I mind that given the timing of the referendum and the 'closeness' of the result ('only' 6.5 million votes and 9.4pp margin, combined with limited turnout), there is going to be serious disturbance.
The main arguments advanced by opponents of the new constitution are the de facto exclusion of votes from occupied territories, Finland, not to mention the inclusion of votes from Turkish and Persian parts of Armenia without prior legal annexation (these are still de jure Ottoman Turkish lands and no peace treaty has yet come to sanction the transfer of these lands, not to mention the little piece of Persia that is still de jure a neutral country even though nobody is actually caring about it). These arguments could be put forward to say that the margin is not large enough to warrant that with these claims considered, it would stay that way.
Kadets, Popular Socialists and a host of national groups could indeed argue this way. Especially the Kadets have a lot of law experts in their number. As for another full-blown resistance movement, it's probably not enough on its own, i.e. if there aren't other escalating factors...

Finland and the occupied territories may hold catch-up referenda later, but what happens If the overall result remains YES, but a certain ethnically definable territory votes NO..

Shoot, I have a fear that there’s going to be a Russian Civil War after all in this timeline! It seems to be shaping up to just be the Russians and Armenians against the Turks and Kazakhs, a more ethnic conflict, an early politically supercharged Basmachi Revolt. Without anarchy from the October Revolution, they may have been in a position to do so. Yet, I still feel like the Union of Equals could pull back from the brink. The Russians could convince the Turks and other restless ethnic minorities to keep more autonomy and settle for peace in the face of German invasion
Yes, the Muslim South is a hot spot. We ought to remember, though, that it is also internally divided... Young Turk-affiliated Jadids, more left-leaning reformers, conservatives... Plus, ethnic delineations which are partly in flux, but certainly exist. Sizable settler numbers, among whom Cossacks and others. And no single Leasing Institution or Army. Kamkov is highly unwilling to fight an anti-colonial uprising there; among the reasons why no Compact has been concluded yet is that he doesn't see a counterpart strong and reliable enough to be able to keep their word, and he specifically doesn't want to get involved in another 1916 or worse.

So, the escalation can be a wake-up call and cause Moscow to consider which side they really want to take. Different SD and SR factions might reach different conclusions here... Sadly, for many Jadids, they used to have good relations to the Kadets, who are now somewhat cornered and also trying to absorb outlawed Russian nationalist groups at the same time.
 
Twenty: Finnish Civil War (May 1917)
Finland 1917-1918

After counselling with @Karelian , I have decided to change Finland’s alternate history slightly.

In a previous update, I had stated that the great National Coalition of bourgeois and agrarian parties and the SDP, which held a majority of seats in the 1916 Eduskunta, falls apart over questions of economic policies already by mid-1917, and that only a “Red Earth” coalition of Social Democrats and the agrarian Maalaisliitto goes forward with drafting a Compact with the CA in Petrograd, thereby establishing an autonomous Finnish Federative Republic. After this has been achieved, they embark on a land reform project which is more radical than OTL’s.

Scratch that.

The National Coalition does not break apart in 1917. The moderate Social Democrat Oskari Tokoi continues to lead the Coalition, in which his equally moderate party colleagues Vainö Tanner (Senator for Finances) and Matti Paasivuori (Senator for Industry and Commerce) work together with Young Finns like Antti Tulenheimo (Senator for Justice) and Agrarians like Kyösti Kallio (Agriculture). The Compact with Petrograd is negotiated like I have stated, but it is ratified in the Eduskunta by a very large majority stretching from the right to the left. And then land reform is tackled by the same parliament, and probably resembles OTL’s version greatly. When Russia drifts further to the left in November, Finland maintains its all-party Coalition in the Senate, even though radical Social Democrats like Otto Kuusinen or Kullervo Manner prefer to stay in touch with radicalized Southern Finnish proletarian activist groups, who demand bread and socialist reforms now and “soviet control over the economy” like in Russia.

Things are, thus, a lot calmer and more stable than IOTL until spring 1918, and the young Finnish Federative Republic is not only tackling the long-standing grievances of its rural population, but is also restoring public safety and order – well, not perfectly, but more so than IOTL – by building up a robust police force (a territorial defense force like Ukraine’s has not been made a part of the Compact, since, just like IOTL before the October Rev, few Finns – apart from the radically nationalist “Activists” and the Jääkäri movement – supported such an idea at that point in time). This force, named “Järjestyskunta”, is stitched together and includes both some experienced men from the old Tsarist apparatus and new recruits, drawing on militias both from the Right (Suojeluskunta) and the Left (Red Guards) and also on less politicized hires.

That preserves calm throughout the winter of 1917/18. But it is not enough by far to deal with what Finland faces when large numbers of Finnish refugees from Petrograd seep back into the country, followed by a very large number of Petrograders and retreating soldiers and sailors. Leon Trotsky organizes the latter into another Republican Guard formation tasked with securing the Karelian isthmus, and attempts to send the former into Southern Finland’s factories in order to take control of, redirect, and step up production of militarily relevant material.

The Tokoi Senate protests against these plans, assembles its security forces, and even mobilises additional factory militia to prevent any illegal takeover. The only problem is, these factory militia are not exactly loyal to the Coalition, and Trotsky’s ragtag, starving crowds can’t really back down because their meagre food reserves have run out and the Finnish authorities have nothing really to spare. Trotsky’s plan, when he heard of the defensive measures taken against his attempted takeover of Southern Finland’s industry, was to send only infiltrators – but instead, thousands upon thousands of Petrograders storm factories in Southern Finnish towns along the railroad line from Vyborg to Helsinki, and not everywhere are they met with resistance. In quite a few places, local worker guards join the new arrivals in taking over the factories and then pillaging the surrounding countryside in search of “hoarded foodstuff”. [1]

The Senate is almost brought to the breaking point by the question of how to deal with this situation. On the Right, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud leads those voices who demand to draft conscripts from among the rural Finnish population into the Republic’s security forces, and to confront the raiders and factory squatters, shoot all who oppose them, and restore order and the rationing regime. On the SDP’s left, protests are forming against a shooting order for the workers.

Tokoi wavers for a few days – enough for the wildfire to spread farther West and reach Helsinki. Heavily criticized by his bourgeois coalition partners, Tokoi meets Trotsky for direct talks on April 16th, and insists that he respect the Compact and Finnish laws. He urges him to turn back, confront the Germans and their puppet Markov, and restore control over Petrograd and thus Finland’s railroad connection to the rest of the country. Trotsky replies that it is not his intention to violate Finnish economic independence, and that the Soldiers and Disposed Workers’ Soviet, whose speaker he formally is, fully intends, in coordination with Voykom, to strike back against the Germans, but for that they need more ammunition and weaponry, and in the meantime they must eat.

Finland’s history has been, through much of the 20th century, marked by bitter debates about the real nature of this encounter, the intentions of both sides, and why any attempt to reach a compromise failed. What really caused the events unfolding in the following weeks, which would go on to shape the young nation so deeply?

The Finnish Right has argued that here a weak leader with no clear agenda (Tokoi) met a strong one with the wrong agenda (Trotsky), hence why any attempt to negotiate was a mistake from the start. Trotsky would have sought to impose himself anyway, and so the Finnish Senate should have used what time it had to build up a national defense so that they could disperse the Russian revolutionaries while they were still disorganized. Radical Left analysis shares some of these interpretations, only with an inverse evaluation: to them Trotsky stood for the Revolution, while Tokoi had already by this point given up on implementing socialism in Finland in any way. Tokoi’s indecision and the reactionary violence of the Finnish Right then coerced Trotsky into adopting more dictatorial measures out of pure self-defense. Those who view Tokoi as the real hero in this scenario see Trotsky not so much as a champion of socialism, but as an aggressive, power-hungry leader of a marauding mob, and they blame the Finnish Right for stabbing the Tokoi Senate in the back and sabotaging its defense as much as they blame Trotsky for pushing the Finns towards a militarization they had not wanted themselves.

The two men’s personalities, their cultural backgrounds, and their views on socialism were certainly not conducive to a compromise. It could also be argued, however, that the relevance of the encounter, which has even been immortalized in popular Finnish songs [2], was secondary at best because the underlying political, socio-economic and military dynamics could hardly have been stopped in their tracks.

Be that as it may – the negotiations failed. Immediately afterwards, Trotsky contacted Centrobalt and brought the sailors of Vyborg and Helsinki and the garrison at Kotka to his side, hoisting the banner of socialist revolution and managing to repeat his Petrograd performance by having himself invested with extraordinary emergency powers to defend the revolution. He travelled on the train - with seasoned revolutionary workers and sailors from Petrograd and Vyborg - Westwards. On April 20th, he held a fiery speech to workers and soldiers in Kouvola, where he called them the vanguard of the international proletariat entering the field of the last of all battles, in which the collapsing ruins of capitalist imperialism would be swept away for good. The cheering crowds were joined by detachments from Kotka and Hamina, who had secured control over their towns as well and brought arms and equipment with them on trains.

The fragile Finnish governing Coalition broke apart under the onslaught of the red tide, or rather, over the question of how to react. On April 17th, Oskari Tokoi gave a report to the Eduskunta regarding the negotiations, and informed the parliamentarians that he had appealed to Supreme Commissioner Boris Kamkov for assistance in calling Trotsky back and bringing the Union Armies to order again. The entire right wing of the Eduskunta frothed at Tokoi’s passive stance, with Svinhufvud denouncing Tokoi as “the Russians’ hapless running dog” and declaring that the threat with which the home country was faced required immediate action now.

Kamkov’s answer, which arrived on the 19th, did not help matters. He affirmed both the right of the Union Army, Republican Guard, and Baltic Fleet soldiery to elect their own soviets and commanders, including Trotsky if they so chose, and the right of the Finnish Federative Republic to organize its economic life autonomously and uphold its laws. He also clarified that Trotsky was only to act within Voykom’s common strategy for the defense of Finland, but otherwise left no doubt that he saw it not in his power to intervene in any more decisive way. He then appealed to all sides, asking them to remain calm, respect the Compact, and focus on the common enemy. Tokoi reacted by beginning the drafting of tens of thousands of citizens into the Järjestyskunta, but this was delayed by the various resignations of right-wing Senators, which left parts of the Tokoi administration temporarily without leadership. To the Right, which assembled behind Svinhufvud, all this was too little, too late. They had sought, and found, a different ally for what they saw as Finland’s safety and stability.

Accordingly, on April 23rd, the first shots in Finland’s Civil War were fired between the Järjestyskunta attempting to defend Lahti and local Red Guards aided by forces under Trotsky’s command, with the latter quickly prevailing and taking over control of factories and the railroad junction. As Lahti turned Red, the remaining Senate and the Eduskunta fled Helsinki – in two directions. The Social Democrats and Maalaisliitto members loyal to Tokoi relocated to Kuopio, while the last Right-wing nationalists boarded North-Westward Bound trains to Vaasa, where Svinhufvud was assembling his “Committee for National Salvation” and gathering nationalist former military officers and mobilizing Suojeluskunta units throughout Ostrobothnia.

On the same day the German Kriegsmarine landed on the Åland isles and took control of them, encountering almost no resistance.

On April 28th, Leon Trotsky presided over a triumphant gathering of soldiers and revolutionary workers in Helsinki, in which the establishment of soviet power in Finland was declared. As its leaders with far-reaching powers for the duration of militant revolutionary struggle, Trotsky and Eero Haapalainen were elected. One day earlier, the first German war ships anchored at the Ostrobothnian coast, bringing the first of more than 2,000 Finnish “Jäger” volunteers equipped and trained by the German army to Finland in order to intervene on the side of Svinhufvud’s Committee for National Salvation, which on the 29th, after hearing of Helsinki’s fall, restyled itself as the Senate of the Grand Duchy of Finland (Regency), as they declared that the Russian revolutionaries had annulled the Compact with their actions and that the Finnish Federative Republic had thus ceased to exist.

The Finnish Federative Republic’s Senate in Kuopio did not agree, of course. As news of the arrival of Germans and the Jääkäri reached Eastern Finland, Tokoi and his government bitterly accused the Right of betraying the national cause of Finland by calling in foreigners to turn Finns against one another. Conscription in the territorially largest, but less densely populated, Northern and Eastern regions of Finland still controlled by Tokoi’s Senate was in full swing, but compared to the other two parties in this fratricidal conflict, the Kuopio Senate had comparatively few weapons and ammunition at its disposal.

Throughout May, Finland is split three-way. In the first weeks, each side consolidates control over their strongholds: Vaasa and Ostrobothnia for Svinhufvud’s Senate, which bases its power on the Suojeluskunta, the Jääkäri and German assistance; everything east of Jyväskylä and north of a line from Mäntyharju to Raivola as well as Oulu, Kemi, Tornio, Kajaani, Lappland, and Karelia North of Sortavala is the territory in which Tokoi’s SDP-Maalaisliitto Coalition and its meagerly equipped conscript army built around the Järjestyskunta maintains control. The majority of Finland’s population lives in the much more industrialised South, though, where “soviet rule” is established in Tampere, Turku, Hanko, Helsinki, Lahti, Kouvola, Vyborg and on the Karelian isthmus. Its backbone is Russian soldiers and militiamen.

The first major movement in the civil war, with which Trotsky attempted to break out of the South and gain control over the railroad line up to Tornio, is the Battle of Haapamäki on May 11th, in which Vaasa units manage to encircle initially successful Red attackers, massacring hundreds and capturing more, thereby fending off the first Red attack on the territories controlled by Svinhufvud’s faction.

This failure was not the first crack which appeared in the image of a triumphant Trotsky and his irresistible radical revolution. The attempt to gain control over the railroad line had been induced by the horrible provisioning situation in which the South found itself – Trotsky had hoped to bring the country’s life-line under his control, thereby connecting the starving cities of the South with Sweden and access to American grain imports. With every week in which the conflict continued, the military nature of his socialism became more and more evident. Factory committees were brought in line with open brutality against dissenters. Resistance against Trotsky’s rule began to form in the South, too – almost none of it being of bourgeois nature, even though Trotsky and Haapalainen continued to blame and lambast the nationalist bourgeoisie for everything which went wrong. In the factories as well as among the soldiers, clandestine anarchist networks began to grow, waiting for the opportunity to rid their socialist experiment of the iron fist of Trotsky’s military regime. But more importantly, the Southern Finnish countryside began to consolidate into a solid block of stubborn resistance. Formerly landless torppari, most of them supporting the socialists or Santeri Alkio’s left wing of the Maalaisliitto, had gained their own tracts of land in last year’s agrarian reform, and their loyalty to Oskari Tokoi’s Kuopio Senate as well as their hatred of the foreign and urban regime of Trotsky, whose troops ruthlessly combed the countryside for supplies, was unbroken. On May 19th, the first raid against a Red detachment in Karkku, followed by a raid on a train, was conducted by peasant insurgents loyal to the Tokoi Senate, who escaped with their loot – food and weapons – on horseback.

In the last ten days of May fighting intensified, with all sides having completed their build-up. An offensive led by the forces of the Vaasa Senate Southwards against the Reds, aiming at Tampere, was rebuffed. For all its internal threats, the Finnish soviet state would not buckle quite so easily. Vaasa and Kuopio forces skirmished over control of the Northern portion of the railroad line to Tornio. Moscow urged the revolutionaries in the South and the democratically elected Senate of Oskari Tokoi in Kuopio to unite against the Vaasa Senate and their German allies – but while there was no major offensive taking place between the Kuopio forces and Trotsky’s, anyone who lived through these times in Finland was absolutely certain that such cooperation would never occur. And while the rest of the former Russian Empire – well, most of it – was casting their votes for or against the new democratic constitution, Finland remained in the grip of civil war and widespread hunger, which proved a fertile ground for yet another catastrophe: a disease which was beginning to spread across the globe…


[1] Karelian’s comment: “And since many of these people will be Ingrian Finns who speak a different dialect with a Russian accent, the horror images of right-wing nationalists of 'rampaging horders of lawless rabble' turn to reality.”

[2] Thanks to Karelian for pointing out this one – you must check YouTube etc. for OTL’s Finnish anti-Kerensky song, it was a hilarious experience for me.

And once again thanks to @Betelgeuse for editing this text!
Upon his suggestion, here is an attempt at visualising where the front lines ran in May 1918:
Finland-May-1918.png

South of the Red line is where Trotsky's soviets rule. West of the Blue line is the Vaasa Senate, East of it the Kuopio Senate.
 
For fellow Finnish readers: the TTL situation is a product of several factors: the quicker restoration of the OTL power vacuum in public order, in the tradition of the 1905 general strike-era committees of public order.

The largest butterflies are of course the way the valtalaki and the establishment of Finnish independence are dealt with. This creates room and political impetus for a determined joint reform attempt and the continued existence of the SDP majority in Eduskunta.

This brings the OTL land reform plans forward, and in general things are more or less hanging in the balance when Petrograd falls and all Hell breaks loose. Tokoi is perhaps the worst person to deal with this rapid earthquake in the political situation, and the Activist wing of the OTL Sotilaskomitea has continued their clandestine work more or less as in OTL.

In essense the Vaasa and Kuopio factions are roughly similar to OTL White Republicans and Monarchists, with the all-important question of legality splitting their ranks. The more stable eastern and northern parts of the country initially go along with the Tokoi Senate through inertia, but as the new division of the Finnish society becomes apparent, different parts of the Finnish society go up in arms just like in OTL, and the question of the day is: who betrayed whom, and which side represents the real Finnish patriotism?

Meanwhile the socialists in Southern Finland are fighting over the differences of socialist dogma in their own internal civil war.
 
All that will not create a good precedent for the Polish (and other autonomist/independent movement)...honestly if i was Pildusky and co. i will consider the new boss the same of the old and basically if you give them a finger they take all the arm with them; plus Wilson can take them as a personal cause (like he did with jugoslavia) and can create a lot of diplomatic and economic consequence
 
All that will not create a good precedent for the Polish (and other autonomist/independent movement)...honestly if i was Pildusky and co. i will consider the new boss the same of the old and basically if you give them a finger they take all the arm with them; plus Wilson can take them as a personal cause (like he did with jugoslavia) and can create a lot of diplomatic and economic consequence
The model of "classical autonomy" (with full cultural and social sovereignty and a great degree of economic self-control, but without serious military of one's own), which Finland (and Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia, too) has chosen, looks a lot less attractive now and armies of your own and sovereign borders look better. But the circumstances of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and the myriads of other potential national entities also differ in each case. Also, depending on who comes out as victors of the Finnish Civil War, they'd communicate something different entirely back to Moscow: if Trotsky's revolutionaries can take over the entire country and quell any resistance, they'll want to stay in close touch with the rest of the Union of Equals - and at the same time, they've become a strong faction in its internal power games. If the Vaasa Senate prevails, Finland goes for full independence, backed by Germany first, and when the Great War tide ultiamtely turns against Germany, they'll try to find someone in the Entente interesting in limiting Russia's influence on the European continent to back them. If the Kuopio Senate prevails, they'd probably try to continue to steer a course between Skylla and Charybdis, probably insisting on keeping their own army and protecting their own borders, but also preserving their integration into the former-imperial Russian market structures and trying to stay on friendly terms with Moscow, maybe with a more loose follow-up Compact, which gains them a status more like that of Ukraine or Armenia, and less like that of Estonia (but who knows how Estonia looks once it's liberated...).
 
The model of "classical autonomy" (with full cultural and social sovereignty and a great degree of economic self-control, but without serious military of one's own), which Finland (and Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia, too) has chosen, looks a lot less attractive now and armies of your own and sovereign borders look better. But the circumstances of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and the myriads of other potential national entities also differ in each case. Also, depending on who comes out as victors of the Finnish Civil War, they'd communicate something different entirely back to Moscow: if Trotsky's revolutionaries can take over the entire country and quell any resistance, they'll want to stay in close touch with the rest of the Union of Equals - and at the same time, they've become a strong faction in its internal power games. If the Vaasa Senate prevails, Finland goes for full independence, backed by Germany first, and when the Great War tide ultiamtely turns against Germany, they'll try to find someone in the Entente interesting in limiting Russia's influence on the European continent to back them. If the Kuopio Senate prevails, they'd probably try to continue to steer a course between Skylla and Charybdis, probably insisting on keeping their own army and protecting their own borders, but also preserving their integration into the former-imperial Russian market structures and trying to stay on friendly terms with Moscow, maybe with a more loose follow-up Compact, which gains them a status more like that of Ukraine or Armenia, and less like that of Estonia (but who knows how Estonia looks once it's liberated...).

There is also an external factor, the one member of the entente that have everyone, Russia included as she has not cut herself from the world market, to the economic balls...the USA or more precisely Wilson; the Finnish (and other) can opt to instead winning the independence military to 'merely' don't lose and wait for an intervention by the USA...the more i think at it and the more i believe that WW and co. will go for resolve the adriatic question as quickest as possible to concentrate over the East European mess (expecially if WW is in a not support the socialist mood).
As with OTL Italy and France, Petrograd decision to come to not really satisfying term can be forced thanks to economic factor and all the rest of the entente will be in a somewhat slighlty better situation (they have occupied Syria 4 months earlier and i doubt that the UK will have a conscription crisis ITTL, even because the A-H/German last offensive will be less strong than OTL due to the continuing fighting in the east)
 
There is also an external factor, the one member of the entente that have everyone, Russia included as she has not cut herself from the world market, to the economic balls...the USA or more precisely Wilson; the Finnish (and other) can opt to instead winning the independence military to 'merely' don't lose and wait for an intervention by the USA...the more i think at it and the more i believe that WW and co. will go for resolve the adriatic question as quickest as possible to concentrate over the East European mess (expecially if WW is in a not support the socialist mood).
As with OTL Italy and France, Petrograd decision to come to not really satisfying term can be forced thanks to economic factor and all the rest of the entente will be in a somewhat slighlty better situation (they have occupied Syria 4 months earlier and i doubt that the UK will have a conscription crisis ITTL, even because the A-H/German last offensive will be less strong than OTL due to the continuing fighting in the east)
Oh, Wilson... he's a wildcard really. Where he's going to put his heart... who knows! The US have some pragmatic interests, of course, but if we're only looking at those, then there's a bit of rift between the US and the UK. But Wilsonian policies weren't quite so pragmatic... As my NYT articles alluded, Kamkov's Commission, and especially his Inokom (=committee/ministry of foreign affairs), are acutely aware of the need to woo Wilson and the US government, and have achieved some success on that front. But that was in March, of course, and by May and the Finland crisis, Wilson's opinion may have turned against them. Or not.
I won't comment on the UK too much, I'll only say this much: next week's update will tell us more about them.
As for Italy and its chances in the Adriatic: well, it appears as if Italy could indeed have some leeway... but of course 1918 is still long, AND it all also depends on what the two of us are going to do with Italy's internal political situation! ;)
 
Oh, Wilson... he's a wildcard really. Where he's going to put his heart... who knows! The US have some pragmatic interests, of course, but if we're only looking at those, then there's a bit of rift between the US and the UK. But Wilsonian policies weren't quite so pragmatic... As my NYT articles alluded, Kamkov's Commission, and especially his Inokom (=committee/ministry of foreign affairs), are acutely aware of the need to woo Wilson and the US government, and have achieved some success on that front. But that was in March, of course, and by May and the Finland crisis, Wilson's opinion may have turned against them. Or not.
I won't comment on the UK too much, I'll only say this much: next week's update will tell us more about them.
As for Italy and its chances in the Adriatic: well, it appears as if Italy could indeed have some leeway... but of course 1918 is still long, AND it all also depends on what the two of us are going to do with Italy's internal political situation! ;)

The thing to consider when dealing with Wilson is that at his core, he is a true believer and inflexible uncompromising zealot on par as any OTL hardcore revolutionary communist; he truly believe that he had a mission, that the people are on his side while the various goverment maybe not and more importantly that he know much better than anyone; unfortunely in OTL the USA had the biggest influence due to the financial situation and so even if Wilson diplomatically speaking was a barbarian, he hold all the card and everyone else need to play to his tune.
Honestly in OTL various goverment (even the italian ironically) thought that were succesfull in wooing him, only to discover that his interpretation of a fair treaty were a lot different from theirs, leaving WW thinking the worse of them and immediately become hostile (the man was very petty and hold grundge like nobody...he truly believed to be basically the second coming).
 
Twenty-One: Central Powers Under Fire (June 1918)
New York City (USA): New York Times, June 9th, 1918, p. 1:

CENTRAL POWERS UNDER FIRE FROM ALL SIDES!

ITALIANS HAVE RETAKEN CONEGLIANO

Now on its fifth day, Italy’s military offensive [1], bolstered by French and British support, continues to regain ground lost to the Austro-Hungarian armies after last year’s Battle of Caporetto. More and more divisions of the Italian Eighth Army are crossing the Piave River, and yesterday they succeeded in liberating the town of Conegliano. Meanwhile, the Fourth Italian Army continues to inflict heavy casualties on General Horsetzky’s Eleventh Austro-Hungarian Army on Mount Grappa. [2]

GERMAN ADVANCE IN FLANDERS STOPPED


Fourteen days after its beginning, the German offensive along the Lys has been fought to a standstill. After the capture of Hazebrouck [3], any further advance was denied to the German Fourth and Sixth Armies by the bravery of the heroic British and Portuguese Expeditionary Forces, who are joined every day by French reinforcements arriving from Amiens. The French, under the command of General du Mitry, have been able to fend back a German attempt at capturing the coal fields of Béthune - with high losses for both sides. “Operation George”, it appears, has lost its steam, and an outflanking of General Haig’s British armies has been prevented.

AFTER REVAL: RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET CONTINUES OFFENSIVE

After their victorious naval encounter and successful capture of the port of Reval, followed by a raid on the German-controlled city and then the landing of thousands of soldiers, the Baltic Fleet of the Union of Equals continues its offensive in the region by challenging German control over the Aland Islands. Heavy fighting has been reported across the archipelago over the course of yesterday. In the meantime, the last remnants of German authority seem to have disappeared in Reval, and the local branch of their puppet “United Baltic Duchy” is reported to have fled to Riga. [4]

MASSACRE IN BUKHARA

Security forces loyal to Alim Khan have put down a revolt by groups affiliated with the Young Turks and killed a great number of insurgents in Bukhara. The Emirate, it appears, will not become a foothold for Ottoman Turanist infiltration of the region anytime soon. [5]


[1] This is not an OTL offensive. IOTL, the Italians had plans for such an offensive, but then General Diaz, who had been somewhat skeptical, received intelligence that the Austro-Hungarians were planning an offensive of their own, and so the Italian plans were changed. They began to prepare themselves for what would become the (for A-H disastrously fruitless) Second Battle of the Piave.

ITTL, Austria-Hungary cannot start an offensive because they still need all the forces they have on their Eastern Front where no peace has been negotiated. Therefore, the Italians go through with their offensive plans, possibly under political pressure from their Entente allies, who are hard-pressed by the Germans in Flanders (see below). They want to keep up the pressure on the Central Powers, lest Austria-Hungary send reinforcements to the Western Front (which IOTL it did).

[2] All in all, this is not yet a total collapse on the scale of OTL’s Vittorio Veneto, and although Austria-Hungary has problems with provisioning their army (to put it mildly), morale has not yet dipped to the ultimate low point which it had reached in late October 1918 IOTL. Thus, they’re resisting, and the Italians advance at a “normal” pace.
The ultramarine line superimposed on the map of OTL's Battle of Vittorio Veneto shows how far the Italians have advanced ITTL in five days:
Italian-offensive.jpg


[3] IOTL, the smaller “Operation Georgette” stopped a few kilometers east of Hazebrouck. Hazebrouck, on the railroad line connecting the Channel Ports with the Entente forces south of the La Bassée canal, is of considerable strategic importance, so this is a significant setback for the British especially. If the coal fields of Bethune are captured, too, in the following weeks then the Entente forces will face serious challenges in the provisioning of military materiel.

In contrast to OTL’s Spring Offensive, in which the Germans concentrated their attacks against mostly French positions in the Artois (Operation Michael especially), ITTL the Brits bear the brunt of the main attack (Operation George instead of Georgette). My reasoning behind this is as follows:

IOTL, the Spring Offensives were aimed at capturing Paris and knocking France out of the war. ITTL, not only do the Germans lack the necessary numerical superiority and provisions to even remotely hope to reach Paris, but Ludendorff has also learned from Operations Peter and Paul, which have captured Petrograd, that taking over a country’s capital does not necessarily result in that country’s government throwing in the towel. Therefore, his conclusion is to focus on more limited objectives. The political goal of this last-ditch offensive effort is the same as IOTL: to obtain a position of strength from which a white peace can be negotiated. ITTL, the targeted victims are not so much the French but the British. Hindenburg and Ludendorff are hoping to throw the British (and the last Belgian contingents too) out of Flanders, and maybe even capture the Channel Ports, from which they could break the stranglehold of the British naval blockade. Or, at the very least, they are hoping to cut the British forces in two and capture Bethune for the reasons outlined above.

The red line superimposed on the map of OTL's Operation Georgette shows how far the Germans have advanced ITTL's Operation George:
battle-of-the-lys.jpg


[4] The Baltic Fleet of the Russians had a great number of powerful ships, and they still have them ITTL, too, as they were all evacuated to Finland. If anyone could mobilise the sailors, who were not exactly a solid backbone for any of the regimes of OTL, to leap into action, it is probably the great revolutionary orator Trotsky. He has picked his fight well: the Germans did not have a massive naval presence in the region. And the timing was propitious, too, because the Germans have committed their manpower and materiel to the Western front.

This is just a bridgehead so far, and the attack on Reval was at least as much a desperate raid for, well, anything, as it was the beginning of the liberation of Estonia. Navally speaking, the logical objective is to make the Gulf of Finland a Russian lake again, with only Kronstadt remaining in Markov’s hands. This way, if the Russians are encircling his regime in Petrograd, the Germans cannot send in reinforcements by sea without overcoming the restituted sea fortress.

The implications of Trotsky’s departure to pursue naval adventures is probably greatest on the Finnish Civil War. More on that next week.

[5] It is really high time for Moscow to develop a Southern strategy. These are the results of not doing anything: the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva continue policy not unlike when they were vassals to the Russian tsars – their autocratic powers are not openly challenged by Moscow, and they are still doing the Russians' dirty job in these cotton-producing quarters. Formally, they have not held the referendum on the Constitution, but they have not obstructed the soviets in organizing it in some places, either; now, the establishment has cracked down on those who seek reforms in the very moment when these reformers appear most suspicious to Moscow.

These are developments which must shame any Socialist Revolutionary or Social Democrat: with their lack of criticism, they condone the continued autocracy of the emirs and khans, and now, through negligence, they have bloodied their hands with the blood of people who screamed for freedom, democracy and a more modern society – we’ll see if the Russian Left still learns their lesson before it’s too late and the lumping in of all Muslim reformists with the Young Turks and the latter with supporting the Ottomans becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy...
 
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Hnau

Banned
I'm not surprised what happened in Central Asia, but it's a damn shame... :( I appreciate the map and the reasoning behind the divergent Spring Offensive! Always very interesting to tune into this timeline, you keep it very... let's say "fresh" and well-written, too, of course! :)
 
I'm not surprised what happened in Central Asia, but it's a damn shame... :( I appreciate the map and the reasoning behind the divergent Spring Offensive! Always very interesting to tune into this timeline, you keep it very... let's say "fresh" and well-written, too, of course! :)
I am so happy to hear that the TL continues to please you!

Regarding Central Asia, I would so much rather write about a success story of about a reformist / Jadidist Islam which is less tied to a national project like Turkey and instead carries more universalist, pacifist, anti-imperialist overtones. But given the ignorance and the attitudes concerning the Muslim "Tatars etc." prevalent among the Russian Left of that time (and of course not only them) - and of course the internal divisions -, I thought a straight path like a Federative Republic of Turkestan was unrealistic. Before 1917, many Jadidists had some manner of good relations with some branches and individuals from the Kadet party. That's not really helping them a lot now, either, and not only because the Kadets are in the opposition, but also because among the Kadets, the Russian nationalist wing (who seeks to absorb all those formations to their right which have been outlawed and persecuted by the Commission, and unite the entire not-militantly-antidemocratic Russian opposition against socialism, many of whom are ardent Great Russians) has become overwhelmingly more powerful than those who still regard national self-determination and cultural rights as paramount even if they set in motion dynamics like in Finland which threaten to cause secession from the Union.

Needless to say, what happens the places we now call Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan does not go unnoticed in Moscow anymore. But even if someone observes the connections between anti-imperialism and the Central Asian question and draws his conclusions, it is questionable, by now, if they still have time to change the course of events...

Regarding the Offensive in Flanders: one relevant consequence is that, when the Entente counter-offensive begins (because, let's face it Herr Ludendorff, the Brits are not going to agree to a peace in which Germany is rewarded with annexations anywhere at this point, even if you could throw the BEF back to the Channel ports), the French and the US will have to be its backbone initially, with the BEF only being able to contribute in full force once the German gains in Flanders have been rolled back.

Also, Flanders is the only place where the Germans have advanced beyond the highly secured Hindenburg Line so far. While the Hundred Days Offensive of OTL began by catching over-extended and exhausted Germans in poorly defensible positions, ITTL they'll have to break through the Hindenburg / Siegfried line, Cambrai-style. If nothing changes this in its tracks, that's going to be a huge carnage.
 
Also, Flanders is the only place where the Germans have advanced beyond the highly secured Hindenburg Line so far. While the Hundred Days Offensive of OTL began by catching over-extended and exhausted Germans in poorly defensible positions, ITTL they'll have to break through the Hindenburg / Siegfried line, Cambrai-style. If nothing changes this in its tracks, that's going to be a huge carnage.

There is the alternative to a direct assault to the Hinderburg line, the southern route aka assault in Baviera through A-H, it was a strategic proposal in late 16/early 17 but renounced for interallied rivalry...the prospect to a massacre cambrai-style can make people rethink the general strategy.
People in Wien will be extremely worried, the line in Italy are holding but barely and a continued pressure will be bring a collapse of the army, the continued fight in the east are wasting resources that the Empire don't have and if someone in the court had still some brain cell will offer a separate peace immediately even at risk of the Germans taking over as think don't look very well for the future.

Prospect for Germany are not good even if they resist the ITTL version of the hundread days offensive, the food situation is critical, their allies barely stand and revolution is on the air and there is the continued fight on the east that wast resources; honestly H&L only option is once Operation George is over, offer term for a compromised peace by throwing all his allies to the wolf and accepting the loss of A-L and part of the Polish populated zone but partecipate at the division of A-H.

The two other member of the CP are important at the moment for the Entente strategy.

Bulgaria by now is seeing the writing in the wall and as OTL want a way out, in OTL june 21 the new prime minister of Bulgaria started secret negotiation for Bulgaria exit from the war but the principal condition was Sofia keeping eastern Macedonia; the British refused due to not damage Greece interest and demand...but ITTL they can accept to break the stalemate, maybe promising major compensation in Smyrne (or even Cyprus) or going for a partition of the zone (but i think that they offer Cyprus to Athen first to make her comply) as with Bulgaria out, A-H position become untenable and the OE will ask again an armistice even if it bring the Russian at the table
 
There is the alternative to a direct assault to the Hinderburg line, the southern route aka assault in Baviera through A-H, it was a strategic proposal in late 16/early 17 but renounced for interallied rivalry...the prospect to a massacre cambrai-style can make people rethink the general strategy.
People in Wien will be extremely worried, the line in Italy are holding but barely and a continued pressure will be bring a collapse of the army, the continued fight in the east are wasting resources that the Empire don't have and if someone in the court had still some brain cell will offer a separate peace immediately even at risk of the Germans taking over as think don't look very well for the future.

Prospect for Germany are not good even if they resist the ITTL version of the hundread days offensive, the food situation is critical, their allies barely stand and revolution is on the air and there is the continued fight on the east that wast resources; honestly H&L only option is once Operation George is over, offer term for a compromised peace by throwing all his allies to the wolf and accepting the loss of A-L and part of the Polish populated zone but partecipate at the division of A-H.

The two other member of the CP are important at the moment for the Entente strategy.

Bulgaria by now is seeing the writing in the wall and as OTL want a way out, in OTL june 21 the new prime minister of Bulgaria started secret negotiation for Bulgaria exit from the war but the principal condition was Sofia keeping eastern Macedonia; the British refused due to not damage Greece interest and demand...but ITTL they can accept to break the stalemate, maybe promising major compensation in Smyrne (or even Cyprus) or going for a partition of the zone (but i think that they offer Cyprus to Athen first to make her comply) as with Bulgaria out, A-H position become untenable and the OE will ask again an armistice even if it bring the Russian at the table
Excellent Idea concerning Bavaria, but it's still a way to go.
Concerning Bulgaria, I have Not yet mentioned Skra di Legen, but I also don't see why it would not happen like IOTL. So, yes, Bulgaria becomes a loose Cannon soon probably. Do we have any experts in Bulgaria here who could Help me?
More in your excellent ideas on Monday when I'm Back at my Computer.
 
Excellent Idea concerning Bavaria, but it's still a way to go.
Concerning Bulgaria, I have Not yet mentioned Skra di Legen, but I also don't see why it would not happen like IOTL. So, yes, Bulgaria becomes a loose Cannon soon probably. Do we have any experts in Bulgaria here who could Help me?
More in your excellent ideas on Monday when I'm Back at my Computer.

In general the internal political situation in the CP will be one of 'frantic damage control'; the OE already asked term, OTL Bulgaria had done it in June and the French revelead last year that the A-H tried a separate peace and even the German are just trying to get better term in the peace treay...victory now is out of the question, this is all for limiting the loss, a situation that will really affect the troops and civilian morale.

Now the decision are in the hand of the politician, while the ITTL situation of the entente his better than OTL, there is also the factor that everybody is tired and the war has been costly and many will fear revolution at home, so eliminate the Macedonian front by simply giving some lenience to Bulgaria and appease Greece with something else can be very very tempting, expecially with the potential domino effect towards OE (i bet they already ask again term, reluctantly accepting the Russian) and the A-H as it allow the Entente to liberate Serbia and attack directely A-H, in a moment that's in a particulary bad position (if the italian continue the offensive, the Hapsburg commad will be forced to order a retreat in a more easy to supply line and to shorten the front); expecially because it will cause a lessening of the pressure over Russia (and Romania), so i expect that the Union goverment will try, with discrection, to support this idea


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turnip_Winter will be much much worse with less plunder from the east ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galician_Protocol ) and continued fight there, meaning that the internal situation is reaching explosive level and in any case, soldiers and civilian alike will be much more weak due to the increased food scarcity.
The increased dire military situation and the worsening political landscape (both internal and with his allies, as i doubt that the OE and Bulgarian attempt to separate peace had gone unnoticed by Berlin) can 'force' Admiral Hipper to search the last battle for the honor of the Navy earlier ITTL causing a revolt that in this situation can be much worse than OTL and become more widespread
 
@lukedalton,

I agree on the objective situation in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria: they’re economically on the brink of collapse and starvation, politically, only a few steps away from revolt and revolution, and militarily there is no longer any realistic hope to turn the tide, and of course that’s horrible for morale, so mutinies might be around the corner.

Thing is, the internal political antennae in all four countries are not really attuned to this.

In Germany, OHL has practically installed a military dictatorship, based on the tacit, no: loud and clamouring support of an alliance between the old military aristocracy and a shrilly ultra-nationalist bourgeoisie. Asking for terms and accepting them if they not only not include any territorial, economic, strategical or political gains at all after so many horrible sacrifices, but also even include ceding Alsace-Lorraine and, politically even more dangerous, Posen, where many junkers had enriched themselves nicely, is going to cost them this right-wing support immediately – these are groups for which even the unmistakable hammering of the Hundred Days Offensive was not enough to bring about a sense of reality, hence the “Stab in the back” legend and the enduring Wilhelmine restorationist sentiment on the Right during OTL’s Weimar years. While the democratic centre and left parties are mostly loyal patriots who would stand in and accept a rational peace and be politically harmless, like they did IOTL, only a minority among the military leadership are actually understanding this, while the majority has been panicking about socialism for decades. Hindenburg and Ludendorff themselves certainly were among those with only a limited sense of reality, too, and they definitely did not want to take the blame for the catastrophe of the war. About Wilhelm II, a lot has been researched and said, and while opinions diverge, one thing is certain, I believe: he was not exactly good at swallowing his ego, or promoting far-sighted policies. What is worse (at least if your objective is a white peace for Germany) is that at least within the SPD, rifts are even deeper than IOTL, with the repression against striking workers having been more severe than IOTL, the solidarity with the Russian revolutionaries, whom the German army has thrown mustard gas at, is a significant factor and it is, compared to OTL, relatively unambiguous – ITTL, Rosa Luxemburg is not worrying about restricting the workers’ freedom and liberties like she was with regards to Lenin’s regime, and quite generally, the Russian Revolution is much less polarizing within German social democracy, it enjoying almost universal support among the base, and the leadership around Scheidemann and Ebert is forced to either radicalize, or lose more and more touch with their base, which would certainly turn to the USPD even more than IOTL. A first modest sign of such “radicalization” compared to OTL is something I have not mentioned yet – I think ITTL the SPD in the Reichstag could not vote for the last round of War Bonds. They were accepted by a parliamentary majority nonetheless, but the SPD’s opposition and growing doubts among the centre parties, too, are reflecting in even less financial success for these war bonds. This means, the German war machine must rely, to a greater extent than IOTL, on new money emissions, thus accelerating the inflation. But to come full circle in my argument: the German leadership as it is is not the most far-sighted, its basis of support is as deluded as ever, and an alternative basis of support in the form of the centre-left is beginning to drift out of reach.

Austria-Hungary’s political leadership may be more aware of the situation they are really facing. But, and if I understand your argument right, you see things this way, too: They really have nothing to gain in seeking terms. If they are faced with defeat at the hands of the Italians, national secessions, and a dismembering of their state if they don’t seek terms, or the alternative of occupation at the hands of the OHL if they seek terms, which means they can’t even defuse a revolutionary and secessionist situation by abdicating and/or acquiescing to secessions, I can understand why they wouldn’t want to choose between Skylla and Charybdis and instead decide to hope against all hope for some sort of miracle.

In Bulgaria, the government which came to power in June was as national-liberal as the one which preceded it, only the premier was not Germanophile, but traditionally Russophile. His opinion about Russia is bound to have changed dramatically over the course of the last year, though, much like IOTL. Of course, keeping Eastern Thrace would sweeten Bulgaria’s exit, but can the Entente really convincingly promise this? The Venizelists have basically putsched their way back into power in Greece by pushing the Megali Idea on the side of the Entente, and Bulgaria was the enemy they had been focusing on from the beginning. Also, Greece had a weak position in OTL’s Entente and was not on good terms with the nascent Soviet Union, but ITTL, the relation of Venizelos’ government with the Union of Equals is a lot better. Actually, expect Axelrod’s foreign policy to work towards securing Wilson’s USA and Venizelos’ Greece as the two closest allies of the Union of Equals within the Entente – IOTL, Anglo-Francophile factions dominated among the Venizelists, but then again, they had no alternative, either, and the treatment of Greece by the British and the French during the war was not exactly flattering Greek national pride… If Greece is courted by various factions among the Entente, I doubt that the Bulgarian government can hope to get away lightly. Also, the presently cordial relations between *Russia and Romania need to be considered: here is a source for fears of losing more of Dobrugea… And the national liberals of Bulgaria will also certainly fear that Russia would much prefer the main opposition party, the Peasants’ Party of Stambolinsky, in power…

As for the Ottoman Empire, there is some reason why Enver’s faction has prevailed in the internal power struggle. The CUP leadership is riddled with people whom Wilson and Kamkov would love to see put on trial for what we call genocide, and the current goings-on in the South of the former Russian Empire can only aggravate fears that the brave new Entente world may not be such a nice place to live in if you happen to be a Turk, or a Muslim, or both. Now of course there is very little the OE can still hope for, and at the court, the compromisers may soon gain the upper hand and open channels of communication again. OTL has shown, though, that a peace treaty with an Ottoman Sultan may not be worth the paper it is written on…

As for Admiral Hipper, I think you are spot-on, although that sortie need not be just a last grand show – there are quite a few places where the Kriegsmarine could actually be tempted to play a decisive role right now. Regarding mutinies: one must not forget that OTL’s Kiel Mutiny was not only triggered by the apparent futility of their sacrifice, it also blossomed so well because the marine units were stacked full of urban workers who often leaned socialist, not few of them drafted after the January Strikes as a means to “pacify” the home front (and often with the commentary that it would not be regrettable if the conscripts never returned…). ITTL, the January Strikes were larger, and so was the wave of repression – and at the same time, in TTL’s late winter / early spring 1918, there was other places where fresh conscripts could be sent to… so it’s not a given that if the war ends with a German mutiny, that this mutiny must take place among the sailors of Kiel…
 

Germany: well, sure your idea on the mood of the political leadership is spot on, as said, getting peace immediately and throwing the allies at the wolf, limiting loss was what i will do...H & L and the rest are on a level of denying similar to the Japanese goverment in WW2. The 'problem' for them is that ITTL with the continued fight in the east, the further suppression/hostility of the SPD, worse food situation...well i think that reality will hit soon in the face in full force, even without the Entente launching an offensive
Regarding the navy, honestly any action at this stage will be for the glory as IRC the situation of the ships in term of reliability, mantenaince and coal was not very good and while i agree that a military plan with a real reason can be more acceptable to the crew and not met with a revolt, instead of the idea to simply die for the 'glory' of the service...the end result can be the same, a brave but fruitless operation basically the German version of Operation Ten-go.
If the January strikes have been even larger with a larger suppression and more people sent to the front as a mean to get rid of them...well i doubt that this will do a lot of good at the overall industrial production of Germany, in general i really want what the German leadership smocked for thinking that they can obtain better term continuing to fight in this condition.

A-H: the really sad part, was that at this stage they know that even in case of victory the best case scenario was becoming a puppet of Germany and was more probable that the Empire end soon after the peace; basically they are continuing to fight because they can't stop it and are afraid of any type of decision. Maybe i'm overtly optimistic, but the italian offensive risk to force a general retreat to at least shorten the front and the logistic line and reach a defensive line more developed and capable

Bulgaria: yep they are on an hard stop and Romania will have the support to gain more from them (even if Bucharest will surely concentrate on Hungary); said that while i agree that Greece will be on better term with the Union of Equal, the idea to end almost immediately the conflict in the balkan due to the extremely probable domino effect's of a Bulgarian surrender will surely tempt them, as while they are standing they are not in a very good shape and ending the war as quick as possible will be something that nobody will dismiss easily. For this reason, i say that the British can offer Cyprus and occupation of Smyrne (even if was half promised to Italy, but really never ratified, unlike Adalia) as a mean to mollify Athen with the Union support it...even because the general staff of the entente think that the war will continue till 1919 (a thought that will not make people very happy).

OE: regarding the fate of OTL peace treaty, well a big factor for Kemal success was URSS support with both gold and weapons, here i doubt that will receive much as the Union will want (as everyone else) her pound of flesh...but yes in general they are in a tight spot as the Entente is already in Aleppo, six month in advance of OTL

Bits and odds:

- with the Union of Equal still in the fight as a cobelligerant/ally, it's very probable that there will be no massive pubblication of the secret treaty signed by the Russian Empire like the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Treaty of London with Italy, meaning for now a more relaxed diplomatic situation.
-https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscription_Crisis_of_1918 Is the british conscription crisis avoided? With the Spring offensive much more limited in term of men and objective, the panic and urgency can be avoided as the French and American are still 'relatively' untouched.
- the future Jugoslavia will probably suffer more, the continued fight in the east and less food in general mean more deaths for Bosnian, Croatian and Slovene, and the population in occupied Serbia will see her food and cattle requisitioned even more to sustain the CP war effort (OTL food shortage and epidemic caused the loss of almost 25% of the overall population...and if things go worse)
 
@lukedalton,
indeed, the secret treaties, including Sykes-Picot, have not been published and probably will not be in the near future.
Conscription has not been enforced in Ireland. In TTL's spring of 1918, the British are not quite as hard-pressed manpower-wise as IOTL. When the German steamroller hits them in late May, their problem is not so much getting more conscripts (the French and Americans are fully capable to relieve and reinforce, with the front sections in the Artois not being under serious attack) but getting their troops already present in Flanders equipped. At least those holding the line against the Germans at Ypres and its environs, i.e. North of Hazebrouck, are cut off from being provisioned from the South, which means any provisions required by them must be shipped across the Channel. Those South of Hazebrouck can rely on French infrastructure, but if the Germans capture Bethune, that infrastructure is put under serious duress, too, as e.g. coal must be shipped from a lot farther. But basically, no, His Majesty's Army is not scraping the bottom for fresh recruits. Anglo-Irish relations are strained anyway after the Easter Uprising, but at least the escalation of the Conscription Crisis has been avoided ITTL.
The situation of the Yugoslav population is certainly not at all admirable, I would agree.
 
Huh, just found this thread. Looks interesting!

I see Russia still controls Ukraine. When the Germans launched their offensive towards Petrograd, why didn't they also try to occupy Ukraine like in OTL?

EDIT:
Geez... It's shaping up that the lack of a German everything-but-the-kitchen-sink offensive will result in the the war getting prolonged despite the failure to eliminate Russia. This does mean the Central Powers will probably have a much more spectacular collapse on their home front in early 1919 though.

How's the Thessaloniki front doing, is there a possibility of a breakthrough on the level of OTL into the Balkans, or at least a large offensive? Bulgaria is probably in a weaker position than OTL....

BTW how much of a peace movement is there in Russia? Since being at war was not very good for them even before they lost Petrograd.
 
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Huh, just found this thread. Looks interesting!
I see Russia still controls Ukraine. When the Germans launched their offensive towards Petrograd, why didn't they also try to occupy Ukraine like in OTL?
The situation ITTL's February and March 1918 was entirely different from OTL's Operation Faustschlag. Faustschlag was conducted against an almost non-existent enemy: the imperial army had dissolved (with parts of it conducting operations against the Bolshevik government), the Red Army was only being scrambled together, and specifically Ukraine was in civil war mode, with various armed groups welcoming the Central Powers.
TTL, things are very much different. The old imperial army is being massively restructured from mid-1917 onwards, it is downsized and partly substituted by militia of all sorts, but the CP are not pushing into a void, they are merely faced with a weakened enemy in a difficult phase, which is why the Germans at least continue to achieve successes, but they're not on a scale of Faustschlag because they have to fight for every mile they advance, they can't just kill a few Bolsheviks who held a railway station, then board their armies onto a train, and repeat the operation in the next town.
Because the Germans knew that, they focused on the Northern segment of the front, where they hoped (and succeeded) to capture Petrograd because they thought this (or even standing before the city's gates menacingly) would force the Commission to surrender to their terms.
Ukraine was attacked by an Austro-Hungarian army ITTL at the same time, but while the Germans could break through and advance on Petrograd, the Austro-Hungarian army, ill-equipped, in bad morale and with provisioning difficulties, failed to achieve any major successes, although they, too, did advance a little in the Offensive against Lutsk. In that part of the front, the A-H army was fighting not only against the Third Union Army, but also against Ukrainain territorial defense forces and against the Czechoslovak Legion. Elsewhere, Polish and Bessarabian legions were holding their own along the front, along with the new-formed Fourth Union Army. Especially the "ethnic" forces were, if badly equipped, showing great morale (so they did IOTL). The Austro-Hungarian offensive advanced, but then gut stuck as the front line stiffened, and then the whole thing was called off when its futility became obvious. (Sort of how it became obvious to the Germans in the West with their spring offensive of OTL, too, only here on a smaller scale - not geographically, but in terms of intensity of manpower and materiel invested).

EDIT:
Geez... It's shaping up that the lack of a German everything-but-the-kitchen-sink offensive will result in the the war getting prolonged despite the failure to eliminate Russia. This does mean the Central Powers will probably have a much more spectacular collapse on their home front in early 1919 though.
Hm, maybe :) Though I must say I find their OTL collapse pretty spectacular already.

How's the Thessaloniki front doing, is there a possibility of a breakthrough on the level of OTL into the Balkans, or at least a large offensive? Bulgaria is probably in a weaker position than OTL....
It is pretty much the same as IOTL. The Battle of Skra di Legen has been fought in late May, and lost by the Bulgarians, just like IOTL. There isn't much of a difference here because the Anglo-French troops are of the same nature as IOTL (the British are investing those forces which are ITTL not needed as reinforcements on the Western front in their Palestinian campaign against the Ottomans, and even throughout May, they are attacking Ottoman positions and still advancing (more on that later). The Greeks, on the other hand, weren't much really, which cannot come as a surprise given that their now-allies had practically enforced a Greek demobilisation a few years before. Concerning Bulgaria, I'd be glad to have someone with deeper knowledge of its history helping me out...

BTW how much of a peace movement is there in Russia? Since being at war was not very good for them even before they lost Petrograd.
The peace movement is not quite as strong as it was IOTL because ITTL, peace has been seriously offered and attempted twice, by two different People's Commissions, yet every time, the Central Powers (specifically the Germans) demanded simply unacceptable terms. Revolutionary Defencism is much, much more widespread ITTL - ITTL, it doesn't mean "I support the stupid Provisional Government where the Kadets want to continue imperialist strategies, just because I'm a Russian patriot", instead it means "I go back to war because the Germans have not given us any choice: I haven't risen up to throw off the yoke of the tsar, his okhrana, and the landlords' power, just to be enslaved by Ober Ost".
At least this is the position within many organizations. In the Constituent Assembly, there are three types of Marxist factions: Bukharin's Bolsheviks, who are against the war, then the broad centre of the IRSDLP unification faction, which had hoped for peace but has rallied around the red flag now that the Germans were so uncompromising, and then there's a small minority opposition of Mensheviks who did not want to participate in the unification for one reason or another, which is a mixed bag of Revolutionary Defencists and pacifists. In the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the pacifists had replaced Chernov with Kamkov, but when Kamkov couldn't obtain peace, either, they have fallen into the Revolutionary Defencist lien, too. The centrist opposition (Popular Socialist Labour and Kadets) are defencists anyway. A handful of anarchists is staunchly pacifist, except for Kropotkin, who supports the war.
Now, that is only the political parties. The lower levels of the new political system are also filled with defencists, though - these are the people who are very much aware of the gains they have made in the revolution, and they do not want to lose them if the Germans install a puppet dictator like Markov who would persecute them.
But this doesn't mean that there isn't still a lot of individual desertions and spontaneous protests going on. Some of these "saboteurs", as the Kamkov coalition has labelled them, have been cracked down on - let's not forget the VeCheKa, TTL's version of the Cheka, and persecuting militant pacifists is one of their tasks. While they are not allowed to summarily execute people, they can spy around, apprehend and detain people for an unlimited period of time, and that detention is certainly something nobody would like to experience. But even with all this revolutionary defensism and militia and crackdowns on anarchists and pacifists, the war-wariness can't be rooted out, I'm aware. This is basically the reason why we still haven't seen a Russian counter-offensive by early-to-mid June, except for Trotsky's naval adventures. Kamkov and his Voykom (minister of defense...) Pavel Lazimir are struggling to find enough reliable forces (and equip them in economically very fragile circumstances) which they could throw at the Germans. They have enough to hold positions, and by now they should have enough to start a counter-offensive, too, but there is a great panic what happens if that counter-offensive fails... and the widespread war-wariness is certainly the reason why this fear is so intense.
 
The peace movement is not quite as strong as it was IOTL because ITTL, peace has been seriously offered and attempted twice, by two different People's Commissions, yet every time, the Central Powers (specifically the Germans) demanded simply unacceptable terms. Revolutionary Defencism is much, much more widespread ITTL - ITTL, it doesn't mean "I support the stupid Provisional Government where the Kadets want to continue imperialist strategies, just because I'm a Russian patriot", instead it means "I go back to war because the Germans have not given us any choice: I haven't risen up to throw off the yoke of the tsar, his okhrana, and the landlords' power, just to be enslaved by Ober Ost".
At least this is the position within many organizations. In the Constituent Assembly, there are three types of Marxist factions: Bukharin's Bolsheviks, who are against the war, then the broad centre of the IRSDLP unification faction, which had hoped for peace but has rallied around the red flag now that the Germans were so uncompromising, and then there's a small minority opposition of Mensheviks who did not want to participate in the unification for one reason or another, which is a mixed bag of Revolutionary Defencists and pacifists. In the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the pacifists had replaced Chernov with Kamkov, but when Kamkov couldn't obtain peace, either, they have fallen into the Revolutionary Defencist lien, too. The centrist opposition (Popular Socialist Labour and Kadets) are defencists anyway. A handful of anarchists is staunchly pacifist, except for Kropotkin, who supports the war.
Now, that is only the political parties. The lower levels of the new political system are also filled with defencists, though - these are the people who are very much aware of the gains they have made in the revolution, and they do not want to lose them if the Germans install a puppet dictator like Markov who would persecute them.
But this doesn't mean that there isn't still a lot of individual desertions and spontaneous protests going on. Some of these "saboteurs", as the Kamkov coalition has labelled them, have been cracked down on - let's not forget the VeCheKa, TTL's version of the Cheka, and persecuting militant pacifists is one of their tasks. While they are not allowed to summarily execute people, they can spy around, apprehend and detain people for an unlimited period of time, and that detention is certainly something nobody would like to experience. But even with all this revolutionary defensism and militia and crackdowns on anarchists and pacifists, the war-wariness can't be rooted out, I'm aware. This is basically the reason why we still haven't seen a Russian counter-offensive by early-to-mid June, except for Trotsky's naval adventures. Kamkov and his Voykom (minister of defense...) Pavel Lazimir are struggling to find enough reliable forces (and equip them in economically very fragile circumstances) which they could throw at the Germans. They have enough to hold positions, and by now they should have enough to start a counter-offensive, too, but there is a great panic what happens if that counter-offensive fails... and the widespread war-wariness is certainly the reason why this fear is so intense.

It will be 'fun' having them at Versailles, as i doubt that even the revolutionary goverment will want a strong Germany as a neighbourg regardless of the type of goverment and with their economic situation they will go towards the French route and try to squeeze everything from the defeated nations as a mean to rebuild Russia.
On the other side, bolshevick or not, London will want to limit Russia sorry the Union of equal influence expansion...for principle alone as they don't want a single nation have control of Europe, not with Germany and sure not with new Russia; this can create some strange bedfellows, from obstacolate France uber punishment of Germany to support them trying to keep them as allies as a counterpoint to the Union and a possible resurgent Germany, naturally there are couple of substitute/addition at this plan like Italy and Poland (it's part of the 14 points and frankly i doubt that the new goverment will mean anything to any Polish patriot except some hardcore revolutionary).
 
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