Would Operation Barbarossa still be executed if Britain is out of WW2 by then?

[Post]

It's a white peace, which is basically one side (in this case, the British) admitting that they will lose if they continue fighting. It might not be quite a surrender, but it's damned close.

I was thinking of something like the peacetreaty of Amiens, which in the end only temporarily ceased hostilities.

In this case at most it would acknowledge the German territory gains, but still keep the empire assets at where they were when the peace was signed. Which would mean the Italians would gain some parts of Egypt. Not a lot though, because although the first post says that the Italian momentum was not broken by operation Compass, they already had stopped their advance a lot earlier, shortly after they advanced.

 

[Michele]

People say a lot of things after a shocking experience, they frequently change their minds once heads cool off, as in this case.

Sure. And people may also come up with official explanations for decisions, which aren't necessarily the real reason.

And that was my whole point, they rebuilt the 7th, prepared to use it, and cancelled the operation on grounds other than the FJs vulnerability.

Well yes, they rebuilt their para force. I never said the Germans were against small-scale coup-de-main paradrops, that's evidenced by historical reality - and those company-sized, battalion-sized or at most understrength-regiment-sized launches have to come from a pool of trained personnel.

 

[Sam R.]

That's the point, it wasn't just 'push it a bit further' it was prevented the economy from imploding and the government being unable to fight the war. In my earlier post I linked to a Russian historian who makes a strong case that the Soviets lied (overinflated) about official output numbers for tanks and aircraft in 1941-42 at least, which meant they were really balanced on a knife's edge by 1942

Does not follow. That Soviet production figures were inflated (obviously,) does not mean that they were balanced on a knifes edge. The proportion of offensives capable corps supplied by Lend Lease is the effective question. We can then determine the relative impediment of having to use non-offensive capable equipment to stand up divisions and the relative offensive impairment. As your argument was put here *any* proportion of Lend Lease going to 1941 offensive capable strategic units would mean that the Soviet economy was balanced on a knive’s edge. As I’ve said, the *determinate* proportionality isn’t being argued above. (As such the argument is repairable)

and Lend Lease really was vital to preventing the USSR from collapsing under the strain of the offensives of 1942.

Again. It depends on the relative impairment and the capacity of the party to maintain effective repression. Regardless of why we consider the Soviet Famine of 1932-1932 to have occurred, it demonstrates the capacity of the party to maintain control of a population with grossly inadequate food resources. Of immediate interest is of course the 1946 famine when too few labourers worked the land. Lend Lease / direct aid / purchased supplies are only relevant if their economic impact is greater than that of Barbarossa to date, or the 1932-1933 famine in the most affected areas. The Party isn’t going to crack under the strain. It’d have to be irrepressible uprisings, primarily amongst urban workers and other heavy industries. I’d suggest that the scissors crisis’ resolution shows the propensity of the party to fete these workers at the expense of rural proletarians and peasants. Again your argument can be rescued by comparing the proportionality to other economic crises in soviet history.

 

[MattII]

I was thinking of something like the peacetreaty of Amiens, which in the end only temporarily ceased hostilities.

In this case at most it would acknowledge the German territory gains, but still keep the empire assets at where they were when the peace was signed. Which would mean the Italians would gain some parts of Egypt. Not a lot though, because although the first post says that the Italian momentum was not broken by operation Compass, they already had stopped their advance a lot earlier, shortly after they advanced.

No-one trust Hitler, so the only 'peace' will come at the barrel of a gun.

 

[AdA]

Regarding the definition of British terms for ending the war, mentions of a "white peace" and references to a "Treaty of Amiens" analogue overlook the fact that the bare minimum Britain would have to accept was a return to the 1914 situation (with far more dangerous players). Leaving the war in 1940 means throwing away the victory in WW1.
There would be no way to mask the magnitude of this, and it could be felt by population as nothing but a defeat.
While in France the defeat could be presented in terms of national divisions, as a "stab in back" from the left (a notion that despite being false was powerful enought to still be presented by some people today) in Britain it would simply be a case of one generation throwing away the sacrifice of the previous generation.
There would be no easy come back from this, and the political impact in what was left of Europe in june 1940 would be imense.

 

[merlin]

Well, there's really no way that Germany can take Britains empire
I can see Britain selling weapons to the USSR. And with an armistice with Germany, the convoys to Murmansk wil have it a lot easier. I can't see an armistice prohibiting it, because then the UK wouldn't have signed it,they'd want their hands as free as possible. An armistice won't go much further than "we don't fight anymore."

I can see it likely that just the opposite happens. After a Dunkirk debacle the Halifax 'peace' faction in the Cabinet gets more support, and Churchill is obliged to allow enquiries of what the 'Terms' may be> Halifax proudly points out from visits by military attaches, the Germans aren't insisting on any German occupation troops. The do though insist on a pro-German stance in the British press, and look forward to signing a non-aggression pact.
while, this is all happening - revolt happened in South Africa, pro-German faction nearly seized power, could happen yet.
Anti-left propaganda in the press, for the Allies demise on Communist/left-wing in France, even the Government was being too friendly with Moscow, Berlin had to step in to secure it's eastern border.
With reminders in the press, of Britain's actions in Russia in 1919 it paved the way for British RN in the Baltic in 1941 - assisting to free the Baltic states, landing supplies at Riga..

 

[MUC]

This thread has become quite vague in its discussion because we do not have a clear POD.
When exactly does Britain stay out of the war? Is it 1940 (after the Battle of France) or is it 1941 (immediately prior to Barbarossa OTLs date) or somewhere in between? Depending on the timetable a lot changes.

Effects with a POD after the British defeat in France:

Italy is at peace with Great Britain, no need for North African Campaign.
Italy still invades Greece and has a) more resources for that theater of operations b) freedom in the Mediterranean. No British aid to Greece. We assume Greece still does not allow the Italians in (questionable, since they would be the only nation facing the Axis, if they decide to fight and wont get British aid).
Greece can still hold off the Italians at the Albanian front for some time and push back, but Italy has the capacity to invade and hold several islands and potentially even Crete, after neutralizing the small Greek fleet. No need for German paratroopers in Crete. The invasion through Albania was hampered by logistics in OTL due to Albanian port capacity, the situation is not better in this ATL. It's possible that Greece will sue for peace at some point however if lots of islands are lost and more pressure is put on by the Italians. The RM can roam freely in the Aegean / Eastern Med without the RN opposing it. Even if the Greeks dont seek truce and the Germans do not intervene, the Italians will prevail at some point. The Germans intervened in OTL not to "rescue the Italians", but to make certain the British did not gain a foothold in the Balkans. With Britain out of the war, they no longer need to do that. The Italians can continue their offensive from Albania, starve off Greece and grab islands, up until the Greeks decide to surrender or crumble. It will be inevitable without British support.
It is questionable whether or not a Yugoslav campaign would be necessary. At this point Germany is the sole ruling power and the Yugoslav officers may decide to call off the coup in fact.
Avoidance of the North African campaign & the Balkan campaign leads to Barbarossa possibly able to start 1-2 weeks earlier (I know airports were not ready and muddy weather still remains, but 1-2 weeks earlier is potentially possible). This means that the Germans may reach Moscow before winter kicks in and Soviet reinforcements arrive. If Stalin is not killed or couped the war will still drag on, since the Germans will still be pushed back, albeit with potentially lower losses. If Stalin is killed or couped, there may be a truce.
But let's assume that either Barbarossa is not launced earlier or that Stalin remains in power and the war continues.
Come 1942, the Germans will be more powerful in the Eastern Front. With Britain out of the war they do not need that many resources allocated to the West, the Med and N. Africa.
In OTL more than 40% of the fighter planes of the Luftwaffe were in the Western Front & the Med in 1942. No need for that any more. The extra couple divisions not in Africa may become a handy reserve force in the Eastern force.
One can also expect the Italians to contribute more forces in mainland Europe, now that they won't suffer all the losses they had in Northern & Eastern Africa, freeing up German troops from anti-partisan and occupation duties.
Turkey will be pushed to enter the war on the Axis side and it may indeed happen. Even if Turkey does not enter the war, the Germans will be faster and more successful in their summer offensive of 1942 in the Soviet Union. They have more trucks (lot's of those went to the Afrika Korps in OTL), they have a lot more planes and they have more troops. If the Turks join the war or open the Straights for the RM to enter the Black Sea, the Russians are in even deeper trouble.
Stalingrad will be captured early and not ignored since the German advance will be swifter in this OTL and still even if the Russians manage to pull off a counteroffensive they won't be as mobile as in OTL due to the lack of trucks and tanks without Lend Lease. They will also need to be more cautious when it comes to munitions expenditures, so Soviet artillery barrages will be lighter.
We are also bound to see a shift in German war production in 1941. With Britain out of the war, priorities will be different. Less steel and industrial capacity will go to flak batteries, fortifications in the West, u-boats and more will go into tanks, artillery and logistics (trains, trucks). I expect the Soviets to lose the Caucasus in late 1942 in this ATL.
Either Stalin throws in the towel after that and seeks truce or the Germans launch a second attempt at Moscow then.
Another factor is what happens with the US in this ATL. I am not sure, if Hitler would declare war as in OTL in 1941 after the Japanese attack. Even if he does declare war, the US are in a tough position on how to harm Germany.
An outright transatlantic invasion in Aftica (transatlantic Torch) is out of the question. With Britain out of the war, it will be very difficult for the US to help out the Soviets, trying to send in convoys to Murmansk would be suicidal.

P.S. One interesting butterfly is that if truce between Germany and Britain is signed immediately after the evacuation of BEF from France, the French fleet may not be attacked and largely neutralized by the RN. This does have potential butterflies, if the Germans manage to grab it at some later timepoint...

 

[thaddeus]

The question is whether Britain restarts it themselves or waits to be attacked. Seems like they'd be more than happy to push Hitler East and stay out unless some juicy opportunity presents itself like Germany is so weakened that France revolts and Britain can easily step into ensure their independence.

I guess it depends precisely why (and when) the British surrendered. I don't think just the loss of the BEF at Dunkirk would be enough, surely it would have to also involve a gradual strangulation of the British economy? If the Shoeburyness mine isn't mis-dropped by accident, that would make things a fair bit more difficult.

It's a white peace, which is basically one side (in this case, the British) admitting that they will lose if they continue fighting. It might not be quite a surrender, but it's damned close.

Well this isn't ASB, so they have to starve Britain out, there's no other way to get Britain to capitulate.

my speculation would be working German torpedoes coupled with historical British strike(s) on the French fleet being more successful (they were trying to sink a battleship in the middle of the Med.)

so you have more loss of British ships, at least some of the BEF and all the French stranded at Dunkirk, followed by worse destruction of French fleet. IF UK continues it appears they likely drive Vichy regime into open warfare?

(you could add in the above mentioned magnetic mines being a more robust initial effort, all a fairly realistic series of events?)

more speculative you could have the Soviets move on Turkey or even Iran in an alt. Winter War, any action that gives the appearance of a more durable CommuNazi alliance? the British would want a Phoney Peace to allow the inherent hostility between the two to resurface?

 

[Athelstane]

It's a white peace, which is basically one side (in this case, the British) admitting that they will lose if they continue fighting. It might not be quite a surrender, but it's damned close.

More like an admission that they can't win. Britain only really loses if it's conquered - also beyond German capabilities.

But what Hitler seems to have been offering was something close to a status quo ante bellum - though Italian mediation might have come at a price in Malta...

Well this isn't ASB, so they have to starve Britain out, there's no other way to get Britain to capitulate.

Well, again: How do they starve Britain out? The Germans never came even as close as they did to doing that in the Great War.

 

[Athelstane]

Leaving the war in 1940 means throwing away the victory in WW1.

But Britain had already thrown away the victory in WW1 when it allowed Germany to rearm; to march back into the Rhineland; when it signed a naval arms treaty allowing Germany to rebuild its navy at the max capacity its shipyards would allow for at least a decade; when it acquiesced to German absorbtion of the heart of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1938-39.

But you're right: even a white peace will feel like a defeat, since it comes on the heels of the destruction of the BEF and the Fall of France.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Does not follow. That Soviet production figures were inflated (obviously,) does not mean that they were balanced on a knifes edge. The proportion of offensives capable corps supplied by Lend Lease is the effective question. We can then determine the relative impediment of having to use non-offensive capable equipment to stand up divisions and the relative offensive impairment. As your argument was put here *any* proportion of Lend Lease going to 1941 offensive capable strategic units would mean that the Soviet economy was balanced on a knive’s edge. As I’ve said, the *determinate* proportionality isn’t being argued above. (As such the argument is repairable)

In 1941 they weren't specifically because of production, even if the numbers were inflated, but by 1942 the economy was due to the losses in resources and manpower and the mass evacuations of between 17-24 million people in 1941-42. It is also hard to factor in L-L due to the fact that most of it wasn't in finished weapons and trucks, but was either raw materials, production machinery, food, fuel, finish parts, radios, etc., stuff that enabled production and improved performance in the field if not even enabled it. In OTL 1941 the economy was not on a knife's edge given the losses they sustained, it took until 1942 to make those losses bad enough that the economy was 'over mobilized' according to Harrison, but ITTL it could well be worse given the substantial increase in Axis resources available.

Again. It depends on the relative impairment and the capacity of the party to maintain effective repression. Regardless of why we consider the Soviet Famine of 1932-1932 to have occurred, it demonstrates the capacity of the party to maintain control of a population with grossly inadequate food resources. Of immediate interest is of course the 1946 famine when too few labourers worked the land. Lend Lease / direct aid / purchased supplies are only relevant if their economic impact is greater than that of Barbarossa to date, or the 1932-1933 famine in the most affected areas. The Party isn’t going to crack under the strain. It’d have to be irrepressible uprisings, primarily amongst urban workers and other heavy industries. I’d suggest that the scissors crisis’ resolution shows the propensity of the party to fete these workers at the expense of rural proletarians and peasants. Again your argument can be rescued by comparing the proportionality to other economic crises in soviet history.

That happened in peacetime against a 'class' that was determined to be the enemy. The Soviet ability to conduct peace time repression of a subset of one region does not mean it could do the same in wartime against a much larger swath of the population, especially if what they need is that population to work to enable the economy to function; if they are too weak due to starvation to work, then no matter the repression the system breaks down. It happened in several places IOTL despite LL food and the use of 'victory gardens' to supplement that grossly inadequate official rations. IOTL people working in factories were even dying into 1944 from the results of malnutrition in 1941-43:
https://www.amazon.com/Hunger-War-Provisioning-Soviet-during/dp/0253017084

Without the LL food shipments, which was about 310k tons from June 1941-June 1942 and increased from July 1942-June 1943 to about 1 million tons, most of it high calorie pre-packaged food, deaths and disease from food problems would be substantially worse.
https://histrf.ru/uploads/media/default/0001/12/df78d3da0fe55d965333035cd9d4ee2770550653.pdf

In the first months of 1942 food supplies to the USSR almost entirely reduced to flour, wheat, sugar. But the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States made a request for more canned meat, fats and oils. Significant food supplies from the United States began in October 1942, when the enemy seized a rich agricultural region of the North Caucasus, and stood at the walls of Stalingrad. The increase in these deliveries grew rapidly, and in December they were given priority over other strategic industrial products14

Food supplies under Lend-Lease had a very wide range, which should never be forgotten when assessing military and economic aid of the United States to its Russian ally. The data of Tables 1 and 2 are stated as an example:16

Please refer to pp.111-113 for the tables, they detail all the food sent.

During the supplies under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received 238 million kg of frozen beef and pork, 218 million kg of canned meats (including 75 million kg of stew), 33 million kg of sausages and bacon, 1,089 million kg of chicken meat, 110 million kg of egg powder, 359 million kg of vegetable oil and margarine, 99 million kg of butter, 36 million kg of cheese 72 million kg of milk powder.17 Various sources determine that the general volume of supplies was up to 4 or 5 million tons. The difference is due to the variety of methods to determine the volume, the difference between metric and short tones and a number of other reasons. Reporting data of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States contain a lot of accurate information.18 Some foods have played a huge role for recovering soldiers, the number of which reached 22 million people during war. Average annual imports of grain, cereals, flour (in terms of grain) made 2.8% of average annual grain stocks in the USSR. The need of the army for bread and grain forage at that time, not to mention potatoes and vegetables, was mainly satisfied by local funds. And for all other domestic food, centralized supply continued to keep a leading position, accounting for 90% or more of total deliveries.19

It is necessary to once again stress the role of food supply, especially the United States. Being pretty weakened in material and human resources, the village could not provide adequate food to the multimillion army, employees of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, and the entire population of the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, the food supply to the Soviet Union was very much appreciated. It is difficult to imagine a situation in the country without such assistance.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Basically, assume that British morale is broken after disaster hits their armies in the opening years of WW2. The BEF’s evacuation from Dunkirk is more of a failure, the Italian invasion of Egypt somehow does not have its momentum broken by Operation Compass, and the Luftwffe manages to incur heavier damage on British infrastructure. Churchill is no-confidenced, and parliament makes a formal, conditional peace with Hitler before mid-1941.
The main question is, how does this affect Hitler’s plans for invading the USSR later on?

With a 'peace' in the west there is a reduced need for naval and air forces elsewhere. Others have addressed this to some extent in this thread. Thennaval construction program could be dialed back where it makes material for the eastern war available. A wholesale reduction does not necessarily result in a 1-1 exchange, but selective redirection of resources helps.

The loss of the German aircraft in the BoB has been remarked on here as well. Nearly 2000 aircraft 'saved' for use in 1941 through this, & the aircrew. Then there is a the smaller saving from no Balkans campaign, or diversion of air forces to Lybia & Italy.

Then there is a savings of fuel & related items from these several campaigns not happening. What I see as a possible loss would be in vehicles. OTL there was a significant expansion of German motorization through looting the automotive stocks in the west. Military grade vehicle were seized enmass for the Wehrmacht. further, less desirable commercial grade vehicles were seized and given to German business/industry to replace military grade vehicles requisitioned for the Wehrmahct. Peace treaties with the Netherlands , Belgium, and France might include such a massive transfer of automotive stocks, but then it may be less. My wild guess here it would be something less & the Wehrmacht less motorized than OTL. Similary draconian rationing of peril fuels in the west helped increase the Wehrmachts fuel reserves for the eastern war. Again my guess is this is a lesser amount than OTL.

Given the unreality of Hitlers planning for Op BARBAROSSA of OTL none of this may matter at the strategic level. Obviously fewer supply trucks, mechanized divisions, or fuels reserves implacts tactical & operational planning, but I suspect the overarching assumptions and strategic plan would look much the same.

OTL the garrisons remaining in the west were immobile port garrisons, with a small mobile reserve. Adding this into the equation for the eastern war of 1941 looks irrelevant. Much of that might remain in the west as a residual enforcement force as the Peace treaties with France & the Low countries are finalized. Since this was a very immobile 'army' its relevancy in the east is mostly as a reserve of cannon fodder, replacements for losses of the opening months of the campaign. Then there is the perennial question of the Afrika Korps taking Moscow. Unless one substantially improves the Axis logistics effort I cant see the elimination of the Balkans campaign, or the Lybian expedition making any strategic difference. More mechanized units = greater logistics demand.

I’m under the impression that Stalin would be more willing to listen to his advisors on an imminent German invasion if Britain is out of the ring, but i’d like to hear your arguments on this.

Maybe. Without a war in the west Stalin logically cant dismiss evidence of a attack coming. Yet he did dismiss strong evidence OTL, so we cant dismiss such ourselves.

Effects epends on how soon the choice is made. My take is that in strategic terms the German attack was no surprise. The Red Army was mobilizing its reserves and reorganizing for war about as fast as practical. Operationally it means changes in the deployment of the existing and the newly mobilized units. Tactically it means when the attack comes the armies on the frontier are not caught in their barracks & training camps. They would be concentrated in their battle positions, ammunition distributed and artillery deployed. War communications would be set up, and war codes ready. This makes some difference in the opening days, and has some knock on effects thru the summer and autumn. Perhaps the largest long term effect would be a increase of German & Rumanian casualties in July & August. OTL the German lost about 390,000 KIA, WIA, prisoners, and non combat casualties by the end of August. If the Red Army is 20% more efficient in inflicting casualties in the first 60 days, then the Wehrmacht loss push towards 470,000. Run that projection out to November & a OTL loss of approx 800,000 becomes 960,000. I'll leave the reader to speculate on the effects there.

 

[AdA]

But Britain had already thrown away the victory in WW1 when it allowed Germany to rearm; to march back into the Rhineland; when it signed a naval arms treaty allowing Germany to rebuild its navy at the max capacity its shipyards would allow for at least a decade; when it acquiesced to German absorbtion of the heart of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1938-39.

But you're right: even a white peace will feel like a defeat, since it comes on the heels of the destruction of the BEF and the Fall of France.

The main gain for Britain in WW1 was to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant power in Europe. Weapons limitations were just an insurance policy. Acknowledging German dominance in 1940 would be throwing away WW1.

 

[MattII]

More like an admission that they can't win. Britain only really loses if it's conquered - also beyond German capabilities.

You have Churchill being tossed out, and no-one trusts Hitler, so the only way you can get a white peace is if Hitler demonstrates a clear superiority of arms.

Well, again: How do they starve Britain out? The Germans never came even as close as they did to doing that in the Great War.

I don't know how, but for this scenario to work that's what has to happen.

 

[Seandineen]

Perhaps trading a alliance with a non Hitler led Reich for Madagascar instead of the Holocaust.

 

[Sam R.]

Perhaps trading a alliance with a non Hitler led Reich for Madagascar instead of the Holocaust.

Sorry mate, but you’re going to learn some deeply unpleasant things about the war.

You start Barbarossa, you get a holocaust.

The problem of widespread undesired populations was put on the table by the failure to adequately starve soviet pows to death in camps, and by the failure of “actions” to be anything more than secondline entertainment for first line troops or a way to psychiatrically disturb the most committed Nazis. Browning’s _Ordinary Men: Police battalion 101_ is seminal to this new “eastern” process functionalism. Police battalions were comprised of older men (who should be inured against Nazi propaganda), whose party affiliations matched Weimar voting. And they were a fundamental implement and fundamentally demanded to shoot all Jews and as many Slavs as they desired.

The demand for the holocaust is bottom up as well as top down. It starts with “police actions” and an oversupply of “undermen” in camps the state refuses to feed. It gets mechanised because the poor darlings get psychiatric injuries from starving and killing fellow human beings all day on a craft basis. You start Barbarossa, the holocaust becomes systematically deadly.

There are other equivalent studies of pb in Yugoslavia. I’m sorry if you thought leadership ideology was at fault. The decision to kill millions of European civilians as an end in itself was a genuinely popular one in Germany.

Yours,
Sam R.

 

[Marc]

Less assets that Germans need to spend on the Wehrmacht gets directed to the SS, and an acceleration of the Final Solution.

 

[Seandineen]

Sorry mate, but you’re going to learn some deeply unpleasant things about the war.

You start Barbarossa, you get a holocaust.

The problem of widespread undesired populations was put on the table by the failure to adequately starve soviet pows to death in camps, and by the failure of “actions” to be anything more than secondline entertainment for first line troops or a way to psychiatrically disturb the most committed Nazis. Browning’s _Ordinary Men: Police battalion 101_ is seminal to this new “eastern” process functionalism. Police battalions were comprised of older men (who should be inured against Nazi propaganda), whose party affiliations matched Weimar voting. And they were a fundamental implement and fundamentally demanded to shoot all Jews and as many Slavs as they desired.

The demand for the holocaust is bottom up as well as top down. It starts with “police actions” and an oversupply of “undermen” in camps the state refuses to feed. It gets mechanised because the poor darlings get psychiatric injuries from starving and killing fellow human beings all day on a craft basis. You start Barbarossa, the holocaust becomes systematically deadly.

There are other equivalent studies of pb in Yugoslavia. I’m sorry if you thought leadership ideology was at fault. The decision to kill millions of European civilians as an end in itself was a genuinely popular one in Germany.

Yours,
Sam R.

I see.

 

[GauchoBadger]

@Carl Schwamberger
I understand your argument. Frankly, i also don't think a smaller number of trucks and vehicles for the German war effort would be much of a disadvantage, considering the traffic problems that occurred in OTL Russian roads as German trucks, trains, and horses congested them into bottlenecks.

 

[cortz#9]

@Carl Schwamberger
I understand your argument. Frankly, i also don't think a smaller number of trucks and vehicles for the German war effort would be much of a disadvantage, considering the traffic problems that occurred in OTL Russian roads as German trucks, trains, and horses congested them into bottlenecks.

The Germans could've used more half-tracks for Barbarossa both light and heavy.