Without American entry, could the British raise a million man army in India for use in Europe?
How long could WW1 have lasted if the US never entered?
- Thread starter ToxicStorm22
- Start date
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Army_during_World_War_I
Yes, a million men served outside India, but they were used mainly against the Ottomans. If WW1 continues longer and the Ottomans collapse as OTL, then it is likely they would shift to the Balkans as the Central Powers collapse in sequence.
In my opinion, many of the posts here skip over a significant thing without much attention.
That significant thing is the collapse of Russia. In OTL, the USA had joined, so the Entente had a real idea they could handle replacing Russia with the USA. But in this timeline, the impending collapse of Russia has to have its own response, and can't just be waved away.
My expectation is that fear, possibly irrational and possibly not, will accompany that. First, on Russia's side, the lack of the USA will be that much more of a hint to bail out of the war. And for the rest of the Entente... we know now in hindsight how much Brest-Litovsk did and did not help Germany/the CP, but they don't. So they will be afraid (rightly or wrongly is what the past 16 pages have been about) that without Russia Germany will be able to sucker-punch them. And so they will look for ways to relieve that fear.
The first response will be a last try for an offensive, but that may flounder on something like the French mutinies (in a new guise due to the additional pressure on the offensive to succeed, so expect more initial power in the push, and a mroe rapid decline in attempts as hopelessness sets in). In any case, I don't expect big success. Then, it will be followed by trying to salvage the situation.
The most likely, IMO, is a general conference (chaired by the USA, for all we know) to decide before Russia collapses entirely (the Czar is probably still out). The CP will have the upper hand, as they're mostly in control of foreign territory and Russia's collapsing, but no total victory - and having rejected USW, the CP wll have no clear idea how to win proper, either.
So I'd expect the return of colonies the Germans still partly control, Poland and maybe bits of the Baltic as German satellites (or for the Baltics, if the bits are small enough, annexed outright). Luxemburg is probably a new state of Germany, some border shifts towards Liege, maybe a dismantling of forts on the French side of the French-German border, and Serbia out or puppeted (Romania will presumably lose land too). The Ottoman borders will probably be fairly unsettled as the powers are unsure how much Arab gains to officially acknowledge, and will depend on who is (after the truces start) more willing to still send in support to either side there. Russia will be the clear loser, while in the west noone obviously won (but being no longer 'encircled' Germany will be the implicit winner).
That significant thing is the collapse of Russia. In OTL, the USA had joined, so the Entente had a real idea they could handle replacing Russia with the USA. But in this timeline, the impending collapse of Russia has to have its own response, and can't just be waved away.
My expectation is that fear, possibly irrational and possibly not, will accompany that. First, on Russia's side, the lack of the USA will be that much more of a hint to bail out of the war. And for the rest of the Entente... we know now in hindsight how much Brest-Litovsk did and did not help Germany/the CP, but they don't. So they will be afraid (rightly or wrongly is what the past 16 pages have been about) that without Russia Germany will be able to sucker-punch them. And so they will look for ways to relieve that fear.
The first response will be a last try for an offensive, but that may flounder on something like the French mutinies (in a new guise due to the additional pressure on the offensive to succeed, so expect more initial power in the push, and a mroe rapid decline in attempts as hopelessness sets in). In any case, I don't expect big success. Then, it will be followed by trying to salvage the situation.
The most likely, IMO, is a general conference (chaired by the USA, for all we know) to decide before Russia collapses entirely (the Czar is probably still out). The CP will have the upper hand, as they're mostly in control of foreign territory and Russia's collapsing, but no total victory - and having rejected USW, the CP wll have no clear idea how to win proper, either.
So I'd expect the return of colonies the Germans still partly control, Poland and maybe bits of the Baltic as German satellites (or for the Baltics, if the bits are small enough, annexed outright). Luxemburg is probably a new state of Germany, some border shifts towards Liege, maybe a dismantling of forts on the French side of the French-German border, and Serbia out or puppeted (Romania will presumably lose land too). The Ottoman borders will probably be fairly unsettled as the powers are unsure how much Arab gains to officially acknowledge, and will depend on who is (after the truces start) more willing to still send in support to either side there. Russia will be the clear loser, while in the west noone obviously won (but being no longer 'encircled' Germany will be the implicit winner).
ferdi254
Banned
They had as much £Stg as they wanted to print.
This was the time when currencies were tied to Gold. If you start printing money then the value of such money is going to decrease as Germany proved beyond doubt. So they may be able to force colonies to accept paper money but no one else. So please tell me how do they pay for imports that do not come from colonies?
At that time you did not transport large amounts of paper you had to transport gold. No gold or accepted other currency no imports.
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Deleted member 1487
They were still on the gold standard even if in weird sorta-kinda way, printing more even without the gold standard would result in hyperinflation and would have cost it any credibility as a financial hub.
First choice is pay in £stg as suppliers may well be interested in also buying British assets; perhaps your country wants a Dreadnaught post-war?
Suppliers not prepared to be paid in £stg also risk losing the business to competitors who do.
Gold standard did not mean that that all currency in circulation was backed by gold. A shortage of US$ or physical gold is not the same as being bankrupt.
Deleted member 1487
Yeah, actually that is the definition of the gold standard, your paper money has value because it is convertable to gold on demand:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_standard
Convertability to gold was a feature of the British currency; convertability to gold coins was suspended, but to gold bar it was not like in the above quote, but discouraged. If they totally suspended convertability then effectively the gold standard is dead and it is only within the areas that the UK controls that they can enforce whatever value they want on the currency, but internationally then it would effectively be treated as a free floating currency, which the printing of more paper money is going to tank the exchange value. Good luck trying to pay neutrals in it or getting the Dominion interested in payments in it.
ferdi254
Banned
I always wrote a couple of times that you may be able to force colonies to accept GBP but no one else will. What happened at the time if you tried to spend printed paper money... have a look at Germany.
The economy of that time was different from the one today. If you did not have gold or accepted currency no one would sell you anything.
Sorry this fact will not disappear.
The economy of that time was different from the one today. If you did not have gold or accepted currency no one would sell you anything.
Sorry this fact will not disappear.
These are both good points.
What does Kerensky's war policy look like without American belligerency in 1917?
We do know that Wilson sent Elihu Root to Petrograd in June of 1917 to offer Kerensky $325 million in war loans if Russia stayed in the war. Kerensky was reluctant, but ultimately accepted - and then launched the final Russian offensive of the war in June. The offensive, as we know, was a disaster - resulting in mutiny, massive casualties, and a 240km Russian retreat. And, shortly thereafter, the October Revolution.
But if there is no U.S. entry, there is no American war loan, nor any of the hope that American co-belligerency brings, either. Not only the proposition of the Kerensky Offensive is brought into grave doubt; but one really has to wonder whether Kerensky would remain in the war at all. Yes, Kerensky thought a victory would restore deteriorating army morale; but without the economic means to support the attack, it could look like a bootless exercise to him. I think the result . . . is almost certainly a Russian withdrawal from the war in the summer of 1917 - probably starting with a cease-fire, followed by drawn-out peace negotiations with the Central Powers. (Another butterfly: the Germans would almost certainly see little value in sneaking Lenin back into Russia, if Kerensky decides to seek terms quickly enough.)
In which case the Entente now faces what would amount to a double blow in the second half of 1917: Russian exit from the war, followed by the Caporetto disaster in Italy. (And you can throw in what will likely be an even faster Rumanian surrender.) And this time, no good news to offset it!
This scenario likely leads London and Paris to conclude (by late 1917) that an Entente victory is no longer likely (or perhaps even possible). The difficulty is that the Germans will now think that a Central Powers victory *is* within sight. And so what you need next is the failure of the inevitable German offensive (which is sure to be some variation of the German Spring Offensives of OTL). Both sides must reach a conclusion that they cannot *win* - and then the task becomes to come up with a way not to lose. Germany is holding more strategic cards than the Entente, but it also is facing potentially greater danger the longer the war goes on since both of its major allies (Austria-Hungary, Turkey) are approaching disintegration, to say nothing of growing popular discontent on the German home front.
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Problem is that as posters on other threads about this have shown there was no real desire to end the war by any party in the provisional government, not even the Bolsheviks, it took the disasters kerensky offensive and subsequent austro-german counter offensives that made pice at any price groups the majoraty.
If Russia is out, almost for sure with no America and likely sooner than OTL, and Italy is at best weaker (fewer supplies, no morale boost from the USA) and possibly out, A-H is in much better shape. Absent external pressure (no Russia, +/- Italy, no USA helping the Entente), A-H still has internal issues but now they have some breathing room to try and solve them or at least last out until the war ends. A peace that gives them at least some positives may help keep A-H together. The Ottomans are going to fall apart, the absence of the USA with troops and loans may mean that the Entente moves more slowly there.
What exactly do you mean by "fall apart"?
Their Armenian minority is already pretty much destroyed, and the Greek one is spread too thin to rebel with any chance of success. The biggest "minority" area remaining to the OE is Syria, but even if that falls there is no reason why its loss should bring Turkey down. Damascus and Aleppo are no more vital to its existence than Baghdad. And if the Balkan Front is still holding there is no particular threat to Constantinople.
For GB the war doubled prices, France they tripled and Germany quadrupled before collapse. A-H prices were up 16 fold, Turkish prices went up 18 fold and Germany has to prop these up. The Entente were purchasing from the US to counterbalance restricting trade with the CP. If the US stop trading with all Europe then they will heavily impact their own economy.
I too am sceptical of this often repeated idea, the Arab revolt was carried on French and British backs, and when they betrayed them OTL the mighty Arab revolt went *poof* in an instant. If the Entente pull their support (because it's more needed elsewhere) even the hopelessly inept Ottoman army will beat them and reestablish what can count as order in the region.
I have a hazy recollection of reading in a British newspaper that TE Lawrence's Arab protégé, Emir Faisal, was in correspondence with Constantinople almost to the end of the war, keeping the door open for reverting to the Ottoman side in the event of CP victory.
Has anyone else heard of this?