Hi, Italian citizen here and I have something to say about a paragraph in your latest update that has left me a little disoriented. I start by saying that this is my first post in this thread since I'm still catching up with the TL (I'm currently going over chapter 10 with a fine comb, to be sure I don't miss any detail on the ATL evolution of a paramount scenario like the Middle East), but I usually glance at any new update as they are posted and since news about the Italian political situation is the very first piece of info we're given I just couldn't ignore that.
To cut the long story short, since we all know your methodology as a writer of alternate history, I think we deserve to know something more about the victory of the "YES" front in the referendum against the Fortuna-Baslini Law since, unless I'm missing something incredibly important in the chapters I still have to read, I firmly believe that you'd need at least a swarm of Spruce Goose-sized butterflies to change the result of that referendum so radically.
87.7% of the Italian electorate cast their votes in those two fateful days of May 12 and 13, 1974. 87.7%. A percentage that has never been reached again, let alone surpassed. And 59.3% of the voters chose not to repeal Fortuna-Baslini. Even having more people going to ballot box would be a real plausibility stretch, since I can't imagine a way that wasn't actually attempted in real life by the "Yes" and "No" campaigns to convince them to cast their votes for the most crucial popular consultation in the history of the country. And let's say that more people actually went to the ballot box ITTL, there just weren't enough of them in the country to make the "Yes" front win, even in the unlikely even teverybody decided to trace an X on the Vatican-approved option. The numbers just do not add up.
But it's not just a matter of pure electoral arithmetics, alas. There were a lot of trends and contingent factors at work in Italian politics and society during those fateful years which rowed against a victory of the anti-Fortuna-Basalini front.
Fortuna was a Socialist. Baslini a Liberal. Divorce wasn't and couldn't be portrayed as a product of the creeping influence of Godless Communism on the God-fearing Italian people since the PSI and the PLI were traditional, historical allies of Christian Democracy and would have stayed that way after the referendum said that their law had to stay. In fact, the Communists themsleves were unsure about the opportunity of dying on a hill to defend Fortuna and Baslini's form of divorce, which was perceived as way too timid and bourgeois ("5 years of separation before a couple can actually rescind their marriage? What's this farce?") compared to the idea they had. Only the charismatic presence of the new PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer and the enviable discipline enforced on the Party's ranks kept the official leftist opposition on the path of commitment to the "No" front, despite not being in the frontlines of the campaign. Now, a Communist Party that chooses not to die on the hill of bourgeois divorce would be an interesting point of divergence that could have some funny effects on the final result of the 1974 referendum, but that's in no way related to a rising international front hell-bent on pushing back against broad civil liberties.
And then there's the fact that just two years before the Italian Constitutional Court had finally decriminalized adultery in a historic verdict that was perceived as common sense at the time by the majority of the population, especially since the repealed law, in typical Macho fashion, was especially punishing for female adulterers. There was a trend in motion, one towards a more laical approach to life in the country, especially amongst women. Ripples from McGovern's election in the US are expected to be there, but not to be powerful enough to annihilate the effects of the sexual revolution and the spread of a more relaxed attitude towards Catholic dominance over societal norms. It's just too convenient in a politically-divided landscape like the Italian one.
And then there's the matter of Amintore Fanfani being once again the national secretary of DC. Several party bigwigs (Rumor, Moro, Colombo, Cossiga) did not like that. At all. He was old. His way of doing politics was old. From day one, the crusade against divorce in Italy was going to be Fanfani's crusade, not the party's. Even with the Catholic Church pressing its political arm to do even the impossible to preserve the sanctity of marriage, there's no way that DC's consolidated correntismo magically disappears and DC presents a believably united front in support of the "Yes" option. Unfortunately for the defenders of marriage, when Deep-Red Emilia-Romagna and Most Catholic Sicily vote the same way, like it happened IOTL, it means that maybe, just maybe, your front wasn't that united to begin with. And believe me, Yes, in the Christian Democracy of old religion and political orthodoxy were the rule of the land until an opportunity arises to give a cold shower to that/those guy/s. And even outside the party, support for the "Yes" option was far from consistent in the galaxy of Catholic organizations and movements. I seriously doubt that one year and a half of McGovern presidency would be enough to turn Italian Catholics into a unitary force for reaction, especially when the new breed of Catholic politicians during those years was made up of liberal, not conservative Catholics (Gozzini, Scoppola, La Valle, Prodi...). There is no direct New Right equivalent in Italy in 1974 that can ride the wave of discontent against the wave of progressivism emanating from the Leader of the Free World and his cohorts.
That's what I have to say about this matter. I'll defer to your judgment as TTL's demiurge.
To cut the long story short, since we all know your methodology as a writer of alternate history, I think we deserve to know something more about the victory of the "YES" front in the referendum against the Fortuna-Baslini Law since, unless I'm missing something incredibly important in the chapters I still have to read, I firmly believe that you'd need at least a swarm of Spruce Goose-sized butterflies to change the result of that referendum so radically.
87.7% of the Italian electorate cast their votes in those two fateful days of May 12 and 13, 1974. 87.7%. A percentage that has never been reached again, let alone surpassed. And 59.3% of the voters chose not to repeal Fortuna-Baslini. Even having more people going to ballot box would be a real plausibility stretch, since I can't imagine a way that wasn't actually attempted in real life by the "Yes" and "No" campaigns to convince them to cast their votes for the most crucial popular consultation in the history of the country. And let's say that more people actually went to the ballot box ITTL, there just weren't enough of them in the country to make the "Yes" front win, even in the unlikely even teverybody decided to trace an X on the Vatican-approved option. The numbers just do not add up.
But it's not just a matter of pure electoral arithmetics, alas. There were a lot of trends and contingent factors at work in Italian politics and society during those fateful years which rowed against a victory of the anti-Fortuna-Basalini front.
Fortuna was a Socialist. Baslini a Liberal. Divorce wasn't and couldn't be portrayed as a product of the creeping influence of Godless Communism on the God-fearing Italian people since the PSI and the PLI were traditional, historical allies of Christian Democracy and would have stayed that way after the referendum said that their law had to stay. In fact, the Communists themsleves were unsure about the opportunity of dying on a hill to defend Fortuna and Baslini's form of divorce, which was perceived as way too timid and bourgeois ("5 years of separation before a couple can actually rescind their marriage? What's this farce?") compared to the idea they had. Only the charismatic presence of the new PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer and the enviable discipline enforced on the Party's ranks kept the official leftist opposition on the path of commitment to the "No" front, despite not being in the frontlines of the campaign. Now, a Communist Party that chooses not to die on the hill of bourgeois divorce would be an interesting point of divergence that could have some funny effects on the final result of the 1974 referendum, but that's in no way related to a rising international front hell-bent on pushing back against broad civil liberties.
And then there's the fact that just two years before the Italian Constitutional Court had finally decriminalized adultery in a historic verdict that was perceived as common sense at the time by the majority of the population, especially since the repealed law, in typical Macho fashion, was especially punishing for female adulterers. There was a trend in motion, one towards a more laical approach to life in the country, especially amongst women. Ripples from McGovern's election in the US are expected to be there, but not to be powerful enough to annihilate the effects of the sexual revolution and the spread of a more relaxed attitude towards Catholic dominance over societal norms. It's just too convenient in a politically-divided landscape like the Italian one.
And then there's the matter of Amintore Fanfani being once again the national secretary of DC. Several party bigwigs (Rumor, Moro, Colombo, Cossiga) did not like that. At all. He was old. His way of doing politics was old. From day one, the crusade against divorce in Italy was going to be Fanfani's crusade, not the party's. Even with the Catholic Church pressing its political arm to do even the impossible to preserve the sanctity of marriage, there's no way that DC's consolidated correntismo magically disappears and DC presents a believably united front in support of the "Yes" option. Unfortunately for the defenders of marriage, when Deep-Red Emilia-Romagna and Most Catholic Sicily vote the same way, like it happened IOTL, it means that maybe, just maybe, your front wasn't that united to begin with. And believe me, Yes, in the Christian Democracy of old religion and political orthodoxy were the rule of the land until an opportunity arises to give a cold shower to that/those guy/s. And even outside the party, support for the "Yes" option was far from consistent in the galaxy of Catholic organizations and movements. I seriously doubt that one year and a half of McGovern presidency would be enough to turn Italian Catholics into a unitary force for reaction, especially when the new breed of Catholic politicians during those years was made up of liberal, not conservative Catholics (Gozzini, Scoppola, La Valle, Prodi...). There is no direct New Right equivalent in Italy in 1974 that can ride the wave of discontent against the wave of progressivism emanating from the Leader of the Free World and his cohorts.
That's what I have to say about this matter. I'll defer to your judgment as TTL's demiurge.
