Realistic Allied WW2 victory without either the USSR or the US?

[ObssesedNuker]

I said that the French can win - allthough that its not very likely if there is not a mid 1930- POD that strenghtens/improves the French air force. All you and Badlogic could produce were dubious claims with no citation that the French can win even with the Germans dominating the skies and that air power is not that important - which runs completely to everything that has happened in WW2.

Given that all you've been able to produce are articles which don't actually refute any of our observations or even indeed tend to support them on multiple counts, your own assertions are extraordinarily dubious and clearly stem from a uncritically romantic view about the effectiveness of airpower in WWII alongside blind acceptance of unreliable indicators like kill claims. The claim that what we're stating runs against everything that happened in WW2 is likewise completely baseless. We have solid examples of forces without air superiority conducting successful defensive and offensive operations against forces far more overwhelming then what the Germans threw at Sedan. Operation Uranus is an excellent example: while the Soviets did make efforts to contest the air during it, the Luftwaffe continued to hold the upper hand and conducted furious air attacks on several of the advancing Soviet formations, to no avail. The Soviet offensive at Stalingrad was one of their greatest exploitation successes and it was conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power.

Oh, and to head off Wiking's inevitable claim that this was only possible because the Germans transferred air power out: all of the transfers from Luftlotte 4 were pulled from the forces supporting the Caucasus campaign, with the Stalingrad region completely unaffected, as per Bergstrom's Black Cross Red Star, vol.3, page 194-195, and these were made up for by the reinforcement of another 6 bomber groups transferred from a different part of the front. The number of CAS groups, in particular, remained unaffected.

Make no mistake, a air force is a good force multiplier and operating under a blanket of friendly air power offers ground and naval forces additional freedom, but airpower cannot carry either a war or a (ground) campaign on its own. If your ground forces are too weak to deal with the enemy's ground forces, then the enemy are just going to suck up any losses your airpower inflicts and roll over you.​

 

[Mike D]

I asked for a realistic scenario - not some fantasy. HOW exactly are the British "winning" without LL food? Without US troops? Without US shipping space built in the US? The UK+Dominion build roughly 1/4 the aircraft, 1/7 the tanks and 1/5 the shipping space of the "Big Three". If this is enough to beat the Germans - then the Allies were complete fucking idiots OTL.

The realistic scenario is that the UK doesn't need to outproduce the US or USSR, they need to outproduce Germany and Italy which they did for virtually the entire war.

Food is produced in many places outside of the US and without war with Japan there is both more naval power to protect it while being shipped to the UK and only facing war in Europe/North Africa rather than also having to equip the Far East too there will be more money available to buy food too. You seem to forget that without capturing the Ukrainian wheat fields and with money running out even faster than the UK, Germany are also going to struggle to feed their people and they are much worse off for resources of virtually all kinds than the British Empire once the money runs out to buy them from the Soviets.

Without war against Japan there are millions of Indian troops available, along with the full strength of Australia and New Zealand and the British forces historically sent to the Far East to make up for the lost numbers of US troops.

If the USSR and US aren't involved then British priorities will change and they will change their production priorities to reflect that - just because they produced x Lancasters and y Churchills IOTL doesn't mean they'll produce exactly the same numbers in this scenario - maybe they choose to rely on Mosquitos to attack German industry while using the resources put into heavy bombers to develop and build better tanks quicker and use more shipyard resources for cargo ships rather than large numbers of aircraft carriers and battleships.

 

[Post]

If the USSR and US aren't involved then British priorities will change and they will change their production priorities to reflect that - just because they produced x Lancasters and y Churchills IOTL doesn't mean they'll produce exactly the same numbers in this scenario - maybe they choose to rely on Mosquitos to attack German industry while using the resources put into heavy bombers to develop and build better tanks quicker and use more shipyard resources for cargo ships rather than large numbers of aircraft carriers and battleships.

And maybe they will transfer more of the heavy (long-range) bombers to Coastal Command, since the lack of support from the US means the Battle of the Atlantic goes (even) worse early in the war, so they realize they need to change their tactics, which might lead to winning it sooner.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The realistic scenario is that the UK doesn't need to outproduce the US or USSR, they need to outproduce Germany and Italy which they did for virtually the entire war.

Now this, this I don't really see. Without lend-lease, the British are going to run out of funds for cash and carry imports and then they'll have to quit the war in 1942 or '43 as their production drops away for lack of raw materials. It won't be a overnight or sudden economic collapse, but probably a gradual reduction of industrial production and a constraining of options. At the very least, the shortages will force the British to become less militarily active in order to shore up their economy...

The Germans for their part, have all of Europe under their belt after they knock out France and can trade with/through the USSR at rather favorable rates to fill in what their missing. So long as they don't attack the USSR and close off that enormous hole in the blockade, they can at least meet enough of their needs to at least stay afloat and maintain their earlier ability in conducting military activity.

 

[Medved]

Given that all you've been able to produce are articles

Which is a lot more than you have provided.

We have solid examples of forces without air superiority conducting successful defensive and offensive operations against forces far more overwhelming then what the Germans threw at Sedan. Operation Uranus is an excellent example: while the Soviets did make efforts to contest the air during it, the Luftwaffe continued to hold the upper hand and conducted furious air attacks on several of the advancing Soviet formations, to no avail. The Soviet offensive at Stalingrad was one of their greatest exploitation successes and it was conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power.

During Uranus the Soviets outnumbered the Germans 2:1 and the Axis 1.1:1. They used 1500 aircraft gainst 732 German ones of which just 402 were servicable. The weather was so bad that most of the time the German aircraft had to remain grounded.

Make no mistake, a air force is a good force multiplier, and operating under a blanket of friendly air power offers ground and naval forces additional freedom, but airpower cannot carry either a war or a (ground) campaign on its own. If your ground forces are too weak to deal with the enemy's ground forces, then the enemy are just going to suck up any losses your airpower inflicts and roll over you.

Well here we clearly diasgree.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Given that all you've been able to produce are articles which don't actually refute any of our observations or even indeed tend to support them on multiple counts, your own assertions are extraordinarily dubious and clearly stem from a uncritically romantic view about the effectiveness of airpower in WWII alongside blind acceptance of unreliable indicators like kill claims. The claim that what we're stating runs against everything that happened in WW2 is likewise completely baseless. We have solid examples of forces without air superiority conducting successful defensive and offensive operations against forces far more overwhelming then what the Germans threw at Sedan. Operation Uranus is an excellent example: while the Soviets did make efforts to contest the air during it, the Luftwaffe continued to hold the upper hand and conducted furious air attacks on several of the advancing Soviet formations, to no avail. The Soviet offensive at Stalingrad was one of their greatest exploitation successes and it was conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power.

Source please.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus#Soviet_offensive

While the Red Air Force strafed retreating Romanian soldiers, the Luftwaffe provided only negligible opposition.[74][75]

Sources:

• Bell, Kelly (Fall 2006). "Struggle for Stalin's Skies". WWII History: Russian Front. Special. Herndon, Virginia: Sovereign Media. Issue. 1539-5456.
• McTaggart, Pat (Fall 2006). "Soviet Circle of Iron". WWII History: Russian Front. Special. Herndon, Virginia: Sovereign Media. Issue. 1539-5456.

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/d...grad-marshal-georgi-zhukovs-operation-uranus/

The gods smiled on the Soviets about mid-morning as the fog dissipated enough for the Red Air Force to enter the fray. Aircraft from K.N. Smirnov’s 2nd and S.A. Krasovsky’s 17th Air Armies swooped down upon the retreating Romanians with a vengeance. The Luftwaffe was nowhere to be seen as the Soviet pilots bombed and strafed enemy troops and positions.

Plus per E.R. Hooton and Joel Hayward the Luftwaffe was ground down to a nub in terms of operational ratings due to their heavy support and losses taken from June-October 1942, so weren't available to do anything about the encirclement. After it the heavy Luftwaffe presence was pushed into air transport to supply the 6th Army.

Oh, and to head off Wiking's inevitable claim that this was only possible because the Germans transferred air power out: all of the transfers from Luftlotte 4 were pulled from the forces supporting the Caucasus campaign, with the Stalingrad region completely unaffected, as per Bergstrom's Black Cross Red Star, vol.3, page 194-195, and these were made up for by the reinforcement of another 6 bomber groups transferred from a different part of the front. The number of CAS groups, in particular, remained unaffected.​

The transfer was part of it during the encirclement phase (not available to help by quick transfer to Stalingrad), so was of course the pressing of bombers into transports throughout the air bridge, which meant they weren't used for bombing, while during the encirclement phase the weather prevented most flying. Also the CAS and various bombers had been worn down to a nub due to the heavy support rendered from June-October. I can look up operational ratings later when I have more time.
​

 

[Medved]

The realistic scenario is that the UK doesn't need to outproduce the US or USSR, they need to outproduce Germany and Italy which they did for virtually the entire war.

OTL spg production 1942-1944. British Empire: 20 000 - Germany: 37 000
OTL aircraft production 1942-1944. British Empire: 80 000 - Germany: 80 000

So your claim is evidently wrong.

Food is produced in many places outside of the US and without war with Japan there is both more naval power to protect it while being shipped to the UK and only facing war in Europe/North Africa rather than also having to equip the Far East too there will be more money available to buy food too. You seem to forget that without capturing the Ukrainian wheat fields and with money running out even faster than the UK, Germany are also going to struggle to feed their people and they are much worse off for resources of virtually all kinds than the British Empire once the money runs out to buy them from the Soviets.

Without war against Japan there are millions of Indian troops available, along with the full strength of Australia and New Zealand and the British forces historically sent to the Far East to make up for the lost numbers of US troops.

If the USSR and US aren't involved then British priorities will change and they will change their production priorities to reflect that - just because they produced x Lancasters and y Churchills IOTL doesn't mean they'll produce exactly the same numbers in this scenario - maybe they choose to rely on Mosquitos to attack German industry while using the resources put into heavy bombers to develop and build better tanks quicker and use more shipyard resources for cargo ships rather than large numbers of aircraft carriers and battleships.

SIGH..... the British were RUNNING OUT of manpower by 1943! Their Industrial production was SHRINKING. Their Army/Navy/Air Force was SHRINKING. They are lacking MILLIONS of TONS of food, resources, minerals, fuel ect which they have gotten from the US OTL and which CANNOT be supplied by the Dominions. 40 Million Canadians/Australians/New Zealanders/South Africans CAN NOT replace 140 Million Americans. Indians will NOT die by the Millions for their Colonial Overlords. EVERYTHING you have just written is complete ASB.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Which is a lot more than you have provided.

It's rather less, actually. In addition to pointing out the places when your articles support my points, I've also provided two actual scholarly books that discuss the subjects that came up (Glantz's "Battle of Kursk" when dealing with the spurious claim that German air power stopped the Orel Offensive and Chris Bergstrom's "Black Cross/Red Star Volume 3" for the Stalingrad situation) this. I can also add books like "Wages of Destruction" and "Cry Havoc", which examine how the Germans essentially only had one shot in 1940 become apparent when you examine their logistical and economic situation. Badlogic named quite a number of specific books as well, while you haven't been able to single out a single one which actually supports your claims.

During Uranus the Soviets outnumbered the Germans 2:1 and the Axis 1.1:1. They used 1500 aircraft gainst 732 German ones of which just 402 were servicable. The weather was so bad that most of the time the German aircraft had to remain grounded.

The Soviets also outnumbered the Germans during the rest of 1942 and in 1941 as well. Didn't prevent the Germans from seizing air superiority for long stretches of time. Weather also affects both sides of the front, so the Soviets had to contend with the same inclement conditions as the Germans. Yet as Bergstrom writes, the Germans still tended to hold the upper-hand in the air.

Well here we clearly diasgree.

But professional military strategists don't!

"As far as military innovations go, air power must be regarded as one of the most genuine and significant. It seems reasonable to argue that the exploitation of heavier than air aircraft in the twentieth century changed the character of warfare in a lasting fashion. Almost every conflict is now influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by air power. Indeed, as Field Marshal Montgomery noted: 'If we lose the war in the air we lose the war and lose it quickly.' Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that air power has become the decisive instrument in modern warfare. As noted in the Introduction to this book, strategy is a complex, multidimensional activity. That being the case, to identify any one factor as being decisive is an oversimplification." -Understanding Contemporary Strategy, pg.158

The chapter goes on to detail the benefits of airpower, including its flexibility and responsiveness, but also its weakness including its high costs and low efficiency, limited battlefield presence, and relative vulnerability to weather. It concludes with the lines:

"Although Kosovo and the 1991 Gulf War appear to signal an advance in the potency of air power, the instrument has yet to convincingly display an independent war-winning ability. This failure to fulfill the ultimate promise of Douhet's theory is largely due to the innate shortcomings of air power. In particular, air power's inability to control ground, due to its lack of physical presence, will always stymie it as an instrument of decision." [p.178]

It's worth noting that I never claimed that air power is not important and influential in general nor that it wasn't important in the German breakthrough at Sedan. That is not the same thing, however, as saying it was the sole decisive factor.

Source please.

Already provided Bergstrom's "Black Cross/Red Star Volume 3" which covers the air battle during Stalingrad in general.

 

[Medved]

The Soviets also outnumbered the Germans during the rest of 1942 and in 1941 as well, both in total aircraft and frequently in operational aircraft. Didn't prevent the Germans from seizing air superiority for long stretches of time. Weather also affects both sides of the front, so the Soviets had to contend with the same inclement conditions as the Germans. Yet as Bergstrom noted, the Germans still tended to hold the upper-hand in the air.

Excuses. You wrote:

We have solid examples of forces without air superiority conducting successful defensive and offensive operations against forces far more overwhelming then what the Germans threw at Sedan. Operation Uranus is an excellent example: while the Soviets did make efforts to contest the air during it, the Luftwaffe continued to hold the upper hand and conducted furious air attacks on several of the advancing Soviet formations, to no avail. The Soviet offensive at Stalingrad was one of their greatest exploitation successes and it was conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power.

Yet

1. You failed to show "solid examples" of forces without air superiority conducting successful defensive/offensive operations against forces far more overwhelming.
2. Your claim about Operation Uranus and the "furious German air attacks" and RA operations that were"conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power" seems to be nothing but fantasy.

From Williamson Murray: Strategy for Defeat - Luftwaffe 1933-1945:

Moreover, the Russian winter offensive caught the Luftwaffe in an exposed and difficult situation. Beginning in late August, a diminution of German air strength in the east in favor of other theaters had taken place. Between mid-August and early November, the eastern front lost four and two-thirds bomber Gruppen (approximately 140 bombers) and five and one-third fighter Gruppen (160 fighters). The collapse in Egypt and the invasion of French Northwest Africa caused a withdrawal of further three and one-third bomber Gruppen (100 bombers) and one and one-third fighter Gruppen (40 fighters).17 Much of the withdrawal came from Richthofen's Luftflotte 4, thereby diminishing air support for forces fighting around Stalingrad. Further weakening Luftflotte 4 was the fact that the general staff created a needless headquarters, Luftwaffe Command Don, to provide an air assignment for one of its favored officers.18

The collapse of Sixth Army's flanks enabled the Russians to complete a deep encirclement around Stalingrad. Soviet troops seized the airfields that Luftflotte 4 had prepared for winter operations and pushed many support and maintenance personnel into the pocket. As a result, Richthofen's units had to establish themselves on new airfields that were soon overcrowded and did not possess the support needed for the operations now beginning.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-5.html

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Already provided Bergstrom's "Black Cross/Red Star Volume 3" which covers the air battle during Stalingrad in general.

I saw that, but that part you mentioned only covers the transfer of air units to the Mediterranean, not the conduct of the air battle during Uranus. I have yet to find a source that talks about Luftwaffe efforts to stop the encirclement beyond saying they basically didn't do much of anything due to poor operational ratings, crew exhaustion, and weather. They only started doing something during the effort to supply the pocket, but then most of them weren't bombing Soviet troops, rather they at best were engaging in FLAK suppression or CAS for Winter Storm, which was pretty limited.

 

[Deleted member 114175]

Indians will NOT die by the Millions for their Colonial Overlords.

No but they also won't unanimously and instantly mutiny to the Empire of Japan. If Japan tries to conquer both China and India at the same time they will fail.

 

[Medved]

No but they also won't unanimously and instantly mutiny to the Empire of Japan. If Japan tries to conquer both China and India at the same time they will fail.

Which is absolutely irrelevant for the war in Europe.

 

[Bad@logic]

Couple of issues with this assessment; most of the aircraft produced in May-June 1940 weren't operational due to missing critical components, though the air frames were ready.

A product of hasty industrial mobilization, over time it is an issue which would have been corrected - which is the key to the discussion here, not May 1940, but the long term state of the French aircraft industry. I am fairly certain that if one looked at any other aircraft industry during the equivalent period several years after the decision to rapidly expand production, one would have encountered a similar issue of a imbalance between equipment and aircraft. Something which can be fixed over time: of course the French didn't have the time to fix it.

There was a huge shortage of pilots, as the AdA has skimped on pilot training, which was harder to generate than air frames and they were effectively running out of pilots as of June 1940; their rate of accidents was double that of the RAF and Luftwaffe due to fatigue, so the choice to cut back was driven by practical limits on their abilities, rather than simply doctrinal choice for a long war.

Certainly an issue, but the French, as Neither Decadent, Nor Traitorous, Nor Stupid: The French Air Force and Doctrine in the 1930s can attest, were by May 1940 taking into account the need to expand aircrew and air support crew, with additional training, the establishment of new bases, and secure training zones in North Africa. Their limited sortie rate was as far as I know present from the beginning of the war, and in any case certainly did play into French beliefs concerning doctrinal usage of aircraft: Maurice Gamelin, admittedly an army commander, strongly believed that any combat would see a quick attrition of aircraft when they actually got used, and this view is also restated as being present in the French airforce during WW1 and during the Rif war in The Rise and Fall of the French Air Force: French Doctrine and Strategy, 1900-1940

This is also why they lost so badly in the air, they lacked the means to sustain their losses of pilots and didn't even have people to ferry ready aircraft to the military from the factory, so had to detach combat pilots to fly them to AdA bases to prep them for combat.

Which is a natural product of not having had much experience in the war, and over time something which would improve.

What pilots the French did have were good, but no better than their opponents on average, so their quality against quantity ploy didn't work out all that well, especially when their opponent actually already had combat experience in Spain and Poland and they had none. In the long run had they survived they'd have more aircraft than pilots, especially as the army sucked up more and more manpower to replace casualties

French fighter pilots did much better than their English counterparts in the Battle of France, enough to provide for something approaching qualitative equality with their German opponents despite their much inferior equipment. Of course, pilot skill is only one asset of the equation and superior organization, doctrine, numbers, etc. is also highly important, and the French were lacking in most other areas. But in any case the French were expanding pilot training, so while I am sure there would be shortages it is an issue which in the long run would be reduced - combined with decreasing relevance of aviation as a whole, as the battlefield would become more rigid, more dense, and saturated with anti-aircraft weapons, as more and more troops would be mobilized on all sides and plunged into the same relatively condensed theater, where aviation wouldn't have as much of a chance to shine in the tactical role.

And of course, one can relate that the German pilot situation would be less rosy than during our own timeline due to the large number of German pilots downed over France and subsequently captured only to be released with the armistice would not be available to the Germans.

and even the navy would be needed to fight Uboats and maintain LOC and deal with Italy.

Without the Fall of France, as Blunted Sickle points out, the U-Boat threat is far less severe without the German U-boat bases in France, and unless if Italy actively enters the war, the demands of the navy won't grow dramatically.

 

[Ian_W]

Allthough this is an alternate history forum, there seems to prevail a deterministic belief that the Allies win WW2 - even in a scenario where either the US/GB or the USSR are removed from the equation. The explanations offered are fantastic and include: Millions of Indians defeating the Reich for Great Britain, the USSR managing the war by itself despite lack of food and pretty much everything else by 1942,and the WAllies just sitting out the war untill the atom bomb is ready - allthough they have no idea when it will be ready. Of course, they not only never lose, they also never negotiate. So I would like to see realistic scenarios where Germany/the Axis is completely defeated, even with the Allies missing one or even two players.

You've been told.

France holds in 1940, and Italy stays out.

This is very simple to do - the Germans don't go for Sickle Cut, and instead go with their original Fall Gelb plan to go via Belgium.

Therefore, we get a slogging match in Belgium between the Allied and German armies, which plays to the French strengths of deliberate battle rather than the German genius for improvisation.

The Luftwaffe can't maintain high intensity operations beyond July, and the OTL Battle of Britain that ground down the German fighters happens over Belgium, the Channel Ports and eastern France instead.

The German army and Air Force gets further ground down in a deliberate campaign in 1941, and then collapses by 1942.

The Allies make heavy use of colonial troops for manpower reserves, just like in WW1 - again, this is OTL ... look at the Free French divisions in France in 1944, and you'll find they were Moroccan and Algerian.

In short, go read pdf27's A Blunted Sickle.

Now, if you want to make silly claims like Indians wouldn't volunteer to fight the Germans (they would and did - see North Africa and Italy) and that the French would lose 99% of the time (absolutely not the view of the German High Command in 1940), then sure. There is no "realistic" scenario, because you've already decided anything that can lead to a German defeat is unrealistic.

 

[History Learner]

Given the disparities in population and industry, even if Sickle Cut fails inevitably the French will be forced into submission, especially given that the Germans have a window until 1942 at the least before the Soviets can really do anything. If we're assuming that France has already fallen and it's just a Germany v. British match up, than there is no debate to be had; Britain, at best, can achieve a stalemate but not a victory.

 

[James Ricker]

I'm amused by the images of German divisions being slowed down by armies of orange cones and a few flagmen. It reminds me of driving on I-77 in north Charlotte.

Oh, have to throw in some out of the way detours and the occasional surprise construction zone.

Knocking down a bridge or two and switching road signs wouldn't hurt.
But I pictured roads and bridges crumbling under the weight of Panzers and artillery prices

 

[Bad@logic]

Given the disparities in population and industry, even if Sickle Cut fails inevitably the French will be forced into submission, especially given that the Germans have a window until 1942 at the least before the Soviets can really do anything. If we're assuming that France has already fallen and it's just a Germany v. British match up, than there is no debate to be had; Britain, at best, can achieve a stalemate but not a victory.

Yes, the Anglo-French bloc has such a truly minuscule war making capacity....

(although why Haiti and Turkey are part of the Anglo-French empires is something which I have never quite been able to figure out...)

 

[Ian_W]

Given the disparities in population and industry, even if Sickle Cut fails inevitably the Germans will be forced into submission

Corrected that for you.

It's also important to remember that the Germans run out of hard currency to pay for fuel before the Entente does.

 

[Medved]

You've been told.

I have been told a pretty unlikely outcome, that is not easily possible without a mid -1930s POD centering on the French air force. Also the case presented has nothing to do with the scenarios asked above, which all deal with Germany against the "Big Three" after the fall of France.

This is very simple to do - the Germans don't go for Sickle Cut, and instead go with their original Fall Gelb plan to go via Belgium.
Therefore, we get a slogging match in Belgium between the Allied and German armies, which plays to the French strengths of deliberate battle rather than the German genius for improvisation.
The Luftwaffe can't maintain high intensity operations beyond July, and the OTL Battle of Britain that ground down the German fighters happens over Belgium, the Channel Ports and eastern France instead.
The German army and Air Force gets further ground down in a deliberate campaign in 1941, and then collapses by 1942.
The Allies make heavy use of colonial troops for manpower reserves, just like in WW1 - again, this is OTL ... look at the Free French divisions in France in 1944, and you'll find they were Moroccan and Algerian.
In short, go read pdf27's A Blunted Sickle.
Now, if you want to make silly claims like Indians wouldn't volunteer to fight the Germans (they would and did - see North Africa and Italy) and that the French would lose 99% of the time (absolutely not the view of the German High Command in 1940), then sure. There is no "realistic" scenario, because you've already decided anything that can lead to a German defeat is unrealistic.

SIGH..... You may change the ground campaign, but this will not change the air campaign. Even if the French do much better on the ground, by early June their air force is still practically non existent. The British without the advantages they enjoyed during the BoB will also do a lot worse than OTL, and they will still not commit all of their air forces to the continent out of fear that France might still fall.

As for the claim that the LW runs out of steam by July - after just 2 months of fighting: A complete ridiculous claim proven wrong bei the BoB and most other air campagins coonducted by the LW during WW2.
Also by July the LW is practically unopposed, so even if they have problems they can scale back their involvement and still be very effective.

Also if the campaign should take until 1941, then its the French collapsing, not the Germans. Also colonial troops are a poor replacement for American/Allied troops, and in terms of numbers didnt even represent 10% of Allied armies. Also - colonial troops will no die for their colonial overlords indefinitly.

 

[Medved]

Corrected that for you.

You cant correct something which was true in the first place.

It's also important to rember that the Germans run out of hard currency to pay for fuel before the Entente does.

Again nonsence. OTL Britain was broke by April 1941, this was with all the gold they took from Belgium, France, the colonies ect. So even if the French manage to fight well into 1941, they will run out of currency faster than the Germans.