Improve the Singapore Strategy

Second, Phillips told the Admiralty he intended to attack the enemy forces off Kota Bharu and eight hours later, he sailed, 1005 on the 8th London time. The Admiralty did not reply to his message, and at 2200 on the 9th London time, when Force Z had been at sea for some 36 hours, there was a staff conference on naval dispositions in the Pacific. Churchill, Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Pound were in attendance. Churchill favored withdrawal, but at the late hour, it was decided to settle things in the morning. It was already too late. If deterrence had failed, why not immediately order him to Ceylon or Australia? That's a failure of the Prime Minister and the Admiralty.

To return to the original question, what was really needed was an equal commitment by all three services. The Army should have provided artillery, including AAA (when the Japanese bombed Singapore on the 8th, the only guns that could reach the altitude of the bombers were the 5.25in aboard Prince of Wales), and some light and/or medium tanks, and the RAF needed to provide more modern fighters and some twin-engine medium bombers A squadron or two of heavy bombers, even Short Stirlings would have helped as well. Vickers Vildabeest were not exactly the planes to give the Japanese pause. Ad those to a cruiser squadron with supporting destroyers, and larger carrier/capital ship fleet in the Indian that could be in Singapore in a number of days (even if it doesn't do so, the threat is there) and the Japanese calculations for their southern move would be very different, in my opinion.

My thoughts,

Politics (colonial ones, to boot)demand a fleet, no matter how adequate, be deployed to Singapore to save face from the natives.

Where can all the extra force be diverted from?
 
I think one of the elements missing in the Singapore Strategy was proof of concept to demonstrate the feasibility of the strategy. If the idea was to send a battlefleet to Singapore in times of danger, why not send one every few years, or at least once to see if it can be done? The Singapore base was completed in 1938, but a fleet could have been sent after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

The Treasury was going scream bloody murder for the expenses and the voting population was going to look at such "warmongering" and "wasteful" exercise with displeasure. Also, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was by no means an indication of a naval threat to UK seapower in SEA.

Don't not forget war is a political tool. I find such failure to consider UK domestic politics among members confusing.

Also, hindsight is not useful in evaluating what should then leaders do.
 
Politics (colonial ones, to boot)demand a fleet, no matter how adequate, be deployed to Singapore to save face from the natives.

Where can all the extra force be diverted from?
There we get away from British Far East policy into Australian and New Zealand policy that said rely on the Royal Navy rather than pay for the ships your own people are telling you that you need. They claimed that the Singapore naval base was essential for their national defence but kept their treasuries closed when it came to paying their fair share of the costs. Depression or no depression the pre war Australian and New Zealand defence expenditures cannot be justified.
 
There we get away from British Far East policy into Australian and New Zealand policy that said rely on the Royal Navy rather than pay for the ships your own people are telling you that you need. They claimed that the Singapore naval base was essential for their national defence but kept their treasuries closed when it came to paying their fair share of the costs. Depression or no depression the pre war Australian and New Zealand defence expenditures cannot be justified.

Welcome to Grand Strategy 101. Study on Imperial Defence requires understanding of Inter-Dominions relationships, Dominion-UK relationships and how the British national security apparatus (The Committee of Imperial Defence, set up in 1923, the first of such organisations in the world that integrated the armed forces, the diplomatic service and the intelligence service into a single advisory body) precept and evaluate threats.
 
Apparently at the 1937 Imperial Conference the Australian Government offered funding for either a Battleship, A Bomber Wing or an Armoured Division but the UK knocked it back. There was also an awful lot of British trade and investment in Asia and that the Pound was the worlds reserve currency that needed protecting than just the Dominions. It was understood that the UK was Priority 1, Asia 2 and Med 3. 2 and 3 somehow got swapped with little discussion.
 
Welcome to Grand Strategy 101. Study on Imperial Defence requires understanding of Inter-Dominions relationships, Dominion-UK relationships and how the British national security apparatus (The Committee of Imperial Defence, set up in 1923, the first of such organisations in the world that integrated the armed forces, the diplomatic service and the intelligence service into a single advisory body) precept and evaluate threats.

The other consideration is that in any 'Equation' regarding the forces that could be sent East, I don't think anyone had imagined that by 1941 Germany would be dominant in Europe, France and its Navy effectively knocked out and at worst an additional threat with Italy also weighing in.

All prewar plans would have turned to shit!
 
Apparently at the 1937 Imperial Conference the Australian Government offered funding for either a Battleship, A Bomber Wing or an Armoured Division but the UK knocked it back. There was also an awful lot of British trade and investment in Asia and that the Pound was the worlds reserve currency that needed protecting than just the Dominions. It was understood that the UK was Priority 1, Asia 2 and Med 3. 2 and 3 somehow got swapped with little discussion.
Have you details on the offer?

According to the Naval Historical Society of Australia and this matches what I've previously read on the topic Australia offered to pay for a battleship to be built if the Royal Navy bought the existing Australian cruiser force off them to defray the cosfs. The British response was that shipyards are currently busy and they weren't particularly interested in purchasing Australian cruisers. At any rate an unescorted battleship was not a good option and that a single capital ship was an easy target for enemy forces. Australia eventually chose to spend the same funding on a couple of light cruisers and a number of destroyers and corvettes.
 
Politics (colonial ones, to boot)demand a fleet, no matter how adequate, be deployed to Singapore to save face from the natives.

I think if politics were primary driver, Churchill and the Admiralty might have been more accomodating to Australia and New Zealand as they pulled their ships back to their home waters. But as I learned in retail, an ounce of image is worth a pound of performance. That fleet doesn't have to be based in Singapore, it or elements of it just need to show up once in a while so everyone remembers they are around. They could just as easily have been based in Trincomalee.

Where can all the extra force be diverted from?

That was the point of the discussion I referenced over on the BC board, Barry. The map there shows the RN dispositions as of October 1941, leaving a month or so if forces are to be assembled. I would not have wanted to have been in Pounds shoes, and worse, who could have foreseen just how bad that last quarter of 1941 was going to be for the RN? Ark Royal lost 14 November, Barham lost 25 November, Prince of Wales and Repulse lost 10 December, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant mined 19 December. Also subtracted, Indomitable aground 3 November, 15 December Illustrious and Formidable collide returning from repairs in the US. In the space of a month the RN went from where Prince of Wales and Repulse could be 'spared' to being short of both capital ships and carriers. The only positives were Warspite completed repairs in December and Duke of York joined the fleet in November.

Regards,
 
I think if politics were primary driver, Churchill and the Admiralty might have been more accomodating to Australia and New Zealand as they pulled their ships back to their home waters. But as I learned in retail, an ounce of image is worth a pound of performance. That fleet doesn't have to be based in Singapore, it or elements of it just need to show up once in a while so everyone remembers they are around. They could just as easily have been based in Trincomalee.



That was the point of the discussion I referenced over on the BC board, Barry. The map there shows the RN dispositions as of October 1941, leaving a month or so if forces are to be assembled. I would not have wanted to have been in Pounds shoes, and worse, who could have foreseen just how bad that last quarter of 1941 was going to be for the RN? Ark Royal lost 14 November, Barham lost 25 November, Prince of Wales and Repulse lost 10 December, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant mined 19 December. Also subtracted, Indomitable aground 3 November, 15 December Illustrious and Formidable collide returning from repairs in the US. In the space of a month the RN went from where Prince of Wales and Repulse could be 'spared' to being short of both capital ships and carriers. The only positives were Warspite completed repairs in December and Duke of York joined the fleet in November.

Regards,

Do you have a link to the map you are referring to?
 
I think if politics were primary driver, Churchill and the Admiralty might have been more accomodating to Australia and New Zealand as they pulled their ships back to their home waters. But as I learned in retail, an ounce of image is worth a pound of performance. That fleet doesn't have to be based in Singapore, it or elements of it just need to show up once in a while so everyone remembers they are around. They could just as easily have been based in Trincomalee.



That was the point of the discussion I referenced over on the BC board, Barry. The map there shows the RN dispositions as of October 1941, leaving a month or so if forces are to be assembled. I would not have wanted to have been in Pounds shoes, and worse, who could have foreseen just how bad that last quarter of 1941 was going to be for the RN? Ark Royal lost 14 November, Barham lost 25 November, Prince of Wales and Repulse lost 10 December, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant mined 19 December. Also subtracted, Indomitable aground 3 November, 15 December Illustrious and Formidable collide returning from repairs in the US. In the space of a month the RN went from where Prince of Wales and Repulse could be 'spared' to being short of both capital ships and carriers. The only positives were Warspite completed repairs in December and Duke of York joined the fleet in November.

Regards,

Add to that the US Fleet taking it on the chin on December 7th 1941 which led to three battleship (New Mexico, Idaho, Mississippi) and one carrier (Yorktown) getting immediate transfer orders to the Pacific.
 

MatthewB

Banned
Okay folks........... I'd say we've covered why sending a fleet is not feasible or likely. So, what do you recommend for the Far East? Singapore base cost £28 million (1938 GBP). So you've got plenty of government cash to play with.

Given how the Japanese valued British possessions in the Pacific, including the Solomon Islands, PNG, https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/pacific.htm I've always thought better use could have been made by the British pre-war. A secret submarine base, for example.
 
Okay folks........... I'd say we've covered why sending a fleet is not feasible or likely. So, what do you recommend for the Far East? Singapore base cost £28 million (1938 GBP). So you've got plenty of government cash to play with.
The problem is where do we cross the line into ASB hindsight.....?

And what are we allowed to spend it on, does it have to be on the far east as we know with hindsight it will probably anyway be striped in 38-41 to serve west.....?

Without hindsight simply rebuilding the full (or at least three more QEs/Repulse/Hood) RN battle line in the 29-37 period to the full QE/Renown level would be a much better investment.....

With hindsight £28M will buy a lot of very interesting prototypes.... Radar, Squid, 6pdr, Rolls-Royce R/Griffon,......it would also cover a certain £5 patent renewal!
 
I honestly feel that Singapore base was probably the best strategy Britain had available to them assuming that they planned on facing no more than 2 of Germany Italy and Japan at the same time or that France would be an allied power.

I'd probably develop Singapore more as a forward operating base and Ceylon for fleet repair but that would depend on the date if knew Japan was going to invade China.
 

Riain

Banned
Vickers MkIII tanks and all the other gear for an armoured division or 3 in the 30s? Rebuilding all the Queen BBs and 3 BCs to modern standards and building a much better FAA?

There are holes all through the British defence establishment between the wars, but these don't negate the need for the Singapore strategy.
 
Okay folks........... I'd say we've covered why sending a fleet is not feasible or likely. So, what do you recommend for the Far East? Singapore base cost £28 million (1938 GBP). So you've got plenty of government cash to play with.

Given how the Japanese valued British possessions in the Pacific, including the Solomon Islands, PNG, https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/pacific.htm I've always thought better use could have been made by the British pre-war. A secret submarine base, for example.

Do you mean you have 28 million in 1938 to play with or are you going further back?
 
Okay folks........... I'd say we've covered why sending a fleet is not feasible or likely. So, what do you recommend for the Far East? Singapore base cost £28 million (1938 GBP). So you've got plenty of government cash to play with.

Given how the Japanese valued British possessions in the Pacific, including the Solomon Islands, PNG, https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/pacific.htm I've always thought better use could have been made by the British pre-war. A secret submarine base, for example.

The subs that would have used it would have been sent to the Med and expended there. And we know this, because that's what happened...

The East may have been above the Med in the pecking order, but in late 1941 only one was an active theatre and so that's where the materiel ended up. The problem is the Med.
 
I hate to bang on about this, but again using Malaya as a safe training area solves a lot of the problems. Sub training in Europe carries the very real risk of your trainees being mistaken for the enemy or otherwise being drawn into combat before they're ready. Now obviously once the Japanese attack training becomes combat but it means that there are at least there are forces in the area available and hopefully enough will be near the end of the perisher course to be useful. Graduates of the Perisher course were known to terrify other navies.
 
I hate to bang on about this, but again using Malaya as a safe training area solves a lot of the problems. Sub training in Europe carries the very real risk of your trainees being mistaken for the enemy or otherwise being drawn into combat before they're ready. Now obviously once the Japanese attack training becomes combat but it means that there are at least there are forces in the area available and hopefully enough will be near the end of the perisher course to be useful. Graduates of the Perisher course were known to terrify other navies.
It takes a very long time pre large scale air travel to move crews from GB to Malaya why waste that time when they can train off Scotland with the escort groups also training with them....? (minimum 48 days at a sustained 10 Kn going round Med, so sending them eats at least 3 months.... )

Also just how many subs did RN have that are not just doing immediate working up or are decrepit and to old available....?
 
Do you have a link to the map you are referring to?

Hi Logan,

The map of the RN dispositions in October of 1941 is on my postimage account




Background to the map: Over on the WWII Cruiser site

http://www.world-war.co.uk/index.php3

Under their "INFO" drop menu, they have a "Fleet Locator". Pick the month, the year and it will show you RN dispositions. I had taken a screen shot of October 1941 once, and used it in the BC board thread I mentioned. However, photobucket started charging for linking, and in the course of discussion the BC board pointed out some inaccuracies. So I decided to make my own, which is the above.

Regards,
 
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