AHC: Better Strategy on the Western Front? [WWII]

[BobTheBarbarian]

Would it have been possible for the Allies to execute OVERLORD and DRAGOON as two arms of one massive pincer attack?

Re-locate the D-Day beaches back to Dieppe to increase the scale of the encirclement, gather forces after landing, push south (not east) to gobble up Paris and link up with the Sixth Army Group at Dijon. More than a million Germans are killed, captured, or otherwise isolated in one swoop. From there, a concerted thrust along a relatively narrow front through the Saar and up into Germany: Strasbourg, Stuttgart, Nuremburg, and Leipzig - all the way to Berlin.

Sounds pretty far-fetched, but could it have worked?

 

[McPherson]

Would it have been possible for the Allies to execute OVERLORD and DRAGOON as two arms of one massive pincer attack?

Re-locate the D-Day beaches back to Dieppe to increase the scale of the encirclement, gather forces after landing, push south (not east) to gobble up Paris and link up with the Sixth Army Group at Dijon. More than a million Germans are killed, captured, or otherwise isolated in one swoop. From there, a concerted thrust along a relatively narrow front through the Saar and up into Germany: Strasbourg, Stuttgart, Nuremburg, and Leipzig - all the way to Berlin.

Sounds pretty far-fetched, but could it have worked?

Attacking into the teeth of 15th Army over that horrible ground that close to German supply depots? I'm not liking those odds at all.

 

[sloreck]

The USA cannot short the Pacific any more than they did in the Germany first strategy. Politically a no go. In fact a lot of what went to the Pacific would not be of much use in Europe. As far as "multiple landings" go, doing this runs the risk of not being able to concentrate when you need it, and also the possibility of a subsidiary invasion to be squashed. Also, the Allies simply don't have the logistic ability to support too many separated landings.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

Attacking into the teeth of 15th Army over that horrible ground that close to German supply depots? I'm not liking those odds at all.

The 15th Army's main strength was at Calais, not Dieppe.

 

[McPherson]

The 15th Army's main strength was at Calais, not Dieppe.

See MAP and compute reaction times.

IOW I am quite happy with what I wrote. I understand exactly what would happen if the Wallies tried Dieppe 2.0.

 

[Aber]

but your English ally goofed and half of his trucks are garbage
I don't think the British ever understood the nuts and bolts of logistics all too well. Certainly the Americans scrambled for every liter of gas and every kilogram of ammunition they could steal from each other. It is a myth that the Wallies were well supplied.

Re trucks - are you referring to the alleged engine issues, as research has shown these are greatly overstated.

Logistics - the British had practiced in Africa, advancing over 1700 miles. I'll have to check the dates but IIRC they shut down intake operations in Normandy and started moving the logistics base forward even before any Channel ports had been captured. There are very few examples of shortages in British supply in NW Europe, compared to the permanent US artillery ammunition shortage.

Antwerp was more important than crossing the Rhine in September for example.​

If you don't cross the Rhine in September then you probably have to wait for Spring; landing in May and an extra month of campaigning would have made a large difference.

Discussed this above. I think a push on Antwerp (narrow front) might have been justified given West Front early Sept. 1944. Montgomery did not see it. He had his reasons. ​

So what was Montgomery's 40 division plan in late August?

The key point is that Montgomery did not need Antwerp as he could meet his supply needs from the smaller Channel ports. It was supply for the US forces that was the issue, and at the start of September Eisenhower was including Rotterdam (as well as Antwerp) in his list of objectives.

The practical difficulties of opening Antwerp (and in particular Walcheren Island) have been dealt with at length on other threads.

 

[McPherson]

From "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" by Russell F. Weigley, page 281.

Yet Montgomery had been unable to avoid lowering his logistical sights from arguing for a forty-division offensive to settling for an eighteen-division advance. For one thing, he had on his hands an embarrassing fiasco of British logistics which increased his dependence on American help. Some 1,400 British three-ton lorries, plus all the replacement engines for this model, had been discovered to have faulty pistons rendering them useless. The represented the loss of 800 tons a day.

From "There's A War To Be Won, The United States Army In World War II" by Geoffrey Perret, page 371.

The transportation crisis was made worse by square-wheeled British mobility. In North Africa and again in Italy it took the British up to three times as long to move a soldier or a ton of supplies as it took the Americans. (footnote 37) During the pursuit, the British supply system virtually collapsed when thousands of brand-new but useless British trucks fell apart almost as soon as they hit the road. Three U.S. divisions were immobilized: The 26th, 95th, and 104th had come to fight but couldn't get out of Normandy because their trucks-and hundreds more-were taken to haul supplies for Montgomery. (footnote 37, page 588; John P. Lucas papers: diary, November 15, 1943: "Now I am stopped, not by the enemy but by the British inability to move. Their transport is so inferior . . ." USAMHI Archives. See also Lucian K. Truscott Jr., Command Missions (New York: 1954), 188.)

From "Eisenhower A Soldier's Life" by Carlo D'Este, page 591

The Red Ball continued in a modified form until the pursuit ended, a heroic but ultimately futile effort to keep the wheels from coming off the great Allied war machine, which had become a casualty of its own spectacular triumph. (footnote 31) To make matters worse, at a crucial moment fourteen hundred newly introduced three-ton British trucks broke down almost immediately with cracked piston rings, leaving the British 21st Army Group without crucial transportation and dependent on U.S. assistance. (footnote 32) (footnote 31, Christopher C. Gabel, The Lorraine Campaign, U.S. Army monograph, 1985. to long to copy talks about overloading trucks, tire shortages, supply Paris, and the French rail system that had not been repaired yet) (Footnote 32, The author cites Perret, which is above)

I have alluded to the US ammunition problem and why.

The British had a similar disaster. They were permanently undersupplied 20 pounder and 14 cm ammunition because they screwed up their ammunition usage estimates and did not catch up until August. .

17 Advanced Ordnance Depot, that outfit was torpedoed and sunk aboard their ship which screwed up deployment of British army logistics before a British or Canadian soldier stepped across Sword or Juno. 7 day delay to reconstitute which the British never made up. Americans lost their Mulberry so that was their week. Their supply system was more unit pull forward from the beaches based so it was not so inland depot dependent. See below further.

British 17 Base Ammunition Depot sorts out around 16 June. The British site near Vaux, their planned depot locus in France was not constituted, until 13 June. Till then it was unit ad hockery and chaos reigned in the British beach dumps. 14 Advanced Ordnance Depot landed on 28 June and constituted on Audrieu. 17 Base Ammunition Depot arrived on 11 June. 15 Base Ammunition Depot arrived on 18 June to take over beach logistics in British sectors. The Americans were much better organized and somewhat better established (see above.) by 14 June. Losing their Mulberry was actually a mixed blessing as they had to adopt Pacific methods to Over the Beach. This worked much better for them. Plus they got Cherbourg by 30 June and put it into service by mid August in time for the September campaigns. The British were starved almost into January. Antwerp was a desperate necessity. Dieppe and Ostende did not have the port capacity or transshipment equipage or proper road nets, Le Havre, Calais and Bologna stood sieges and were wrecked and useless until late September. Antwerp or nothing. With Montgomery's plans of operations, it was nothing.

================================================

You aren't going to beat the terrain or the Dutch and Belgian Autumn weather (mud and marsh). Plus the road net could not sustain Montgomery's proposed narrow front (18 UK/Canadian/American divisions) unless the supply line LLOCs were shortened and tonnes per kilometer/days was halved per truck park available. That extra month (landing in May) will not change this transportation fact of life.

Monty's 40 division plan for August was not practical if the revised 18 division plan in September (at his own logisticians' insistence) was impractical.

Since it is true that 21 AG did not meet its supply needs from the Channel ports at all, that those 1400 British trucks were deemed practically useless until repaired and replaced (2 months that took; so while it may seem minor after August, during July operations, it hurt the Wallie campaign in France badly. Got to factor that critical time delay here. McP.), that the British depot system was a full week delayed in constituting and never caught up in the demand backlogs, that the British suffered a permanent divisional artillery ammunition shortage as severe as the Americans, that British army logistics was overall far less efficient as a people or supply mover than the Americans (only 1/2 as efficient) that Montgomery or his logistics staff consistently underestimated land forces requirements basing such estimates on WW I experience, that is the RTL evidence that the British did not understand logistics at all in France in 1944.

 

[Aber]

From "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" by Russell F. Weigley, page 281.

From "There's A War To Be Won, The United States Army In World War II" by Geoffrey Perret, page 371.

From "Eisenhower A Soldier's Life" by Carlo D'Este, page 591

One of the problems of history is that writers copy each others work without checking the underlying documents. The base source is Wilmott's Struggle for Europe 1951 p 472:

This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) has faulty pistons which rendered them useless.

The source given is The Administrative History of the Operations of 21st Army Group p47:

(c) Vehicle Maintenance
During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill-effects ensued. A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4x4 Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and to have piston trouble.

For context this is at the end of a long section setting out how the British dealt with the transport challenges of the pursuit phase where there is no mention of any impact of the defective lorries. Similarly there is a long thread on AHF where someone has been reviewing the war diaries of transport companies and not found any evidence of significant vehicles unavailability.

TL;DR Wilmott converted an aside about a engine design issue into a transport problem not supported by the original source document; this has then been repeated and enlarged by subsequent historians.

The British were starved almost into January. Antwerp was a desperate necessity. Dieppe and Ostende did not have the port capacity or transshipment equipage or proper road nets, Le Havre, Calais and Bologna stood sieges and were wrecked and useless until late September.

Up to 7 September the British were supplied from Normandy

Bearing in mind the satisfactory levels of supplies of all natures in the RMA, it was decided to cut down imports from an average of some 16,000 tons per day to only 7,000 toms a day - Admin History 21st Army Group

After that date Dieppe was open with a capacity of 6-7,000 tons per day; Ostend from 28 September with capacity of 5,000 tons per day, Boulogne from 12 October with a capacity of 11,000 tons per day, Calais was only used for personnel from November.

TL;DR No evidence of widespread supply shortages; capacity of Channel ports exceeded Normandy.

that the British suffered a permanent divisional artillery ammunition shortage as severe as the Americans

While still managing to lend the US Army 100 25pdr guns and ammunition for 120 days; Ruppenthal Vol2 p271

However this was of course helped by the re-capture from the Germans of 80,000 25 pdr shells at Louvain.

 

[McPherson]

One of the problems of history is that writers copy each others work without checking the underlying documents. The base source is Wilmott's Struggle for Europe 1951 p 472:

The source given is The Administrative History of the Operations of 21st Army Group p47:

For context this is at the end of a long section setting out how the British dealt with the transport challenges of the pursuit phase where there is no mention of any impact of the defective lorries. Similarly there is a long thread on AHF where someone has been reviewing the war diaries of transport companies and not found any evidence of significant vehicles unavailability.

TL;DR Wilmott converted an aside about a engine design issue into a transport problem not supported by the original source document; this has then been repeated and enlarged by subsequent historians.

Up to 7 September the British were supplied from Normandy

After that date Dieppe was open with a capacity of 6-7,000 tons per day; Ostend from 28 September with capacity of 5,000 tons per day, Boulogne from 12 October with a capacity of 11,000 tons per day, Calais was only used for personnel from November.

TL;DR No evidence of widespread supply shortages; capacity of Channel ports exceeded Normandy.

While still managing to lend the US Army 100 25pdr guns and ammunition for 120 days; Ruppenthal Vol2 p271

However this was of course helped by the re-capture from the Germans of 80,000 25 pdr shells at Louvain.

Hmm.

1, American source 1. To give an overview.
2, I note with interest your September dates and tonnages. Not enough for 18 divisions. How do I know this? A Wallie division used ~650 tonnes per day. 11,700 tonnes for 21 AG. Ostende and Dieppe with 11,000 tonnes in theory could supply those 18 divisions short 1,700 tonnes, except 30% was wasted in transport costs. 3,000 tonnes additional shortfall we add to that. The shortfall from Sword, Gold and Juno was 50% by transport cost. The UK turnaround through Omaha and Utah was so fouled up the US said to hell with it and shipped own forces supply from Atlantic ports direct to France and cleared through Cherbourg and Brest.
3, I think Liddell Hart is one we can add to the 1400 trucks citations. History of the Second World War from 1971.From where did he get it?

By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless.[1] These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.

[1]See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47

4, That is Wilmot; "The Struggle For Europe" on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition. BRITISH source, citing their official history by page .

They were screwed up. They said so. They even give the time hack. And their numbers check with mine to an unfortunate fare thee well.

So it does come back to Wilmot, but not page 472. And the problem is that he gives HIS SOURCE and cites it on page 524 in the copy I quote.

5. https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA640838

British account of what they saw and did. Note that they give incorrect information about the Falaise Gap? So got to be careful (as Raymond Spruance said of the lying Marc Mitscher) of "official accounts".

Nevertheless, note what is on page 21. The official history, Item 85. It mentions 8,900 tonnes supply shortfall that had to be made up by emergency airlift. BTW that would be AMERICAN airlift since 90% Allied air freight not dedicated to MG ongoing when this crunch came, was at that time was USAAF.

It is what it is. I wish it were not so, but so it was.

 

[Aber]

Hmm.
3, I think Liddell Hart is one we can add to the 1400 trucks citations. History of the Second World War from 1971.From where did he get it?

4, That is Wilmot; "The Struggle For Europe" on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition. BRITISH source, citing their official history by page .

They were screwed up. They said so. They even give the time hack. And their numbers check with mine to an unfortunate fare thee well.

So it does come back to Wilmot, but not page 472. And the problem is that he gives HIS SOURCE and cites it on page 524 in the copy I quote.

And?

I have a copy of both Wilmott and the Administrative History of 21st Army Group. The relevant source paragraph in the latter re the 1400 trucks is (as I quoted above):

(c) Vehicle Maintenance
During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill-effects ensued. A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4x4 Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and to have piston trouble.

The source does not say this had any impact on British operations, that is Wilmott's interpretation. As far as I am aware no primary source evidence has been found of British transport companies having significant numbers of vehicles unavailable (and I am aware of participants on another forum who have been trawling the war diaries for the relevant units).

5. https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA640838

Link does not work for me, so I have no idea what you are talking about.

shipped own forces supply from Atlantic ports direct to France and cleared through Cherbourg and Brest.

Brest? Where the survey report on 29 September concluded that unloading of anything would not be possible for 75 days?

 

[phx1138]

Step back from OTL Neptune. There are four options I see. One, for Torch, is land at Bône instead of Oran. That's probably too risky for Marshall to sign off on.

Two, bottle up DAK rather than clear them out. Let the RN MTBs have their fun (if DAK actually tries to evac).

Three, shoot Winston when he suggests invading through Yugoslavia.

Four, ignore Winston when he suggests invading Italy, & hit Northen & Southern France at once in around May or June '43. (This does require deciding soon enough, so the priority on LCs isn't reduced... It may, but IMO shouldn't, require a slowdown in SWPA for a month or two.)

In short, end the war by the end of '44, & figure out what to do about keeping the Sovs out of Korea & Japan & how to keep France from screwing things up in Vietnam & Algeria...

there was a hard limit to a land-all-around strategy: the availability of landing craft and landing ships

That's because of a production priority decision which reduced the number of LC in favor of CVs, because the May-June '44 date was accepted. Believe it or not.

Sending another 15 divisions to Europe would have meant devoting more ship building capacity to transports and supply ships

Less than you might think. Every ship used in PTO could do twice the work for ETO, because of poor loading/unloading facilities in PTO, among other issues. (I can't blame pure laziness, but it has a bad smell, to me.)

 

[Ian_W]

Four, ignore Winston when he suggests invading Italy, & hit Northen & Southern France at once in around May or June '43. (This does require deciding soon enough, so the priority on LCs isn't reduced... It may, but IMO shouldn't, require a slowdown in SWPA for a month or two.)

Using what for air cover to support the invasion of Southern France ? And using what for transports to support two large invasions in mid-1943 ?

It's May/June 43, so you don't have time to take Corsica and Sardinia, and the Luftwaffe hasn't been ground down sufficiently either.

Also, what do you do when the Germans take what they were going to use at Kursk and throw it at one of your inadequately-covered-by-air invasions ? I mean, apart from look at the possibility of a breakthrough followed by mass surrenders.

This sort of gross ignorance of logistical reality is exactly why there were people whose job was to sit on Churchill when he pointed fingers at maps.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Less than you might think. Every ship used in PTO could do twice the work for ETO, because of poor loading/unloading facilities in PTO, among other issues. (I can't blame pure laziness, but it has a bad smell, to me.)

Roughly triple the transit time to the S Pacific from the US West coast ports compared to the RT from Baltimore or Boston to Liverpool.

Or 80 ton/days vs 30 ton/days. So a 10,200 ton capacity Liberty ship delivers 30,600 tons to SPac in 8-10 months, & delivers 81,600 tons to Liverpool in the same time.

Thats the simple version. Slower ships, like the Liberty ships generally went on the short hops like the North Atlantic route & the fast ships in the long runs, like the Cape route to Persian or Indian & Australian ports. So the ships redirected from delivery to Wellington NZ or Suez give you a larger saving in ton/days. Ten as you say there is the problem of lack of warehousing on Fiji leading to the ship idle there until unloaded.

 

[phx1138]

Using what for air cover to support the invasion of Southern France ? And using what for transports to support two large invasions in mid-1943 ?

How much air was used over Italy? How much shipping to supply ops there? And civilian needs? How much would be specifically created, or set aside, if JCS knows the invasion is going ahead, which didn't pertain OTL?

It's May/June 43, so you don't have time to take Corsica and Sardinia

No? Don't waste the time, effort, & manpower reducing Tunisia, & go right for Sicily after bottling up DAK--& don't let anybody escape Sicily.

the Luftwaffe hasn't been ground down sufficiently either

Do you insist on OTL level of superiority? If so, you're right. I'm not so sure the WAllies didn't have enough--or couldn't find it.

Also, what do you do when the Germans take what they were going to use at Kursk

What does the Red Army do unfettered?

And that presumes the Germans can get it to Normandie unhampered (or substantially).

This sort of gross ignorance of logistical reality is exactly why there were people whose job was to sit on Churchill when he pointed fingers at maps.

It may be. IMO, it merits examination. Presuming OTL constraints must still apply, IMO, is a mistake.

Edit:
I'll also say, given a choice between Southern France & Normandie, I'll take Normandie every time. If the force & facilities won't support *Anvil, call it off for *Neptune.

Knowing it's coming off in May/June '43, IMO JCS is going to adjust everything they're doing, & not stick to OTL: in essence, accelerate the OTL schedule. Will that produce exactly OTL results? No. Will it produce substantially the same ones? IMO, yes--which makes overwhelming panzer attacks, in the face of a (less arid) rail desert, (almost) as improbable as OTL. And that's against the much easier time getting ashore, & staying ashore.

I reject the proposition the JCS was too stubborn to adjust its planning in the face of the changed situation.

Antwerp was more important than crossing the Rhine in September for example. Cut off a whole week of Red Ball travel from Normandy to the fronts if the seaports were 400 km away instead of 1100 km, ya know? BAD GENERALSHIP not to understand the time/fuel/load factors involved.

Agreed, & Monty, when it was pointed out to him by a Canadian, appears to have ignored it...

I'd add a couple of small points in ref the Red/White Ball op (both, again, based on the Official History). One, they used deuce-and-a-halfs, not ten-tonners, which were in short supply (because nobody anticipated needing them so much). Two, the semis that were used were ill-organized; the historian suggests the op should have more closely resembled a railyard. (He didn't, however, diagram it, so I have no real idea what he had in mind... I'd love to know.)

 

[Ian_W]

How much air was used over Italy? How much shipping to supply ops there? And civilian needs? How much would be specifically created, or set aside, if JCS knows the invasion is going ahead, which didn't pertain OTL?

No? Don't waste the time, effort, & manpower reducing Tunisia, & go right for Sicily after bottling up DAK--& don't let anybody escape Sicily.

Do you insist on OTL level of superiority? If so, you're right. I'm not so sure the WAllies didn't have enough--or couldn't find it.

What does the Red Army do unfettered?

And that presumes the Germans can get it to Normandie unhampered (or substantially).

It may be. IMO, it merits examination. Presuming OTL constraints must still apply, IMO, is a mistake.

Edit:
I'll also say, given a choice between Southern France & Normandie, I'll take Normandie every time. If the force & facilities won't support *Anvil, call it off for *Neptune.

In some kind of order.

Look at a map. Sicily doesn't do anything for supporting an invasion of Southern France. You need Corsica and Sardinia, because fighters don't fly that far.

Yes, I do insist on something similar to OTL levels of superiority, because right up until the very end of the war, because absent hostile air cover, where a Panzer Corps wanted to go, it went.

Without Kursk ? It sits around for a bit, surprised the Germans didn't attack where Zhukov said they would, and then re-conquers the Ukraine on schedule.

Yeah. In '43, they can get to Normandy unhampered, because at this point the Luftwaffe is still a thing.

It deserves examination, And then to be squashed, for the same reason Winnie's dumbshit ideas about the Balkans deserved examination, and then to be squashed.

 

[phx1138]

Roughly triple the transit time to the S Pacific

That's a big part of it, ditto warehousing. From a vague recall of the AUS Official History volume on logistics, I have a sense there was more than that, some amount of laxity, too. That may be writer bias, or bad recall, or both.

Look at a map. Sicily doesn't do anything for supporting an invasion of Southern France. You need Corsica and Sardinia, because fighters don't fly that far.

Sicily should take Italy out of the war, perhaps make her change sides. As noted, I can happily write off *Anvil.

Yes, I do insist on something similar to OTL levels of superiority

"Something similar" is not "the same as", which is my point. Was "similar enough" in reach, given what was at hand in '43--& given what could be, given JCS puts its entire emphasis on Normandie '43 instead of '44?

where a Panzer Corps wanted to go, it went.

Once it reaches (approximately) the battlezone, I won't debate it. Getting anywhere near it, with railways wrecked? The Allies couldn't cope with the ruination, let alone the Germans. How much less wrecked is the French (& international) rail net with the lower Allied air strength?

Without Kursk ? It sits around for a bit, surprised the Germans didn't attack where Zhukov said they would, and then re-conquers the Ukraine on schedule.

And the absence of any German attack has no influence whatever? So what was the point of attacking, except to do it?

Yeah. In '43, they can get to Normandy unhampered, because at this point the Luftwaffe is still a thing.

And the Allied ability to destroy railyards & trains isn't trivial even in '43. It wasn't done OTL because it didn't need to be: Neptune was scheduled for a year later. What would be achieved if the need was there?

So if you were Eisenhower or Alanbrooke, with no access to history books from the future, at which date would you have written the memo to your subordinates instructing them to start planning on the basis that German armoured formations were now a non-issue since they would be shot/bombed to shreds as soon as they appeared?

At the risk of sounding complacent, about December '44. It was becoming clear fuel shortages were crippling German armored operations, & Allied air dominated the sky. The change in Germany's fortunes in the Ardennes, after the change in the weather, persuades me.

Historiographers might roast me for it later, however.

There are very few examples of shortages in British supply in NW Europe

AIUI, fuel shortages were a persistent issue, leading to (frex) immobilizing Third Army for a time (which infuriated Patton).

Antwerp was more important than crossing the Rhine in September for example. Cut off a whole week of Red Ball travel from Normandy to the fronts if the seaports were 400 km away instead of 1100 km, ya know? BAD GENERALSHIP not to understand the time/fuel/load factors involved.

AIUI, Monty had it pointed out to him by a Canadian (& he didn't respect Canadians, so he ignored it ).

There were two issues in ref the Red/White Ball. One, they used deuce-and-a-halfs, not ten-tonners, which were in short supply (because nobody had anticipated needing them so much). Two, the semis that were used weren't put to best use. (The Historian, in the volume I read, said the op should have more closely resembled a railyard. He didn't diagram it, so IDK what he had in mind. I'd love to know.)

 

[McPherson]

The source does not say this had any impact on British operations, that is Wilmott's interpretation. As far as I am aware no primary source evidence has been found of British transport companies having significant numbers of vehicles unavailable (and I am aware of participants on another forum who have been trawling the war diaries for the relevant units).

Of course not, if it is British origin data. Montgomery pulled a Mitscher. HE picked the trucks!

Americans tend to notice that in their commentaries.

McP.

 

[Aber]

AIUI, fuel shortages were a persistent issue, leading to (frex) immobilizing Third Army for a time (which infuriated Patton).

Fuel supply is complex, as it involved more integration between British and US supply services than most other commodities. However as well as the overall supply levels, how it was distrusted in accordance with priorities is critical, and the British seem to have done this better - IIRC Guards Armoured had enough fuel for another 100 miles after Brussels, while US First Army tank divisions were immobilised in pursuit in southern Belgium.

US Third was immobilised to give US First Army more fuel to go towards the Aachen Gap, it was not diverted to the British.

 

[McPherson]

Fuel supply is complex, as it involved more integration between British and US supply services than most other commodities. However as well as the overall supply levels, how it was distrusted in accordance with priorities is critical, and the British seem to have done this better - IIRC Guards Armoured had enough fuel for another 100 miles after Brussels, while US First Army tank divisions were immobilised in pursuit in southern Belgium.

US Third was immobilised to give US First Army more fuel to go towards the Aachen Gap, it was not diverted to the British.

Staffwork. BRITISH staffwork. They stole the fuel. Bradley in the cascade outranked Patton, so he got the lion's share of what was left.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Bradley in the cascade outranked Patton, so he got the lion's share of what was left.

Not quite sure what this means? Bradley commanded a army group of two armies at that date, the 1st commanded by Hodges & 3rd/Patton.