April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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Goodness, even these "good" landings where the Seafire doesn't break its undercarriage look scary enough.

Even the ditching is uneventful enough.

If you have the opportunity, read John Landsdown's book on the Light Fleets off Korea

https://www.amazon.com/Carriers-Kor...rriers+in+korea&qid=1560252442&s=books&sr=1-4

The Seafire by Korea is the F47, but it is eye-opening how fragile they still are, bending fuselages on landing sustaining other damage. It helps understanding why the Unicorn was a maintenance carriers, so major repairs could be handled without tying up hangar space in an operational carrier in combat....

Regards,
 
If you have the opportunity, read John Landsdown's book on the Light Fleets off Korea

https://www.amazon.com/Carriers-Kor...rriers+in+korea&qid=1560252442&s=books&sr=1-4

The Seafire by Korea is the F47, but it is eye-opening how fragile they still are, bending fuselages on landing sustaining other damage. It helps understanding why the Unicorn was a maintenance carriers, so major repairs could be handled without tying up hangar space in an operational carrier in combat....

Regards,

The idea of having to have armored box hanger carriers meant that they would be carrying fewer aircraft and have less capacity to carry out their own maintenance verses other fleets

Not so much of an issue given the number of land bases the British had!

But the idea was to build 3 Unicorns to act as a floating reserve hanger and carry out air maintenance and servicing for the 10 planned Illustrious carriers to overcome this limitation and this decision was made at about the same time as the decision to go armored box hanger so should be seen as part of that decision - what's telling is that he original aircraft compliment of a Illustrious is 33 aircraft (this number would of course rise!) which is the expected compliment of the Unicorn (technically she could also carry more but parts of the hangers were intended to be used for maintenance etc)

A lot of hand wringing went into the idea (far far too much IMO) with the fear that Unicorn and her sisters would be seen as proper carriers and only Unicorn was built with 2 of the Light fleets later finished as Aircraft maintenance carriers
 

MatthewB

Banned
The idea of having to have armored box hanger carriers meant that they would be carrying fewer aircraft and have less capacity to carry out their own maintenance
But you'd think a central tenet of that smaller CAG strategy would be to have aircraft that are robust and easy to maintain. When the British launched the AFD concept they should have said, okay, we're going to have fewer aircraft and less space to maintain them, so we can't have hangar queens and each aircraft is going to have to be available as often as possible. I know, sir, let's take the most fragile land-based fighter.....
 
But you'd think a central tenet of that smaller CAG strategy would be to have aircraft that are robust and easy to maintain. When the British launched the AFD concept they should have said, okay, we're going to have fewer aircraft and less space to maintain them, so we can't have hangar queens and each aircraft is going to have to be available as often as possible. I know, sir, let's take the most fragile land-based fighter.....

The late and much lamented Just Leo once said of fighter aircraft "Performance is not the most important consideration in a fighter plane - it is the only consideration"

In late 1942 there was no carrier based aircraft then available that the allies could place on a flat top that could match the latest Axis land based fighters and in some cases the latest land based twin engine bombers

The only Western airframe that could was the Spitfire and it 'could' operate from carriers despite the fact it was never intended to.

Maybe it was not as robust as the Wildcat or even the Sea Hurricane but neither of those aircraft had the performance necessary to carryout the mission of the day so would have been useless!

And that bad reputation that the Seafire has gained came from operating from light slow escort carriers and it was the first carrier fighter that had such high landing on speeds (no surprise that the RN managed to get the Corsair to work!)

Obviously the AFDs pre dates the Spitfire/Seafire and we have the whole mess over the FAA being under RAF control (and itself struggling to expand at the time) - and while I lament the decisions that resulted in the FAA not going to war with a decent single seat fighter and having to muddle through - we have to consider that RAF Fighter command 'was' robust and ready for the important challenge that it faced and overcame in the summer and Autumn of 1940 with its fragile land-based fighter!
 
The late and much lamented Just Leo once said of fighter aircraft "Performance is not the most important consideration in a fighter plane - it is the only consideration"

What's the definition of performance? Speed? Maneuverability? Firepower? Range? A combination thereof?

If we're just considering speed and maneuverability, I could not disagree more, Cryhavoc. A defensive fighter might prioritize those, but not an offensive fighter. What good is a fighter that can't reach the site of the battle?

The Zeros tremendous range allowed it to escort strike aircraft to take the fight to the enemy and still have a useful time over target. '

RAF Bomber Command learned the hard way not having a fighter to escort bombers to Germany meant switching to less accurate night bombing.

If 'performance' were the be-all and end-all, the Buffalo would not be universally looked down on outside of Finland.

In late 1942 there was no carrier based aircraft then available that the allies could place on a flat top that could match the latest Axis land based fighters and in some cases the latest land based twin engine bombers

The only Western airframe that could was the Spitfire and it 'could' operate from carriers despite the fact it was never intended to.

If there were no such thing as pilot quality I might agree, but the Wildcat held the line against the Zero, and even gained the advantage thanks to the USN being the only air service in the world training pilots in deflection shooting. And leading a crossing target so it and the bullets meet is a skill that needs to be learned. Outside the USN, the RAF's George Buerling, a hunter in his off-time, understood leading a target. While in England his gun camera constantly showed him shooting at empty air as he claimed Germans shot down. So Fighter Command sent him to Malta.

Every other air force in the world was dedicated to maneuver, which made the Zero so formidable, but so many of it's qualities were sacrificed for that attribute it was vulnerable in other aspects.

Maybe it was not as robust as the Wildcat or even the Sea Hurricane but neither of those aircraft had the performance necessary to carryout the mission of the day so would have been useless!

Every pilot killed in a kite with a propeller attached is a waste of resources. Every time a rugged plane brings a pilot home to fight another day is a victory.

And that bad reputation that the Seafire has gained came from operating from light slow escort carriers and it was the first carrier fighter that had such high landing on speeds (no surprise that the RN managed to get the Corsair to work!)

Don't get me started on the FAA/Corsair myth. VF-17 was doing their carrier qualifications on the CVE Charger before the FAA received its first Corsair. The Jolly Rogers went west with Bunker Hill but when they reached Hawaii, they were swapped out for VF-18 with Hellcats because there was no supply chain for Corsairs with the fleet.

Regards,
 

MatthewB

Banned
In late 1942 there was no carrier based aircraft then available that the allies could place on a flat top that could match the latest Axis land based fighters and in some cases the latest land based twin engine bombers
I understand all that. My point is there should have been a carrier based fighter capable of matching the latest land based fighters from Europe as part of the AFD concept and execution. When you develop a battleship you don't sort out the guns after the ship is built, but as part of the overall design.
 
I understand all that. My point is there should have been a carrier based fighter capable of matching the latest land based fighters from Europe as part of the AFD concept and execution. When you develop a battleship you don't sort out the guns after the ship is built, but as part of the overall design.

AIUI you are completely misstating the "concept" behind British Aircraft carrier development in the mid to late 30s
(when the RAF was still in total control of aircraft types and numbers supplied to the RN)

Firstly, there was no British "AFD=Armoured Flight Deck" concept but rather an "Armoured Box" concept
designed to give protection of the sides as well as the top side of the ship.. and especially the hangar.

Secondly, there was no need for as you so elegantly put it "a carrier based fighter capable of matching the latest land-based fighters" precisely because these carriers would not operate within the range of land-based fighters by day. (One reason the RN also developed night attack capability)

That also meant they would be out of range of dive bombers, which the RAF, in any case, dismissed as ineffective.
Even land-based torpedo planes were under-rated, another method that the RAF was not interested in.

The main existential threats to RN carriers would be enemy surface ships (which even the RAF could understand)
and longer ranged high-level bombers (which the RAF loved to the point of obsession).

Wrt to surface gunfire, the vertical armour need only be planned to keep out light cruiser shells.
Carriers would be escorted by RN heavies if enemy capital ships were a threat

In any case, a Carriers best protection would be to remain undetected by shooting down enemy recon planes
and by detecting enemy ships while they were still at a distance.
Hence the 1938 specification which resulted in the Fulmar: robust, good armament (for its time), reasonable range, able to perform recon/patrol itself but no dogfighter.

If the carrier was detected and an enemy air raid was mounted, the British were convinced it would be numbers of high-level bombers attacking in formation but with no fighter escort because of the range.
Therefore the same type and numbers of fighters could deal with some of the attacking force
and the carriers own heavy AA would disrupt the rest (even if few of the attackers were hit).

The horizontal armour was specified to beat those few bomb hits that might be achieved.

However, most of the British assumptions proved invalid ...

They did have to operate carriers in range of land,
they could not always provide an appropriate escort
etc

Above all aviation advanced faster than expected.
Enemy planes got faster, had longer ranges, carried larger weapons and were available in larger numbers.

The "Armored" carrier DID prove useful, but a high-performance fleet defence fighter WAS needed.
The SeaFire was a panic reaction ... understandable given Britains position in early 1941
.. but in hindsight NOT the best decision even then.
 
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If you think the Z511 is a beast, check out the proposed float version of the C-130:

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/a-c-130-hercules-amphibian-makes-too-much-sense-to-be-t-1716610531

1332117460933068872.jpg


Regards,

Good Lord. Great shades of the Spruce Goose. :eek:
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
In addition, the RN in the 1930s believed that - in pre-radar times - there was no way that fighters could be alerted & launched off a carrier in time to intercept an incoming strike. So the guns of the escorts was considered the best defence, and the carrier needed armour protection against bombs, hence the armoured hangar. That meant that not only could fewer aircraft be carried, but that the hangar dimensions restricted the FAA to smaller aircraft. But that was OK as the main defence wasn't aircraft, so we carry fewer fighters and concentrate upon TBRs. Which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the small number & variable quality of FAA fighters carried means the fleet can't rely upon them for protection, so the guns become the main defence...

Of course radar changed the odds and the lack of decent fighters in numbers became a quandary with the smaller hangars - carry more CAP (now worth the effort) at the expense of strike &/or reconnaissance aircraft.
 
Nice work so far, absolutely gripping TL.

However, I have run into term "Second Line Destroyer" several times now, regarding the IJN destroyers, and I am wondering what that actually means. Are these WW1 and Interwar era destroyers modified in some way, or purpose made destroyers, "inferior" in some way to more modern designs?
 
1130 Hours, 11 December 1942, Kanchrapara Airfield, Calcutta, India – The 64-plane strike had taken off 30 minutes earlier and was assembling at its rally point off the coast of India just over 100 miles southeast of Calcutta. Two RAF Hudsons from No. 353 Squadron were acting as assembly ships for the 36 RAF Blenheims from No. 34, No. 60, and No. 113 Squadrons, 12 Hudsons from No. 62 Squadron, and 16 FAA Fulmars from HMS Indomitable. No. 34 and No. 60 Squadrons were equipped with Blenheim IVs and had received training in skip bombing tactics from Ken Ault’s No. 11 Squadron in September and October on Ceylon No. 113 Squadron was equipped with new Blenheim Vs, fitted out with .303 caliber machine guns in the nose and were configured for strafing like No. 62 Squadron’s field modified Hudsons.

Due to the difficulties of keeping so many planes together, the attacking aircraft split into two groups with No. 34 and No. 113 Squadrons in one group and No. 60 and No. 62 Squadrons in the other with each group escorted by eight Fulmars. Each group was led by one of the assembly bombers and at 1145 hours they were flying southeast into the Bay of Bengal toward Ramree Island at 9000 feet, the altitude the Fulmars performed best at.
 
Nice work so far, absolutely gripping TL.

However, I have run into term "Second Line Destroyer" several times now, regarding the IJN destroyers, and I am wondering what that actually means. Are these WW1 and Interwar era destroyers modified in some way, or purpose made destroyers, "inferior" in some way to more modern designs?

Generally their older destroyers that were kept around and in some cases modified for duties like escort or as destroyer transports - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Momi-class_destroyer
 
In addition, the RN in the 1930s believed that - in pre-radar times - there was no way that fighters could be alerted & launched off a carrier in time to intercept an incoming strike. So the guns of the escorts was considered the best defence, and the carrier needed armour protection against bombs, hence the armoured hangar. That meant that not only could fewer aircraft be carried, but that the hangar dimensions restricted the FAA to smaller aircraft. But that was OK as the main defence wasn't aircraft, so we carry fewer fighters and concentrate upon TBRs. Which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the small number & variable quality of FAA fighters carried means the fleet can't rely upon them for protection, so the guns become the main defence...

Of course radar changed the odds and the lack of decent fighters in numbers became a quandary with the smaller hangars - carry more CAP (now worth the effort) at the expense of strike &/or reconnaissance aircraft.

Additionally, RN carriers were expected to operate a lot in the North Sea, Eg: In range of land based air. And no carrier of the Era was ever going to outmass a land based strike. So trying to carry enough fighters to fend off incoming strikes was nothing more than a folly. Which meant that the Armoured deck was the superior option.
 
1200 Hours, 11 December 1942, Chittagong, India – Another large strike group took off out of airfields around Chittagong. No. 27 Squadron sent up 12 Beaufighters and they were followed into the air by 16 FAA Albacores from No. 821 and No. 827 Squadrons escorted by 16 RAAF Buffaloes from No. 25 Squadron. The Beaufighters were going on their own with orders to strafe escorting warships to suppress their anti-aircraft guns. The Australian Buffalo pilots were told to stick to the slower Albacores no matter what. Sending the torpedo bombers in daylight was a controversial decision but the strike leader, Major AC Newson of the Royal Marines, commander of No. 821 Squadron thought that if they could get in an early afternoon strike and if the Japanese convoy was not stopped, the FAA planes could then be turned around for a night strike if one was necessary. The Albacores from No. 821 Squadron were armed with torpedoes while the planes from No. 827 Squadron were toting four 500-pound bombs each. The problem was the squadrons’ torpedoes had only arrived at the airfield from Ceylon four days earlier and the weapons maintainers were still certifying the weapons, some of which may have been damaged due to rough handling while getting transported from Trincomalee.

In addition to the squadrons taking off out of Chittagong, No. 155 Squadron at Cox’s Bazar and No. 5 Squadron at Akyab were each sending eight P-36s on fighter sweeps against the Japanese convoy. The pilots’ orders were simple, engage Japanese fighters escorting the convoy and keep them busy as long as possible.
 
1230 Hours, 11 December 1942, Mingaladon Airfield, Burma – The second group of 12 Zeroes from the Kanoya NAG along with six more Oscars from the 64th Sentai took off and headed for the convoy. Rear Admiral Shima had reported his convoy getting overflown and attacked by several different enemy reconnaissance aircraft and he expected more robust attacks in the coming hours. This second group of Zeroes would be able to remain over the convoy until nightfall and would provide around two hours of double coverage over the convoy with the group of Zeroes already on station.
 

nbcman

Donor
Wonder what the author will call this upcoming battle because the Bay of Bengal furball doesn’t quite sound formal enough.
 

SsgtC

Banned
Jesus this is gonna be a mess. Both sides are throwing everything they have into the air. The Allies have a heavy fighter escort, and they've learned how to use them, but the Japanese are going to have a lot more fighters over the convoy than the Allies are expecting them too. No matter who wins, this has the makings of a pyrrhic victory.
 
1300 Hours, 11 December 1942, Chittagong, India – With most of the attack squadrons on their way, planning continued for follow on operations. The Vultee Vengeance equipped No. 82 Squadron was held back to provide air support for the troops at dug in around Akyab along with Indian Lysanders. The Vengeance crews were not happy they were not getting a crack at the convoy but as the least experienced attack squadron in No. 221 Group, it was decided to hold them back. Additionally, the planners were working on the details for a night attack against Rangoon’s docks by the Wellingtons of No. 99 and No. 215 Squadrons along with whatever heavy bombers the US 10th Air Force was willing to allocate.

At Cox’s Bazaar, 70 miles to the south, the Indian Battles from the morning’s reconnaissance mission were back on the ground and getting turned by the ground crews as quickly as possible. One had been shot down and another was damaged but six of the attack planes were ready by 1400 hours and they joined eight other Battles from No. 7 Squadron and eight P-36s from No. 155 Squadron that were already armed and fueled and by 1415 hours the 22 plane attack group was headed south for Ramree Island.
 
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