The Best of Bad Choices: A 'Long' War/Occupation

[Stryker_911]

In a recent Sealionista thread, one of the major proponents of the detestable sea mammal was so convinced of its potential, but only in comparison to the decision to invade Soviet Russia. Obviously, this poster engaged in the unusual combination of a large dose of hindsight and glue-sniffing, and refused to let silly things like facts get in the way of a grand narrative.

What I'm building up to is this; Nazi Germany has conquered the low countries. They've forced the allies out of Norway, won the battle for France, but ultimately, lost the BoB. Historically, the invasion of Soviet Russia, and 'assisting' Mussolini's botched ambitions are the next hurdles.

Rather than commit to a more immediate invasion, what if Germany attempts to play the long game and consolidate their territorial gains? I am not advocating a white peace between the Entente and Germany, Hitler had broken far too many promises for that to ever be considered.

The channel separates the only remaining enemy that Germany remains engaged with. Obviously the Germans lack the capacity to engage the British in any meaningful way beyond submarine warfare and bombing campaigns, but the UK is similarly constrained. Not that I believe that that would remain so in the near future; afaik only the US had any experience in amphibious ops and in building the requisite landing craft, but as a sea power, the UK is far more likely to develop in that vein than Germany.

So, I know it's a big ask of the lackluster German economy, but could they play the long game, could they maintain their holdings long enough to do something meaningful against their belligerents (UK), or build up a more powerful force that might see them have a greater chance against the foe that they ideologically MUST attack sooner or later?

 

[Kalga]

With what money, resources, and markets? (i.e. the economy issue)

-money: you could play with the numbers with exchange rates vis a vis the conquered countries, but that'll build resentment (although they're already pissed, so who cares) as well as wrecking their economies in the long term, so the least of the problems.
-resources: the UK is still doing their blockade, and now Germany is saddled with all the occupied countries' and allies' needs as well. There's the Soviets but that...
-markets: ... brings us to the next problem, with the UK blockade in place the USSR is effectively the only major market for German goods, which they'll need to export in order to get the resources & materials for their industries. The problem being is that by selling industrial products & machinery to USSR Germany is effectively making the noose that they'll put their own neck in. Stalin is not someone you want to trust if you're Hitler.

 

[Paul_Sussex]

Regarding amphibious ops, as per Wiki -

In 1926, the first motor landing craft (MLC1) was built by the Royal Navy. It weighed 16 tons, with a draught of 6 feet 6 inches (1.98 m), and was capable of about 6 knots (11 km/h; 6.9 mph). It was later developed into the landing craft mechanised. It was at the insistence of the British prime minister Winston Churchill in mid-1940 that the LCT was created. Its speed was 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) on engines delivering about 700 hp (520 kW). Designated the LCT Mark 1, 20 were ordered in July 1940 and a further 10 in October 1940.

Not to say there will be any immediate invasion, but with less pressure from the Axis (if there's less appetite for Benny's escapades abroad) will there be an earlier build up of amphibious forces? And more concern on Adolf's part?

 

[Garrison]

In a recent Sealionista thread, one of the major proponents of the detestable sea mammal was so convinced of its potential, but only in comparison to the decision to invade Soviet Russia. Obviously, this poster engaged in the unusual combination of a large dose of hindsight and glue-sniffing, and refused to let silly things like facts get in the way of a grand narrative.

What I'm building up to is this; Nazi Germany has conquered the low countries. They've forced the allies out of Norway, won the battle for France, but ultimately, lost the BoB. Historically, the invasion of Soviet Russia, and 'assisting' Mussolini's botched ambitions are the next hurdles.

Rather than commit to a more immediate invasion, what if Germany attempts to play the long game and consolidate their territorial gains? I am not advocating a white peace between the Entente and Germany, Hitler had broken far too many promises for that to ever be considered.

The channel separates the only remaining enemy that Germany remains engaged with. Obviously the Germans lack the capacity to engage the British in any meaningful way beyond submarine warfare and bombing campaigns, but the UK is similarly constrained. Not that I believe that that would remain so in the near future; afaik only the US had any experience in amphibious ops and in building the requisite landing craft, but as a sea power, the UK is far more likely to develop in that vein than Germany.

So, I know it's a big ask of the lackluster German economy, but could they play the long game, could they maintain their holdings long enough to do something meaningful against their belligerents (UK), or build up a more powerful force that might see them have a greater chance against the foe that they ideologically MUST attack sooner or later?

Well the short answer, in a manner of speaking, is read Adam Tooze's 'Wages of Destruction' for a comprehensive explanation of why this wouldn't work. Longer explanation is that the Germans did consider a long war strategy and rejected it as they concluded, probably correctly, that the constellation of potential enemies they faced simply dwarfed the capacity of the German war industry. Germany was already running with a ruinous level of its GDP going into the military. They knew full well that once the British Empire, USA and USSR got up to speed they would be overwhelmed. Bear in mind the US was already cranking up its support for the British and an invasion of the USSR was an ideological and practical necessity for the Nazi's. Even if the USSR was willing to keep supplying them with raw materials depending on the largesse of Stalin was not sustainable in the long term and in exchange for those materials Germany was providing high tech machinery that improved both the quantity and quality of the Soviet armaments industry.

On the consolidation front the fundamental issue is that the industry and agriculture of Western Europe was just as dependent on imports of oil, rubber, nitrates, animal feed, etc. as Germany was. That new industrial base Germany had to be supplied from the same limited base of materials that had already created a cycle of 'boom and bust' in the armaments industry as resources were reallocated from one priority to another as the strategic situation changed. This is a large part of why Hitler kept upping the ante, he knew time wasn't on Germany's side and only a short war offered Germany any chance of victory.

 

[Stryker_911]

Well, in regards to landing craft, I stand corrected Paul, thanks very much! Always a pleasure to learn something new.

So essentially Nazi Germany 'planned' for a short war, based on their own constrained capacity. Perhaps it is a product of sensationalist history, a retelling, if you would, that presumes that the nazi war machine followed the same or similar guidelines for war as other western nations. Their creation and use of many great, or at least well-used weapon systems might seem to exaggerate this view, I guess.

Re their economy and strategic situation; I am well aware of the ideological need to attack the communists. It is a hard thing to imagine, let alone comprehend, but could the Nazis pull back from their strategic gains (as in literally, pull out ala the US in Iraq) while ostensibly maintaining hegemony and negotiate a peace (not necessarily a peace accepted by the British, I accept full-well the impossibility of this. I also accept the near impossibility of Nazis doing this in the vein of them no longer being nazis by doing so).

I realize that its very much going against the grain in that Axis forces pull out of the low countries and France, but attempt to pillage as much resources at the same time (in the short term) while doing so, as the economy desperately needs these resources to keep afloat.

Sooner or later, even if accepted, that particular deck of cards will spectacularly collapse. I acknowledge that I do not know the particulars of just how utterly boned the German war economy was. But would this withdrawal allow for a better chance at the Soviets, or was Germany screwed no matter what alternate option it could conceivably take?

 

[jacobk]

If you really want to go for a big divergence, Stalin was at least open to the idea of joining the Axis.

Now, joining the Axis is different from joining the war, but having the USSR officially on side would at least keep the Eastern Front quiet. It would probably keep the raw materials flowing, too, as Stalin seemed to be happy to trade resources for technology and time (and bits of eastern Europe).

That would also open up the possibility of the UK doing something spectacularly unwise like Operation Pike that might prompt more genuine cooperation with the USSR. If you take the need to invade the USSR off the table and Germany is then extremely careful not to drag the USA into the war, then they just have to face being ground down by the UK... and probably lose anyways.

Any time you start talking about artful diplomatic maneuvering by Nazi Germany the timeline gets very speculative very quickly. In a hypothetical WWII where the Nazis don't act much like Nazis, sure, things could've been different. But if the Nazis weren't Nazis the Germans probably wouldn't have decided to open the door labeled WWII: it'll be like WWI except harder.