen, but the sequence of offensives continued for far longer then Citadel did and saw Soviet forces take vastly heavier losses, yet did not exhaust Soviet reserves. From a strategic perspective, Soviet forces were facing major combat operations pretty much continuously from July 1943 all the way until March 1944 during which Soviet forces largely maintained, and even in a number of cases increased, their strength. This wouldn’t have been possible had the reserves they were deploying on July 15th been the last they had as you claimed.
No, you simply claim their closing on the front but that’s not what your maps show. They show the 27th Army still approaching and rather well positioned to deploy on the Germans left flank while the 53rd Army was still far enough back that it could conceivably be deployed anywhere along the line. It also does not change that the German forces by July 15th were literally collapsing from exhaustion, having exhausted the supplies of meth that kept them going since (and even during) Prokhorovka. They needed the subsequent time off even more badly then the Soviets did and continuing the offensive would mean they would be even weaker while the Soviets would only be gaining even more strength. Without any prospect of a breakthrough, Manstein would have no room to maneuver like he did at 4th Kharkov and would have been little more then a punching bag. If he was at the top of his game, the most he could hope to achieve is getting his forces out reasonably intact.
The Grossdeutschland Division was the most high profile example and the one that delayed the 11th Guards breakthrough at the critical moment long enough for 9th Army to withdraw additional panzer formations to guard the retreat.
"By late-July Soviet forces were introducing major new forces to combat and threatened, imultaneously, to collapse German defense around Bolkhov and lunge southward toward the key rail line at Karachev. Seizure of Karachev would sever all German communications with Orel. On 26 July the three tank corps of General Badanov's 496-tank 4th Tank ARmy struck west of Bolkhov and Bragramian committed the 2d Guards Cavalry Corps and a corps of the 11th Guard Army in a thrust on Karachev. Although the German XXIII and XXXXI Panzer Corps stubbornly resisted, the immense pressure forced the Germans to abandon Bolkhov and to withdraw to new defense lines northwest of Orel and less than ten kilomaters from the vital Briansk-Orel rail line. Only the timely arrival of the Panzer Grenadier Grossdeutschland contained the southward drive of Bagramians 11th Guards Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. A frustrated Begramian threw division after division against German forces defending Karachev as Model shifted his bedraggled panzer divisions westward from the Bolkhov sector to contain Soviet forces short of the critical rail line." -The Battle of Kursk, Glantz & House, Pg 240
Sicily was Hitler’s stated reason for calling off Citadel, but it was neither the only reason nor even the most pressing.
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I agree. I'd also suspect the German military would be a hollow legion after such a series of campaigns. OTL unit strength had taken a near permenent reduction, and quality was confined to a shrinking number or formations. Not much point in deploying 30 Panzer divisions if their effective strength is half battalion of Panther tanks each & the rest of the army are walking wounded with horse drawn artillery.
Er, I never said Germany would defeat UK. I implied a stalemate which would be a de facto win for Germany, who now controls continental Europe.
I disagree. I dont think even Hitler would have been so stupid not to make some sort of piece by 43-44 as politically, economically, and socially Germany was spent. The reason they fought on in reality is because Germany, like the USSR, faced extermination (or at least felt that way thanks to genocidal bombings and Goebbels propaganda). In ATL in the OP, I believe both the USSR and Germany cannot really continue fighting, so they come to terms, lick wounds, and wait for round 2.
The reason the USA was willing to garrison Iceland was due to the edging towards war and the "neutrality zone". Of course I know that Iceland, as well as the Azores were not and never had been possessions of the USA. My point was supplying troops to occupy the one and potentially the other contributes to the US desire for a "safe" Atlantic. This is quite different from sending occupation force to garrison someplace like Iraq. Similarly the US did have some casualties prior to the entry in to the war, after all that is a risk of the military. However being willing to accept a small number of casualties (think of the Panay) is different from put tens of thousands of troops in to an area involved in an active "world war".
When LL was started, and it was at a much smaller level than it became after the USA was involved in the war. Since the USA has, for whatever reason, that being involved in WWII/war in Europe is not in the national interest, the political will to finance this effort by the British and Russians (and to a lesser extent the Free French and other "free" forces) simply won't be there. The failure of the Entente powers to repay even a reasonable percentage of the WWI loans guaranteed by the US government was quite a sore point, and brought up frequently between the outbreak of war an PH.
There is a good deal of difference between buying some sort of government securities and the sort of investment in Liberty Bonds in WWI and Savings Bonds in WWII. Celebrities and war heroes went on national bind drives, every movie show started with a clip to "buy bonds", and much more. Children could buy ten cent stamps to build the cost of a bond. This sort of "loan" to the government was only happening because the USA was involved in the war, not to pay for LL to send to Britain when the USA was not in the war. Similarly there were additional taxes levied for the war. I very, very much doubt that these sort of financial sacrifices would be politically acceptable to most of the US public as long as the USA was neutral. (1)
(1) 1914-17 there were no additional war taxes, nor were there bond drives to "tax" the average American to pay for the war in Europe. These measures only came about after the USA entered the war.
When LL was started, and it was at a much smaller level than it became after the USA was involved in the war. Since the USA has, for whatever reason, that being involved in WWII/war in Europe is not in the national interest, the political will to finance this effort by the British and Russians (and to a lesser extent the Free French and other "free" forces) simply won't be there. The failure of the Entente powers to repay even a reasonable percentage of the WWI loans guaranteed by the US government was quite a sore point, and brought up frequently between the outbreak of war an PH.
There is a good deal of difference between buying some sort of government securities and the sort of investment in Liberty Bonds in WWI and Savings Bonds in WWII. Celebrities and war heroes went on national bind drives, every movie show started with a clip to "buy bonds", and much more. Children could buy ten cent stamps to build the cost of a bond. This sort of "loan" to the government was only happening because the USA was involved in the war, not to pay for LL to send to Britain when the USA was not in the war. Similarly there were additional taxes levied for the war. I very, very much doubt that these sort of financial sacrifices would be politically acceptable to most of the US public as long as the USA was neutral. (1)
(1) 1914-17 there were no additional war taxes, nor were there bond drives to "tax" the average American to pay for the war in Europe. These measures only came about after the USA entered the war.
Good example with the Panay. So the USA weren't only interested in a "safe Atlantic", apparently. In fact there were deployments of US forces in central America and in Shangai, as well as a thinly disguised US fighter group training to attack the Japanese under Chinese roundels. Work for the US Naval base in Londonderry had begun in June 1941, with housing for hundreds of personnel. Then there were of course the US possessions and mandates across the Pacific. So the USA actually also desired a safe Canal Zone with a safe central America, obviously liked a safe Pacific, would have wished a safe China, and did not mind looking forward to a safe Europe. A "safe Atlantic" of course included the fact that the destroyers-for-bases agreement saw US troops land, in 1940, in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, and I'm surely forgetting some other place, all British colonies. Only British colonies got US garrisons? No, still before Pearl Harbor, US troops were sent to protect the Dutch colony of Surinam (bauxite source, you see). So apparently a safe South America also was a good idea, even if it meant protecting a European colonial power's colonies. Oh, and with Iceland they also took Greenland, BTW.
I could continue, but in short, I agree that the USA would not send troops in 1940-41, while at peace, in areas where there was an actual war going on (thought they had done exactly that a couple decades before). I disagree that Iran, Iraq, and even Egypt once the British have at least pushed the Axis into Libya or even better cleared North Africa, would be considered as areas with an actual war going on. They would be considered vital for the overall safety of the US interests, like Dutch Surinam or British Bahamas or Danish Greenland.
My own take is different. The USA are not at war because, first, the Japanese have ended their ventures, and, consequently, the Germans have decided they cannot keep hunting US-escorted convoys in the Atlantic. They decide this because they can't count on Japanese help and because of the knowledge that this would eventually, after one sunk USN ship too many, make sure the USA decide to declare war on them.
But the US Administration has not changed views. While FDR can't be sure a DoW vote would get through, and therefore can't risk asking for it, he's still hell-bent on doing "anything short of war" to defeat Nazi Germany. And note the polls up to late 1941 show the US population is increasingly in favor of that tack, even if this might risk resulting in war. So Lend Lease and other likewise unprecedented measures are in place. Presumably, waiting for the time when Germany ends up doing something so egregious that the DoW can pass.
Huh, so why didn't Hitler offer peace to the Westerners in December 1944? Germany was spent. The Westerners were not thought to be intentioned to wipe out the German people. The Westerners would have turned that down, no separate peace without the Soviets, but the Germans couldn't know this for sure without trying. Yet no peace offer, on the contrary, Wacht am Rhein.
Maybe you misunderstand Hitler.
This also assumes that Japan is not still allied to Britain and not deploying forces as well, it also assumes no other contributions. If there is peace in China (pretty dam necessary really to avoid a pacific war really) Chinese manpower could also be available in more direct way than used in WW1.
With no Japan in the war, yes more British Commonwealth & Empire troops would be free to bolster the 8th Army in north Africa. It would of course not be a simple case of all troops in Malaya, Singapore and Burma going to Egypt, but given that Britain defeated Rommel at El Alamein and pushed him back into Tunisia before Torch OTL, then it's reasonable to assume the same as a minimum ITTL. It's also not unreasonable to assume the extra BCE troops capable of taking Tunisia, and perhaps even making landings in Sicily and then casting eyes beyond.
Long term however, Britain does not have the manpower and resources by this point to go for any sort of D Day. It's likely to be a slow slog in southern Europe, up ITaly or across to the Balkans.
As to the USSR, the key for them is feeding their population and army. Their reserves of manpower and space is seemingy endless, and OTL the German Army did not have the numbers and strength to sustain offensive operations deep in enemy territory along so vast a front. The key opportunity to win the war in the east came and went OTL before the US entered. The Soviet counter at Stalingrad was possible because of American Lend Lease and the Soviets getting plenty of US food and trucks, but even so the Germans had overextended themselves regardless. By this point they were punched out.
No US help to the Russians at this point means that the Soviet Union is not going to be able to carry out the sort of huge encirclements that the Germans had been inflicting on them, but they can still chuck men in front of bullets for long enough until their Generals and industry catch up to western tactics.
So in essence it'd probably mean a much longer war, with more attritional battles or static lines of the type seen in WW1, quite possibly into the late 40's, and until such time as the British can get Tube Alloys to bear an instant sunshine fruit or two and flatten Berlin.
Long term however, Britain does not have the manpower and resources by this point to go for any sort of D Day. It's likely to be a slow slog in southern Europe, up ITaly or across to the Balkans.
As to the USSR, the key for them is feeding their population and army. Their reserves of manpower and space is seemingy endless, and OTL the German Army did not have the numbers and strength to sustain offensive operations deep in enemy territory along so vast a front. The key opportunity to win the war in the east came and went OTL before the US entered. The Soviet counter at Stalingrad was possible because of American Lend Lease and the Soviets getting plenty of US food and trucks, but even so the Germans had overextended themselves regardless. By this point they were punched out.
No US help to the Russians at this point means that the Soviet Union is not going to be able to carry out the sort of huge encirclements that the Germans had been inflicting on them, but they can still chuck men in front of bullets for long enough until their Generals and industry catch up to western tactics.
So in essence it'd probably mean a much longer war, with more attritional battles or static lines of the type seen in WW1, quite possibly into the late 40's, and until such time as the British can get Tube Alloys to bear an instant sunshine fruit or two and flatten Berlin.
If the British Empire did go tube alloys by 1945 I could see Hurricane laughing in Berlin or Nuremberg before the Soviet union gets to the vistula
What British bomber is dropping this off? How are the British ensuring air superiority against the Germans without American aircraft?
Given the time that it would take the British to develop and produce an air launched nuclear weapon, do you not think it at all plausible that the British could adapt existing aircraft or even create a new design for the delivery system?
OTL immediately post 1945 British aircraft design was the pinnacle of aeronautics, so the skillset is clearly there, they just need a reason.
A slightly modified Lancaster, of course - the aircraft that the USAAF considered for their own delivery platform, save that they preferred something made in the USA. So they slightly modified their own bomber.
As to air superiority, the British could manage to make a mission safe over German skies at night, I'd guess. They might send a couple of 500-bomber raids to two other targets, and escort the Silverplate Lanc with a box of a hundred Mosquito night-fighter intruders, for instance.
I always figured they could build on the Lincoln design. Similar 30,000 ft operational ceiling, and was designed to carry the Grand Slam bomb so could handle the weight. Would still require a lot of work, but the design could in theory be modified like the Silverplate was to the B-29.
Of course they could; the Tudor spinoff was ready in June 1945, had nearly the same ceiling as the B-29, and enough payload.
Carl you often talk about 'war gaming' scenarios and I find the idea fascinating
Would you be up for creating a thread on how you do this - ie what system you use etc
I was using Larry Bonds Harpoon system for modern naval warfare back in the 80s but have never really dabbled with a land campaign system before
Cheers
Thanks - you see the question asked so many times as a sort of 'gotcha' response to Tube Alloys I always wondered if I was missing something really obvious.
No, the Avro Tudor, which was a civilian spinoff of the Lincoln. Note I'm not saying the Tudor can be used for delivering a nuke as-is. It can't, what with being a passenger liner. I'm saying that from the Lancaster the British had already developed, in 1945, a 4-engined aircraft with a higher ceiling (the usual complaint about a nuclear Lanc) and bigger payload.