How long could WW1 have lasted if the US never entered?

[Mikestone8]

The big difference is here the Entente are not likely capable of a war winning offensive. That is the difference the US made and that is huge. Now I understand that many folks refuse to accept the evidence the German Army was defeated on the battlefield. It happened but the Stab-In-The-Back myth has been repeated so many times. The thing is successful offesnives do typically rely on massive disparities in combat power. That is what the US provided.

Quite. And (absent America) the Entente needs a "winning offensive" in a way that the CPs don't. The latter are standing deep in Entente territory, so only need to hang on to what they have in order to go into any peace conference with a tremendous advantage. [1]All they have to do is "hang in" until British and French soldiers become convinced that they are never going to break through, and their morale starts slipping.

Even if Germany does opt for an offensive, it won't necessarily take anything like the same form as OTL's. Much of what Ludendorff did was governed by his sense of "racing against the clock" due to the imminent arrival of US troops.



[1] In 1916 Field Marshall Robertson expressed concern on this very point, observing that Britain might find herself going into a Conference "with Togoland as our only bargaining counter".

 

[RodentRevolution]

Quite. And (absent America) the Entente needs a "winning offensive" in a way that the CPs don't. The latter are standing deep in Entente territory, so only need to hang on to what they have in order to go into any peace conference with a tremendous advantage. [1]All they have to do is "hang in" until British and French soldiers become convinced that they are never going to break through, and their morale starts slipping.

Even if Germany does opt for an offensive, it won't necessarily take anything like the same form as OTL's. Much of what Ludendorff did was governed by his sense of "racing against the clock" due to the imminent arrival of US troops.



[1] In 1916 Field Marshall Robertson expressed concern on this very point, observing that Britain might find herself going into a Conference "with Togoland as out only bargaining counter".

Except the CP leaders clearly did need a winning offensive and they clearly staked their political futures on unlimited submarine warfare in OTL. One of the concerns the French had in 1917 is that as many as 11% of people in letters sampled by the censor were willing to consider a peace without demands. 11% however was, is and remains a small minority. Now it might grow over the subsequent duration of the war but you also similar moves in Germany pushing for the regime to pursue a peace on a status quo antebellum.

So the German leadership will want something as alternative to unlimited submarine warfare. A land offensive seems unpopular among proponents of CP outright victory so a peace offer would seem to be on the cards. However if the Entente do manage to dig their heels in then Germany remain in considerable trouble and her allies even more so.

So again I propose that we could see Russia falling more or less on time, last ditch land offensive and then an offer of terms. However yes while the Entente losing outright is maybe a possibility so too is the whole hog of OTL 1918, failed land offensive, Kaiser turns to last ditch HSF sortie, mutiny, collapse. Then again you might see the HSF sortie...get roughly handled, mutiny and then collapse. It is still on the cards.

Obviously of course we are assuming an anti-commercial America who enjoys going into a recession here.

The thing is we can strong, strong, strong option the CP and still see the Entente able to put up a fight.

 

[Tibi088]

Yes the problem is with you. Might is more usually seen as equivalent to maybe than obviously.

Germany didnt seek term OTL in a worse situation. So I still dont see why they might seek terms here.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Germany didnt seek term OTL in a worse situation. So I still dont see why they might seek terms here.

They went with an unlimited submarine offensive. Now as another option they might try a land offensive. It is only one of the options on the list. They need thought to present as doing something to folks in the trenches and on the home front.

There are lots, at least given what we know, that this could go. Rejecting a 1917 peace offer (depending of course on the offer) might in retrospect be seen as the Entente's big mistake assuming they get a worse offer subsequently. However there is still a lot of resistive capacity on both sides as of 1917. There are also a lot of reasons to suspect the Entente might just last longer than the Germans who anyway were faced with the fact that their key allies could not last.

 

[sloreck]

When the Kaiserschlacht was launched Ludendorff et al knew it was an all in offensive, and it was done because they realized that with millions of Americans coming in as well as increased supplies for the Entente time was not on their side. Absent this, they can use a combination of limited local offensives and withdrawals to eliminate salients and build strong defenses and stand on the strategic defensive. OTL the Entente was still having little or no success offensively in the west until the Germans launched and lost Michael. The morale in the French Army was shot, absent the hope of American manpower keeping the army on the defensive was the best they could hope for. If there had been any attempt to launch anything more than some local action you very well might have seen the French soldiers vote with their feet like the Russians did.

Yes, the Germans probably could not have taken Paris in any case absent America, but they did not have to. A peace with the west with relatively little territorial change at least in France, keeping the east and the Balkans and both Germany and A-H will take it. The colonies will go, who really cares. The Ottomans will retreat to something like the current borders of Turkey, and neither the UK nor France will have either the resources or will to go after them and Germany is not going to continue the war so that the Ottomans can hold on to Palestine, Syria, Arab and parts of Iraq.

If, in spite of the changed circumstances, the Germans do launch the Kaiserschlacht in spring, 1918 I expect it will end the war one way or another. Either they will succeed against a weaker Entente, or it will fall short and exhaust Germany. Take your pick, but IMHO it won't go on.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

And the USA is still a factor. If it didnt explicitly state that it wont enter the war - hack even than - the chance of an intervention will always be there like the sword of Damocles ower the germans head. Mitteleurope exist, the encirclement is ower and they can get a favourable peace in the west. IMO they will see that the price for more in the west is simply not worth it and because of the USA still entails risks.

Check out the book "Too Proud to Fight" by Devlin about Wilson's presidency. By 1917 he was anti-Entente for a variety of reasons; without USW and the ZT there is NO way he's going to DoW Germany and every chance he will force the freedom of the seas issue with the Entente over the Black List and blockade. Even pro-Entente elements of the US government were warning Britain they had lost Wilson and to be prepared to make concessions. Were it not for the monumental stupidity of Ludendorff/Hindenburg the arrogance of the British was on the verge of destroying any good will they had with Wilson, which would have potentially fatal consequences for them. It was an involved issue how things had changed so much by then compared to 1915, but a lot of the problem had to do with the Entente refusal to enter into negotiations with him to end the war, while the Germans did, even if they weren't particularly serious about it and it was a ploy to justify their return to USW. Had Falkenhayn hung on to his command USW wouldn't have happened, the Germans would actually engage with Wilson in good faith (Falkenhayn was interested in negotiations to end the war) and then the British are going to have all the rope to hang themselves, while the Germans would avoid the disastrous Hindenburg economic Programme and would thus avoid the Turnip Winter, so be in a better place all around come 1917.

 

[ferdi254]

Without the USA entering, by June 1917 the Entente would not have been able to buy a leaf of tea from anybody unless they could force some colonies to donate the goods.

Meaning: GB has to cut down food consumption by 40%. Artillery tubes and shell production would go down by at least 30% for GB and France and 70 for Italy. Meaning 80% less aviation fuel.

And more losses in all sectors of the economy.

So how will they survive after Russia is out?

 

[Mikestone8]

When the Kaiserschlacht was launched Ludendorff et al knew it was an all in offensive, and it was done because they realized that with millions of Americans coming in as well as increased supplies for the Entente time was not on their side. Absent this, they can use a combination of limited local offensives and withdrawals to eliminate salients and build strong defenses and stand on the strategic defensive.

If I correctly understand Zabecki, Ludendorff would have preferred St George (a much beefed-up version of the attack on the Lys which he actually made in April) to Michael, but was constrained by time factors. In that sector, depending on the weather he could not count on the ground being dry enough before May - and he couldn't wait that long with the AEF on the horizon.

Obviously we can't say for certain how St George would have fared but even the weaker Georgette got within five miles of the crucial rail junction at Hazebrouck, loss of which would cripple the supply system of the northern armies, and effectively split the BEF in two. If the end result is a front line hitting the sea somewhere near Etaples, then Germany has inflicted a body blow without increasing its commitments. You don't get that colossal salient which made such a standing invitation to Entente counter-attacks. And the loss of "Wiper" in particular would be a knock to British morale, as the place had acquired considerable symbolic significance.

 

[sloreck]

The absence of the AEF on the horizon does open up other possibilities for the Germans to do an offensive in spring, 1918. IMHO the problem is that a large spring offensive, whether Michael or St George would represent an "all in" situation for Germany. The absence of the USA in the war makes things better for Germany by making the overall situation worse for the UK/France. If Italy is out of the war that does free up some resources for the Western Front, but only so much. If Germany launches a large offensive and succeeds then they have achieved a military status where the Entente has to end the war on very positive terms for the CP but not a Versailles Diktat. OTOH, if the Germans don't take Hazebrouck or reach the sea or if they reach those goals but are driven back promptly, like OTL they have spent their strength and morale will begin to collapse like OTL. While I don't think you'd see the Entente advances following a failed offensive like OTL, you return to a stalemate on previous lines or worse for the Germans and now their "attrition/exhaustion" advantage is gone.

There are lots of examples of "all or nothing" offensives launched by one side where they see themselves losing and try and strike a decisive blow to avoid defeat/collapse. This is pretty much done when one side sees defeat as inevitable, like a boxer who has exhausted his strength and tries for one last big punch before he goes down. In the scenario where the USA does not enter WWI, IMHO Germany is not in this situation in spring, 1918 and therefore would not take such a gamble.

 

[Aber]

Without the USA entering, by June 1917 the Entente would not have been able to buy a leaf of tea from anybody unless they could force some colonies to donate the goods.

No, just No. That's not how government finances and international trade work.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

If I correctly understand Zabecki, Ludendorff would have preferred St George (a much beefed-up version of the attack on the Lys which he actually made in April) to Michael, but was constrained by time factors. In that sector, depending on the weather he could not count on the ground being dry enough before May - and he couldn't wait that long with the AEF on the horizon.

Obviously we can't say for certain how St George would have fared but even the weaker Georgette got within five miles of the crucial rail junction at Hazebrouck, loss of which would cripple the supply system of the northern armies, and effectively split the BEF in two. If the end result is a front line hitting the sea somewhere near Etaples, then Germany has inflicted a body blow without increasing its commitments. You don't get that colossal salient which made such a standing invitation to Entente counter-attacks. And the loss of "Wiper" in particular would be a knock to British morale, as the place had acquired considerable symbolic significance.

Part of the issue with Georgette was the pointless focus on Ypres instead of weighting the attack at the more vulnerable logistics network west of it...of course Ludendorff didn't even consider the logistics of the British, so despite having the ability didn't focus on that.
A full strength St. George probably would have blundered on Hazebrouck by it's sheer size, but to balance that without Michael the Entente would have had the ability to move reserves into the area that Georgette didn't have to deal with IOTL.

 

[Zen9]

Sigh...

India makes money, that's why it's the jewel in the Imperial Crown. It's a market the British sell to and buy tea and other things out of.
No need for dollars, or even gold. Or oil.....
That's why the Merchantalists liked it.
In fact I'm getting a disturbing Merchantalist bent coming across here about economics.

Sugar from the west indies. To feed the addiction to tea....

 

[Mikestone8]

The absence of the AEF on the horizon does open up other possibilities for the Germans to do an offensive in spring, 1918. IMHO the problem is that a large spring offensive, whether Michael or St George would represent an "all in" situation for Germany.

However, some offensives could be more "all in" than others.

The 1918 offensives as they panned out OTL were about as "all or nothing"" as you can get. The two flanks - north of Arras and east of Reims - hardly budged. All the big German gains were in the centre. Result - an enormous bulge, with undefeated Entente armies on both flanks. Germany was, quite literally "leading with her chin", and must either break through and get total victory, or else face counter attacks which, given the wearied state in which four months of fighting had left her, was likely to mean defeat. .Essentially Ludendorff had gambled and lost.

OTOH, this is far less likely with St George. Even an unsuccessful one (ie failing to take Hazebrouck), leaves only a modest dent in the front line, rather than the enormous salients of OTL, whilst a successful one means a big advance on the flank and probably much less of one in the centre [1], so that the German line is straightened out and if anything shortened, producing gains which Germany has a good chance of holding on to.

[1] I am guessing here that even if Michael still takes place as a follow-up to St.George, it is likely to be a far more modest effort than OTL's. As a glance at the map shows, in British and French sectors alike, the first German attack was by far the most successful, with subsequent ones making far less headway. While I suppose this could be pure coincidence, my personal guess is that it ain't.

 

[oofo]

However, some offensives could be more "all in" than others.

The 1918 offensives as they panned out OTL were about as "all or nothing"" as you can get. The two flanks - north of Arras and east of Reims - hardly budged. All the big German gains were in the centre. Result - an enormous bulge, with undefeated Entente armies on both flanks. Germany was, quite literally "leading with her chin", and must either break through and get total victory, or else face counter attacks which, given the wearied state in which four months of fighting had left her, was likely to mean defeat. .Essentially Ludendorff had gambled and lost.

OTOH, this is far less likely with St George. Even an unsuccessful one (ie failing to take Hazebrouck), leaves only a modest dent in the front line, rather than the enormous salients of OTL, whilst a successful one means a big advance on the flank and probably much less of one in the centre [1], so that the German line is straightened out and if anything shortened, producing gains which Germany has a good chance of holding on to.

[1] I am guessing here that even if Michael still takes place as a follow-up to St.George, it is likely to be a far more modest effort than OTL's. As a glance at the map shows, in British and French sectors alike, the first German attack was by far the most successful, with subsequent ones making far less headway. While I suppose this could be pure coincidence, my personal guess is that it ain't.

If the offensives are conducted sequentially, it would have been best for the Germans to start with a Michael rather than George. Reason being is if Hazebrouck is taken first, Amiens will certainly be reinforced. If Amiens is captured first, the Entente armies are split and moving troops to block an advance on Hazebrouck becomes twice as difficult, due to the severed railways (most notably the French won’t be able to send reinforcements to Flanders like they did during Georgette IOTL).

The gains made Blucher-Yorck look impressive at first glance, but in reality served only as a hindrance to the Germans. Of course, with a successful Michael or sequential Michael-georgette, Blucher-Yorck may not happen at all for a variety of reasons.

Also of note if that the BEF is forced to withdraw, south of the Somme (I view a withdrawal to the channel ports as unlikely, unless done to evacuate troops, since numerous British officers seemed to view keeping a connection with France as more important than keeping the ports) to the line of Amiens-Abbeville, the Germans will have shortened their lines greatly, likely giving them a reserve to use as they wish.

 

[Tibi088]

If the offensives are conducted sequentially, it would have been best for the Germans to start with a Michael rather than George. Reason being is if Hazebrouck is taken first, Amiens will certainly be reinforced. If Amiens is captured first, the Entente armies are split and moving troops to block an advance on Hazebrouck becomes twice as difficult, due to the severed railways (most notably the French won’t be able to send reinforcements to Flanders like they did during Georgette IOTL).

The gains made Blucher-Yorck look impressive at first glance, but in reality served only as a hindrance to the Germans. Of course, with a successful Michael or sequential Michael-georgette, Blucher-Yorck may not happen at all for a variety of reasons.

Also of note if that the BEF is forced to withdraw, south of the Somme (I view a withdrawal to the channel ports as unlikely, unless done to evacuate troops, since numerous British officers seemed to view keeping a connection with France as more important than keeping the ports) to the line of Amiens-Abbeville, the Germans will have shortened their lines greatly, likely giving them a reserve to use as they wish.

If I remember correctly the point is the railway to the channel ports - and in this regard it was not important if Amiens or Hazebruck falls as either of them falling would cut the railline the british used to supply their armies. Of course there are alternate lines but this would lengthen the supply line considerably so the permanent (meaing not taken back shortly) loss of either Amiens or Hazebruck means that the supply situation for the british army would become quite difficult at least for a while..

 

[oofo]

If I remember correctly the point is the railway to the channel ports - and in this regard it was not important if Amiens or Hazebruck falls as either of them falling would cut the railline the british used to supply their armies. Of course there are alternate lines but this would lengthen the supply line considerably so the permanent (meaing not taken back shortly) loss of either Amiens or Hazebruck means that the supply situation for the british army would become quite difficult at least for a while..

Not quite. There were two rail hubs north of the Somme, Amiens and Hazebrouck. Hazebrouck recieved supplies from the Channel Ports while Amiens got them from south of the Somme. A double track line connected the two towns. If only one of these logistics hubs were captured, the BEF would have problems but likely could have been able to maintain position. The loss of both, however, would have resulted in about a 55% drop in supplies received. If this occurred, the BEF would be forced to make a withdrawal, abandoning their heavy equipment (including a lot of their tanks!).

The reason why Amiens should be captured first if the Germans were aiming to strike at the BEF logistics is that it is south of Hazebrouck. If Amiens is captured first, then reinforcing Hazebrouck with troops from south of the Somme becomes a much more tedious process, costing precious time. This is because with Amiens captured, the railway connecting it with Hazebrouck is severed, and there was not a single double tracked railway running on the north-south axis in the BEF area of operations.

Striking at Hazebrouck first in a Georgette scale operation would have made it extremely clear the the Entente that the Germans would be aiming to capture Amiens next due to its importance, and thus it would be heavily reinforced. Besides, the condition of the British 5th Army in spring 1918 made Michael the best choice.

 

[The Undead Martyr]

There was little British attention to Austria. Some British forces were sent there after Caporetto, but only modest ones. As for Turkey, she might lose Syria but once the front line fell back to the mountainous and thoroughly defensible Anatolia, any advance would soon bog down. Indeed, given that Syria was earmarked for France rather than GB, Britain may not even put much priority on conquering that.




It is very much changed by what happens in France.

If Germany is not as hard-pressed in Sep-Oct 1918 as OTL, she can send forces to Italy to shore up the Austrians. Ditto for Bulgarians and Turks. They will fall if and when Germany is on the ropes, but not before.

I don't see how that assertion follows; divisions cannot be conjured from thin air and the Entente have more of them and will react to any German moves.
Germany was not doing well (nobody was) but her allies were already imploding- the British broke through Palestine due to the Turks running out of manpower and overcommiting against the Bolsheviks, for instance.
If Germany pulls divisions from France then that means the French do better regardless, so no breakthrough there and perhaps the opposite with an earlier German collapse. Germany used everything she had on the Spring Offensive- that was at the limit of her ability, any divisions she spares for Italy (and they will need a lot, Diaz is competent and the Piave River is a strong defensive line on home turf, unlike the overextended Italian advance positions prior to the 12th Izonzo) will be sorely missed elsewhere.

WWI breakthroughs are taken for granted without any context as to the manner and with little regard to the bloody, grueling reality of trench warfare. Startling successes like Caporetto and the Brusilov Offensive are exceptions which prove the rule- states at this time, and their armies, are far too resilient to be easily broken through with dense infantry formations, especially on narrow and relatively defensible terrain. For all their numerous failings, the Italian army of WWI was, by 1917, not egregiously worse than her western entente allies in doctrine or leadership, and if her capabilities were less so were the commitments. As with the French the Italians have the advantage of strong interior lines (Lombardy is a fairly well developed area) and a solid and compact front; a German offensive, as against France, certainly might push the line back and achieve a temporary breakthrough but it will not induce a complete collapse or encirclement, and the effort will be a last gasp of the German Army which simply does not have any gas left in its metaphorical tank. The momentum is not there, and the Germans do not have the numbers.

 

[Jiraiyathegallant]

Reading this for 16 pages, I believe Italy’s status is the surprisingly the most important area of dispute.

It seems like virtually everyone who favors the Entente specifically believes Italy will stay in the war while most who favor the CPs odds believe Italy drops out at some point. Consequently, pro-Entente posters believe that significant pressure will still be applied to AH and by extension Germany, while pro-CP posters believe that Italy will drop out and remove an enormous amount of pressure from the CPs.

I’m curious, how many people that favor the CPs in this thread believe Italy will stay in the war and how many pro Entente posters believe Italy folds but the CPs lose anyhow?

 

[Mikestone8]

WWI breakthroughs are taken for granted without any context as to the manner and with little regard to the bloody, grueling reality of trench warfare.

I said nothing about breakthroughs.

My point was that with no AEF the German army is under less pressure on the Western Front, so can release troops to prevent any Italian breakthrough against the Austrians.

As for the Piave, if it is a strong defensive position for the Italians, presumably it is so for the Austrians also.

 

[ferdi254]

GB had no more gold or hard currency by May 1917. How do they and their allies stay in the war for one more year?

Of course the colonies will have to accept british pound but you can only get so much out of them and hardly any industrial goods.