WI Britain and France gave Germany a war ultimatum when it occupied Bohemia?

[raharris1973]

Edited based on the initial feedback:

Appeasement was fully discredited after Hitler's occupation of Prague. What if, instead of taking the approach of drawing lines by guaranteeing the next prospective victims, Britain and France basically went onto a war footing in the weeks after the occupation of Prague, mobilizing, speeding up rearmament, economically embargoing and blockading Germany and preclusively buying up supplies. The British and French issue the Germans a "slow ultimatum" since the occupation of Bohemia is already a fait accompli, and the initial stages of the war from the Allied side will be "phony" as the OTL war of 1939. So on March 31, Britain and France demand Germany evacuate rump Bohemia in 60 days, and allow in League of Nations monitors, or Britain and and France will be in a state of war with Germany. [the 60 days timeframe is comparable to the amount of time Saddam Hussein was given to withdraw from Kuwait in 1990-1991]

What happens from April 1939 onwards under these circumstances?

 

[Derek Pullem]

Revisionist historians will accuse the French and British of provoking war.

 

[Saint_007]

While to be honest, it would be the most sensible move to try and force Hitler to stop being a bastard, it would have only been regarded as a provocation in the long run. Hitler would switch to buying more of his stuff from the USA and USSR, and then sped up his schedule for war. By then, he'd be pushing forwards for the next step in his plan, and OTL declaration of war by Britain and France was just inevitable. If they didn't try and stop him at Poland, he would have pushed on for something else, maybe even France.

Plus, an embargo would assume Hitler was rational, or that he understood the power of economic pressure. If he was either, do you think he'd have started the war in Europe?

 

[Michele]

First thing first, a blockade is an act of hostility. It amounts to firing the first shot, and indeed, it wouldn't be beneath Hitler ordering German cargo ships to try and force their way through a Royal Navy blockading ship, thus forcing the British to actually fire that first shot. By that, you have thrown away the very notion of "undeclared" war.

Apart from that, and assuming no blockade, the French and British economies quickly overheat. They can't spend spend enough to mobilize and keep their armed forces on a total war footing, while simultaneously going full tilt on rearmament, and also on preemptive purchases from third parties.

Also, if you add to the measures above a boycott of German products (not that there were many for export by that time, but it's the announcement that counts) and an embargo, Germany has a much stronger case for the "we're surrounded by enemies" justification.

Finally it remains to be seen whether the USA, the USSR, the South American oil producing countries agree to the pre-emptive purchases. From a merely economic POV, they should. But who says the Soviets, for instance, don't decide it's politically important to sell oil to both sides?

Note this is what Hitler more or less expected (without the full mobilization, which really makes no sense without going to war) as a reaction to the invasion of Poland, and was more than willing to go with it. And this was before he knew for a fact that the Soviets would supply Germany.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

First thing first, a blockade is an act of hostility. ...

A embargo is not the same thing as a "blockade". the differences are huge. This is very contradictory in terms of policy, actions, & effects. Two very different directions that operate at cross purposes.

.. economically embargoing and blockading Germany ...

...What happens from April 1939 onwards under these circumstances?

The British government may take the Soviet proposal for a alliance more seriously, leading to at least a understanding between Britain, France & Moscow. The waiving the German Sovet treaty in August 1939. The Politburo preferred a alliance with France, but anti Communist opposition within the French and British governments prevented it. If this occurs & the USSR joins a embargo the nazi government is faced with a titanic fail. Despite the acquisition of the Czech gold & foreign currency reserves in March 1939 the German economy was Fragile. Pain and the downward spiral will come there far faster than in the alliance economies.

nazi propaganda would rally the faithful, but as inflation, shortages, unemployment, and panic sets in through the spring & early summer its going to get really uncomfortable in Berlin. With no treaty, pact, or agreement with the USSR any military solution by the nazis is looking extremely high risk.

 

[kernals12]

First thing first, a blockade is an act of hostility. It amounts to firing the first shot, and indeed, it wouldn't be beneath Hitler ordering German cargo ships to try and force their way through a Royal Navy blockading ship, thus forcing the British to actually fire that first shot. By that, you have thrown away the very notion of "undeclared" war.

Apart from that, and assuming no blockade, the French and British economies quickly overheat. They can't spend spend enough to mobilize and keep their armed forces on a total war footing, while simultaneously going full tilt on rearmament, and also on preemptive purchases from third parties.

Also, if you add to the measures above a boycott of German products (not that there were many for export by that time, but it's the announcement that counts) and an embargo, Germany has a much stronger case for the "we're surrounded by enemies" justification.

Finally it remains to be seen whether the USA, the USSR, the South American oil producing countries agree to the pre-emptive purchases. From a merely economic POV, they should. But who says the Soviets, for instance, don't decide it's politically important to sell oil to both sides?

Note this is what Hitler more or less expected (without the full mobilization, which really makes no sense without going to war) as a reaction to the invasion of Poland, and was more than willing to go with it. And this was before he knew for a fact that the Soviets would supply Germany.

Britain's unemployment rate was 12% at this point. They had plenty of excess capacity.

 

[Michele]

Britain's unemployment rate was 12% at this point. They had plenty of excess capacity.

"Spend" refers to state coffers, not to manpower.

 

[Michele]

A embargo is not the same thing as a "blockade". the differences are huge.

I'm aware of that, thank you. If you read the OP, you'll see it proposes both.

 

[Saint_007]

I missed the blockade bit.

Yeah, that's undeclared war, basically just asking for a fight. The other side has no choice but to fight his way out or risk being seen as weak. It works today because the fleet usually doing the blockade is the USN, which can flatten any challengers. While the RN and MN could destroy the Kriegsmarine, the resultant land war is inevitable as Germany tries to force France to give in and break the blockade.

 

[kernals12]

"Spend" refers to state coffers, not to manpower.

Don't make me give the modern monetary theory speech.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm aware of that, thank you. If you read the OP, you'll see it proposes both.

I saw that clearly, the proposal of both simultaneously creates a mess. Best to address on or the other separately. More realistic would be a embargo/sanction alone. As you point out a 'peace time' blockade is impractical.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

"Spend" refers to state coffers, not to manpower.

The unemployment affects state coffers as labor cost for returning the unemployed to work tends to be substantially lower. There also the knock on effect of returning the unemployed to wage earning. Also unemployed labor generally means unused production capacity, which is cheaper to use vs converting existing or building new.

In the US at the time the unused capacity ran as high as 25% depending on who's numbers you interpret. 15 or 20 % would still be substantial, & was a benefit to the Allies when the Neutrality Acts were modified to the Cash and Carry policy. They got some great prices on underused industrial capacity.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

They're going to need League of Nations agreement to make an embargo and sanctions stick.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Appeasement was fully discredited after Hitler's occupation of Prague. What if, instead of taking the approach of drawing lines by guaranteeing the next prospective victims, Britain and France basically went into undeclared war mode in the weeks after the occupation of Prague, mobilizing, speeding up rearmament, economically embargoing and blockading Germany and preclusively buying up supplies.

What happens from April 1939 onwards under these circumstances?

So... basically what if the Anglo-French had been doing what they had been doing since Summer 1938? I imagine OTL is your answer...

 

[Michele]

The unemployment affects state coffers as labor cost for returning the unemployed to work tends to be substantially lower. There also the knock on effect of returning the unemployed to wage earning. Also unemployed labor generally means unused production capacity, which is cheaper to use vs converting existing or building new.

In the US at the time the unused capacity ran as high as 25% depending on who's numbers you interpret. 15 or 20 % would still be substantial, & was a benefit to the Allies when the Neutrality Acts were modified to the Cash and Carry policy. They got some great prices on underused industrial capacity.

That's all nice and well, but the fact of the matter is that the UK was hitting serious cash flow problems by mid-1941, and while they were nearly fully mobilized and arming like mad, they weren't pre-emptively buying Romanian or Soviet oil. Spending like there is no tomorrow can be done, of course, by employing pretty drastic measures. But it is one thing to do it while the country is at war and the population accepts that as a harsh but unavoidable reality. Trying to do the same while officially in peacetime will quickly make the government highly unpopular. And postponing elections is, again, something you can do in war, but not in peace.

And while I'm at it, I'll add that 12% of 46 millions is some 5.5 millions. By mid-1940, the Army had more than 1.5 million men, the Royal Navy and the RAF would come in for another 0.5 million, and then you'd have all the men and women in auxiliary services, like the merchant navy or the full-time personnel of civil defense and firefighters and nurses, that would be necessary in war but did not increase production. So the actual percentage of the unemployed that might find work in industries, assuming they had the necessary skills, is probably closer to 7% if one wants to have the armed forces fully mobilized and the country ready for war, even if nominally in peace.

 

[Michele]

I saw that clearly, the proposal of both simultaneously creates a mess. Best to address on or the other separately. More realistic would be a embargo/sanction alone.

Yes. That's entirely what Hitler expected in May 1939, i.e. before the trade agreements with the Soviet Union, and was OK with that.

As you point out a 'peace time' blockade is impractical.

Well, it either works because of a huge imbalance of forces - in which case it is extraordinarily practical -
or it fails dramatically, and quickly peacetime becomes wartime, like at the Tiran Straits.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

If you are delving into a act of war, like a bolckade you may as well go the full course & declare war. If you don't have the political juice for that then the blocakde will be in trouble. You may be able to pull off a embargo.

 

[Legault]

Britain and France basically went into undeclared war mode in the weeks after the occupation of Prague, mobilizing, speeding up rearmament

France was already rearming at almost full speed, the 1939 spring program of nearly 65 billion over four years (1940-1943) is voted in response to the entry of German troops into Prague and the annexation of Bohemia-Moravia. The expenditure in rearmament represented 33% of the total government expanse or 8.6% of the total GNP (while France had not yet recovered from the crisis) in 1939.
The somewhat disappointing results (but not bad, the allied overall have more equipment in 1940) was because:
-There simply weren't enough industrial command in the 20's and the 30's so the factory in some key sectors such as aviation can't provide the sudden surge demands in planes (lack of qualified workers). You have to take account that France had a much smaller industrial (civilian + military) capacity compared too UK or Germany.
-France didn't invest at first in rebuilding/modernizing its' industrial and productive apparatus before making the commands in the mid 30's, because of the machine tools, their production speed was too slow so that when entering in service fighters and bombers were almost obsolete.
-A lot of the french companies involved in armament industry are too tiny, a nationalization program was required in some sectors and executed, however it temporarily disrupt the production.
-The mobilization in September 1939 was too large and too many specialized workers were mobilized which hurt the industry.

Overall France's military industry just needed a bit more as it lagged one or two year behind Germany to be able with UK to completely outproduce the Reich.

 

[raharris1973]

So... basically what if the Anglo-French had been doing what they had been doing since Summer 1938? I imagine OTL is your answer...

They were doing all this between summer 1938 and September 1939? "mobilizing, speeding up rearmament, economically embargoing and blockading Germany and preclusively buying up supplies."

This does not square with other posters who think it would have been unsustainably expensive.

If you are delving into a act of war, like a bolckade you may as well go the full course & declare war. If you don't have the political juice for that then the blocakde will be in trouble. You may be able to pull off a embargo.

OK, you've convinced me the halfway house doesn't work, I will revise the OP and have them declare war. How does that war go. I figure it starts out as "phony" as OTL's, but what about when action starts on sea, air, and eventually on the ground?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
OK, you've convinced me the halfway house doesn't work, I will revise the OP and have them declare war. How does that war go. I figure it starts out as "phony" as OTL's, but what about when action starts on sea, air, and eventually on the ground?

I'm not dissing the lower Embargo & preparatory mobilization level. Thats worth looking closer at. But yes. declaring war in April 1939 over the violation of the Munich Agreement/treaty is worth a look too.